CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 juillet 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5655E895 { margin-left:43.41pt; padding-left:20.99pt; font-family:Arial } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s6529836E { margin-left:50.51pt; padding-left:11.24pt; font-family:Arial } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sA69DFD4C { margin-left:7.26pt; padding-left:2.99pt } .s644ED209 { margin-left:6.58pt; padding-left:3.67pt } .s28F84568 { margin-left:57.18pt; padding-left:4.57pt; font-family:Arial } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s85A364CF { width:35.31pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sF3B96856 { width:11.87pt; display:inline-block } .s4569EA9F { width:226.44pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt }       THIRD SECTION             CASE OF M v. THE NETHERLANDS   (Application no. 2156/10)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   25 July 2017     FINAL   25/10/2017   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of M v. the Netherlands, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Helena Jäderblom, President,   Branko Lubarda,   Luis López Guerra,   Helen Keller,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková, judges,   Egbert Myjer, ad hoc judge, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 4 July 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 2156/10) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Netherlands national, Mr M (“the applicant”), on 7   January 2010. The President of the Section acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of Court). 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A.W. Eikelboom and Mr   M.   Pestman, both lawyers practising in Amsterdam. The Netherlands Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent and Deputy Agent, Mr R.A.A. Böcker and Ms K. Adhin, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him had violated Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention in that the AIVD ( Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst , General Intelligence and Security Service) had exercised decisive control over the evidence, restricting his and the domestic courts’ access to information contained in documents and controlling its use, making it impossible for him to instruct his defence counsel as he would have needed to, and preventing him from offering witness evidence effectively. 4.     On 2 December 2014 the applicant’s aforementioned complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible. 5.     Judge Johannes Silvis, the judge elected in respect of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, withdrew from sitting on the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court). On 21 May 2015 the President of the Section accordingly appointed Mr Egbert Myjer to sit as ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 §   1 of the Rules of Court). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Houten. A.     Introduction 7.     The applicant was employed by the AIVD as an audio editor and interpreter. In this capacity he had access to classified information ( gerubriceerde informatie ), which he was under a duty not to divulge to persons not authorised to have knowledge of it. 8.     The suspicion arose that the applicant had forwarded copies of classified documents to persons outside the service, including in some cases persons who were under covert investigation by the AIVD in connection with possible terrorist activity. 9.     On 30 September 2004 the applicant was arrested. He was charged with divulging State secret information to persons not authorised to take cognisance of it and taken into detention on remand ( voorlopige hechtenis ). 10.     The AIVD advised the applicant in writing that he was still under an obligation of secrecy. Consequently it would be constitutive of a further criminal offence if he were to discuss matters covered by his duty of secrecy with anyone including his counsel. 11.     The applicant’s counsel were also warned that they might be prosecuted should they divulge any State secret information to third parties. B.     Proceedings before the Regional Court 12.     The trial opened before the Rotterdam Regional Court ( rechtbank ) on 10 January 2005. It was adjourned several times. 13.     The applicant’s counsel protested against the restrictions affecting communication between themselves and the applicant, which in their submission undermined the effectiveness of the defence. They also asked for certain documents to be added to complete the file: these included the internal AIVD report that was the basis of the prosecution, which was absent from the file altogether, and the documents which had supposedly been leaked, which had been added to the case file in redacted form with parts blacked out. They further repeated a request, made earlier in writing, for the applicant to be released unconditionally from his duty of secrecy in order to conduct his defence ( vrijwaring ). 14.     The public prosecutor ( officier van justitie ) announced that some but not all of the documents requested by the defence would be added to the file but refused to release the applicant from his duty of secrecy unconditionally. 15.     On 24 January 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision remitting the case to the investigating judge, to whom it would fall to carry out investigations in such a way as to mitigate, and compensate as far as possible, the handicaps under which the defence laboured. 16.     On 4 March 2005 the head of the AIVD informed the applicant in writing that communication of matters covered by his duty of secrecy was permitted, subject to the following conditions: He would be allowed to discuss such matters only with his counsel, Ms Böhler and Mr Pestman; He was not allowed to reveal the identity of any AIVD staff or human sources; He could discuss only “that which [was] contained in the case file”; This exemption covered only information that was strictly necessary for the defence; This exemption was valid only until the final judgment in the domestic proceedings was given. The letter continues: “In order to preclude any misapprehension I stress that this release from the duty of secrecy does not apply to the suspect’s counsel. In the event that counsel wish to make use of information obtained from the suspect with a view to the defence of M, this must be done in consultation with the investigating judge. The investigating judge will then determine whether the (answers to the) questions are of any relevance to the criminal proceedings ( strafvorderlijk van belang ). If this is the case, the AIVD will then indicate to what extent State secrets are at stake in this context.” 17.     On 1 April 2005 the Head of the AIVD wrote to the investigating judge in the following terms: “... I consider it of great importance that the suspect ( verdachte ) should be able to defend himself adequately against the matters of which he is suspected. This entails that he will have to consult his counsel for that purpose. To that end I have granted the suspect conditional release from his duty of secrecy. These conditions are necessary and serve the interest of national security. There exists a certain tension within these frameworks, i.e. a (more far-reaching) release (as requested) of the duty of secrecy and the interests of national security. After all, the AIVD can only carry out its statutory duty within a certain measure of secrecy. Three criteria are of importance in this respect, namely that the AIVD should be able to maintain the secrecy of its current levels of intelligence, its sources and its working methods. These are critical thresholds that can be seen as the practical implementation of the so-called ‘jeopardise’ criterion in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. ... ... Two additional conditions apply: 1.     the release from his duty of secrecy granted [the applicant] shall apply solely to communication between the suspect, his lawyers Böhler and Pestman, Public Prosecutor Z. and the court, and 2.     shall take place within the confines of the offices of the Investigating Judge or in the presence of the trial court in a closed hearing. ... The parties to the proceedings are to submit their questions and other requests to you [i.e. the investigating judge]. You then check whether the questions and requests are of any procedural significance ( strafvorderlijk belang ) in these proceedings, as you have indicated to me with regard to the three subjects mentioned by counsel. In the affirmative, you offer me the opportunity to consider whether the text of the questions in itself can harm national security. In the (probably most likely) event that the questions in themselves cannot harm national security, the answer can be provided in the accustomed way, i.e. by means of an official AIVD report ... In addition, and if the parties to the proceedings consider it necessary, more specific answers can be given by means of, for example, the hearing of witnesses. Perhaps unnecessarily I would observe that section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act ( Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten ) applies. In the event that the line of questioning ( vraagstelling ) in itself is capable of endangering national security, it is my responsibility, pursuant to section 15 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to ensure the secrecy of the information that should remain so and accordingly the classification of that information. I   therefore propose that you do not place this information, after I have classified it, in the case file and to request the Regional Court to deal with those questions at a closed hearing. I am of the opinion that the above procedural proposal serves the interests of all parties to the proceedings, taking into account the interests involved in national security. ... The second condition, which is that the suspect should not be allowed to disclose the identities of AIVD members or human sources, appears clear enough to me. All   information that, whether or not in combination with other information, may lead to the identities of AIVD members or human sources becoming known, falls within the scope of the second condition for release [from the duty of secrecy]. ... As regards the third and fourth conditions, I am of the view that these too are sufficiently clear: [the applicant] is released from his duty of secrecy vis-à-vis his counsel Dr B. Böhler and Mr M. Pestman in so far as consultation between the suspect and his counsel [Dr] Böhler and Mr Pestman relates to the crimes with which he is charged. In the event that counsel wish to discuss documents with the suspect which they may wish to add to the case file, the third and fourth conditions should be interpreted to mean that the documents must be relevant and directly necessary for the defence in this case and may possibly be added to the case file. [These requirements of] relevance and direct necessity also apply to the preparation of requests and defences. As to the latter condition: if and when such a procedure becomes a real possibility I will consider, if asked, whether release from the duty of secrecy, conditional or not, is possible. ... Fourthly, you have asked me to react to the witnesses requested by counsel. I   presume that you mean the AIVD members. I am of the opinion that this is above all a matter of criminal procedure, the public prosecutor indicating in her letter that the questions counsel would like to ask relate primarily to the working methods of the AIVD, the spreading of the leaked information and the internal investigation into this. I can agree with the position taken by the public prosecutor that these questions can most probably be answered by me or my deputy during a witness hearing. Whether and to what extent national security permits the questions to be answered will have to be seen for each question. This will require me first to have the questions intended to be asked at my disposal, so that the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations can decide together and in due time on the application of section   86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. As to the possible questioning of AIVD members as witnesses, I would ask you to make it possible, in pursuance of Article 187c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for special access to be granted to an additional AIVD member. This person can consider the interests of national security for each specific question during the interrogation. This will also permit the defence to put ‘sub-questions’, questions arising from the questions previously submitted in writing. The hearing of witnesses will thus, in my opinion, considerably speed up the pace of the proceedings – at least as far as the hearing of witnesses is concerned – since the (additional) AIVD member present will in many cases be able to decide almost immediately whether the said sub-questions can be answered. This acceleration of the proceedings, in my opinion, benefits all parties to the proceedings. I am prepared to advise the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, on the basis of section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to consider this in any exemption decision. ...” 18.     On 15 April 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision in which, following the public prosecutor, it refused to make the exemption unconditional. It expressed the view that it would serve no useful purpose to allow the applicant to disclose the identities of AIVD staff members and informants to his counsel. The interests of the applicant were sufficiently protected inasmuch as the exemption covered information strictly necessary for his defence. The Regional Court ordered the investigating judge to hear thirteen witnesses referred to by name and seven witnesses referred to by a code name or number. It refused to order the hearing of fifteen other witnesses referred to by a number and one named witness immediately, leaving that decision to be taken by the investigating judge after a particular witness, an AIVD staff member called B., had been heard. As to the partially blacked-out documents, the Regional Court noted that it too was thereby prevented from considering whether they held secret information within the meaning of Articles 98 and 98a of the Criminal Code ( Wetboek   van Strafrecht , see below); even so, the prosecution interest in maintaining secrecy prevailed. 19.     The named witness B. was heard on 23 May 2005 and 6 June 2005. It appears that he refused to answer certain questions because of his duty of secrecy. 20.     It appears that on 9 June 2005 the investigating judge decided to refuse to hear the sixteen witnesses requested by the defence for lack of available time ( agendatechnische redenen ). 21.     On 17 June 2005 the investigating judge decided that the unnamed witnesses permitted to be questioned would be heard at a secret location, under heavy disguise and with the use of voice distorting equipment. A representative of the AIVD and legal counsel of the State would attend in addition to the prosecution and the defence. 22.     The defence lodged an objection against the investigating judge’s decision of 17 June 2005 with the Regional Court, stating also that they would not cooperate in any witness hearing held at a secret location. They also asked for the named witnesses already heard to be relieved of their duty of secrecy and to be heard anew. 23.     The Regional Court held a hearing in camera on 5 July 2005. The defence outlined its provisional strategy, which was to aim for an acquittal by identifying potential sources of the leaks other than the applicant and by demonstrating that the documents leaked did not contain State secrets properly so-called. They also wished to establish the applicant’s attitude to his work for the AIVD. This strategy required the applicant’s former direct colleagues to be questioned and uncensored copies of the documents in question to be made available to the defence and the court. 24.     On 8 July 2005 the Regional Court gave an order for two further named witnesses to be heard but dismissed the defence’s objection for the remainder. 25.     On 14 July 2005 the defence challenged two judges of the trial chamber who had also taken part in the decision of 8 July 2005, arguing on various grounds that positions taken in the latter decision prejudged the outcome of the trial. 26.     The following day, 15 July 2005, the challenge was dismissed and the trial hearing was resumed. The defence asked for documents to be added to the file, including all those found in the applicant’s desk. The Regional Court remitted the case to the investigating judge for the hearing of the witnesses authorised to be heard, in so far as they had not already been heard, and requested the prosecutor to add documents to the file including a description – to be prepared by the AIVD – of the documents found in the applicant’s desk. 27.     Witnesses were heard on various dates. In so far as they were unnamed AIVD staff members, they were identified by a number; they were heavily disguised and they were placed in a box that left only their upper body visible; and their voices were distorted. The applicant states that it was impossible to discern their body language and facial expressions. He further states that an AIVD official was present, who could – and did – prevent named and unnamed witnesses from answering a proportion of the questions put by the defence, and that this was permitted by the investigating judge. 28.     The trial hearing was resumed on 30 August 2005. Finding no indication that the AIVD information had been leaked by someone else, the Regional Court yet again refused to hear the named witness and the fifteen unnamed witnesses. As to AIVD staff members who refused to disclose certain information based on their duty of secrecy, it stated that the final decision whether to allow this lay with the trial court itself but found that it could not set precise limits as the prosecution wanted. 29.     The trial hearing was resumed on 6 and 7 October 2005. The   applicant made no statement. 30.     On 30 November 2005 the trial hearing resumed. The prosecution and the defence made their closing statements. 31.     The Regional Court gave judgment on 14 December 2005. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. C.     Proceedings before the Court of Appeal 32.     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal ( gerechtshof ) of The Hague. 33.     The appeal hearing opened on 28 September 2006. Among other things, the applicant’s counsel objected to the refusal, in the proceedings at first instance, to allow the defence an unconditional exemption that would allow the applicant and his counsel to communicate unimpeded; to the hearing of unnamed witnesses under heavy disguise, in a closed box that partially hid them from view and with the use of voice distortion, even though they were the applicant’s former direct colleagues; to the withholding of evidence by the witnesses, based on their duty of secrecy as AIVD staff members; and to the withholding of documentary evidence requested by the defence. The prosecuting Advocate General ( advocaat ‑ generaal ) conveyed an offer by the AIVD to allow an independent expert to see uncensored AIVD documents and report on their content; the expert proposed had previously been a member of a committee appointed to investigate the internal functioning of the AIVD itself. The defence protested that this expert lacked independence precisely for that reason. 34 .     The Court of Appeal delivered an interlocutory judgment on 12   October 2006. Its reasoning incl uded the following: “The duty of secrecy arising from the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act Serviced Act is subject only to the exceptions set out in that Act. The implication is that only the possibility offered by section 86(1) of that Act offers a solution for the applicant’s present predicament. The interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Article 98 and following of the Criminal Code seek to protect, stand in the way of a complete release from the duty of secrecy as the defence would wish and a complete exemption from prosecution for disclosing State secrets to be granted by the Public Prosecution Service. It is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes a restriction of – normally entirely – free and confidential consultation between the suspect and his counsel and that – if it remained in force in its entirety – it would prevent a fair trial. In the present case, the suspect has been granted conditional release from that duty by the AIVD, based on the latter section of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Service Act, as have his two counsel. The conditions accompanying that release, all of which concern interests of State security in relation to interests of the defence in the present criminal proceedings, appear to the Court of Appeal neither unreasonable within the framework of the interests of State security nor unworkable within the framework of the interests of the defence. ... Finally, it is the case that if the suspect and the defence, if they consider that the space left to them by the said release is not sufficient to conduct a defence meeting the requirements of the Convention and they consider, in their assessment, that he/they have to transgress his/their duty of secrecy further than the conditions governing the release allow, they can plead justification ( rechtvaardigingsgrond ), namely the interest of a proper defence within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Advocate General gave the assurance at the hearing of 28 September 2006 that no prosecution would be brought if a violation of the duty of secrecy by the suspect – and as the Court of Appeal presumes, his counsel as well – was justified by invoking Article   6 of the Convention.” and “The Court of Appeal assumes that the defence request [for access to the internal AIVD investigation materials] comprises all investigations undertaken by the AIVD after it had become known that a third party, i.e. S., possessed [a copy of a classified AIVD document]. It does not appear from the file that these internal investigations were set out in any report. The case file contains criminal complaints ( aangiftes ) based on those investigations. It must be noted in the first place that the defence request does not concern documents in the possession of the Public Prosecution Service within the meaning of Article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; none of the participants in the proceedings is aware of the content of the internal investigations, save for what has been stated by witnesses in this respect, and what is set out in the said criminal complaints. There is therefore no violation of the principle of ‘equality of arms’ [1] . Quite apart from the question whether the AIVD, given its duty and responsibility ..., would be willing to submit its report or any written documents concerning its internal investigation to the public prosecution service to be added to the file, the question needs to be considered whether these documents, which do not emanate from any investigatory body, can in reason be relevant to the defence. The defence has not, in the present case, suggested, let alone shown, that the materials compiled by the AIVD within the framework of its internal investigation have been obtained unlawfully or are unreliable, but only that the documents and information provided by that service have been accepted uncritically ( voor zoete koek aangenomen ) first by the National Police Internal Investigations Department ( Rijksrecherche ) and then by the Public Prosecution Service and cannot be checked. The Court of Appeal takes the provisional view – without wishing to prejudge its final decision [on the question whether the trial was fair] – that the said materials can be assessed based on the statements of the witnesses questioned, albeit, as far as AIVD members are concerned, subject to some restrictions owing to their duty of secrecy.” It noted the “particular tension between fundamentally opposed interests”, namely the applicant’s interest as a defendant in a criminal trial and the State interest in maintaining the secrecy of AIVD information, but rejected the protests put forward on the applicant’s behalf. The judgment took note of a promise made by the Advocate General not to prosecute for a violation of the duty of secrecy if that violation was justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention ( gerechtvaardigd is door een beroep op artikel   6 EVRM ). It asked the prosecution to submit certain official reports but not the uncensored AIVD documents requested by the defence. 35.     The appeal hearing was resumed on 12 February 2007. The applicant announced that he might, in his own defence, have to reveal State secret information. This prompted the Court of Appeal to exclude the public from the interrogation of the applicant, despite the latter’s protests. 36 .     In the course of questioning by his counsel the applicant mentioned the names of particular AIVD staff members; these are not recorded in the official record of the hearing. The Advocate General protested against the mentioning of these names in so far as they were not already to be found in the case file, which in his view was not justified by Article 6 of the Convention, and announced his intention to prosecute if the applicant should “transgress those limits” ( mocht hij die grenzen overschrijden ). The applicant’s counsel replied that the defence needed these names in order to decide whether to call the persons concerned as defence witnesses and pointed out that the public had been excluded. After the president decided that the Advocate General should be entitled to state a view on the acceptability of questions put to the applicant by his counsel, the applicant stated that he would for the remainder of the hearing comply with his duty of secrecy. Thereupon the hearing was reopened to the public. 37 .     On 14 February 2007 the applicant’s counsel Mr Pestman sent the Advocate General a letter by fax, to which was appended a list of questions he and Ms Böhler would have wished to ask the applicant in support of the case for the defence. These questions concerned AIVD working methods and procedures and AIVD members. One question asked the applicant to identify individual AIVD members on a handwritten anonymised organigram by name. Other questions asked the applicant to state the names of AIVD members other than himself who would have had access to the documents found to have been leaked. 38.     The hearing continued on 15 February 2007. The Advocate General announced his intention to prosecute the applicant should he answer questions naming AIVD sources, providing an insight into AIVD working methods or relating to the blacked-out parts of the redacted documents. Responding to protests by the defence, the Court of Appeal referred to its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006 (see paragraph 34 above), in which it had stated that if the applicant considered a breach of his duty of secrecy in the interest of his defence he would, if prosecuted, be able to pray the right under Article 6 of the Convention to defend himself in justification. The decision to prosecute, however, belonged to the Public Prosecution Service alone to the exclusion of the courts. 39.     The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 1 March 2007. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court on the technical ground that the Regional Court’s judgment could not be simply endorsed, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. 40 .     The evidence relied on was the following: Statement by the applicant at the hearing of the Court of Appeal (12 February 2007), to the effect that: He worked for the AIVD and accordingly had the documents mentioned in the charges at his disposal; Knew some of the targets personally; Had written down names and addresses found in his address book himself; Had one of the documents (a phone tap report) in his home as well as in his office at work; He knew the name of another target. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 29   September 2004, criminal complaint lodged on behalf of the AIVD by its acting head, to the effect that it has emerged that one of the targets (O.) turns out to be aware that he is an object of investigations. In particular, O. turns out to possess a copy of a document to that effect. The document has been circulated to “tens of persons” within the AIVD. The applicant is mentioned by name. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 5   October 2004, statement by the AIVD’s acting head to the effect that a secret AIVD document (copy of a telephone interception report) has been found during a search of the applicant’s home. The name of the person who printed it out would normally have been stated on the document but appears to have been removed. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 5   October 2004, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that a document shown him by police officers is secret and that one of the persons to whom it had been given was the applicant. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 28   October 2004, statement by an AIVD official relating to investigations undertaken by the AIVD itself on a copy of the hard disk of the applicant’s home computer. This is stated to have revealed information compromising the applicant. In   particular, the applicant is reported to have informed a target about AIVD investigations. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4   November 2004, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that a fax seized from a target was a transcript of an intercepted phone call prepared by the applicant. The content of the document reveals specific methods used by the AIVD in   terrorism-related investigations. The document is identical to a document found in the applicant’s office desk, which bears the applicant’s ID. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 31   January 2005, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that the leaked information is State secret, sensitive, and relates to ongoing AIVD operations for gathering information on   terrorist groups. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30   September 2004, from which it appears that the applicant was arrested that day and was found in the possession of an address book. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4   October 2004, mentioning that objects (envelopes, diaries, a phone tap report, written notes, floppy discs, compact discs and computers) were seized in the applicant’s home. No further details given. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4   October 2004, list of goods seized in the home of a target. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 6   October 2004, relating the search of the applicant’s office and describing State secret documents found in his desk. One of these is identical to a document found in the possession of a target; another is identical to a document found in the applicant’s home (albeit that the applicant’s ID has been whited out). These documents are identified by the acting head of the AIVD as State secret. A transcript of a page out of the applicant’s address book, bearing names in Arabic script identified by an AIVD expert as   the names of targets. A copy of a post-it note found in the applicant’s address book. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8   October 2004 to the effect that two (unnamed) AIVD members have classified the list of goods seized in the applicant’s home (paragraph 9 above) as State secret. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8   October 2004 identifying persons mentioned in the transcript of the phone tap. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 12   October 2004 identifying the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation as identical to a document found in the applicant’s office desk. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27   October 2004 to the effect that a document found in a search of the home of a target (C.) was identical to a classified document found in the applicant’s office desk. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 29   December 2004 relating the arrest of another target (O.), who was found to be in possession of classified AIVD documents. O. stated that these had been sent to a friend of his anonymously by post. A search of the applicant’s hard disk revealed an e-mail inquiring of a friend (S.B.) whether “the information sent to him by post had been of any use.” National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 3   February 2005. A search of the dwelling shared by Mohammed B., who was later convicted of the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, had led to the finding, among the personal effects of Mohammed B.’s flat-mate, of a transcript of a conversation that was part of an AIVD investigation. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 3   February 2005. The post-it note found in the applicant’s address book bore an address to which it appears that “the aforementioned document” was found to have been sent. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 18   March 2005. Description of documents found in the possession of the target C., whose house had been searched, and copies of some of which were found in the possession of the target O. All are classified documents already mentioned in other National Police Internal Investigations Department reports. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 21   January 2005. Interview of an AIVD official responsible for the security of the IT system. No name is given, the official identified only by a number (05/20040094). It emerges that the applicant had access to all the systems needed for his work as an audio analyst and had his own user ID and password. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 21   February 2005. Interview of witness 05/20040094 to the effect that the applicant, and he alone, prepared a transcript of a conversation later found in the possession of the target H. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30   September 2004. Interview of the applicant from which it appears that the applicant has been employed by the AIVD since 2003, receives weekly reports about investigations in progress (which are classified), has signed a promise of secrecy and knows the targets O. and C. who are friends of his brother-in-law. He is aware that O. and C. are investigation targets. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2   October 2004. Interview of the applicant, who recognises the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation, which he admits is classified and should not have left AIVD premises, but which he must have taken home by mistake. The applicant also recognises a note bearing a name. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 6   October 2004. Interview of the applicant, who recognises the post-it note with the names of three targets (O., K. and H.) and admits that he knows he should not take names of targets home. The applicant also admits that there is no other possible explanation for finding the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation in his office desk than that he himself put it there. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 7   October 2004. The applicant identifies two observation reports which are classified. One of them is stated to have been found in his office at work. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 26   October 2004. The applicant identifies the name of the target H. on the post-it note. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8   November 2004. The applicant identifies private e-mail addresses used by him (in his private capacity of agent for a travel agency based in Morocco) and by his wife respectively. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8   November 2004. The applicant admits that the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation bears his user ID. The name H. on the post-it note corresponds to the person H. who is a target of an AIVD investigation; the applicant himself identified him as a target. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27   October 2004. A DNA sample is taken from the applicant. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 9   November 2004. The DNA sample corresponds to DNA found on an envelope. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8   November 2004. A further DNA match is found on an envelope. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 25   March 2005. It is more than one billion times more likely that the DNA match can be explained by the presence of the DNA of the applicant than by the presence of the DNA of strangers. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 1   October 2004. The target C. states that he received two envelopes containing documents from which it appeared that he and other Moroccan men were being watched. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2   October 2004. The target C. relates how he received the two envelopes. The first had been sent to him at his home address. The second had been addressed to him, but sent to the home address of a second person, B1, and handed to him by a third, B2. Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. Target C. recognises the documents sent to him. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27   September 2004. Statement by the target O. O was aware that he was being watched, since his friend C. had received reports by post. Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. The target O. admits that when arrested he had two sheets of paper in his pocket which he had received from a friend (A.B., the “third person” mentioned in document no. 36). National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30   September 2004. B1 states that the target C. had received letters mentioning “our names”. One had been sent to his address (the address of the target C.); the second had been sent to the address of B2. The letters had been AIVD documents from which it appeared that all three were being watched. B1   recognised the documents. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2   October 2004. B2 recognises the envelope sent to C. from a photocopy. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2   October 2004. B2 describes how the second letter, addressed to C. and O., was received at the address of B1. He   had opened the letter, which mentioned him and O. He had left it with C. O. had received a copy as well. Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. B2   recognises the second letter referred to under no. 42. He had taken the letter to C. and given a copy to O. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 18   January 2005. Statement by S.B. (see under no. 18 above) who admits to knowing the applicant and also that he had received the e-mail from the applicant. In April or May   2004 he had received a transcript of an intercepted conversation from the applicant. Official record by the investigating judge of 21 June 2005. S.B. admits to having received the e-mail from the applicant. He   admitted to having received a transcript by mail and recognised it from a photocopy. National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 10   November 2004. Target H. recognises the telephone transcript, which was sent to him at his home address. He suggests that it was sent to him because the other targets still lived with their parents. Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations [which is the Ministry responsible for the AIVD], 15   March 2005, with a statement of the (by then) Head of the AIVD to the effect that it is now possible to accommodate the applicant’s defence by offering documents with fewer parts blacked out, but noting that the documents in issue come from a place that is out of bounds. A copy of the Royal Decree designating the AIVD offices out of bounds. The applicant’s letter of appointment as a member of the AIVD (17 October 2003). Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 10 February 2010, to the effect that the documents found in the possession of unauthorised third parties in the course of the criminal investigation against the applicant concern current AIVD counterterrorist operations and destroying their secrecy endangers national security. Letter from the Head of the AIVD to the investigating judge, 17 June 2005, confirming that those documents concern AIVD counterterrorist operations and endanger the interests of the State by offering an insight into the AIVD’s state of intelligence, sources and operational methods. Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 28 December 2006, signed by the Head of the AIVD, stating that not blacking out the blacked-out parts of particular documents would harm the State by disclosing the AIVD’s state of intelligence, sources (including one human source) and operational methods, naming the foreign intelligence services with which the AIVD cooperates, and disclosing the nature of information exchanged with those foreign services; identifying targeted organisations and their members (referred to as “Arab nationalist extremists”). Official record of verification by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism, 29 December 2006. The   prosecutor has personally examined the documents in issue in unredacted form and found the unredacted parts of the redacted documents identical to the corresponding parts of the unredacted documents. Photocopies of the address book with the post-it note and the redacted AIVD documents were attached to the judgment. 41 .     The Court of Appeal’s reasoning included the following: “In considering whether the positions adopted by the service [i.e. the AIVD] and/or   its members as regards the necessary secrecy and in answering the question to what extent restrictions on (among other things) the right to question witnesses can be justified, other issues than that of defining State secrets in a strict sense also play a part. That is apparent from the chapeau paragraph of section 85(1) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, which imposes on AIVD officials a duty of secrecy ‘without prejudice to Articles 98-98c of the Criminal Code’. That obligation extends to ‘all information the confidential character of which he knows or ought reasonably to suspect’. Only a ministerial decision as referred to in section 86(2) of that Act can relieve the official of this duty of secrecy if he wishes to act as a witness. The legislature has thus placed the choice in the ‘conflict ... between the interests of State security, which may imperatively require certain sources or information to be kept secret, and the interest of establishing the material truth in, among other things, ... criminal procedure’ [reference to the statutory drafting history of an earlier Act, repealed by the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, omitted] in the hands of the said Ministers. ... The above leads the Court of Appeal to conclude as follows. In addition to State secrets within the meaning of Article 98 of the Criminal Code there are other matters that (in the view of the AIVD) fall under the duty of secrecy of section 85 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The Court of Appeal deduces, on the basis of what is laid down in section 86 of that Act, that that obligation (in principle) prevails over the duties of a witness in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeal’s examination of the question whether an AIVD staff member has rightly invoked his duty [of secrecy] is necessarily detached/marginal. Things are different where it concerns the question whether the right of the defence to question witnesses is materially impaired, it being relevant, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, whether the statement of that particular witness is used in evidence.” and “The interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Articles 98 and following of the Criminal Code are intended to protect, stand in the way of granting a complete exemption from the duty of secrecy as desired by the defence. It is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes, to some extent, a restriction on – normally entirely – unimpeded free and confidential discussion between the suspect and his counsel and that – had it been in force unmitigated – it would prevent a fair trial. As the Court of Appeal held in its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006, the duty of secrecy is subject only to the exceptions set out in the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. This means that the situation in which the suspect finds himself in the present criminal case leaves only the avenue left by section 86(1) of the said Act.” and “The Advocate General has given the undertaking, at the Court of Appeal’s hearing of 2 September 2006, that [the applicant] shall not be prosecuted if a violation of the duty of secrecy by [the applicant] is justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention, with due regard to the demands of proportionality and subsidiarity inherent pertaining to a legal defence ( stra