CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 avril 2017

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text-decoration:line-through } .s41030776 { height:55.8pt } .s352E089 { height:77.15pt } .s67F5E8B1 { height:49.2pt } .s273F6D70 { height:49.25pt } .s46C66D70 { height:48.45pt } .s672FE8B1 { height:49.8pt } .s2B3E089 { height:77.25pt } .sEAD0756B { height:55.95pt } .sD4796D70 { height:41.45pt } .s17C8E089 { height:78.05pt } .s2F1E089 { height:77.05pt } .sC4E9E8B1 { height:42.7pt } .s146DE8B1 { height:41.2pt } .s46426D70 { height:48.05pt } .s85F4E8B1 { height:48.8pt } .sF8F82762 { height:99.1pt } .s871DE8B1 { height:48.1pt } .s28C76D70 { height:42.35pt } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s49424500 { height:30.8pt }       FIRST SECTION             CASE OF TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA   (Application no. 26562/07 and 6 other applications – see list appended)                 JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   13 April 2017       FINAL   18/09/2017     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   Table of Contents PROCEDURE THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     General information B.     The events of 1 to 4 September 2004 1.     Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004 2.     Hostage-taking 3.     Events of 1 to 2 September 2004 4.     Storming and rescue operation 5.     Events of 4 September 2004, identification of bodies and burials 6.     Assuming responsibility for the terrorist act C.     Criminal investigations 1.     Criminal investigation no.   20/849 2.     Criminal investigation in respect of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev 3.     Criminal proceedings against police officers D.     Civil proceedings brought by the victims 1.     First group of claimants 2.     Second group of claimants E.     Parliamentary inquiries 1.     Report prepared by the North Ossetian Parliament 2.     The Federal Assembly report F.     Other relevant developments 1.     Humanitarian relief 2.     Other important public and media reactions 3.     Victims’ organisations G.     Expert reports submitted by the applicants after the admissibility decision 1.     Expert report on counter-terrorism 2.     Expert report on medical (forensic) aspects of the operation II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Regulation of anti-terrorist operations and the use of force 1.     Suppression of Terrorism Act and Criminal Code 2.     Field Manuals B. Amnesty Act III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A. Use of force by law-enforcement officials B.     International humanitarian law THE LAW I.     PRELIMINARY ISSUES II.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION (ALL APPLICANTS) A.     Article 2 - positive obligation to prevent threat to life 1.     The parties’ submissions 2.     The Court’s assessment B.     Procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention 1.     The parties’ submissions 2.     The Court’s assessment III.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION (APPLICATIONS Nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11, 37096/11 AND 14755/08) A.     Planning and control of the operation 1.     The parties’ submissions 2.     The Court’s assessment B.     Use of lethal force 1.     The parties’ submissions 2.     The Court’s assessment IV.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION (ALL APPLICANTS) A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicants 2.     The Government B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     General principles established in the Court’s case-law 2.     Application of the above principles in the present case V.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION A.     Non-monetary measures B.     Damage 1.     The first group of applicants 2.     The second group of applicants 3.     The Government 4.     The Court’s assessment C.     Costs and expenses 1.     The first group of applicants 2.     The second group of applicants 3.     The Government 4.     The Court D.     Default interest     In the case of Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska ,   Khanlar Hajiyev,   Julia Laffranque,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Erik Møse,   Dmitry Dedov, judges, and Abel Campos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2014, 9 January 2017 and on 15 March 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in seven applications (see Appendix for details) lodged between 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011 against the Russian Federation with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 447 Russian nationals. One group of applicants (“the first group of applicants”, applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11) were represented by Mr Kirill Koroteyev, a lawyer of EHRAC/Memorial Human Rights Centre, an NGO with offices in Moscow and London, assisted by Ms Jessica Gavron, advisor; and the remaining applicants (“the second group of applicants”, applications nos. 14755/08, 49339/08 and   51313/08) by Mr Sergey Knyazkin and Mr Mikhail Trepashkin, lawyers practising in Moscow. A complete and updated list of 409 applicants and their representatives is set out in the Appendix. 2.     The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr   G.   Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3.     By a decision of 9 June 2015, following a hearing on admissibility and the merits (Rule 54 § 3), the Court declared the applications partly admissible. On the same date the Court decided that the applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. 4.     The parties replied in writing to each other’s observations on the merits. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     General information 5.     The applicants raised various issues related to the terrorist attack, siege and storming of school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, from 1   to   3   September 2004. Some applicants were held hostage and/or injured, while others had family members among those taken hostage, killed or injured. Information in respect of each applicant is summarised in the Appendix. 6.     While most events are relevant for all the applicants, their position in the domestic proceedings differed somewhat. However, given the number of applicants, the extent of the domestic procedures and the difficulties associated with establishing each applicant’s procedural role, the present judgment refers to them collectively as “the applicants”. This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings was relatively similar, whether or not each of them participated in a given procedural step, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others v.   Russia , no. 27065/05, § 181, 2 December 2010). 7.     The anti-terrorist operation mounted from 1 to 4 September 2004 involved a number of State agencies. The documents in the case file refer to the police, internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, army servicemen of the Ministry of the Defence and officers of the Federal Security Service ( Федеральная Служба Безопасности (ФСБ) – hereinafter “the FSB”). Unless otherwise specified, the terms “security personnel” or “security forces” used in the present judgment apply to any of those State agents. Equally, the terms “anti-terrorist” or “security operation” are used to describe the operation of 1 to 4 September 2004. 8.     The voluminous material in the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from four criminal investigations, three criminal trials, two sets of civil proceedings for compensation, two reports by parliamentary groups and one dissenting opinion thereon, books and articles written in the aftermath, copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and/or their relatives, the applicants’ own statements to the Court and independent expert reports. The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above and other publicly available information. B.     The events of 1 to 4 September 2004 1.     Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004 (a)     Terrorist attacks in 2004 9.     The year 2004 saw a surge of terrorist acts in Russia involving numerous civilian victims. Mr Shamil Basayev, the underground leader of the Chechen separatist movement, either claimed responsibility or was held responsible for these acts. 10.     On 6 February a suicide bomber killed over forty people and wounded over 250 on an underground train in Moscow. 11.     In February and March several explosions in the Moscow Region damaged gas pipelines, a heating station and electricity pylons. 12.     On 9 May the President of Chechnya, Mr Akhmat Kadyrov, and several senior officials were killed by a bomb in a stadium in Grozny. 13.     On 21 and 22 June a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked Nazran, Ingushetia’s largest town. They primarily targeted police stations and other security offices; over ninety people were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted. 14.     On 24 August two civilian aeroplanes which had departed from Moscow Domodedovo Airport simultaneously exploded in mid-air; ninety people lost their lives. 15.     On 31 August a suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance to an underground station in Moscow, killing ten and wounding about fifty others. (b)     Evaluation of the terrorist threat in North Ossetia 16 .     On 18 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued the following telex (no.   1751) to all local departments of the interior: “[The North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] has received information indicating the movement of participants of [illegal armed groups] from the plains of [Ingushetia] and [Chechnya] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [Ingushetia] and [North Ossetia]. A meeting of the fighters is presumably planned for mid-August of this year, following which they are intending to commit a terrorist act in [North Ossetia] similar to that in Budennovsk. According to the available information, the fighters plan to capture a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [North Ossetia], and then submit demands to the country’s leadership for the withdrawal of troops from [Chechnya]. A large sum of money in [a foreign] currency has apparently been transferred from Turkey. [This information is being] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken.” 17.     On 27 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued Decree no. 500 on the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of North Ossetia, which was sent to all district police stations. The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings, and contained a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage-taking during public gatherings on the Day of Knowledge in the settlements situated along the administrative border with Ingushetia. The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the Interior should inform the administrations of educational facilities accordingly, put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally inform police staff of their functions, carry out hourly updates of the situation at public gatherings, give immediate feedback to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior and provide contingency staff in each police department. 18 .     On 25, 27 and 28 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued three other telexes to the local departments concerning security measures to be taken during the Day of Knowledge, heightened terrorist threats in the region and the prevention of possible attacks. The personnel of the Ministry of the Interior were put on high alert ( усиленный режим несения службы ). (c)     Preparations for the hostage-taking in Beslan 19.     As revealed by subsequent investigations, towards the end of August   2004 a sizeable group of terrorists (at least thirty people) were camping and training between the villages of Psedakh and Sagopshi in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia. In the early hours of 1 September 2004 the group crossed the administrative border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, driving a GAZ-66 utility truck. 20.     At 7.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 Major S.G. from the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior stopped the vehicle for an inspection at the administrative border with Khurikau. The terrorists disarmed him, placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-2107 and drove to Beslan. Major S.G. escaped and later testified about these events. 2.     Hostage-taking 21 .     At 9 a.m. on 1 September 2004 school no.   1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, held a traditional Day of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of the academic year. Over 1,200 people gathered in the courtyard of the E ‑ shaped two-storey building located on Kominterna Street in the centre of the town, whose population was approximately 35,000. The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny ( Правобережный районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД) – hereinafter “the Pravoberezhny ROVD”). The gathering included 859 schoolchildren, sixty teachers and staff of the school and members of their families. Dozens of children below the age of six were in the crowd with their parents, since several kindergartens in Beslan were closed on that day for various reasons. One unarmed police officer, Ms Fatima D., was at the ceremony. 22.     According to some sources, on the morning of 1 September 2004 the Beslan traffic police were called to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, through the town. The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, saying that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of Mr Dzasokhov’s convoy, and thus leave the school unprotected. 23.     During the first few minutes of the ceremony, at about 9.05 a.m., a group of at least thirty-two people (the number of terrorists is disputed – see below) armed with various weapons, including machine guns, explosives and handguns, surrounded the people in the school courtyard and, shooting in the air, ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through smashed windows on the ground floor. A GAZ-66 vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out. According to some witnesses, some other terrorists came from behind the school and another group was already in the building. 24.     The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with local residents and the police. At least two local residents were killed (Mr R. Gappoyev and Mr F. Frayev) and some were wounded during the shooting. It also appears that two terrorists were wounded. About one hundred people, mostly adults and senior students, managed to escape. Another fifteen people hid in the boiler building, from where they were rescued later in the day. 25.     Despite the initial chaos, the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those in the courtyard – 1,128 people (the exact figure is disputed by some sources), including about 800 children aged between several months and eighteen years. Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or escape through fire exits, but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium. 26.     The hostages were assembled in a gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring about 250   square metres. The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey their orders. The hostages’ personal belongings, mobile telephones and cameras were confiscated, and they were ordered to sit on the floor. 27.     The attackers then proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the gymnasium, using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support. Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task, which was completed within about two hours. A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the hostages’ heads, two large IEDs attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor. Some IEDs were filled with parts such as metal pellets, screws and bolts. They were connected by wire to pedal detonators (“dead man’s switches”), which two of the terrorists took turns to hold. Two women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath – suicide bombers – remained in the gymnasium among the hostages. 28.     The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium, to allow air and probably avoid the use of gas as a means of attack. Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points, with windows smashed and stocks of food, water and ammunition set out. During the course of the day the terrorists kept shooting out of the school windows in the direction of the security personnel and civilians gathered outside. 29.     At 9.25 a.m. the Ministry of the Interior in Vladikavkaz received information about the seizure of the school. It was immediately transmitted to Mr Dzasokhov and the FSB. 3.     Events of 1 to 2 September 2004 (a)     The hostages’ situation 30.     The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium. During the first few hours of captivity some families remained separated, but they were allowed to reunite later during the day. 31.     The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than Russian. Mr Ruslan Betrozov, whose two sons were in the gymnasium, repeated the captors’ orders in Ossetian. One of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of everyone in the gymnasium by shooting him from close range; his body was not removed until several hours later. Mr Betrozov’s sons Alan (born in 1988) and Aslan (born in 1990) witnessed the execution; both boys died on 3   September 2004 during the storming. Another father of three, Mr Vadim Bolloyev, was shot in the shoulder during the first few hours of the crisis for apparently refusing to obey the terrorists’ orders. By the end of 1 September he had died in the gymnasium. His younger son Sarmat (born in 1998) survived the attack, but his two daughters Zarina (born in 1993) and Madina (born in 1995) died during the storming. 32.     During the course of the day on 1 September 2004 the attackers allowed groups of children, under their escort and accompanied by adults, to access the toilets outside the sports hall to drink tap water. They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and distribute it among the hostages in small quantities. The terrorists also took a large television into the gymnasium and on several occasions turned on the radio so that some of the hostages could hear about the events on the news. 33.     On 1 September the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages and some mothers with nursing babies to stay in a smaller adjacent weights room, where they could stretch out on the floor. They were later taken into the sports hall. 34.   From 2 September the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine. They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they would be undergoing a “dry hunger strike” in support of their captors’ demands. Some chewed the leaves of interior plants in order to relieve their thirst. Survivors later complained of severe thirst and heat on 2 and especially 3 September 2004. (b)     Execution of male hostages 35.     From the outset the terrorists separated most of the men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building, or put in place IEDs. They were told that their disobedience would lead to the execution of women and children in the hall. 36.     On the morning of 1 September two men were ordered to lift up floorboards from the library floor. Floorboards were also lifted from the corners of the gymnasium. Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors. 37.     On the afternoon of 1 September several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor. An explosion occurred there at 4.05 p.m., as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured. One (or two) women suicide bombers and one terrorist of Arab descent were killed by this blast. Several explanations for that explosion were put forward; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation, Mr Khuchbarov, “ Polkovnik ” (Colonel), had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists had no longer needed and at the same time had activated the explosive belt of one of the suicide bombers because she had objected to the treatment of the children. Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside, as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated killing the female bomber, the Arab terrorist and several hostages. 38.     Men who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off with automatic rifles. Karen Mdinaradze survived the explosion and the ensuing execution. When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive, he was allowed to return to the gymnasium, where he fainted. He later testified about these events. At about 4.30 p.m. on 1 September the terrorists forced two men to throw bodies out of a window on the first floor. One of them, Aslan Kudzayev, jumped out the window and was wounded but survived. His wife, one of the applicants, was released on 2 September with their infant daughter; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming. 39.     According to the investigation, sixteen men were killed by the terrorists on 1 September. Another sixteen people were wounded that day as a result of shots fired by the terrorists. 40.     At about 3 p.m. on 2 September the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school, although it appears that no one was hurt and there was no return fire. (c)     Negotiation attempts 41.     At around 11 a.m. on 1 September the terrorists passed a note to the authorities via one of the hostages. Mrs Larisa Mamitova, an ambulance doctor, walked to the school gates, handed the note to a man who approached her and walked back; in the meantime her young son was being held at gunpoint inside the building. The note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of the people with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and a paediatrician, Dr Roshal. The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in the event of an attempt to storm it, and that the terrorists would shoot fifty hostages for any one of them killed. However, it appears that the mobile telephone number had either been wrongly noted or was switched off, as no telephone contact could be established at that time. 42.     At 1 p.m. on 1 September the Russian State television programme “ Vesti ” announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities, containing their demands and images filmed inside the school. One hour later it was announced that the videotape was empty. Later, the very existence of this videotape remained disputed. 43.     Around 4 p.m. on 1 September Mrs Mamitova took out a second note, containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator, Mr Aslakhanov, an aide to the Russian President. She also told the person who collected the note that there were over 1,000 hostages inside the building. 44.     The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator, the FSB officer Mr Z. His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the hostages’ conditions and the possibility of exiting or surrendering or removing bodies from the school courtyard remained futile. 45.     Dr Roshal arrived in Beslan on the afternoon of 1 September 2004. When he called the hostage takers, on 1 and 2 September, they were hostile and told him that they would only enter into negotiations if all four people requested by them came to the school. They told him that if he attempted to enter alone, he would be killed. They also refused to accept food, water or medicine, and forbade him from entering the building to examine the sick and wounded. 46.     On 2 September the former President of Ingushetia, Mr   Ruslan Aushev, arrived in Beslan at the request of the operative headquarters (“the OH”). It appears that at about 3 p.m. he, for the first time, telephoned Mr   Akhmed Zakayev, the head of the self-proclaimed Chechen separatist government who was living in London. He told Mr   Zakayev about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded 1,000. 47.     Following telephone contact with the terrorists, at 3.30 p.m. on 2   September, Mr Aushev was allowed to enter the school. He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege. Mr   Aushev was led to the gymnasium and had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists, Mr Khuchbarov (“ Polkovnik ”). 48.     Following negotiations, Mr Aushev was permitted to leave with twenty ‑ six (other sources indicate twenty-four) people – nursing mothers and their babies. All the women had older children in the school and were forced to leave them behind. 49.     Mr Aushev took out a message from Mr Shamil Basayev addressed to the Russian President, Mr Vladimir   Putin. It demanded that troops be pulled out of Chechnya and official recognition of Chechnya as an independent State. In return, it promised that terrorist activities in Russia would end “for the next ten or fifteen years”. It made no mention of the school siege. It appears that the terrorists also gave Mr   Aushev a videotape depicting part of his visit, the gymnasium with the hostages, explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on a “dead man’s switch”. It also contained a statement by Mr   Khuchbarov that the negotiations should involve Mr Aslan Maskhadov, the President of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen State, who had been in hiding at the time. 50.     On 2 September and on the morning of 3 September the attackers tried to contact the North Ossetian authorities of North Ossetia with the assistance of the school director, Mrs   Tsaliyeva. Two hostages – children of the head of the North Ossetian Parliament, Mr   Mamsurov – were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and tell him that they were suffering without water and food. It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures (district prosecutor, a well-known sportsman) were singled out by the terrorists but no contact was established. 51.     In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr   Z., on 2   September direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr   Gutseriyev, an influential businessman of Ingush origin. He supplied Mr   Aushev with the requisite telephone numbers, participated in conversations with Mr Akhmed Zakayev and eventually tried to liaise with Mr   Maskhadov. 52.     As can be seen from various information sources, at around 5   p.m. on 2 September Mr   Aushev, Mr   Dzasokhov and Mr   Zakayev had a telephone conversation during which Mr   Zakayev promised to involve Mr   Maskhadov in the negotiations (see paragraphs 129, 321, 331, 339 below). Some sources indicate that these talks apparently resulted in Mr   Maskhadov agreeing to go to Beslan. (d)     Coordination of the authorities’ actions and the involvement of army and other security detachments 53.     At about 10.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 the OH started to function on the premises of the Beslan town administration. The exact composition, leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed. According to most sources, it was initially headed by Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, and as of 2 September by General V.   Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Mr   Tsyban, the Minister of the North Ossetian Ministry of Emergency Situations (Emercom) Mr   Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs   Levitskaya, deputy head of the information programmes department of the State television company, Rossiya , Mr   Vasilyev and the commander-in-chief of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence General Sobolev (see paragraphs 130, 158, 183, 312-333 below). 54.     The detachments of the 58th Army started to arrive in Beslan during the afternoon of 1 September. On 2 September 2004 eight armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and several tanks of the 58th Army arrived. They were placed under the command of the FSB special purpose units and positioned around the school out of the terrorists’ sight. 55.     In the early morning of 3 September the FSB special purpose units went to Vladikavkaz for joint training with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to prepare for a possible storming. (e)     Situation with the hostages’ relatives outside the school 56.     Thousands of people in Beslan were directly affected by the crisis. 57.     Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area, local residents and ethnic Ossetians from outside Beslan, some of whom were armed, remained around the school building throughout the siege. 58.     On the afternoon of 1 September the hostages’ relatives were invited to the town’s Cultural Centre. Until the end of the siege the Cultural Centre remained a hub for communicating with relatives and providing medical and psychological assistance to them. 59.     At 7 p.m. on 1 September the North Ossetian President Mr   Dzasokhov, the deputy speaker of the North Ossetian Parliament Mr   Kesayev and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr   Sikoyev met with relatives in the Cultural Centre. During the meeting Mr Sikoyev informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and had refused to accept food, water or medicine for the hostages. 60.     At about 9.30 p.m. on 1 September Dr Roshal participated in the meeting at the Cultural Centre. He assured those present that the conditions in the school were “acceptable” and that the hostages could survive for several days without food or water. He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities. 61.     On 2 September a psychological aid unit was set up at the Cultural Centre. 62.     Late in the evening of 2 September Mr Dzasokhov held another meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre. 63.     At 11.15 a.m. on 3 September he announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that “new public figures” had appeared in the negotiation process. 64.     Some of the applicants were among the relatives who had gathered outside the school building or stayed at the Cultural Centre, and submitted written statements describing the events. (f)     Information about the crisis 65.     From the outset the information about the hostage-taking was strictly controlled by the authorities. Mr Vasilyev, a member of the OH and a senior employee of Rossiya , was put in charge of contacting the journalists. 66.     On the afternoon of 1 September the media announced, referring to official sources, that about 250 people had been taken hostage. Later that day the media reported a “corrected” number of hostages: 354 people. According to some hostages, this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute men or throw their bodies out of the window. It also transpires from the hostages’ statements that after the announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet, saying that “there should be no more than 350 of you left anyway” (see paragraph 285 below). 67.     On the evening of 2 September Dr Roshal held a press conference. He announced that he had talked on the telephone to a terrorist nicknamed “ Gorets ” (highlander), who had put forward no demands. 68.     At 1 p.m. on 3 September State television showed some of the terrorists’ relatives of Ingush origin asking them to release the hostages. One woman, the wife of a presumed hostage taker, said that she and her children were being held somewhere “against their will” and asked her husband to do everything “to avoid harming the children”. 4.     Storming and rescue operation (a)     Morning of 3 September 2004 69.     The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger. They had gone two days without sleep in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened: people started to lose consciousness and some children were hallucinating, having seizures and vomiting. 70.     In the early morning the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor, hanging them along the walls. 71.     At 11.10 a.m. the terrorists agreed to a request by Mr Aushev and Mr   Gutseriyev to allow Emercom to collect the bodies from the school courtyard. 72.     At about noon Mr Dzasokhov informed the OH that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr Zakayev (see paragraph 331 below). According to some sources, that agreement could have extended to the possibility of Mr   Maskhadov arriving in Beslan. 73.     At 12.55 p.m. an Emercom truck and four officers entered the school courtyard. The men had Mr Gutseriyev’s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists. One of the terrorists came out and supervised their work. The explosions inside the gymnasium at 1.03 p.m. came unexpectedly to the group. The ensuing exchange of gunfire resulted in two officers being killed. (b)     The first three explosions in the gymnasium 74.     At 1.03 p.m. a powerful explosion occurred in the upper east part of the gymnasium. Part of the roof was destroyed, the insulation caught fire and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium, killing and injuring those seated underneath. Many of the surviving hostages d