CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 27 juin 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7E985A65 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:1pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s5362FFEB { width:4.87pt; display:inline-block } .s172EF8F1 { width:208.76pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 66687/11 Ömer KARAKUŞ against Turkey The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 27   June 2017 as a Committee composed of:   Ledi Bianku, President,   Paul Lemmens,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 September 2011, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Mr Ömer Karakuş, is a Turkish national, who was born in 1992 and lives in Çorum. The circumstances of the case 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 3.     On 16 June 2001 the applicant’s seven-year old brother Ahmet   Karakuş died after touching a live electric wire that had fallen on the side of a street in a village in Çorum. 4.     The criminal investigation into the incident revealed that the electric wire had broken off the day before due to heavy storm. It appears that two   villagers had informed the Turkish Electricity Distribution Company (“TEDAŞ”), the state-run electricity company, of the broken wire, but no measures had been taken by TEDAŞ for its removal or repair. 5.     As a result of the investigation, the Laçin public prosecutor’s office filed a bill of indictment with the Laçin Criminal Court of First-Instance against a number of officers from TEDAŞ, who were in charge of the maintenance of the electric wires in the area, as well as against M.K., the grandfather of Ahmet Karakuş, who had been entrusted with his care at the relevant time, and M.K., the owner of the house from which the wire had broken, charging them with causing death through negligence. 6.     On 18 March 2004 the Laçin Criminal Court of First-Instance ordered the acquittal of all defendants. 7.     On 25 February 2008 the Court of Cassation held that the criminal proceedings should be discontinued on the grounds that the prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 8.     It appears that on an unspecified date the applicant requested the reopening of the criminal proceedings ( yargılamanın yenilenmesi ) from the Ministry of Justice. On 9 February 2011 the Ministry of Justice rejected the applicant’s request due to its lack of competence to examine such request. COMPLAINT 9.     Without relying on any provisions of the Convention, the applicant complained of the death of his brother by electrocution. He claimed that the TEDAŞ officials in charge had failed to take the necessary measures to eliminate the danger posed by the broken power line. THE LAW 10.     The applicant complained that the State authorities had failed to take the necessary precautions to protect his brother’s right to life. 11.     The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under Article 2 of the Convention. 12.     The Court reiterates in this connection that the first sentence of Article   2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also involves a duty to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of individuals within its jurisdiction as necessary (see, amongst many authorities, Ciechońska v. Poland , no. 19776/04, §   60, 14   June 2011, and the cases cited therein). 13.     The Court further reiterates that in the event of serious injury or death, the duty under Article 2 of the Convention must also be considered to require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so as to secure legal means capable of establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim. Such a system may, and under certain circumstances must, include recourse to the criminal law (see Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey , no. 3648/04, §§ 117-118, 2 February 2016; Mikhno v. Ukraine, no. 32514/12, § 131, 1 September 2016; and Gençarslan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 62609/12, §§ 19 ‑ 22, 14 March 2017 for examples of situations where a criminal-law remedy is required). However, where negligence has been shown, the obligation may also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts (see Ciechońska , cited above, § 66). 14.     Turning to the facts before it, the Court notes that the applicant has only pursued the criminal-law remedy in the aftermath of his brother’s death and did not seek any remedies before civil courts. Bearing in mind the apparently non-intentional nature of the death at issue, the Court considers at the outset that the applicant’s failure to resort to any civil remedies may raise an issue under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as to whether all available remedies have been exhausted. That being said, the Court does not find it necessary to reach a conclusion on this matter since the application is inadmissible in any event, even supposing that the applicant was dispensed from resorting to any other remedies on the facts. 15.     The Court notes in this connection that the criminal proceedings in question were discontinued on 25 February 2008 for having become time ‑ barred, that is approximately three and a half years before the lodging of the present application with the Court. While the applicant subsequently requested the reopening of the criminal proceedings, the Court reiterates that the refusal of a request to reopen proceedings does not restart the running of the six months period referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, unless it is successful and actually results in a reopening (see Eder v. Germany (dec.), no. 11816/02, 13 October 2005, and Hysi v.   Albania (dec.), no. 38349/05, 26 February 2008). The Court therefore considers that the Court of Cassation’s decision of 25 February 2008 was the final domestic decision in the instant case and that the applicant failed to bring his application before the Court within six months of that decision. 16.     It follows that the applicant’s complaints are inadmissible for non ‑ compliance with the six ‑ month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible.   Done in English and notified in writing on 20 July 2017.   Hasan Bakırcı   Ledi Bianku Deputy Registrar   President