CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 9 novembre 2017

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GERMANY   (Application no. 47274/15)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   9 November 2017     FINAL   09/02/2018   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hentschel and Stark v. Germany, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Nona Tsotsoria, President,   Angelika Nußberger,   Yonko Grozev,   Síofra O’Leary,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lәtif Hüseynov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 26 September 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 47274/15) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two German nationals, Mr Ingo Hentschel and Mr   Matthias Stark (“the applicants”), on 22 September 2015. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr M. Noli, a lawyer practising in Munich, and Ms A. Luczak, a lawyer practising in Berlin. The German Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr   H. ‑ J.   Behrens and Ms   K.   Behr, of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. 3.     The applicants alleged, under Article 3 of the Convention, that they had been beaten and that pepper spray had been used on them by police officers who, owing to an inadequate investigation, had been neither identified nor punished. They further complained under Article 13 that they had had no judicial remedy at their disposal to challenge the discontinuation and the ineffectiveness of the investigation. 4.     On 26 February 2016 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Illertissen. The second applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Harburg. A.     Police operation 6.     On 9 December 2007 both applicants went to a football match in Munich. 7.     The police had predicted an increased risk of clashes between rival football supporters owing to confrontations at previous matches between the two teams. Therefore a total of 227 police officers were deployed, including two squads – comprising eight to ten police officers each – of the 3rd platoon of the Munich riot control unit ( Unterstützungskommando ), one squad of the 2nd platoon of the Munich riot control unit and the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion ( Bereitschaftspolizei ). The deployed officers of the Munich riot control unit also included “video officers”, who carried handheld video cameras and recorded videos of incidents that might be relevant under criminal law. The officers of the Munich riot control unit were dressed in black/dark blue uniforms and wore black helmets with visors. The officers of the Dachau public-order support force battalion wore green uniforms and white helmets with visors. Both uniforms did not include any name tags or other signs identifying the individual officers. However, on the back of the helmets an identification number of the squad was displayed. 8.     After the match had ended the police cordoned off the stands of the supporters of one of the teams, including both applicants, to prevent them from leaving the stadium and encountering supporters of the other team. The cordon was lifted after around fifteen minutes. 1.     The applicants’ version of the subsequent events 9.     According to the first applicant, he left the stands after the blockade had been lifted. While walking between the exit of the stands and the exit of the football stadium a group of police officers dressed in black uniforms came running towards the exiting spectators with their truncheons raised above their heads. Some of these officers started hitting the spectators with their truncheons without any prior warning as soon as they reached them. The first applicant himself was hit with a truncheon on the head, which resulted in a bleeding laceration of 3   cm behind his ear. After having reached the exit of the stadium he was treated by a paramedic in an ambulance that was parked close to the ground. Subsequently, he returned to his home town, where he was treated in the emergency unit of the local hospital. 10.     The second applicant also exited the stands after the blockade had been lifted. Before exiting the stadium he was grabbed by the shoulder and, after turning round, had pepper spray doused in the face at close range. He lay down on the ground and was subsequently struck on his left upper arm with a truncheon. He suffered swelling and redness of his face and pain in his arm. 11.     Both applicants were able to identify their attackers as police officers, but were not able to distinguish them further, owing to their identical uniforms and the lack of identifying signs or name tags. 2.     The Government’s version of the subsequent events 12.     According to the Government the blockade was lifted due to the aggressive behaviour of some of the spectators and the pressure applied to the police cordon. When the supporters streamed from the stands towards the exit, they came upon police units which had been called in to provide backup for the police cordon. Subsequently some of the supporters continued their aggressive behaviour towards these officers and provoked them. The supporters’ conduct resulted in the arrest of one supporter and two police officers sustained minor injuries. After a few minutes the police pacified the situation and got the exiting supporters under control. 13.     The Government furthermore challenged the accounts of the applicants and submitted that there was no credible evidence that the applicants had deliberately been hit or harmed by police officers and that the injuries had been a result of the police operation. B.     Investigation 14.     As of 15 December 2007 the press reported about the police operation in the aftermath of the football match, inter alia quoting football supporters describing arbitrary attacks by police officers of the riot control unit with truncheons and pepper-spray. In an article of 18 December 2007 a spokesperson of the police commented on the operation and stated that the alleged assaults by police officers would be investigated. On 2 January 2008, the Munich public prosecutor’s office instigated a preliminary investigation. On 21 January 2008 the second applicant reported the alleged police violence and submitted a medical certificate concerning the effects of the pepper spray on his face from the same day. He filed a formal criminal complaint on 7 March 2008. The first applicant filed a criminal complaint against an unidentified police officer on 25 April 2008. He also submitted a medical certificate confirming a bleeding laceration on his head. The certificate was issued at 12.05 a.m. on 10 December 2007. Several other spectators at the match had also lodged criminal complaints against unidentified police officers. 15.     The investigation was conducted by the unit of the Munich police responsible for offences perpetrated by public officials under the responsibility of the Munich public prosecutor’s office. The officer in charge interviewed a total of twenty witnesses, including the applicants, the officer in charge of the Munich riot control unit and the squad leaders of the deployed squads of the 2nd and 3rd Munich riot control units. 16.     The investigating division was also provided with a DVD showing excerpts of the video surveillance recorded by the riot control police at the football match. The DVDs were compiled by the “video officers” of the Munich riot control unit. In line with their usual procedure the entire recorded video material was reviewed by the respective video officer after his or her deployment and the parts which were deemed relevant under criminal law and of sufficient quality to serve as evidence were copied to a DVD. 17.     On 10 September 2008 the competent public prosecutor discontinued the investigation. He found that the investigation had produced evidence that some of the police officers had used truncheons against spectators, including women and children, in a disproportionate way and without an official order or approval. However, he concluded that the investigation had not led to a situation where concrete acts of violence could be related to specific police officers and it could not be ascertained either whether the use of force had been justified. In sum, the public prosecutor had been able neither to establish whether the applicants’ injuries had been inflicted by police officers nor to identify the suspects who had allegedly struck and used pepper spray on the applicants. 18.     The applicants appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation and argued, in particular, that the public prosecutor had only questioned the squad leaders, but had not identified all the officers involved in the operation and deployed in the area of the stadium at issue. 19.     On 14 October 2008 the public prosecutor reopened the investigation and ordered further enquiries. On 20 October 2008 the head of the investigation unit met with the platoon leaders of the Munich riot control unit and other division heads of the Munich police to discuss the investigation. Neither the public prosecutor nor the applicants’ representative attended the internal police meeting. Subsequently, a further twenty-two witnesses were interviewed including fourteen platoon leaders, squad leaders and video officers of the deployed police units. The individual squad members of the three squads of the Munich riot control unit were not interviewed. The applicants had requested that they be interviewed, as the evidence had suggested that the alleged perpetrators had belonged to one of these three squads. 20.     The investigating police unit was also provided with video surveillance recorded by the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion. Upon the request of the applicants to secure the entire video material of the police operation, and not only the already submitted video excerpts, it was established that the original video tapes and possible digital copies had already been deleted and that only the excerpts were still available. 21.     On 4 August 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the investigation again. In a detailed fifteen-page decision he first summarised the investigative measures taken, referring in particular to the interviews of several witnesses, including police officers and the alleged victims, the review of video material from the police and from the internet, the assessment of the applicants’ written observations and of the submitted documents, inter alia , medical certificates, as well as gathered information and reports on past events and applicable guidelines. After assessing all the available evidence, the public prosecutor concluded that the enquiries had shown that several supporters had aggressively approached, insulted and provoked the deployed police officers and that therefore a situation had existed in which the officers could have been justified in using their truncheons. Besides this general conclusion he held that the applicants had neither been able to identify a particular suspect nor to determine whether the suspected police officers had been male or female and that the investigation had not produced other persons who had witnessed the alleged acts against the applicants. Furthermore, he outlined in detail certain “considerable discrepancies” in the witness statements of the first applicant and referred to “unspecific” statements of the second applicant. Consequently, according to the public prosecutor, there was insufficient evidence to establish criminal conduct by specific police officers to the detriment of both applicants. He concluded that the investigation had to be discontinued again, since the considerable additional investigative measures had not revealed disproportionate conduct on the part of individual police officers, in particular truncheon strikes against innocent bystanders, which would require criminal prosecution of the respective officers. 22.     On 20 August 2009 the applicants appealed and pointed out that the members of the deployed squads had still not been questioned and that the inspected videos were fragmentary, but nonetheless contradicted certain parts of the statements made by the squad leaders. 23.     On 3 February 2011 the Munich general public prosecutor confirmed the decision of the public prosecutor’s office of 4 August 2009 to discontinue the investigation. The instructions on available legal remedies attached to the decision informed the applicants that they could request a judicial decision in the framework of proceedings to force criminal proceedings ( Klageerzwingungsverfahren ). C.     Court proceedings 24.     On 19 September 2011 the Munich Court of Appeal declared the applicants’ application to force further enquiries inadmissible. The court interpreted the applicants’ request as an application to force criminal proceedings ( Klageerzwingungsantrag ) and held that these proceedings were only admissible if the prosecution of one or more identified accused had been requested. An application to force criminal proceedings against an unidentified accused had to be declared inadmissible, since the proceedings were not supposed to identify the accused or replace investigations. Only in a case where a public prosecutor’s office had entirely refrained from investigating a crime had a court the possibility to order an investigation. Under Article   173 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Strafprozessordnung – hereinafter “the CCP”; see paragraph 37 below) a court was only allowed to conduct minor enquiries to fill in remaining gaps in an investigation. Moreover, the applicants had not submitted specific facts or evidence that would have allowed the court to identify an accused. 25.     On 25 October 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on Articles 2 § 2, 19 § 4 and 103 § 1 of the German Basic Law ( Grundgesetz ) (see paragraphs 29-31 below). Besides referring to articles of the Basic Law, the applicants also referred in their complaint to Articles   2, 3, and 13 of the Convention. In essence they complained that the investigation had not been effective and that the Court of Appeal had not evaluated the effectiveness of the investigation. 26.     On 23 March 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter “the Constitutional Court”) refused, in a reasoned decision (2   BvR   1304/12), to admit the applicants’ constitutional complaint. The court held that the investigations had been conducted diligently, but had not established sufficient suspicion of criminal conduct on the part of specific police officers. Moreover, the remaining gaps and factual uncertainties could not be attributed to omissions in the investigation. The court also found that it had not been necessary to question all the squad members who had possibly been involved. In its decision the Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s case-law concerning the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention and, in particular, to the cases of McCann and Others v.   the   United Kingdom (27 September 1995, Series A no. 324) and Grams v.   Germany ((dec.), no. 33677/96, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII). The court also emphasised that the public prosecutor’s office had been the responsible authority for the investigation and thereby “master of the proceedings” ( Herr des Verfahrens ). D.     Other investigations 27.     During the investigation the applicants also filed criminal complaints in respect of assistance given in an official capacity in avoiding prosecution or punishment ( Strafvereitelung im Amt ) and suppression of evidence ( Beweismittelunterdrückung ). The applicants alleged that several relevant parts of the video material, showing disproportionate police violence, had been deleted. The investigation against the five police officers was discontinued by the Munich public prosecutor’s office. 28.     A subsequent appeal before the Munich general public prosecutor was to no avail. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The German Basic Law 29.     Article 2 § 2 of the Basic Law reads: “Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.” 30.     Article 19 § 4 of the Basic Law, in so far as relevant, reads: “Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. ...” 31.     Article 103 § 1 of the Basic Law, in so far as relevant, reads: “In the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law. ...” B.     Criminal Investigations 32.     The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulating criminal investigations, in so far as relevant, read: Article   152 “(1)     The public prosecutor’s office shall have the authority to bring public charges. (2)     Except as otherwise provided by law, the public prosecutor’s office shall be obliged to take action in relation to all prosecutable criminal offences, provided there are sufficient factual indications.” Article   160 “(1)     As soon as a public prosecutor’s office obtains knowledge of a suspected criminal offence either through a criminal complaint or by other means it shall investigate the facts to decide whether to bring public charges. ...” Article   170 “(1)     If an investigation provides sufficient reasons for bringing public charges, the public prosecutor’s office shall bring charges by submitting a bill of indictment to the competent court. (2)     In all other cases a public prosecutor’s office shall terminate the proceedings. The public prosecutor shall notify the accused thereof if he was examined as such or a warrant of arrest was issued against him; the same shall apply if he has requested such notice or if there is a particular interest in the notification.” Article 171 “ If the public prosecution office does not grant an application for preferring public charges, or after conclusion of the investigation it orders the proceedings to be terminated, it shall notify the applicant, indicating the reasons. ...” Article 200 “(1)     The bill of indictment shall indicate the indicted accused, the criminal offence with which he is charged, the time and place of its commission, its statutory elements and the penal provisions which are to be applied (the charges). ...” C.     Organisation of the public prosecutor’s office 33.     The organisation of the public prosecutor’s office is governed in the Courts Act ( Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz ). The relevant provisions, in so far as relevant, read: Section   142 of the Courts Act “(1)     The official duties of the public prosecutor’s office shall be discharged: ... 2.     at the Courts of Appeal and the Regional Courts by one or more public prosecutors; 3.     at the District Courts by one or more public prosecutors or officials of the public prosecutor’s office with a right of audience before the District Courts. ...” Section   146 of the Courts Act “The officials of the public prosecutor’s office must comply with the official instructions of their superiors.” Section   147 of the Courts Act “The right of supervision and direction shall lie with: ... 2.     the Land agency for the administration of justice in respect of all the officials of the public prosecutor’s office of the Land concerned; 3.     the highest-ranking official of the public prosecutor’s office at the Courts of Appeal and the Regional Courts in respect of all the officials of the public prosecutor’s office of the given court’s district.” 34.     The highest-ranking official of the public prosecutor’s office at the Courts of Appeal bears the title general public prosecutor. The Munich general public prosecutor supervises, inter alia , the public prosecutors at the Munich Regional Court. D.     Relationship between the police and the public prosecutor’s office 35.     The hierarchical order and relations between the public prosecutor’s office and the police are regulated by the CCP and the Courts Act. The relevant provisions, in so far as relevant, read: Article   161 of the CCP “(1)     For the purpose indicated in Article 160 § 1 to § 3 [of the CCP], the public prosecutor’s office shall be entitled to request information from all authorities and to initiate investigations of any kind, either itself or through the authorities and officials in the police force provided there are no other statutory provisions specifically regulating their powers. The authorities and officials in the police force shall be obliged to comply with such a request or order of the public prosecutor’s office and shall be entitled, in such cases, to request information from all authorities.” Article   163 of the CCP “(1)     The authorities and officials in the police force shall investigate criminal offences and shall take all measures that may not be deferred, in order to prevent concealment of facts. To this end they shall be entitled to request, and in exigent circumstances to demand, information from all authorities, as well as to conduct investigations of any kind in so far as there are no other statutory provisions specifically regulating their powers. (2)     The authorities and officials in the police force shall transmit their records to the public prosecutor’s office without delay. Where it appears necessary that a judicial investigation be performed promptly, transmission directly to the Local Court shall be possible. ...” Section   152 of the Courts Act “(1)     The investigating personnel of the public prosecutor’s office shall be obliged in this capacity to comply with the orders of the public prosecutor’s office of their district and the orders of the officials’ superior thereto. ...” E.     Proceedings to force criminal proceedings 36.     The possibilities for an aggrieved person to challenge a decision to discontinue a criminal investigation are regulated in Article 172 of the CCP, which, in so far as relevant, reads: “(1)     Where the applicant is also the aggrieved person, he shall be entitled to lodge a complaint against the notification made in accordance with Article   171 [of the CCP, see paragraph 32 above] to the official superior of the public prosecutor’s office within two weeks of receipt of such notification. ... (2)     The applicant may, within one month of receipt of notification, apply for a court decision in respect of the dismissal of the complaint by the official superior of the public prosecutor’s office. He shall be instructed as to this right and as to the form such an application shall take; the time-limit shall not run if no instruction has been given. ... (3)     The application for a court decision must indicate the facts which are intended to substantiate the bringing of public charges, as well as the evidence. The application must be signed by a lawyer; legal aid shall be governed by the same provisions as in civil litigation. The application shall be submitted to the court competent to decide. (4)     The Court of Appeal shall be competent to decide on the application. ...” 37.     The CCP provisions regulating the proceedings to force criminal proceedings read: Article   173 “(1)     Upon the request of a court a public prosecutor’s office shall submit to the court the records of the hearings conducted so far. (2)     The court may inform the accused of the application, setting him a time-limit for making a statement in reply. (3)     The court may order an investigation to prepare its decision and may entrust such investigations to a commissioned or requested judge.” Article   175 “If after hearing the accused, the court considers the application to be well ‑ founded, it shall order that public charges be brought. This order shall be carried out by the public prosecutor’s office.” F.     Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 38.     Section   31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act ( Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – hereinafter “the Constitutional Court Act”) declares the decisions of the Constitutional Court binding upon all constitutional organs, courts and administrative authorities. It reads: “(1)     The decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be binding upon the constitutional organs of the Federation and of the Länder , as well as on all courts and those with public authority.” 39.     Under section 32 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court is empowered to issue preliminary injunctions and under section 35 of the Constitutional Court Act it may specify who is to execute its decisions and the method of execution. These provisions read, as far as relevant, as follows: Section 32 “(1)     In a dispute, the Constitutional Court may provisionally decide a matter by way of a preliminary injunction if this is urgently required to avert severe disadvantage, to prevent imminent violence or for another important reason in the interest of the common good. ...” Section 35 “The Constitutional Court may specify in its decision who is to execute it; in individual cases it may also specify the method of execution.” 40.     The relevant provisions regulating constitutional-complaint proceedings read: Section 90 “(1)     Any individual claiming a violation of one of his or her fundamental rights or of one of his or her rights under Article 20 § 4, Articles 33, 38, 101, 103, or 104 of the Basic Law by a public authority may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. (2)     If legal recourse to other courts exists, the constitutional complaint may only be lodged after all remedies have been exhausted. However, the Constitutional Court may decide on a constitutional complaint that was lodged before all remedies were exhausted if the complaint is of general relevance or if prior recourse to other courts were to the complainant’s severe and unavoidable disadvantage.” Section 95 “(1)     If the Court allows a constitutional complaint, the decision shall declare which provision of the Basic Law was violated and by which act or omission. The Constitutional Court may simultaneously declare that any repetition of the contested act or omission would violate the Basic Law. (2)     If the Court allows a constitutional complaint that challenges a decision, the Constitutional Court shall reverse the decision; in the cases referred to in §   90 sec. 2 sentence 1, it shall remit the matter to a competent court. ...” 41.     In accordance with the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court the term “decision” in section 95(2) of the Constitutional Court Act is not limited to court decisions, but understood in a way that it entails every act of a public authority violating the fundamental rights of a plaintiff (1   BvR   289/56, 7   May 1957). In line with this understanding the Constitutional Court set aside, in the case 2   BvR 878/05 (17   November 2005), the reasoning of a decision to discontinue criminal proceedings, as it violated the presumption of innocence of the plaintiff. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 42.     The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) stated in its report to the German Government published on 1 June 2017 on the visit to Germany from 25   November to 7   December 2015 (CPT/Inf (2017) 13) with reference to the Court’s judgments in Kummer v. the Czech Republic (no. 32133/11, §§   85-87, 25   July 2013) and Eremiášová and Pechová v. the Czech Republic (no.   23944/04, 16 February 2012) that it: “has some doubts as to whether investigations carried out by investigators of the central investigation units – and even more so those carried out by criminal police officers of regional or local police headquarters – against other police officers can be seen to be fully independent and impartial.” (CPT/Inf (2017) 13, § 18) 43.     The CPT further reiterated its recommendation that the police authorities should take the necessary steps to ensure that police officers wearing masks or other equipment that may hamper their identification be obliged to wear a clearly visible means of identification (for example a number on the uniform and/or helmet). It held that: “... the CPT has repeatedly stressed that appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that police officers wearing masks or other equipment that may hamper their identification can be held accountable for their actions (e.g. by means of a clearly visible number on the uniform). Such a requirement is also likely to have a preventive effect and significantly reduce the risk of excessive use of force and other forms of ill-treatment.” (ibid., § 21) THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 44.     The applicants alleged under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been beaten and had had pepper spray used on them by police officers who, owing to an inadequate investigation, had been neither identified nor punished. They also complained that the German legal system did not provide them with an effective judicial remedy to complain about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation. In this connection, the applicants relied on Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3. 45.     The Court, as master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 55, ECHR   2015), finds it appropriate to examine the complaints solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicants (a)     Substantive aspect of the complaint 46.     The applicants argued that based on their statements to the Court and to the national authorities, which had been corroborated by the provided medical certificates, it had been established that they had been beaten and had had pepper spray used on them by police officers. Moreover, the investigation had not shown that the applicants had been behaving aggressively or had provoked the use of force in any way. Consequently, the attack they had endured had been unjustified and constituted ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. (b)     Procedural aspect of the complaint (i)     Effective official investigation 47.     The applicants submitted that from the beginning there had been an arguable claim of excessive use of force by the police. Besides their own testimonies, the statements of other spectators at the match and several reports in the press had confirmed their account of events. Consequently, the national authorities had been obliged to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the responsible police officers. 48.     The Government had, nevertheless, failed to do so, since the investigation had suffered from several deficiencies which had made it ineffective. Firstly, the investigation had never produced the identity of the deployed police officers and thereby of the possible suspects. Even though the authorities had deployed helmeted officers without any identifying insignia, the investigating unit had refused to identify and question the officers at issue. Secondly, the investigation had not been conducted by a sufficiently independent authority. The public prosecutor’s office had not been practically independent, owing to the proximity between the local police force and the local public prosecutor’s office and the fact that the latter had to rely on the local police force for the investigation in every single case. Moreover, for all practical purposes the investigation had been conducted by the Munich police and the Munich public prosecutor had only been informed of the status of the investigation. The investigating unit, however, had been part of the same police force as the officers they had been investigating. Therefore the investigating and the investigated unit had been under the command of the Munich Chief of Police and the investigation could not be considered to have been independent or impartial. Thirdly, the investigation had been neither prompt nor thorough. The investigator had failed to secure the entire video material before it had been deleted, had questioned witnesses only after a considerable time and had never questioned all the deployed police officers, or the paramedic who had treated the first applicant at the stadium. 49.     These deficiencies had prevented the identification of the suspected perpetrators and the collection of further evidence, in particular witness statements of the colleagues of the suspected perpetrators confirming the applicants’ accounts. In sum the deployment of helmeted officers without any identifying insignia in conjunction with the deficient investigation had led to the impunity of the perpetrators. (ii)     Remedy to complain of the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation 50.     The applicants submitted that the German legal system had not provided them with an effective remedy to review the effectiveness of the investigation. At the outset they submitted that, given the hierarchical structure of the public prosecutor’s office, the general public prosecutor had not been sufficiently independent. Consequently, the complaint before the general public prosecutor under Article 172 § 1 of the CCP could not be considered an effective remedy in the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. As regards judicial remedies at their disposal they referred to the Court’s judgment in Kaverzin v.   Ukraine (no. 23893/03, § 93, 15 May 2012) and argued that an effective remedy would have required that the domestic courts had had the power to examine all relevant evidence, to overturn the prosecutor’s decision to discontinue, and to initiate enquiries. This, however, had not been the case for them. 51.     Their application to force further enquiries had been interpreted by the Court of Appeal as an application to force criminal proceedings and had been declared inadmissible. The Court of Appeal had only assessed whether the public prosecutor’s office had entirely refrained from investigating a criminal offence but not whether the investigation had been effective within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, the court had had the power only to bring charges, but not to reopen the investigation. 52.     As regards the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the applicants argued that the court had confined itself to assessing whether the decision of the Court of Appeal had been legitimate. It had not examined whether the investigation had been effective. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had not had the power to initiate an investigation or to order specific investigative measures. In accordance with the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court could only declare which provision of the German Basic Law had been violated (section 95(1)) and refer the case back to the competent court (sections 95(2) and 90(1)). The competent court, however, would have been the Court of Appeal again, which had previously decided that it had not had the legal power to reopen the investigation and had declared the application to force further enquiries inadmissible. The applicants further submitted that up until that point there had never been a successful constitutional complaint challenging a decision that upheld the discontinuation of investigations in cases of alleged police violence in which the perpetrator had not been identified. 2.     The Government (a)     Admissibility 53.     The Government submitted that the applicants’ argument that the police had suppressed video material during the investigation should be dismissed owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. After the investigation into this allegation had been discontinued, the applicants had not initiated court proceedings to force criminal proceedings. Moreover, the applicants had not raised this issue in their constitutional complaint. Similarly, the applicants had not complained about the promptness of the investigation before the Constitutional Court either. Lastly, the applicants had also failed to challenge the lack of a judicial remedy, in particular the alleged ineffectiveness of the proceedings to force criminal proceedings, before the Constitutional Court. (b)     Substantive aspect of the complaint 54.     The Government argued that it had not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention or that the authorities had had recourse to physical force which had not been rendered strictly necessary by the applicants’ behaviour. 55.     As regards the police operation as a whole the Government submitted that the police had been confronted with aggressive behaviour on the part of some supporters and had justifiably used their truncheons as a defensive weapon. However, there had been no indication that any police officer had intentionally struck or used pepper spray on the first or second applicant. The accounts of the applicants themselves had neither been credible nor supported by any evidence. (c)     Procedural aspect of the complaint (i)     Effective official investigation 56.     As regards the obligation to effectively investigate the allegations of police violence, the Government submitted that, owing to the lack of a credible allegation, no such obligation had arisen. The German authorities had nonetheless conducted an effective investigation into the police operation and the applicants’ allegations. 57.     During the investigation thirty-nine witnesses had been questioned, including the video officers and the leaders of the relevant units. Moreover, all available video material had been analysed. An investigation into allegations of suppression and intentional destruction of the video material had not confirmed those allegations, but had shown that the material had been handled in accordance with the generally applicable policies. The investigation had been conducted by an independent authority, namely the public prosecutor’s office. As this office had not had their own investigators, they had instructed and supervised officers from the general police force. Lastly, the investigation had been sufficiently prompt and the applicants had been sufficiently involved therein. 58.     Moreover, under Article 170 § 2 of the CCP the public prosecutor’s office could only bring public charges if the investigation had unearthed sufficient reasons to do so. This had not been so in the present case. Furthermore, the public prosecutor’s office had not been obliged to carry out unorthodox investigative measures. It was permissible to omit such measures if weighing up the effort and the anticipated outcome did not justify their taking. Therefore, the public prosecutor’s office had justifiably refrained from questioning the individual police officers involved, as it had already questioned their commanders. 59.     In sum the investigation had not led to the punishment of a suspect because the allegations of the applicants had not been confirmed and not because the suspected police officers had not or could not have been identified. (ii)     Remedy to complain about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation 60.     The Government submitted that Article 3 of the Convention did not require a judicial remedy and that the possibility to challenge a decision to discontinue an investigation before the general public prosecutor under Article 172 § 1 of the CCP had fulfilled the requirements stemming from the Convention. Even though the general public prosecutor had been the superior of each public prosecutor in the respective court district, he or she had been provided with his or her own staff and therefore had been sufficiently independent from subordinate public prosecutors. 61.     Moreover, the applicants had had judicial possibilities to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation at their disposal. Firstly proceedings to force criminal proceedings, a remedy they had also made use of. The Court of Appeal had adopted the most favourable interpretation of the law for the applicants, in accordance with which it could have ordered further investigations if the public prosecutor’s office had conducted an entirely inadequate investigation. As the court had found that this had not been the case and that the applicants had not shown that further enquiries would have been fruitful, the applicants’ request had been declared inadmissible. The Government argued that the Court of Appeal’s assessment had been in line with the requirements for an effective investigation under Article 3 of the Convention. 62.     Lastly, the applicants had also challenged the effectiveness of the investigation before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court had directly referred to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court regarding the obligation to investigate allegations of police violence and concluded that the investigation had been effective. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had also been competent to initiate or reopen an investigation. Under section 35 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court could have specified the method of execution and the competent authority to execute its decision, and under section 32 of the Constitutional Court Act it could have issued a preliminary injunction. Under section 95(2) of the Constitutional Court Act the court could also have set the public prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the investigation aside. The Constitutional Court had already done so in its judgment in the case 2   BvR   878/05. B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     Admissibility 63.     The Court notes that the Government argued that the applicants had not lodged an application to force criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged suppression of evidence and video material. In that connection it observes that these proceedings would have concerned a different investigation. While the applicants unsuccessfully lodged an application to force criminal proceedings concerning the investigation into alleged police violence, they did not do so in respect of the investigation into alleged suppression of evidence. As the applicants’ present application to the Court concerns the allegation of police violence the Court considers it unnecessary for the applicants’ present complaint to have exhausted domestic remedies regarding a second, separate investigation. 64.     Moreover, the Government raised the objection of non ‑ exhaustion regarding two of the applicants’ arguments (see paragraph   53 above), because the applicants had not made these arguments in their constitutional complaint. The Court notes that it is not in dispute between the parties that the applicants challenged the effectiveness of the investigation before the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the applicants referred in their constitutional complaint to the Court’s jurisdiction concerning States’ obligations under the procedural head of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, pursuant to which investigations had to be prompt, thorough and independent. It also notices that the applicants described in detail the course and duration of the investigation and the subsequent court proceedings. Consequently, the Court finds that the applicants provided the Constitutional Court with all relevant information to assess the effectiveness of the investigation, which they challenged in their constitutional complaint. 65.     Lastly, in so far as the Government raised the objection of non ‑ exhaustion in regards to the lack of a possibility to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation, the Court observes that the applicants complained under Articles 19 § 4 and 103 § 1 of the Basic Law that the Court of Appeal had not evaluated the effectiveness of the investigation and that it had not responded in detail to the several alleged flaws therein, as outlined in the applicants’ application to force further enquiries. In the light of the applicants’