CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 27 avril 2017

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LATVIA   (Application no. 22493/05)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   27 April 2017     FINAL   27/07/2017   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Schmidt v. Latvia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Erik Møse,   Faris Vehabović,   Yonko Grozev,   Síofra O’Leary,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lәtif Hüseynov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 21 March 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 22493/05) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German national, Ms Heide Lydia Friedel Schmidt (“the applicant”), on 10 June 2005. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr G. Zemrībo, a lawyer practising in Riga. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms I. Reine and, subsequently, Ms K. Līce. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that her rights of access to a court, to a fair hearing, to pronouncement of a judgment and to the principle of equality of arms have been infringed. 4.     On 4 December 2009 the application was communicated to the Government. 5.     Having been informed of their right to intervene in the proceedings under Article 36   §   1 of the Convention, the German Government did not avail themselves of that right. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Hamburg. A.     Divorce proceedings 7 .     On 19 March 1970 the applicant married A.S. From 1980 the couple lived in Hamburg and as of 1986 they resided in a rented apartment. In 1992 they moved to Riga but maintained their place of residence in Hamburg. In Riga the couple acquired an apartment, which was the applicant’s registered address in Latvia at that time. In 1999 or 2000 the applicant moved back to Hamburg and stayed in the couple’s previous place of residence. The couple maintained contact by telephone and post. On 15   December   2000 they both signed a paper which stated that “with view of regulating their separated life, [the applicant and A.S.] conclude the following agreement”. There is no information on the content of that document. 8 .     According to the documents submitted by the applicant, her residence permit in Latvia expired on 15   January 2002. The Government maintained that the correct date had been 14   May 2003. 9 .     On 5 December 2003 A.S. brought divorce proceedings concerning his marriage to the applicant before the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court ( Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesa ). In his application A.S. stated that the last time he had seen his spouse had been in 2000 and that their marriage was to all intents and purposes dissolved. He also submitted that prior to lodging this claim he had talked to the applicant over the telephone and had informed her of his intention to bring divorce proceedings. He had invited her to submit in writing any pecuniary claims she might have in relation to their common property; however, the applicant had refused to discuss this issue. A.S. also alleged that the applicant’s last known place of residence had been their apartment in Riga and that, owing to their disagreements, he could not find out where the court summons should be sent to. Accordingly, A.S. suggested that the applicant should be summoned to the hearing by a notice in the Official Gazette. 10 .     On 13   January   2004 the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court summoned the applicant to a divorce hearing by sending summons to her previous place of residence in Riga – the apartment in which she used to live with her husband A.S. Upon receiving the information from post authorities that the applicant did not live at the above address, on 27   January   2004 the applicant was summoned to the hearing scheduled for 1   March   2004 with a notice in the Official Gazette. Said hearing was postponed at A.S.’s legal representative’s request in order to present additional evidence. With a notice in the Official Gazette of 3   March   2004 the applicant was summoned to a divorce hearing scheduled for 6   April   2004. 11.     At the hearing of 6 April 2004 the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court established that the applicant had been summoned to the hearing in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Law. Therefore, it ruled that the adjudication of the case could take place in her absence. Owing to his poor health, A.S. was represented by a lawyer who stated, inter alia , that A.S.’s and the applicant’s children lived in Greece. After hearing testimony from two witnesses, who stated that they had not seen the applicant since 2000, the court granted the divorce. No appeal was brought against this judgment and it came into force on 27   April 2004. 12.     On 29 April 2004 A.S. married A.A. – one of the witnesses who had testified in the divorce proceedings. The following day A.S. passed away. 13.     According to the applicant, she learned about the judgment dissolving their marriage when she came to Riga for A.S.’s funeral. The Government did not dispute this fact. B.     German court’s refusal to recognise the divorce 14.     Following a request by the applicant of 26 May 2004 the Justice Authority of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg ( Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg Justizbehörde ) on 27 July 2004 delivered a declaratory decision ( Feststellungsbescheid ) stating that the requirements for legal recognition of the judgment of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court had not been met, as the divorced spouse had not been afforded an opportunity to present her case in the divorce proceedings. On the basis of the information before it, the Justice Authority established that A.S. had been aware of the applicant’s address in Hamburg. Notably, A.S. had maintained contact with this address in general correspondence and in correspondence concerning the pension he had been receiving from Germany and the Netherlands. C.     Supervisory review in respect of the judgment 15 .     Following a prior request by the applicant, on 8 November 2004, the President of the Supreme Court submitted an application for supervisory review ( protests ) to the Senate of the Supreme Court asking for the judgment of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court to be set aside and for the case to be adjudicated anew. He argued that the first-instance court had overlooked some evidence concerning the applicant’s domicile and had erred in its application of the procedural rules when summoning the applicant to the hearings. In accordance with section 59(2) of the Civil Procedure Law, A.S. could have placed a notice about the proceedings in a newspaper in Hamburg, where the applicant resided. Besides, as Hamburg had been the applicant’s registered place of residence, she should have been summoned to the proceedings via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The President of the Supreme Court emphasised that owing to these violations the Justice Authority of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg had refused to recognise said judgment. Lastly, the application for supervisory review stated that the applicant’s rights guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been violated. 16 .     On 16   March   2005 the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, with a final judgment dismissed the supervisory review application and upheld the judgment of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court. The Senate of the Supreme Court concluded that, since   A.S.’s claim had not contained a reference to the applicant’s address and since the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court had therefore been unaware of her whereabouts, its actions had been compatible with the procedural requirements of the Civil Procedure Law. Section 59(2) of the Civil Procedure Law imposed no obligation on the court; it only gave the plaintiff a right to publish the court’s summonses in other newspapers at his or her own expense. The Senate of the Supreme Court also stated that in the circumstances of the present case a reference to Article 6 of the Convention could not serve as grounds for setting aside the judgment of the first ‑ instance court. It reasoned: “The aim of the application for supervisory review – a fresh adjudication of the case permitting the defendant to exercise her procedural rights – can no longer be achieved because the plaintiff, [A.S.], passed away on 30 April 2004, a fact which excludes any further proceedings. Besides, one should bear in mind that following his divorce form Lydia Heide Friedel Schmidt [A.S.] concluded a new marriage, which, according to section 64(2) of the Civil Law, could not be declared null and void, irrespective of whether the judgment of 6   April 2004 of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court would be quashed.” D.     Disputed facts 17.     The parties differ on whether A.S. had been aware of the applicant’s place of residence and on whether the applicant had been aware of the divorce proceedings. In relation to the first issue the applicant maintained that she had been residing in the couple’s previous place of residence in Hamburg and that the landline telephone there had been used for their telephone conversations. Furthermore, A.S.’s retirement pension and health insurance had been transferred to their shared bank account, as well as to their place of residence in Hamburg. The Government, in turn, relied on the information A.S. had submitted to the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court and also emphasised that no other evidence had been at the court’s disposal. 18.     With regard to the applicant’s knowledge of the divorce proceedings the Government pointed to A.A.’s submissions before the Senate of the Supreme Court. In particular, A.A. had alleged that the applicant had been informed of the divorce proceedings over the telephone. The applicant maintained that even though she had been aware of A.S.’s desire to dissolve their marriage, she had only learned of the divorce proceedings following the death of A.S. E.     Subsequent civil proceedings concerning property rights 19 .     On 3 November 2005 the applicant brought civil proceedings against A.A. claiming one half of the undivided share of the property that A.S. had acquired during their marriage. She argued that it had been the spouses’ common property. On 30 November 2006 the Riga Regional Court granted her claim in full. A.A. appealed against this judgment. The Court has no further information about these proceedings. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Summons to court hearings 20.     Section 236(1) of the Civil Procedure Law provides that divorce cases have to be examined in the presence of both parties. However, section 236(4) states that, if the defendant’s place of residence is not known or is not in Latvia the case can be adjudicated without the participation of the defendant provided that he or she has been summoned to the court in accordance with the procedures specified by law. 21.     Section 54(2) of the Civil Procedure Law at the relevant time provided that, if the party’s place of residence was indicated in the application, he or she should be summoned to court by means of a court summons. If the defendant’s place of residence was not known, he or she was supposed to be summoned to court by means of a notice in the Official Gazette. 22.     Section 59(1) of the same Law further specified that a defendant whose place of residence was unknown or who could not be found at his or her place of residence ought to be summoned to court by means of a notice in the Official Gazette . A court could adjudicate a matter without the participation of the defendant, if no less than one month had passed since the day the summons had been published in the Official Gazette (section   59(4)). Under section 59(2), the plaintiffs had a right to publish the text of the court summons in other newspapers at their own expense. The summons was also supposed to be sent to the defendant’s property, if such a property had been indicated by the plaintiff (section 59(5)). 23.     Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Law states that, if the defendant’s place of residence is unknown, the court may, upon a plaintiff’s request, order a search for the defendant. B.     Appeals 24.     In so far as relevant, section 413(1) of the Civil Procedure Law provides that a party to a case may lodge an appeal against a judgment of a first-instance court. In accordance with section   415, an appeal may be lodged within twenty days of the pronouncement of the judgment. An appeal lodged after the expiry of said time-limit shall not be accepted and shall be returned to the appellant. 25.     Section   426 provides that an appellate court shall only adjudicate on those claims which have been decided by the first-instance court. It shall adjudicate on the merits of the claim without sending it for re ‑ adjudication to the first-instance court, except in the cases set out in section 427 of that Law. In accordance with section 427(1)(2), irrespective of the grounds of the appeal, the appellate court shall set a judgment aside and send the case for re ‑ adjudication by a first-instance court if the case has been adjudicated in breach of the procedural norms regulating the duty to notify the parties of the time and place of the court hearing. C.     Renewal of the time-limits 26 .     Section 51(1) of the Civil Procedure Law provides that upon the request of a party to the case a court shall reset a procedural time-limit that has been missed if it finds the reasons for the delay justified. 27 .     Section 53(2) states that a request for renewal of a procedural time-limit has to be accompanied by the documents required for carrying out the specific procedural action and by the grounds for renewal of the time-limit. In accordance with section 53(4), a refusal to renew the procedural time-limit may be appealed against by lodging an ancillary complaint. D.     Supervisory reviews of court rulings 28 .     Sections 483 and 484 of the Civil Procedure Law regulate the possibility of submitting an application for supervisory review of a ruling (a judgment or a decision) that has taken effect. Under section 484 the grounds for submitting an application for supervisory review are substantive breaches of material or procedural legal provisions in cases that have only been adjudicated by a first-instance court, provided that (i) no appeal in accordance with the law has been lodged against the ruling by the parties to the case for reasons beyond their control or (ii) the rights of State or municipal institutions or the rights of persons who are not parties to the case have been affected by the ruling. 29.     At the material time section 483 provided that such an application for supervisory review had to be brought before the Senate of the Supreme Court within ten years of the ruling taking effect and that it could be submitted, inter alia , by the President of the Supreme Court. E.     Termination of court proceedings 30 .     Section 223(1)(7) of the Civil Law provides that the court shall terminate court proceedings if one of the parties to a case dies and the nature of the dispute does not permit the rights to be assumed by another person. F.     Rules concerning dissolution and annulment of marriage 31 .     Section 64(1) of the Civil Law provides that a marriage shall be annulled if at the time it was concluded that one of the spouses had already been married. However, section 64(2) states that a second marriage cannot be annulled if prior to the rendering of the court’s judgment the first marriage has ended due to death, divorce or annulment. 32.     Section 238(1) of the same Law provides that in cases regarding divorce or annulment of marriage claims arising from family legal relationships shall be adjudged concurrently. Such claims include disputes regarding joint family homes and households, personal articles and division of the marital property. 33.     Under section 239(1) of the same Law, in matters regarding dissolution or annulment of marriage a court shall acquire evidence on its own initiative, especially for deciding on issues which affect the interests of a child. 34.     Section 240(1) provides that the court shall, on its own initiative, postpone the examination of a divorce case for the purpose of restoring the cohabitation of spouses or facilitating a friendly resolution of the case. Upon a request of a party the examination of the case for this purpose may be postponed repeatedly. Section 240(2), as worded at the relevant time, provided that the court may not postpone the examination of a case if the parties have lived separately for more than three years and both parties object to the postponement. G.     Declaration of residence 35.     The Declaration of Residence Law was enacted on 20 June 2002 and entered into force on 1 July 2003. Its section 1 provides that the purpose of the Law is to ensure that every person is reachable in his or her legal relations with the State or local government. Section 4(1) provides that in a case of a change of the place of residence, the person concerned has to declare his or her new address within one month. Section 6(1), as worded at the time the Law was enacted, provided that the duty to declare an individual’s residence applied to citizens of Latvia and “permanently resident non-citizens” ( nepilsoņi ) of Latvia; stateless persons who had received an identification document in Latvia; foreigners and stateless persons who had received a residence permit; and refugees. 36 .     The procedure regarding the issuing and registration of residence permits at the relevant time was regulated by the Cabinet of Ministers regulation no. 417   (1997) which was in force until 18   May   2001. It provided that in order to receive a residence permit, a person should fill in an application form indicating his or her place of residence in Latvia. By signing the application form, a person undertook to inform the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs about “any changes in the information mentioned in the application”. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 37.     Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27   November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility provides that where a defendant is habitually resident in a State other than the member State where the action was brought does not enter an appearance, the court with jurisdiction shall stay the proceedings so long as it has not been shown that the defendant was able to receive the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him or her to arrange for his or her defence, or that all necessary steps were taken to this end. 38.     Article 22(b) of the same Regulation provides that a judgment relating to a divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment shall not be recognised where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for his or her defence unless it had been determined that the defendant accepted the judgment unequivocally. IV.     LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES 39 .     The Court has examined practices concerning service procedures in civil proceedings in thirty-one Council of Europe member States, namely Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 40.     In all of the member States surveyed, when a plaintiff lodges a civil action, he or she is required to indicate the address of the defendant. Sometimes also some additional information, such as a telephone number, a fax number, an email address, or an identification-document number is required. 41.     The plaintiff is obliged to attempt to establish the defendant’s address in at least eighteen of the member States surveyed. The plaintiff has to demonstrate, sometimes with a certificate from a public authority, the steps and measures taken. Such steps may include consultation of administrative registers, communication with his or her legal representative, communication with the landlord or caretaker of the former place of residence, the defendant’s relatives, friends and last employer, as well as checking the movements on common bank accounts, contacting the local social welfare office, and so forth. 42.     In some countries measures are in place to ensure that the plaintiff does not withhold the defendant’s address. For example, a plaintiff is required to give an official declaration that he or she does not know the defendant’s address abroad, and provision of false information in that declaration is a criminal offense (Bulgaria). If a plaintiff has acted in bad faith, he or she is required to cover the costs and expenses of the proceedings, even in case of favourable outcome of the proceedings (the Republic of Moldova). 43 .     In at least fifteen of the member States surveyed it is the domestic courts that are required to conduct the search for the defendant’s address. In those countries courts consult population registers, social-security databases, other public registers and databases, and in some countries social networks too. A court may request information from the relevant authorities (such as the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the police – notably via police spot checks or investigations – public prosecutors, the tax authorities, municipal authorities etc.), family members, neighbours, landlords or other private entities such as professional associations, banks, and so forth. In certain member States the domestic courts are expressly required to act with thorough diligence. For instance, in Slovakia and Spain the courts must exhaust all possible measures to reach the defendant. 44.     In at least eight member States surveyed steps to establish the defendant’s place of residence are required from both the plaintiff and the court.   In addition, in some States the duty of establishing the defendant’s address is placed on some other authorities – a prosecutor (Belgium) or a bailiff (France and Luxemburg). The sufficiency of the steps taken is assessed by the court. 45.     When a defendant cannot be reached in any other way, in twenty of the member States surveyed service can be carried out via a public announcement (public notice boards, publication in a newspaper or electronic media). Usually this type of service is considered as a means of last resort and frequently it is used in combination with some other measures. In thirteen of those member States public announcement can be effected via publication in a newspaper distributed in the country, such as newspaper with a high circulation or a newspaper which provides the most reliable way of reaching the defendant. In seven of the member States surveyed (Estonia, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Ukraine) a notice may be published in the official gazette but in three of those (Germany, Romania, and Spain) it must be complemented with other means of public service. 46.     When a defendant resides in the particular country, service will be attempted at his or her registered or last known address in at least eighteen member States, even if it is likely that he or she no longer resides there. However, the registered address is sometimes only a presumption that can be rebutted (for example Italy, Netherlands, Russia). The fact that the defendant has a registered address in the country, when it is likely that he or she no longer resides there, may not be sufficient for valid service of documents (for example Germany, Poland). In other terms, the service is considered valid if it is made at the place where there is a serious possibility that document will be handed over to the recipient. 47.     When the residence of the defendant cannot be identified, in sixteen of the member States surveyed a special representative can be appointed by the court. This representative has the same rights and duties as a legal representative and acts in the best interests of the defendant. In at least two countries (Poland, Sweden) the representative can also be required to try to identify the place of residence of the absent party. 48 .     In at least twenty-two of the member States surveyed procedures exist that allow, in certain circumstances, for the judgment given in absence to be quashed. If the defendant resides at an unknown address abroad, the notification may involve such measures as public announcement and appointment of a special representative (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Romania); public announcement or appointment of a special representative (Poland, Sweden); transmission of the summons to the office of the prosecutor (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy, Luxemburg, France). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6   §   1 OF THE CONVENTION 49.     The applicant complained that the divorce proceedings had been incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial, as she had been deprived of access to court, a fair hearing, pronouncement of a judgment and equality of arms. The applicant submitted that this contravened the requirements of Article   6   §   1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ... Judgment shall be pronounced publicly ...” A.     Admissibility 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The Government 50 .     The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint on various grounds. At the outset they argued that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies, of which there had been two. First, the applicant could have contested the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law setting out the procedure for summoning parties to hearings before the Constitutional Court. Second, the applicant should have lodged an appeal alongside a request for renewal of the procedural time-limit, against the judgment of 6   April 2004 of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court, after she had learned about it. The Government argued that, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and the domestic courts’ case-law on the subject matter, there were firm reasons to believe that had the applicant lodged such a request, the court would have granted it. In that connection the Government relied on a letter of 13 April 2010 by the President of the Supreme Court, addressed to the Government’s Agent, stating that a plaintiff’s concealment of a defendant’s place of residence and a court’s failure to inform a defendant of a hearing could serve as the grounds for requesting a renewal of a procedural time-limit. The Government submitted that the examination of this request would not have been affected by the fact that the other party to the case had died. The Government also emphasised that a refusal to renew said time-limit would still have been amenable to appeal through an ancillary complaint. Moreover, this remedy had been directly available to the applicant. 51 .     The Government also argued that, in contrast to the possibility of bringing an appeal, the power of the President of the Supreme Court to lodge an application for supervisory review was a discretionary and extraordinary remedy. Besides, it was limited to the procedural issues raised by the President of the Supreme Court. Hence, the applicant had not been required to use it. On these grounds, the Government submitted that, even if the Court dismissed the non-exhaustion plea, the applicant would have, nonetheless, missed the six-month time-limit, which ought to be calculated from the beginning of May 2004 when the applicant had learned of the judgment on her divorce. 52.     Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant’s absence from the hearing had not caused her significant disadvantage requiring examination of the present case on its merits. A.S. had only requested dissolution of their marriage and, hence, the court could not have examined any other claim, such as division of the spouses’ common possessions. It was beyond doubt that the proceedings could have only resulted in divorce and it was not clear what arguments the applicant would have wished to put forward had she been present at the hearing. The applicant’s complaint before the Court was motivated solely by pecuniary interest. Nonetheless, on the basis of A.S.’s will the applicant had inherited part of his possessions located in Latvia. Moreover, by the judgment of the Riga Regional Court of 30   November 2006 the applicant had reclaimed from A.A. some other assets and property she had regarded as the spouses’ common possessions. Accordingly, the Government invited the Court to dismiss the complaint on the basis of Article 35   §   3   (b) of the Convention. (b)     The applicant 53.     The applicant contested these arguments. With regard to the possibility of bringing a complaint before the Constitutional Court the applicant noted that the violation of her rights had not stemmed from the applicable legal provisions but rather from the erroneous conclusion of the domestic courts that her address had been unknown. 54 .     In relation to the possibility of requesting a renewal of the procedural time-limit for lodging an appeal, the applicant submitted that the fact that A.S. had already passed away should be taken into account. According to the applicant, this fact would have served as the grounds for dismissing the request for renewal of the procedural time-limit, as it had formed part of the reasoning of the Senate of the Supreme Court when dismissing the supervisory review application of the President of the Supreme Court. The applicant also noted that the Government had provided no case-law proving that this remedy was in fact effective, and she herself was unaware of such cases. 55 .     The applicant also argued that she had used an alternative remedy which she had regarded as more effective and had requested that the President of the Supreme Court submit an application for supervisory review. Moreover, this application had in fact been submitted and the procedural breaches complained of had been assessed by the Senate of the Supreme Court. The applicant argued that she had not been required to use one specific mechanism from the two available domestic remedies and that she could not be prevented from lodging the application with the Court on such basis. 56.     In the alternative, the applicant argued that both of these remedies lacked the requisite standard of accessibility and effectiveness and that neither of them could be regarded as a remedy that should be exhausted prior to lodging an application with the Court. In any case, the applicant considered that the six-month time-limit should be calculated from the final decision actually taken with regard to her case, namely the judgment of the Senate of the Supreme Court of 16 March 2005. 57.     Lastly, with regard to the alleged lack of significant disadvantage, the applicant contended that the Government’s assertions about the outcome of the case were entirely speculative. She pointed to section 240(1) of the Civil Procedure Law pursuant to which the court had had an obligation to postpone the examination of the case for the purpose of restoring the cohabitation of spouses or facilitating a friendly resolution of the case . It could not be excluded that either of those purposes would have been attained. In addition, the case had also had a notable pecuniary effect, as she had lost the right to be recognised as A.S.’s heir and the failure to divide the joint property of spouses had resulted in the applicant having lost a share of those possessions. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies 58.     The Court reiterates that under the terms of Article 35   §   1 of the Convention it may only examine complaints in respect of which domestic remedies have been exhausted and which have been submitted within six months of the date of the “final” domestic decision (see Slivenko and Others v.   Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, § 68, ECHR 2002 ‑ II (extracts)).   The general principles pertaining to the exhaustion of domestic remedies are set out in Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.   17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25   March   2014. 59.     The Court emphasises that the obligation under Article   35 requires only that an applicant should have normal recourse to the remedies likely to be effective, adequate and accessible. In particular, the only remedies which the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches alleged and are at the same time available and sufficient (see Sejdovic v.   Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 45, ECHR 2006‑III). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Mocanu and Others v.   Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, §   223, ECHR   2014 (extracts)). It is incumbent on the Government claiming non ‑ exhaustion to establish that these various conditions were met. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there were special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism; in reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of the individual case (see Selmouni v.   France [GC], no. 25803/94, §§ 76-77, ECHR   1999-V). 60.     The Court will examine in turn the mechanisms which, according to the Government, could have provided more success to the applicant’s grievances. (i)     Constitutional Court proceedings 61.     In relation to the possibility of lodging a constitutional complaint, the Court considers that in the present case it would not have constituted an effective means of protecting the applicant’s rights. The Court has already examined the scope of the Constitutional Court’s review in Latvia and has concluded that the procedure of an individual constitutional complaint cannot serve as an effective remedy if the alleged violation results from an alleged legislative gap (see Mihailovs v. Latvia , no. 35939/10, §   157, 22   January   2013) or erroneous application or interpretation of a legal provision which, in its content, is not unconstitutional (see Elberte v. Latvia , no.   61243/08, §§ 79-80, ECHR 2015 and the cases cited therein). As the applicant’s complaint in essence related to the allegedly erroneous interpretation and application of domestic law, and the Government has not specified in what manner the invoked remedy would in practice be effective for the purposes of the present complaint, the Court considers that the applicant was not required to avail herself of the remedy proposed. (ii)     Proceedings under the Civil Procedure Law 62.     The Government contended that the applicant had a possibility of requesting renewal of the procedural time-limit for lodging an appeal after the applicant had learned about the judgment dissolving her marriage (see paragraph 50 above). The applicant argued that she had used an alternative remedy, namely, a request asking the President of the Supreme Court to submit an application for supervisory review (see paragraphs 54-55 above). 63.     As a counterpart to the applicant’s obligation to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances, the Court has considered that there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Mocanu and Others , cited above, §   223). The Court reiterates its extensive case-law to the effect that an application for review of a final decision or similar extraordinary remedies and remedies the use of which depend on the discretionary powers of public officials cannot, as a general rule, be considered as effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35   §   1 of the Convention (see, for example, Denisov v. Russia (dec.), no.   33408/03, 6   May   2004; Gurepka v. Ukraine , no.   61406/00, § 60, 6   September   2005; and Galstyan v. Armenia , no.   26986/03, §   40, 15   November   2007). It follows that the applicant would not be required to exhaust such a remedy. 64.     In the present case the applicant’s principal grievance under the Convention concerned the manner in which she had been summoned to the divorce proceedings. After the applicant learned about the judgment dissolving her marriage, she had a possibility to submit a request for a renewal of the procedural time-limit for lodging an appeal (see paragraphs 26-27 above). When examining such a request, the domestic court would be required to assess the applicant’s Convention complaints (see the Governments argument to that regard, paragraph 50 above), even though the plaintiff’s death would have prevented to attain a fresh adjudication of the divorce matter (see paragraph 30 above). The applicant, instead, choose to use an extraordinary remedy by requesting the President of the Supreme Court to trigger the supervisory review procedure. That review in her case led to the assessment of the applicant’s principal grievance under the Convention (see paragraph 16 above), even though, as stated above, the Senate of the Supreme Court came to a conclusion that reopening of the contested proceedings would not be possible due to the plaintiff’s death. The comparison of the two mechanisms shows that in the particular circumstances of the case the procedure of a renewal of the procedural time ‑ limit for lodging an appeal, if invoked, would not be more efficient in terms of raising and addressing the applicant’s principal grievance under the Convention as the extraordinary remedy already used by the applicant where it was reviewed by the highest domestic court. 65.     By reiterating that the use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no.   35810/09, §   109, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) and by referring to its conclusions made in paragraphs 68-70 below, the Court concludes that the applicant was not required to avail herself of the request for a renewal of the procedural time-limit which had essentially the same objective for the applicant as the triggered procedure and dismisses the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies. (b)     Compliance with the six-month rule 66.     The pursuit of remedies which fall short of the requirements of Article 35   §   1 of the Convention will have consequences for the identification of the “final decision” and, correspondingly, for the calculation of the starting point for the running of the six-month rule (see Sapeyan v. Armenia , no. 35738/03, § 21, 13   January   2009). Where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, §   86, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Therefore, extraordinary remedies, including the application for review should not, in principle, be taken into consideration for the purposes of the six-month rule. 67.     However, it is a different matter where this remedy has actually been exercised (contrast with Dāvidsons and Savins v. Latvia , nos.   17574/07 and   25235/07, §   71, 7   January   2016), bearing in mind that it is of no importance whether it has turned out to be successful (see Öztürk v.   Turkey   [GC], no. 22479/93, §   45, ECHR 1999 VI). Namely, the running of the six-month period will be interrupted only in relation to those Convention issues which served as grounds for review of a final decision or reopening, and were it was the object of examination before the extraordinary appeal body (see, mutatis mutandis , Sapeyan , cited above, §   24). 68.     In the present case, the Court observes that, following the applicant’s request in which she in essence complained that her rights of access to a court had been infringed, the President of the Supreme Court triggered the supervisory review procedure (see paragraph 15 above). An application for supervisory review was examined on its merits by the Senate of the Supreme Court. In particular, the application dealt with the manner in which the applicant had been summoned to the proceedings and the alleged resulting breaches of her procedural rights – exactly the issue which forms the essence of the applicant’s complaint before this Court (contrast with the case of X   and Others v. Latvia ((dec.), no.   27773/08, §§   9-11), where the application for supervisory review had concerned completely different issues than those subsequently brought before the Court). Accordingly the Senate of the Supreme Court as a court of last instance sitting in an extended composition delivered a final and binding judgment with regard to this particular applicant’s complaint. 69.     The Court further notes that application for supervisory review proceedings in general seeks to review substantive beaches of material and procedural legal provisions (see paragraph 28 above). Had the Senate concluded that the applicant’s summoning to the proceedings had not been in compliance with the domestic law, it is not excluded that in such a case the applicant could have subsequently used another form of a compensatory remedy (see to this regard Dreiblats v. Latvia (dec.), no. 8283/07, 4   June   2013). 70.     To sum up, the Court reiterates that, even though the application for supervisory review could not lead to the reopening of the divorce proceedings, the domestic courts were provided with the opportunity of addressing the core of the human rights issues that the applicant subsequently brought before the Court and they addressed them. 71.     As a consequence, in the particular circumstances of the case, and bearing in mind that Article 35 of the Convention must be interpreted with some flexibility, the Court considers that the judgment of the Senate of the Supreme Court of 16   March   2005 should be taken into account in calculating the six-month time-limit (compare Sapeyan , cited above, §§   25 ‑ 27, where the running of the six-month time-limit was considered to have restarted only in relation to the complaints that had been addressed within the extraordinary appeal proceedings). (c)     Significant disadvantage 72.     The Court points out that the purpose of the “significant disadvantage” admissibility criterion is to enable more rapid disposal of unmeritorious cases and thus to allow it to concentrate on its central mission of providing legal protection of the rights guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols (see Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy , no. 23563/07, § 54, ECHR   2012 (extracts)). The main element of the criterion set by Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention is whether the applicant has suffered any significant disadvantage, the assessment of which may be based on criteria such as the financial impact of the matter at issue or the importance of the case for the applicant (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no.   36659/04, 1   June 2010, and Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no.   25551/05, 1   July 2010). 73.     In relation to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant’s civil status was determined in her absence and, it is argued, without her having had any knowledge of the proceedings. The parties to the case do not dispute the fact that the applicant had learned that her marriage had been dissolved and that A.S. had remarried only when she came to what she thought was her husband’s funeral (see paragraph 13 above). Thus, the Court considers that the importance of the case for the applicant and its effects on the applicant’s private an