CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 5 décembre 2017

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He was represented by Ms A. Gavrilova-Ancheva, a lawyer practising in Sofia. 2.     The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms V. Hristova of the Ministry of Justice. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and established by the Court of its own motion on the basis of publicly available documents, may be summarised as follows. 1.     State Security 4 .     Like other former communist countries in Eastern Europe, at the time of the communist regime (1944-89) Bulgaria had a security service, called State Security, one of whose main tasks was to supress dissent against the regime. It chiefly operated by keeping people seen as dangerous to the regime under surveillance, which it carried out through a network of secret collaborators. At first, State Security was part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1965 it was brought under the direct supervision of the Council of Ministers, but in the period 1968-69 was again placed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was also directly accountable to the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee, Politburo and Secretary General. (a)     Internal structure 5 .     Between 1969 and 1990, when it closed (see paragraph 9 below), State Security had six directorates. The first dealt with intelligence; the second with counterintelligence; the third with military counterintelligence; the fourth with technical and economic espionage; the fifth with security and protection; and the sixth with “the fight against ideological diversion and anti-State acts”. In addition to those directorates, there were five stand ‑ alone departments: investigation; external surveillance and research; records and archiving; encryption and communications; and military and combat readiness. 6 .     After 1975 State Security’s sixth directorate was composed of seven departments. The first was tasked with “the fight against ideological diversion and other subversive activities of the enemy through the intelligentsia”; the second with “the fight against ideological diversion and other subversive activities” among graduate and postgraduate students; the third with countering “subversive activities of the enemy” in religious organisations; the fourth with supressing nationalist activities by various ethnic minorities; and the fifth with countering the activities of Bulgarian emigrant organisations. The sixth department’s task was thwarting “anti ‑ State activities”. The seventh department dealt with information and analysis. In 1981 a new department was added, the new seventh department, which made the former seventh department the eighth department. It was tasked with “combatting terrorism, anonymous enemy activities and escapes” and with tracking down “State criminals”. In 1985 a new “T” (terror) unit was spun off from that department. (b)     Types of files and records kept by State Security 7 .     By section 7(1) of a secret 1978 Instruction by the Minister of Internal Affairs, which remained in effect until the closing of the organisation in early 1990 (see paragraph 9 below), State Security kept nine types of files. They fell into two broad categories. The first consisted of seven types of files relating to targets: “operative inquiry files”, “operative development files”, “operative tracing files”, “operative surveillance files”, “operative files”, “object development files” and “literal files”. The second category comprised two types of files relating to resources used by State Security: “secret collaborator files” and “secret meeting premises files”. 8 .     Reference data about the files were recorded in several card indexes and registration journals (sections 50 to 59 of the 1978 Instruction). Index   no. 4 contained cards relating to active and retired collaborators, people groomed for recruitment, and people whose recruitment had been aborted. Index no. 5 contained similar cards to those in Index no. 4, but was ordered according to operative pseudonym, and Index no. 6 contained cards relating to active collaborators arranged according to department, as well as secret premises (section 50(2)). The other indexes contained cards relating to surveillance targets: dissidents, emigrants, “anti-State” groups, and so on (section 15(2)). (c)     The closing of State Security and the partial destruction of its files 9 .     In January 1990, shortly after the fall of the communist regime in late 1989, the Government decided to close State Security. 10 .     At about the same time, noting the “complicated political and operative situation”, on 25 January 1990 the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in charge of the Ministry’s archive secretly proposed that a number of the files kept by State Security be destroyed. The Minister approved the proposal the same day. A few days later, on 5 February 1990, the Deputy Minister secretly proposed that steps be taken to speed up the files’ destruction. The Minister approved the proposal the same day. 11 .     According to an inventory drawn up by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1994, that covert operation resulted in the destruction of 134,102 of the total 331,995 files kept by State Security. 2.     The applicant’s exposure as having been affiliated with State Security 12.     The applicant is a lawyer. He has been a member of the Sofia Bar Association since 1980. From 1992 to 1995 he was the Secretary General of the Supreme Bar Council, and from 1994 to 1996 he was the Secretary General of the Central Electoral Commission. From 1996 to 1997 he was the liquidator of an insolvent bank. For a few months in 1997 he was the Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister in a caretaker government. (a)     First investigation 13 .     Government ministers must be checked for affiliation with the security services of the communist regime under section 3(1) of the statute that lies at the heart of this case, the Access to and Disclosure of Documents and Exposure of the Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian People’s Army Act 2006 (“the   2006 Act” – see paragraphs 44, 45 and 47 below). Following an investigation into government ministers, on 12 February 2008 the Commission administering the Act (see paragraphs 53-56 below) issued a decision exposing the applicant as having been affiliated with the seventh department of the sixth directorate of State Security (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) between 1982 and 1990. It also put the decision on its website. The Commission relied on a registration form, an entry in the registration journal, an index card, a report on the applicant’s recruitment, and a proposal to discharge him, the latter two documents having been drawn up by the officer who, according to the records, had been the applicant’s handler. 14 .     Two days later, on 14 February 2008 the applicant was able to consult these documents. Shortly after that he published them on his website. 15 .     He did not seek judicial review of the Commission’s decision. According to him, this would have been pointless, as this was not an effective remedy. 16 .     Two days later, on 16 February 2008 a weekly newspaper published information about the applicant’s exposure. A couple of days after that, on 18 February 2008 the applicant wrote an article in a daily newspaper in which, among other things, he denied having been a collaborator, said that he had been unaware of the existence of a file relating to him, and contested the truthfulness of the documents in that file, pointing out that all of them emanated from officers of State Security and that those officers might have put false information in them out of a wish to fill their recruitment quotas or for other ulterior motives. He also stated that he had not been particularly impressed or upset by the publication of the information about him. (b)     Second investigation 17 .     Following an investigation into members of the Supreme Bar Council – who must be checked for affiliation with the former security services under section 3(2) of the 2006 Act (see paragraph 49 below) – on   24 February 2014 the Commission issued another decision exposing the applicant as having been affiliated with the seventh department of the sixth directorate of State Security (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). It relied on the same documents as those serving as a basis for the 2008 decision (see paragraph 13 above), plus two index cards. 18 .     This time, the applicant sought judicial review. He argued that the Commission should only have exposed him if, having carefully examined the former security services’ records, it had been satisfied that they were sufficiently reliable and attested to actual collaboration on his part, which was not the case. The Sofia City Administrative Court allowed the claim and quashed the Commission’s decision. It agreed with the applicant’s argument, and noted that the only records showing that he had been affiliated with the former security services were documents drawn up by the officer who had allegedly been his handler, entries in the registration journals, and index cards. Since those did not clearly prove that the applicant had actually collaborated with those services, the decision to expose him had been unlawful (реш. № 541 от 02.02.2015 г. по адм. д. №   2971/2014 г., АС-София-град). 19 .     The Commission appealed on points of law. In a judgment of 17   June 2016 (реш. № 7361 от 17.06.2016 г. по адм. д. № 4068/2015 г., ВАС, III о.), the Supreme Administrative Court reversed the lower court’s judgment. It noted that the Commission’s first decision to expose the applicant in 2008 had not been challenged by him and had become final, and that the applicant’s claim for judicial review of the third decision to expose him in June 2014 had already been dismissed in a final judgment (see paragraphs 13 above and 22 below). Those facts were crucial for the determination of the case, and in the light of those facts it had to be concluded that the exposure at issue was lawful. (c)     Third investigation 20 .     Following an investigation into the board members of private companies which had bought parts of State-owned companies – who must be checked for affiliation with the former security services under section   3(2) of the 2006 Act, as amended in 2012 (see paragraph 50 below)   – on 4 June 2014 the Commission issued a third decision exposing the applicant as having been affiliated with the seventh department of the sixth directorate of State Security (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). It relied on the same documents as those serving as a basis for the February 2014 decision (see paragraph 17 above). 21 .     The applicant again sought judicial review. He raised the same arguments as those that he had made with respect to the Commission’s second decision in relation to him (see paragraph 18 above). This time, however, the Sofia City Administrative Court upheld the Commission’s decision. Relying on the Supreme Administrative Court’s prevailing case ‑ law under section 25(3) of the 2006 Act and the Constitutional Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of that provision (see paragraphs 71 and 76 below), the Sofia City Administrative Court held that the Commission did not have to check whether the applicant had in fact collaborated or consented to be recruited as a collaborator, but had been bound to expose him, as it had found records relating to him. It was immaterial whether or not there was enough evidence to show that he had actually collaborated (реш. № 1947 от 24.03.2015 г. по адм. д. №   6086/2014 г., АС-София-град). 22 .     The applicant appealed on points of law, reiterating his arguments. In a judgment of 11 May 2016 (реш. № 5566 от 11.05.2016 г. по адм. д. №   5343/2015 г., ВАС, III о.), the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s judgment, fully agreeing with its reasoning. It likewise held that since the 2006 Act did not provide for the exposure of the actual activities of those concerned, but simply the exposure of their affiliation with the former security services, the Commission did not have to assess the nature or extent of their collaboration or establish their actual activities. (d)     The applicant’s public activities since 2008 23 .     Since 1998 the applicant has been a member of the supervisory board of Bulgarian Holding Company AD, an investment company listed on the alternative-market segment of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange. He is still a member of the Sofia Bar Association. 24 .     In November 2009 the applicant published an article in a daily newspaper in which he commented on the rules governing the use of firearms by the police. 25 .     In January 2014 he was appointed a member of the civil society council assisting a parliamentary committee tasked with drafting a new Electoral Code. In February 2014 he gave a radio interview on his work there. 26 .     Between 2014 and 2015 he took part in several television and radio programmes where he was invited, in his capacity as former Minister of Justice, to comment on problems in the judicial system and possible ways of reforming it. In May 2015 he co-signed an open letter in which a number of lawyers and public figures expressed their indignation at the work of the Supreme Judicial Council. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     Relevant constitutional provisions 27 .     Article 5 § 4 of the 1991 Constitution provides that international treaties which have been ratified and promulgated and have come into force with respect to Bulgaria are part of domestic law and take precedence over any conflicting provisions of domestic legislation. 28 .     Article 32 of the Constitution enshrines the right to protection of one’s private life and some related rights in the following terms: “1.     Citizens’ private life shall be inviolable. All shall be entitled to protection against unlawful interferences with their private or family life and against infringements of their honour, dignity or good name. 2.     No one may be placed under surveillance, photographed, filmed, recorded, or subjected to any similar action without his or her knowledge or in spite of his or her express disagreement, save in the cases provided for by law.” 29 .     In defamation cases, the courts have held that infringement of the rights set out in Article 32 of the Constitution is a tort (see реш. № 358 от   23.02.2015 г. по в. гр. д. № 3719/2014 г., САС, and реш. № 1376 от   07.01.2016 г. по в. гр. д. № 1173/2016 г., САС). The Supreme Court of Cassation has done the same in a case concerning unauthorised filming (see реш. № 878 от 16.06.2006 г. по гр. д. № 721/2005 г., ВКС, IV-Б г. о.). 30 .     Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the right to information in the following terms: “1.     Everyone shall have the right to seek, receive and impart information. The exercise of that right may not be directed against the rights and the good name of other citizens or against national security, public order, public health or morals. 2.     Citizens shall have the right to information from State bodies or agencies on any matter of legitimate interest to them, unless the information is a State secret or a secret protected by law or affects the rights of others.” 31 .     Article 56 of the Constitution enshrines the right to a remedy in the following terms: “Every citizen shall have the right to a remedy if his or her rights or legitimate interests have been infringed or threatened. ...” 32 .     Article 120 of the Constitution provides for judicial review of administrative action in the following terms: “1.     The courts shall review the lawfulness of the administrative authorities’ decisions and actions. 2.     Citizens and legal persons may seek judicial review of any administrative decision which affects them, save as expressly specified by statute.” 2.     Attempts to put in place lustration laws 33 .     In 1992 members of parliament put forward several bills providing for the lustration of ex-communist cadres and collaborators of the former security services. Four bills seeking to bar ex-communist cadres from holding any public office did not reach a plenary vote. Three more limited ones were enacted: paragraph 9 of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Banks and Credit Act 1992, which barred such persons from holding executive positions in commercial banks for five years; a new section 10a of the Pensions Act 1957, which provided that time served in an executive position in the former Bulgarian Communist Party and its related outfits would not count for retirement pension purposes; and an Act Provisionally Laying Down Certain Additional Requirements for the Management of Scientific Organisations 1992, which barred ex-communist cadres and collaborators of the former security services from holding posts in academia. All three provisions were immediately challenged before the Constitutional Court. The court struck down the first and the second on the basis that they were discriminatory and interfered disproportionately with the fundamental rights to choose one’s profession and receive a pension (see   реш. № 8 от 27.07.1992 г. по к. д. № 7/1992 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   62/1992   г., and реш. № 11 от 29.07.1992 г. по к. д. № 18/1992 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 64/1992 г.). The third Act survived the constitutional challenge (see реш. № 1 от 11.02.1993 г. по к. д. № 32/1992 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 14/1993 г.), but was repealed approximately two years later in March 1995. 34 .     Lustration initiatives were resumed in 1998, with the enactment of paragraph 1(1) of the additional provisions of the Administration Act 1998, which barred ex-communist cadres and staff members or collaborators of the former security services from holding executive posts in State administration for five years, and sections 26(3) and 59(2)(3) of the Radio and Television Act 1998, which barred such persons from working in the media regulatory authority and in management at Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television. The first provision was declared unconstitutional, chiefly on the basis that it was discriminatory and interfered disproportionately with the fundamental right to work (see реш. № 2 от 21.01.1999 г. по к. д. № 33/1998 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   8/1999   г.). The two others survived an initial constitutional challenge (see реш. № 10 от 25.06.1999 г. по к. д. № 36/1998 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   60/1999 г.), but were struck down by the Constitutional Court fourteen years later in 2013, again chiefly on the basis that they were discriminatory and interfered disproportionately with the right to work (see реш. № 8 от   11.10.2013 г. по к. д. № 6/2013 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 91/2013 г.). 35 .     A third wave of lustration laws were passed between 2009 and 2011. The first lustration law, Rule 3 of the Standing Rules of Parliament, barred members of parliament who had been collaborators of the former security services from serving in Parliament’s presidency, from acting as presidents or deputy presidents of parliamentary committees or members of certain key committees, and from becoming members of international parliamentary delegations. The second law, sections 27(4), 31(3) and 33(3) of the Diplomatic Service Act 2007, as amended in 2011, barred such collaborators from serving as ambassadors, deputy ambassadors or general consuls, or from holding certain executive posts in State administration. The third law, section 11(1)(8) of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency Act 2011, barred collaborators from holding the posts of general director, deputy general director or secretary general of that agency. Between 2009 and 2012 all those provisions were declared unconstitutional, on the same basis as that declared previously: that they were discriminatory and interfered disproportionately with the fundamental right to work (see реш. № 11 от   03.12.2009 г. по к. д. № 13/2009 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 98/2009 г.; реш.   № 11 от 22.11.2011 г. по к. д. № 8/2011 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   95/2011 г.; and реш. № 11 от 02.10.2012 г. по к. д. № 1/2012 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 78/2012 г.). 3.     Laws on the exposure of certain staff members and collaborators of the former security services (a)     Attempt between 1990 and 1991 to expose members of the Grand National Assembly who had been collaborators of the former security services 36 .     On 23 August 1990 the Seventh Grand National Assembly (“the   Assembly”) – the first democratically elected legislature after the fall of the communist regime in 1989 – resolved to set up an ad hoc committee to inquire whether any Assembly members had been collaborators of the regime’s security services. The committee, called the Tambuev Committee after its chairman, submitted its report to the Bureau of the Assembly on 17   April 1991. However, following a leak in the press of the names of about thirty Assembly members who had allegedly been such collaborators, a scandal erupted in the Assembly on 23 April 1991, and the committee was disbanded without completing its work. (b)     1994 decision to declassify information about agents of the former security services 37 .     In a decision of 13 October 1994 (обн., ДВ, бр. 86/1994 г.), Parliament decreed that information about agents of the former security services relating to the period before 13 October 1991 was not a State secret. However, in the absence of legal provisions specifying the manner in which this information could be made public, the decision did not lead to any specific steps. (c)     The 1997 Exposure Act 38 .     In August 1997 Parliament passed an Act – the Access to Documents of the Former State Security and the Former Intelligence Department of the General Staff Act – providing that some State officials (the President and Vice-President, ministers and deputy ministers, members of parliament, Constitutional Court judges, members of the Supreme Judicial Council, judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, prosecutors in the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, regional governors, heads of some executive and regulatory agencies, and the directors general of Bulgarian National Television, Bulgarian National Radio and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency) and the executives of State-owned banks and insurance companies were to be checked for affiliation with the former security services. By section 4, the check was to be carried out by a commission chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs and comprising the heads of the various intelligence services. 39 .     Fifty-two members of parliament almost immediately challenged the constitutionality of the entire Act. In September 1997 the Constitutional Court dismissed the bulk of the application, but, despite the dissent of four judges, struck down the provisions concerning the investigations into the President, the Vice-President and Constitutional Court judges. It held that it would be unconstitutional for them to be checked for affiliation by a commission controlled by the executive. Despite the dissent of four judges, the court also struck down the provision concerning people who only featured in the former security services’ secondary records – the card indexes and registration journals (see paragraph 8 above). It held that these records were not sufficient proof that those people had collaborated, and that this could only be proved with documents emanating from the alleged collaborators themselves. Although the files’ partial destruction had restricted the efforts to uncover such documents, the difficulty was not insurmountable, and the burden to do so fell on the State (see реш. № 10 от   22.09.1997 г. по к. д. № 14/1997 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 89/1997 г.). It later transpired that three judges from the majority had themselves been collaborators (see paragraph 68 below); they had not declared that when dealing with the case. 40 .     In February 2001 the Act was amended, with Parliament taking on board the criticisms levelled by the Constitutional Court: the amendment made the commission administering the Act independent from the executive, and specifically stated that the card indexes and registration journals (see paragraph 8 above) were not categorical proof of affiliation. The amended Act survived a further constitutional challenge (see реш.   №   14 от 30.05.2001 г. по к. д. № 7/2001 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   52/2001 г.), but was repealed just over a year later in April 2002. A constitutional challenge to the repealing Act, chiefly based on its alleged discrepancy with the constitutional right to information, was dismissed (see реш. № 3 от 25.09.2002 г. по к. д. № 11/2002 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр.   94/2002 г.). (d)     The 1999, 2001 and 2005 laws providing for checks of election candidates for affiliation with the former security services 41 .     In 1999 Parliament added a new subsection 4 to section 42 of the Local Elections Act 1995. It provided that all mayoral and municipal councillor candidates were to be checked for affiliation to the former security services in the manner provided for by the 1997 Act (see paragraph   38 above), and that the results of the investigation were to be given to the political parties or coalitions which had nominated them, so that they could decide whether to withdraw the nominations. The Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed a challenge to that provision, holding that it did not strip candidates of the right to run for office, but simply enabled the parties or coalitions which had put the candidates forward to see whether to keep them on the ballot (see реш. № 12 от 24.08.1999 г. по к. д. №   12/1999 г., обн. ДВ, бр. 77/1999 г.). The Central Electoral Commission for Local Elections instructed local electoral commissions to make the results of such investigations public, but the Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision, holding that it impermissibly extended the purview of section 42(4) (see реш. № 4830 от 21.09.1999 г. по адм. д. № 5749/ 1999   г., ВАС, III о.). The provision was repealed in April 2002, alongside the 1997 Act (see paragraph 40 above). 42 .     Paragraph 6 of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Election of Members of Parliament Act 2001 provided for a similar investigation into parliamentary candidates, but only at the request of the political parties or coalitions which had nominated them. By section 48(5) of the Act, a party or a coalition could withdraw a candidate revealed by such an investigation to have been a collaborator of the former security services. The Central Electoral Commission directed that the results of the investigation could be provided by the Commission under the 1997 Act (see paragraph 40 above) by means of a full report or a simple certificate. The Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision in part, holding that the only lawful means of establishing that someone had been a collaborator was via a full report, not a certificate (see реш. № 4270 от 13.06.2001 г. по адм. д. № 4623/2001 г., ВАС, III о.). Both provisions were repealed in April 2002, alongside the 1997 Act (see paragraph 40 above). 43 .     A new section 3(3) of the 2001 Act, added in 2005, provided that the Security of Information Commission – the body overseeing the storage and use of classified information – had to check whether parliamentary candidates were affiliated to the former security services, and give the results of the investigation to the leadership of the political party or coalition which had nominated the candidates. The provision was repealed in 2009. (e)     The 2006 Act and its application (i)     Enactment 44 .     In 2006, shortly before Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, there was fresh impetus to reveal the identities of staff members and collaborators of the former security services. In May, June and August members of parliament introduced three separate bills to this effect. In August Parliament’s Standing Committee on Internal Security and Public Order and its Standing Committee on Defence reviewed the bills and, by large majorities, proposed that they be examined jointly and approved at first reading. Later that same month Parliament debated the bills, which were supported during the discussion by all major parliamentary parties, and approved them at first reading. The first bill was approved by 114 votes to   53, with 28 abstentions, the second by 167 votes to 11, with 18   abstentions, and the third by 186 votes to 10, with 5 abstentions. The second reading, at which stage the bills had been consolidated into one, took place several months later in late November and early December. Nearly all provisions of the consolidated bill were adopted almost unanimously. In particular, the provisions which laid down the sources of information that could be used to establish affiliation with the former security services (see paragraphs 60 and 62 below) were adopted by 124 votes to nil, with 3   abstentions, following a lengthy debate and the rejection of two alternative proposals. 45 .     The Act, whose full name was the Access to and Disclosure of Documents and Exposure of the Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian People’s Army Act, was published in the State Gazette on 19 December 2006 and came into effect on 23 December 2006. (ii)     Scope ratione personae 46.     By sections 1(2) and 26(1)(2) of the Act (the latter provision’s wording was amended in 2012), all those who have held specified “public office” or engaged in a specified “public activity” at any point since 10   November 1989 – the date on which the communist regime in Bulgaria is deemed to have fallen – must be checked for affiliation with the former security services, and exposed if found to have been so affiliated. By section   26(1)(3), everyone who accedes to “public office” or engages in a “public activity” in the future must also be checked for affiliation. 47 .     The list of the types of “public office” – similar to that in the 1997   Act (see paragraph 38 above), but more extensive – was set out in section 3(1). At first, it comprised: (a) the President and Vice-President; (b)   members of parliament and of the European Parliament; (c) the Prime Minister, his or her deputies, ministers, and deputy ministers; (d) judges of the Constitutional Court; (e) the Ombudsperson, the Deputy Ombudsperson and the secretary general of the Ombudsperson’s administration; (f)   chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of State agencies, and members of State commissions; (g) judges, prosecutors and investigators; (h) members of the Supreme Judicial Council; (i) members of the Commission for the Protection of Competition; (j) members of the Commission for the Regulation of Communications; (k) chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, members of the management and supervisory boards, directors, deputy directors, and heads of unit and sector of the Bulgarian National Bank, the Court of Auditors, the National Social Security Institute, and the National Health Insurance Fund; (l) executive directors of executive agencies and heads of State institutions created by statute or by decision of the Council of Ministers, as well as their deputies; (m) members of the management and supervisory boards of the Privatisation Agency and the Agency for Post ‑ Privatisation Control; (n) secretaries general, general directors, deputy general directors, main directors, deputy main directors, directors, deputy directors, heads of local police departments, heads of unit, and heads of sector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; (o) heads and deputy heads of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, and heads and deputy heads of staff of the different types of troops; (p) directors, deputy directors, directorate directors, heads of unit and heads of sector of military intelligence, the military police and the military counterintelligence services of the Ministry of Defence, the National Intelligence Service, and the National Protection Service; (q) regional governors and their deputies; (r) mayors and their deputies, as well as secretaries of municipalities and municipal councillors; (s) chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, general directors, members of the management and supervisory boards, members, and heads of directorates, units or sectors of the Electronic Media Council, Bulgarian National Television, Bulgarian National Radio, and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency; (t) members of the central electoral commissions; (u) the head of the National Centre for Sociological Surveys attached to Parliament; (w)   members of the political cabinets of the Prime Minister, his or her deputies, or ministers; (x) ambassadors, consuls general and deputy heads of diplomatic missions; (y) secretaries general, directors, heads of unit and sector of Parliament administration, as well as staff members attached to Parliament’s standing committees; (z) secretaries general, head of cabinet, secretaries, and heads of unit and sector of the President’s administration; (aa) secretaries general, directors general, deputy directors general, main directors, deputy main directors, directors, deputy directors, and heads of unit and sector in the central and territorial administration of the executive power; (ab) members of the Supreme Attestation Commission; (ac) people employed by the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or any other international organisation of which Bulgaria is member or in whose activities it takes part; and (ad) people holding office to which they were appointed by the President, Parliament, the Council of Ministers, or the Prime Minister. 48 .     In 2009, 2010 and 2011 the list underwent modifications related to the changes in structure of the authorities concerned. In 2012 Parliament expanded it to include (a) investigating police, military police and customs officers, and (b) members of the scientific councils of scientific organisations, such as universities. In early 2017 Parliament expanded the list further, to include (a) municipal ombudspersons and their deputies; (b)   lay judges; (c) secretaries general and directorate directors of the Commission for the Protection of Competition and the Commission for the Regulation of Communications; (d) chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, members, secretaries general and directorate directors of the Commission for Financial Control and the Commission for Energy and Water Regulation; (e) chief architects of municipalities and local mayoral deputies; and (f) members of the regional and municipal electoral commissions. 49 .     The list of “public activities” was set out in section 3(2). At first, it comprised (a) owners, directors, deputy directors, editors-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief, members of editorial boards, political commentators, presenters and newspaper or electronic media columnists, as well as owners and managers of sociological agencies, advertising firms or public-relations firms; (b) the chairperson, deputy chairpersons, main scientific secretary, members of the management boards, directors, deputy directors, and scientific secretaries of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and its scientific institutes and other independent units; (c) rectors and deans, their deputies, heads of branches and departments, and heads of cathedrae (faculty subdivisions) of State-owned and private colleges and universities, as well as heads and deputy heads of schools; (d) managers, executive directors, and members of the management and supervisory boards of health-care institutions, as well as chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, secretaries general and members of the management boards of the Bulgarian Doctors’ Union and the Bulgarian Dentists’ Union, as well as the chairperson, the director general and the deputy directors general of the Bulgarian Red Cross; (e)   chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and registered members of the management and supervisory bodies of political parties and coalitions, trade unions, employers’ unions, and other not-for-profit legal entities; (f) heads and members of the management bodies of religious communities; (g)   chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the Supreme Bar Council, the Bar’s Supreme Supervisory Council, and the Bar’s Supreme Disciplinary Court; (h) chairpersons and members of the management and supervisory bodies of national sport organisations and the Bulgarian Olympic Committee; (i) members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies and representatives of banks, insurance and reinsurance companies, stock exchanges, companies organising unofficial securities markets, investment brokers, and investment companies; (j) sole traders, as well as members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies and representatives of companies engaging in gambling; (k) sole traders, as well as members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies and representatives of companies providing long-distance communication services; (l) sole traders, as well as the members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies and representatives of companies which are radio or television operators; and (m) persons authorised to act as the liquidators of insolvent companies or banks. 50 .     In 2012 Parliament expanded this list to include (a) media company managers; (b) founders of not-for-profit legal entities; (c) members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies of privatised State and municipal companies, members of the managing or supervisory bodies of private companies or sole traders which have acquired shares in, or parts of, such privatised companies, and members of privatisation funds; and (d)   some categories of defaulting debtors of banks which had become insolvent in the 1990s. In early 2017 Parliament expanded the list further, to include (a) chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of the general meetings of universities and faculties; (b) chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of Bar councils, Bar budget councils and Bar disciplinary courts; (c) chairpersons and members of the management and supervisory bodies of licensed sport organisations; (d) individuals who have acquired shares in, or parts of, privatised companies; (e) special administrators of banks appointed by the Bulgarian National Bank; (f) members of the management, controlling and supervisory bodies of State and municipal companies, companies in which the State or a municipality holds half or more of the shares, and subsidiary companies in which such companies hold half or more of the shares; and (g) various categories of suspected insider debtors of insolvent banks. 51 .     By section 26(1)(1), anyone who has been registered as a candidate for the office of President, Vice-President, member of parliament, member of the European Parliament, mayor or municipal councillor must likewise be checked for affiliation with the former security services. By section   26(1)(5), added in early 2017, anyone who becomes a candidate for any type of “public office” must likewise be checked. 52 .     By section 27(4), added in 2011, anyone recommended for an order or a medal must be checked as well, and by section 11(6) of the Orders and Medals Act 2003, also added in 2011, any recommendation that the President confer an order or a medal must be accompanied by the results of that check. The 2010 private member’s bill which led to the enactment of those provisions initially proposed to bar anyone found to have been affiliated with the former security services from receiving an order or a medal. It was, however, modified by Parliament between the first and second reading to provide for a mere check for such affiliation. (iii)     The Commission administering the Act 53 .     By section 4(1) and section 29(1) and (2), the check is carried out by a special Commission. 54 .     This Commission has nine members elected by Parliament for five years (section 5(1)). Before being voted on, candidates must undergo a security check and be heard by Parliament’s Standing Committee on Internal Security and Public Order (section 6(2) to (6)). Parliament then votes on each candidature, and elects the Commission’s chairperson, deputy chairperson and secretary (section 6(7)). 55 .     No political party may have a majority in the Commission (section   5(2)). Only people enjoying public trust and authority are eligible to serve on it (section 5(3)). During their term, the Commission’s members may not hold elected office or be in a management position in a political party or professional organisation (section 5(4) and (6)). They may only be removed from office before the end of their term if they cease to fulfil the eligibility requirements (section 5(7)). 56 .     The first Commission members were elected by Parliament in April   2007. After the expiry of their initial five-year term of office, in May   2012 four of the original nine members were re-elected by Parliament for another five-year term, and five new members were elected. (iv)     Manner of checking and exposing staff members and collaborators of the former security services 57 .     By sections 1(3) and 11, the Commission was given custody of the archives of the former security services, which were to be centralised under its control. By sections 16-20 and paragraph 8 of the Act’s transitional and concluding provisions, all public authorities which had records of those services in their custody had to turn them over to the Commission within eight months of the Act’s entry into force. The Commission’s task was then to go through those records and check whether the people who had held any of the types of “public office” set out in section 3(1) of the Act, or engaged in any of the “public activities” set out in section 3(2) (see paragraphs 47-50 above), featured in them (section 9(2)). 58 .     The question of whether someone was to be exposed as having been affiliated with the former security services was governed by sections 24 and   25. By section 24, as originally enacted, those who had been staff members or collaborators of those services were to be considered as affiliated to them. Section 25, as originally enacted, provided that this was to be established on the basis of documents contained in the services’ records. It then set out, in subsections 1, 2 and 3, the types of documents capable of proving service as, respectively, a regular staff member, a supernumerary staff member, or a collaborator. By paragraph 1(1) of the Act’s additional provisions, a “document” is any recorded information, regardless of the medium used to record the information, and includes information in automated and complex information systems and databases. 59 .     In December 2012, in the wake of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to section 25(3), the subsection concerning collaborators (see paragraphs 74-76 below), Parliament deleted section 24 and moved part of it, in a slightly amended form, to section 25. The explanatory notes to the bill proposing this amendment said that it would clarify a point made by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 76 below) – that the Commission’s task was not to examine the real activities of those whom it checked for affiliation with the former security services, but simply to see whether a record of them being affiliated with those services existed. The amendment came into force on 1 January 2013. 60 .     By section 25(1) and (2), as worded since the December 2012 amendment, someone’s affiliation to the former security services as a regular or supernumerary staff member can be established on the basis of organisational charts, payrolls, or data in his or her personal file. 61.     Paragraph 1(2) and (3) of the additional provisions define “regular staff members” as Bulgarian nationals formally employed by the former security services as operatives or investigators, and “supernumerary staff members” as Bulgarian nationals drafted in by those services to carry out tasks and assignments relating to their mandate. 62 .     By section 25(3), as worded since the December 2012 amendment, someone’s affiliation to the former security services as a collaborator can be established on the basis of: (a) handwritten or signed collaboration declarations; (b) handwritten surveillance reports; (c) remuneration documents; (d) documents handwritten or signed by the collaborator and contained in a surveillance file; (e) documents drawn up by the officer who was the collaborator’s handler; and (f) data about the collaborator in the registration journals, card indexes, records relating to the destruction of files, or other sources. 63.     Paragraph 1(4) of the additional provisions defines “secret collaborators” as Bulgarian nationals who have covertly assisted the