CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 27 juin 2017

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FINLAND   (Application no. 931/13)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   27 June 2017       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v.   Finland, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   András Sajó, President,     Işıl Karakaş,   Angelika Nußberger,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Luis López Guerra,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Kristina Pardalos,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Helen Keller,   Aleš Pejchal,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Síofra O’Leary,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Marko Bošnjak, judges, and Lawrence Early, Jurisconsult, Having deliberated in private on 14 September 2016 and on 5   April   2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 931/13) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Finnish limited liability companies, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy (“the applicant companies”) which had their seat in Kokemäki, Finland, on 18 December 2012. 2.     The applicant companies were represented by Mr Pekka Vainio, a lawyer practising in Turku. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, first Mr Arto Kosonen and then Ms   Krista   Oinonen, both from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant companies alleged, in particular, that their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention had been violated and that the length of the domestic proceedings had been excessive, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). On 21 July 2015 a Chamber of that Section, composed of Guido Raimondi, Päivi Hirvelä, George Nicolaou, Nona Tsotsoria, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Faris Vehabović, and Yonko Grozev, judges, and also of Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, delivered its judgment. It decided by a majority to declare the complaints concerning violation of the right to freedom of expression and the unreasonable length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible, and held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 10 and, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The concurring opinion of Judge Nicolaou and the dissenting opinion of Judge Tsotsoria were annexed to the judgment. On 21   October 2015 the applicant companies requested the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. On 14 December 2015 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request. 5.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. At the final deliberations, Helen Keller, substitute judge, replaced Alena Poláčková, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3). 6.     The applicants and the Government each filed written observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits. In addition, third-party observations were received from the European Information Society Institute, the Nordplus Law and Media Network, Article 19, the Access to Information Programme and Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3). 7.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 14 September 2016 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   K. Oinonen , Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,   Agent, Ms   A. Talus , Senior Adviser, Ministry of Justice Ms   H. hynynen , Senior Adviser, Finnish Tax Administration, Ms   S. Sistonen , Legal Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr   A. Kosonen, Director (ret.), Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Advisers; (b)     for the applicant companies Mr   P. Vainio , Lawyer,   Counsel. The Court heard addresses by Ms K. Oinonen and Mr P. Vainio and the replies given by them to questions put by the judges. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     Background to the case 8.     Since 1994 the first applicant company, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy collected data from the Finnish tax authorities for the purpose of publishing information about natural persons’ taxable income and assets in the Veropörssi newspaper. Several other publishing and media companies also publish such data which, pursuant to Finnish law, are accessible to the public (see paragraph 39 below for an explanation of the Finnish access to information regime). 9.     In 2002 Veropörssi appeared 17 times, with each issue concentrating on a certain geographical area of the country. The data published comprised the surnames and forenames of approximately 1.2 million natural persons whose annual taxable income exceeded certain thresholds, mainly from 60,000 to 80,000 Finnish marks (approximately 10,000 to 13,500 euros (EUR)), as well as the amount, to the nearest EUR 100, of their earned and unearned income and taxable net assets. When published in the newspaper, the data were set out in the form of an alphabetical list and organised according to municipality and income bracket. 10.     The first applicant company worked in cooperation with the second applicant company, Satamedia Oy, and both were owned by the same shareholders. In 2003 the first applicant company started to transfer personal data published in Veropörssi , in the form of CD-ROM discs, to the second applicant company which, together with a mobile telephone operator, started a text-messaging service (SMS service). By sending a person’s name to a service number, taxation information could be obtained concerning that person, on the requesting person’s mobile telephone, if information was available in the database or register created by the second applicant company. This database was created using personal data already published in the newspaper and transferred in the form of CD-ROM discs to the second applicant company. From 2006 the second applicant company also published Veropörssi . 11.     It transpires from the case file that in 1997 the Minister of Justice requested that the police instigate a criminal investigation into the publishing activities of the applicant companies. No information is contained in the file as to the outcome of this request or of any subsequent investigation. 12.     In September 2000 and November 2001, the applicant companies ordered taxation data from the Finnish National Board of Taxation ( verohallitus, skattestyrelsen ). Following the first order, the Board requested an opinion from the Data Protection Ombudsman, on the basis of which the Board invited the applicant companies to provide further information regarding their request and indicating that the data could not be disclosed if Veropörssi continued to be published in its usual form. The applicant companies subsequently cancelled their data request and paid people to collect taxation data manually at the local tax offices. B.     First set of proceedings (2004 – 2009) 1.     Decisions of the Data Protection Ombudsman and the Data Protection   Board 13.     On an unspecified date, probably in 2003, the Data Protection Ombudsman ( tietosuojavaltuutettu, dataombudsmannen ) contacted the applicant companies and advised them that, although accessing and publishing taxation data were not prohibited as such, they had to cease publishing such data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002, when they had published data concerning the 2001 tax year. The applicant companies refused to abide by this request, which they considered violated their right to freedom of expression. 14.     By a letter of 10 April 2003 the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the Data Protection Board ( tietosuojalautakunta, datasekretessnämnden ) to prohibit the applicant companies from processing the taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing those data to the SMS service. He claimed that under the Personal Data Act the companies had no right to collect, store or pass on personal data and that the derogation provided by that Act concerning journalism did not, in his view, apply to the present case. The collecting of taxation information and the passing of such information to third parties were not for journalistic purposes and therefore were not covered by the derogation in the Personal Data Act, but rather constituted the processing of personal data in which the applicant companies had no right to engage. 15.     On 7 January 2004 the Data Protection Board dismissed the Data Protection Ombudsman’s request. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism applied to the present case. As regards the SMS service, the data used in the service had already been published in Veropörssi and therefore the Act did not apply to it. 2.     Decision of the Helsinki Administrative Court (2005) 16.     By letter dated 12 February 2004 the Data Protection Ombudsman appealed to the Helsinki Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen ) reiterating his request that the applicant companies be prohibited from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing such data to the SMS service. 17.     On 29 September 2005 the Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism, which had its origins in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data was adopted (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31, hereafter “the Data Protection Directive”), should not be interpreted too strictly, as an overly strict interpretation would favour protection of privacy over freedom of expression. That court considered that Veropörssi had a journalistic purpose and that it was also in the public interest to publish such data. It emphasised, in particular, that the published data were already accessible to the general public. The journalism derogation thus applied in the circumstances of the present case. As regards the SMS service, the Administrative Court agreed with the Data Protection Board that, as the information had already been published in the newspaper, the Act did not apply to it. 3.     Appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court (2005) 18.     By letter dated 26 October 2005 the Data Protection Ombudsman lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Helsinki Administrative Court. 19.     On 8 February 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Communities (which became the Court of Justice of the European Union on 1   December 2009, hereafter the “CJEU”) on the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC. 4.     Preliminary ruling of the CJEU (2008) 20.     On 16 December 2008 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU handed down its judgment (see Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy , EU:C:2008:727). It found, first of all, that the activities in question constituted “processing of personal data” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46. According to the CJEU, activities involving the processing of personal data such as those relating to personal data files which contained solely, and in unaltered form, material that had already been published in the media, also fell within the scope of the Directive (see paragraphs 37 and 49 of the judgment). The object of the derogation in Article 9 of the Directive for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes was to reconcile the protection of privacy with freedom of expression. In order to take account of the importance of the latter in every democratic society, it was necessary to interpret notions relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly. However, in order to achieve a balance between those two fundamental rights, the protection of the fundamental right to privacy required that the derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of data had to apply only in so far as were strictly necessary (see paragraphs 54 and 56 of the judgment). Journalistic activities were not limited to media undertakings and could be undertaken for profit-making purposes (see paragraph 61). Furthermore, when interpreting the journalistic purposes derogation, account must be taken of the evolution and proliferation of methods of communication and the dissemination of information. Activities such as those involved in the domestic proceedings, relating to data from documents which were in the public domain under domestic legislation, could be classified as “journalistic activities” if their sole object was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which was used to transmit them. Whether or not that was the case, was for the national court to determine (see paragraphs 60-62 of the judgment). 5.     Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (2009) 21.     On 23 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court, applying the ruling of the CJEU and with reference to the case-law on Article 10 of the Convention, quashed the impugned decisions of the Data Protection Board and the Helsinki Administrative Court and referred the case back to the Data Protection Board for a fresh examination with a view to issuing an order pursuant to section 44(1) of the Personal Data Act. The Supreme Administrative Court requested the Board to prohibit the processing of taxation data by the applicant companies in the manner and to the extent carried out in 2002. 22.     In its legal assessment, the Supreme Administrative Court gave the following reasoning: “Scope of the matter The present case does not concern the question of the extent to which taxation data and official documents concerning taxation are public under the Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information. Nor does it concern the right to publish taxation data as such but only the processing of personal data. Therefore, there is no issue of possible prior interference with the content of the publications, but rather an assessment of whether the legal conditions set for personal data processing and protection of privacy are fulfilled. The reconciliation of protection of privacy with freedom of expression is part of the legal assessment of personal data processing in the matter. ... Reconciliation of the protection of privacy and freedom of expression Interpretation of the exception concerning journalistic purposes in the Data Protection Directive. The Court of Justice of the European Communities emphasised that the purpose of the Data Protection Directive is to ensure that when processing their personal data, the Member States guarantee individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular their right to privacy, while allowing the free movement of such information. The Court further emphasised that these fundamental rights must be reconciled to a certain extent with the fundamental right to freedom of expression, and that this task belongs to the Member States. ... It therefore appears from the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the concept of journalism must, as such, be interpreted broadly within the meaning of Article 9 of the Directive, that, on the other hand, the protection of privacy can be derogated from only in so far as it is strictly necessary, and that this task of reconciliation of the two fundamental rights is the task of the Member States. Ensuring proper balance between the rights and interests at stake, including the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Communities’ legal order, is the task of the domestic authorities and courts (see also case C-101/01 Lindqvist ). Interpretation of the exception in the Personal Data Act concerning journalistic purposes. ... It transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE   96/1998 vp) that the purpose of the adoption of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, provided it remained within the limits imposed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in order to conclude that processing of personal data is conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act, inter alia , that data must be used solely for journalistic activities and the data must not be made available to persons other than those involved in those journalistic activities. When interpreting section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act, particular regard must be had to the fact that it concerns the reconciliation of two fundamental rights, namely the freedom of expression and the protection of privacy. ... The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has also adopted a position on reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of privacy. The Court has held, inter alia in its von Hannover judgment of 24 June 2004, that the press plays an essential role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart, in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities, information and ideas on all matters of public interest. On the other hand, the Court also held in the above-mentioned judgment that increased vigilance as regards the protection of private life was necessary in order to contend with the new communications technologies which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data. According to the Court, when balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression, the decisive criterion had to be the contribution made by publishing the data to a debate of public interest. If a publication is only meant to satisfy the curiosity of a certain audience, freedom of expression must be interpreted more narrowly. In the present case, it must be assessed to what extent the impugned processing of personal data as carried out in the course of the companies’ activities falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes that is provided for in section   2(5) of the Personal Data Act. The starting point is whether the aim of their activities was to disclose information, opinions or ideas to the public. In this assessment, account must be taken of whether or to what extent those activities can be seen as contributing to a debate in a democratic society rather than solely satisfying the curiosity of certain individuals. Processing of personal taxation data in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and in the Veropörssi newspaper Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy collected for the Veropörssi newspaper taxation data from different tax offices in which individuals’ names appear together with information on their taxable income. As mentioned above, the case concerns the processing of personal data to which the general requirements in Chapter 2 of the Personal Data Act are applicable, unless the Act allows for an exception from the application of these provisions. It must first of all be assessed whether the processing of personal data in the company’s background file before the publication of such data in the Veropörssi newspaper falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes. From the preparatory work on the amendment of the Personal Data File Act (HE   311/1993 vp), which was the Act in force before the Personal Data Act, it transpires in particular that the press considers that the right to freely disclose information also requires journalists to be able, in advance, to freely collect and store information. Restricting the processing of personal data at this stage, that is to say before publication, could in practice mean that a prior decision is taken on what can be published. Such an outcome would be incompatible with the fundamental right guaranteeing freedom of expression. The issue at stake in the present case concerns publicly accessible personal data received from the tax authorities. The collection and processing of such data in the company’s internal files for the purpose of the company’s publishing activities can, on the basis of above-mentioned grounds, be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes. The processing of large quantities of such data from the various municipal taxation records may well be necessary as background information for the purpose of the editing of a publication concerning taxation and from the point of view of free communication and open debate. At this stage of activities the protection of the privacy of the persons concerned can also be sufficiently secured, provided that the data collected and stored in the file are protected against unlawful processing as required by section 32 of the Personal Data Act. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy has published the personal data collected from the tax offices as wide-ranging municipality-based catalogues in the Veropörssi newspaper. As already stated above, in this regard too it is a question of processing personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act. As part of the case file, the Supreme Administrative Court had at its disposal Veropörssi newspaper no. 14/2004, published by Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and covering the Helsinki metropolitan area. In this respect it must be decided whether a derogation is possible from the requirements relating to the processing of personal data on the basis of section 2(5) of the Act, that is to say whether the impugned processing of personal data by publishing those data in the Veropörssi newspaper came within the scope of the exception provided for journalistic purposes. ... It transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE 96/1998 vp) that the processing of data in the background file referred to in the Personal Data File Act must relate solely to journalistic activities and that the processed data must not be made available to any persons not engaged in journalistic activities. The purpose of section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, within the limits allowed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, the purpose of the Personal Data Act in this respect can be seen as guaranteeing the possibility for free journalistic work prior to the publication of information. The term “processing of personal data for journalistic purposes” cannot be regarded as covering the large–scale publication of the journalistic background file, almost verbatim, as catalogues, albeit split into different parts and sorted by municipality. Since the disclosure of registered data on such a scale is equivalent to the disclosure of the entire background file kept for journalistic purposes by the company, such disclosure does not represent solely an expression of information, opinions or ideas. As stated above, with a view to reconciling the requirements of freedom of expression with the protection of privacy, the collection of data before publication has been made permissible under section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act without any requirement of compliance with general conditions set out in section 8 of the Act. By contrast, the processing of personal data collected in the company’s background file by publishing it and by rendering it available to the general public to the extent that has been done in the present case, and beyond the scope of the minimum requirements set out in section 2(5) of the Act, cannot be regarded as compatible with the purpose of the Personal Data Act. Open public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the disclosure of the personal data of specific individuals in the manner and to the extent described above. When regard is also had to the foregoing comments on the narrow interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act and the fact that a strict literal interpretation of that provision would result in a situation incompatible with the purpose of the Act as regards protection of personal data, the processing of personal data with a view to publishing them in the Veropörssi newspaper, and as far as the contents of this publication itself are concerned, was not conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act. ... Having regard to sections 2(5) and 32 of the Personal Data Act and Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its preliminary ruling, the collection of personal data prior to its publication in the Veropörssi newspaper and its processing in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy cannot as such be regarded as contrary to the regulations concerning the protection of personal data, provided that, inter alia , the data have been protected properly. However, with reference to all the clarifications on how and to what extent the personal data in the background file were further processed in the Veropörssi newspaper, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy did in fact process personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act. Handover of data in a CD-ROM Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy handed over a CD-ROM containing the published data to Satamedia Oy so that the latter could start up an SMS service using that data. As mentioned above, that action amounts to the processing of personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act. Having regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and its effect on the interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act, as well as all that has been said above about the processing of personal data in the Veropörssi newspaper, the handover to Satamedia Oy of personal data collected in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, even though they were published in the Veropörssi newspaper, cannot be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Personal Data Act. Nor can the processing of personal data in such a manner be regarded as having been effected for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in that regard too, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy processed personal data in violation of the Personal Data Act. Processing of personal data for the realisation of a SMS service by Satamedia Oy As stated above in the “Facts” section, Satamedia Oy handed over the above-mentioned personal data to a third company in order to start up a SMS service, which company operated the SMS service on behalf of Satamedia Oy. It was pointed out above that Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy had no right under the Personal Data Act to process the personal data at issue by handing it over to Satamedia Oy. Consequently, Satamedia Oy also had no right under the Personal Data Act to process personal data received in this manner. In addition, it follows from the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the exception provided for in the Data Protection Directive, which concerns the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes, requires the disclosure of data to the public. According to section 2(1) of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media , the term “the public” in that Act refers to a group of freely determined message recipients. Satamedia Oy’s SMS service involves the company processing personal data relating to the taxation of a specific individual on the basis of a request by another individual. It therefore does not concern disclosure of data to the general public, as explained above, but replying to a request by an individual concerning the personal data of another individual. Open public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the possibility of processing the personal data of specific individuals as has been done in this case. Freedom of expression does not require any derogation from the protection of privacy in such a situation. The Court of Justice of the European Communities further stated in its preliminary ruling that the technical means used for the transfer of information is not relevant when assessing whether there is any question of activities undertaken solely for journalistic purposes. As regards the SMS service operated by Satamedia Oy, it is irrelevant that the data were transferred via mobile phones and text messages. Therefore, this is not a case of treating this mode of transmission of data differently from other modes of transmission. The assessment would be the same if the company processed, on the basis of a request by an individual, the personal data of another individual by using some other mode of transmission.” C.     Second set of proceedings (2009 – 2012) 23.     Pursuant to the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 26 November 2009 the Data Protection Board prohibited the first applicant company from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from forwarding that information to an SMS service. It found that the collection of personal data prior to its publication in Veropörssi and its processing in the background file of the first applicant company could not as such be regarded as contrary to the data protection rules, provided, inter alia , that the data had been protected properly. However, considering the manner and the extent to which the personal data in the background file had been published in Veropörssi , the first applicant company had processed personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act. The second applicant company was prohibited from collecting, storing or forwarding to an SMS service any data received from the first applicant company’s database and published in Veropörssi . 24.     By letter dated 15 December 2009, after the Data Protection Board had made its decision, the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the applicant companies to indicate what action they were envisaging in response to the Board’s decision. In their reply, the applicant companies asked for the Data Protection Ombudsman’s views on the conditions under which they could continue to publish public taxation data at least to a certain extent. In his reply the Data Protection Ombudsman stated, with reference to the decision of the Data Protection Board of 26 November 2009, that “when data on taxable income were collected in a database and published in large catalogues almost as it stood, the Personal Data Act was applicable...”. He reminded them of his duty to report any breach of the Personal Data Act to the police. 25.     By letter dated 9 February 2010 the applicant companies appealed against the decision of the Data Protection Board to the Helsinki Administrative Court, which transferred the case to the Turku Administrative Court. They complained that the decision violated the Constitutional prohibition of censorship as well as their right to freedom of expression. According to the applicants, under domestic law, it was not possible to prevent publication of information on the basis of the amount of information to be published or of the means used for its publication. Nor was it possible to rely on the “public interest” as a criterion for preventing publication where preventive restriction of freedom of expression was concerned. Accepting that would mean that the authorities would be able to prevent publication if they thought that the publication did not promote discussion of a topic of public interest. 26.     On 28 October 2010 the Turku Administrative Court rejected the applicant companies’ appeal. It found that the Supreme Administrative Court had stated in its decision of 2009 that the case concerned neither the public accessibility of taxation data nor the right to publish such information per se . As the court was now examining only the 2009 decision rendered by the Data Protection Board, it could not examine the issues which the Supreme Administrative Court had excluded from the scope of its 2009 decision. As the Board’s decision corresponded to the content of the latter decision, there was no reason to change it. 27.     By letter dated 29 November 2010 the applicant companies further appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. 28.     On 18 June 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Turku Administrative Court, reiterating that the case concerned neither the right to publish taxation information as such, nor preventive censorship. D.     Subsequent developments 29.     According to the information submitted by the applicants, the SMS service was shut down after the 2009 decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was served on the applicant companies. The newspaper continued publishing taxation data in autumn 2009 when its content was only one fifth of the previous content. Since then the newspaper has not appeared. The Government, on the other hand, submitted that, according to the applicant companies’ website, Veropörssi was still being published on a regional basis in 2010 and 2011. Moreover, an Internet service continued to operate allowing anyone to request a natural person’s tax data concerning the year 2014 by filling in a form on the website in question. The requested tax information would then be delivered to the customer by phone call, text message or e-mail. 30.     The editor-in-chief of Veropörssi lodged an application with the Court in 2010, complaining that the impugned decision of the Supreme Administrative Court violated his right to freedom of expression. On 19   November 2013 the application was declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention (see Anttila v. Finland (dec.), no. 16248/10, 19 November 2013). 31.     The first applicant company was declared bankrupt on 15   March   2016. The bankruptcy administration did not oppose the continuation of the present proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 94 below). II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Constitutional provisions 32.     Article 10 of the Constitution of Finland ( Suomen perustuslaki, Finlands grundlag , Act no. 731/1999), which protects the right to private life, states: “Everyone’s private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act...” 33.     Article 12 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of expression, provides: “Everyone has the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression entails the right to express, disseminate and receive information, opinions and other communications without prior prevention by anyone. More detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. Provisions on restrictions relating to pictorial programmes that are necessary for the protection of children may be laid down by an Act.” B.     Personal Data Act 1.     Provisions of the Personal Data Act 34.     The relevant provisions of the Personal Data Act ( henkilötietolaki, personsuppgiftslagen , Act no. 523/1999, as in force at the relevant time) provided: “Chapter 1 – General provisions Section 1 – Objectives The objectives of this Act are to implement, in the processing of personal data, the protection of private life and the other basic rights which safeguard the right to privacy... Section 2 – Scope (1) The provisions of this Act apply to the processing of personal data, unless otherwise provided elsewhere in the law. (2) This Act applies to the automatic processing of personal data. It applies also to other processing of personal data where the data constitute or are intended to constitute a personal data file or a part thereof. ... (4) This Act does not apply to personal data files containing, solely and in unaltered form, data that have been published by the media. (5) Unless otherwise provided in section 17, only sections 1-4, 32, 39(3), 40(1) and (3), 42, 44(2), 45-47, 48(2), 50, and 51 of this Act apply, where appropriate, to the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism or artistic or literary expression. Section 3 – Definitions In this Act, (1) personal data means any information on a private individual and any information on his or her personal characteristics or personal circumstances, where these are identifiable as concerning him or her or the members of his or her family or household; (2) processing of personal data means the collection, recording, organisation, use, transfer, disclosure, storage, manipulation, combination, protection, deletion and erasure of personal data, as well as other measures directed at personal data; (3) personal data file means a set of personal data, connected by a common use and processed fully or partially automatically or sorted into a card index, directory or other manually accessible form so that the data pertaining to a given person can be retrieved easily and at reasonable cost; (4) controller means a person, corporation, institution or foundation, or a number of them, for the use of whom a personal data file is set up and who is entitled to determine the use of the file, or who has been designated as a controller by an Act; (5) data subject means the person to whom the personal data pertain; ... Section 32 – Data security (1) The controller shall carry out the technical and organisational measures necessary for securing personal data against unauthorised access, against accidental or unlawful destruction, manipulation, disclosure and transfer and against other unlawful processing... ... Section 44 – Orders of the Data Protection Board At the request of the Data Protection Ombudsman, the Data Protection Board may: (1) prohibit processing of personal data which is contrary to the provisions of this Act or the rules and regulations issued on the basis of this Act... ... (3) order that the operations pertaining to the file be ceased, if the unlawful conduct or neglect seriously compromise the protection of the privacy of the data subject or his or her interests or rights, provided that the file is not set up under a statutory scheme; ...” 35.     Following the judgment of the CJEU of 2008 in the present case (see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy , cited above), section   2(4) of the Personal Data Act was repealed by an Act enacted on 3   December 2010. 36.     Government Bill to Parliament HE 96/1998 vp provides background information regarding the journalistic purposes derogation in section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act. The definition of a database for journalistic purposes was derived from the previous Act but was modified in order to transpose the Data Protection Directive. According to the preparatory work, “a database for journalistic purposes means such databases as are intended to be used only in the context of the journalistic activity of the media and which are not accessible to others”. “Media” is taken to mean any kind of mass media, including news and photo agencies when they keep databases containing personal data used in media’s publishing activities or a news agency’s own publishing activities. Information collected for storage in a database for journalistic purposes can be used only in the context of a journalistic activity, and not, for example, for administrative or marketing purposes. It is also required that the circle of users of the database is limited such as to be accessible only to those persons involved in the journalistic activity. A database for journalistic purposes can be kept, for example, by a newspaper publisher, an individual journalist or a free-lance journalist. 2.     Examples of application of the Personal Data Act 37.     In a decision of 23 January 2015, the Helsinki Administrative Court held that public taxation data could be provided to media in mass deliveries in electronic format. However, neither freedom of expression as a fundamental right nor the preparatory work relating to legislation on the publicity of and access to taxation data supported an interpretation of the law to the effect that the applicant in that case – a representative of a media organisation which had requested data relating to 5.2 million persons (all natural persons earning more than 1 euro in Finland) – had the right to receive such data in electronic format for journalistic purposes. 38.     In contrast, in his opinion of 5 July 2013, addressed to a complainant on another matter, the Data Protection Ombudsman held that the media organisation in question ( Helsingin Sanomat ) had processed data for journalistic purposes within the meaning and scope of the section 2(5) derogation. The latter had not published all of the personal data files collected by it for journalistic purposes, but had published data on a limited group of 10,000 persons considered to be the wealthiest people in Finland. The data published were accompanied by articles and presentations on some of those featured. C.     Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information 39.     Sections 1-3 of the Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information ( laki verotustietojen julkisuudesta ja salassapidosta, lagen om offentlighet och sekretess i fråga om beskattningsuppgifter , Act no. 1346/1999) provide the following: “Section 1 – Scope of the Act This Act applies to documents concerning individual taxpayers which are submitted to or prepared by the tax administration (taxation documents) and the information contained therein (taxation information). The provisions concerning the taxpayer in this Act apply to other persons required to report information, and also to joint tax corporations. ... Section 2 – Relation to other provisions The provisions of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities (621/1999) and the Personal Data Act (523/1999) apply to taxation documents and information unless otherwise provided by this or some other Act. Section 3 – Public disclosure of and right of access to taxation information Taxation information is public to the extent provided in this Act. Everyone has the right to obtain information on a public taxation document in the possession of the tax administration as provided by the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, unless otherwise provided by this Act.” 40.     According to section 5 of the Act, information on a taxpayer’s name, year of birth and municipality of domicile is public, as is the following information: “(1) earned income taxable in State taxation; (2) capital income and property taxable in State taxation; (3) income taxable in municipal taxation; (4) income and taxable net assets, municipal tax and the total amount of taxes and charges imposed; (5) the total amount of withholding tax; (6) the amount to be debited or the amount to be refunded in the final assessment for the tax year. ... The information referred to above in this section may be disclosed at the beginning of the November following the tax year, as valid on completion of the taxation.” 41.     The preparatory work relating to section 5 of the Act indicates that the special regulation in section 16(3) of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities is applicable to data referred to in this section. It also indicates that the Personal Data Act does not restrict the collection of data for journalistic purposes and that the media can be given data referred to in section 5 for journalistic purposes, provided that there are no restrictions imposed by the rules on confidentiality. D.     Act on the Openness of Government Activities 42.     Section 1 (1) of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities ( laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta, lagen om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet , Act no. 621/1999) provides that: “Official documents shall be in the public domain, unless specifically provided otherwise in this Act or anoth