CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 20 février 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s7BE5FA78 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s5243C837 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; font-size:10pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s5830ECD9 { width:0.2pt; display:inline-block } .sDFDF245D { width:188.42pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s662121A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center }       FOURTH SECTION             CASE OF RAMANAUSKAS v. LITHUANIA (No. 2)   (Application no. 55146/14)                 JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   20 February 2018       FINAL   20/05/2018   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ramanauskas v. Lithuania (No. 2), The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ganna Yudkivska, President,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Faris Vehabović,   Egidijus Kūris,   Iulia Motoc,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 55146/14) against the Republic of Lithuania, lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Kęstas Ramanauskas (“the applicant”), on 28 July 2014. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr M. Zabita, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė. 3.     On 9 November 2016 the complaints concerning fair hearing and alleged incitement to commit the offence of taking a bribe were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kaišiadorys. 5.     The applicant worked as a lawyer in his own private practice. 6 .     On 28 January 2011 V.Š., a convicted prisoner, provided a statement to the Special Investigation Service ( Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba , hereinafter “the STT”) and stated the following. He had heard from other inmates that the deputy head of Pravieniškės Correctional Facility, L.D., took bribes to transfer inmates to units with lighter security and that L.D. had mentioned to V.Š. that it was possible to be released on probation for money. V.Š. was questioned by the STT and stated that in December 2010 L.D. had asked him to his office and enquired whether he wanted to be released early. L.D. had indicated that he had a friend who could help V.Š. obtain release on probation and promised to organise a meeting with him. V.Š. was asked again that month by L.D. to go to the latter’s office, where he met the applicant (see paragraph 7 below). V.Š. asked the applicant what he should do in order to obtain release on probation. The applicant stated that V.Š. would first have to be transferred to a unit with lighter security. V.Š. asked the applicant how much it would cost him and the applicant replied that Kaišiadorys [District Court] would cost him 7,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,027 euros (EUR)). After that the applicant indicated several judges that would agree to release V.Š. on probation. The applicant also stated that the cost for the same thing in the Kaunas Regional Court would be approximately LTL   10,000 (approximately EUR 2,896) but that that was not the final amount. The applicant also mentioned that V.Š. would have to pay LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) for the transfer to a unit with lower security. After that conversation V.Š. started recording his discussions with L.D. and the applicant using a voice recorder watch which he said he had obtained from other inmates in exchange for cigarettes. Figures mentioned during the other meetings were LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 579) for the transfer to another unit and LTL 12,000 (approximately EUR 3,475) for the judges at the Kaunas Regional Court as that amount could be more easily divided in three than LTL 10,000. V.Š. stated that no agreement on legal services had been concluded with the applicant. V.Š. then contacted an acquaintance, G.T., a former police officer who promised to contact the authorities. 7 .     The transcript of the conversation recorded between V.Š. and the applicant on 26 January 2011 showed that V.Š. had around LTL   35,000 (approximately EUR 10,137). The conversation went as follows: “The applicant: ‘ ...You understand that the intermediary who will go will also need some, and..’ ... The applicant: ‘You know, salaries there are [LTL] 7,000, so you know...’ The applicant: ‘As with [D], when he brought, looked, he went there with those pennies, [they] said no, and he did not have any more...’ V.Š.: ‘Listen, I will be honest, for example I said, the deputy head asked me, asked. I told him that I will have ten, ten euros, so to say thirty five litai.’ The applicant: ‘... With that, we can easily talk about Kaunas.’ ... The applicant: ‘I believe you. I think that it will go through with such an amount of money.’” The applicant told V.Š. that that amount might not actually be necessary. V.Š. then told the applicant that G.T. would contact him and give him LTL   2,000 (EUR 579). The applicant also told V.Š. that he had won a case against Lithuania at the Court and that he had not accepted a bribe in that case. The conversation went as follows: “The applicant: ‘I have already been burnt and only got things straight in Strasbourg. I have won [in] the Strasbourg Court against Lithuania. I previously worked as a prosecutor.’ V.Š.: ‘The deputy did not tell me anything.’ The applicant: ‘I could go back to being a prosecutor. I have won a case against Lithuania in Strasbourg.’ V.Š.: ‘I will ... shake your hand. I can say ... that this seems unreal to me.’ The applicant: ‘... The prosecutor with a bribe... Strasbourg proved that it was a provocation. I proved it in Strasbourg. The proceedings [there] took eight years.’ The applicant: ‘It was nothing to do with a bribe .... I ... bought an apartment, I asked someone to give me a loan... He ... was in prison later. He was released... and became a snitch.’ V.Š.: ‘A friend’. The applicant: ‘... He used to sleep at my mother’s place... I don’t know where he disappeared to. He will not die a natural death. I was not the only one he set up. Two judges in Kaunas as well.’ ... The applicant: ‘And I won a case in Strasbourg later. The Supreme Court rehabilitated me.’ V.Š.: ‘Yes.’ The applicant: ‘The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges, the plenary session for criminal cases.’ ... The applicant: ‘So look. When will that person come? So that I know what ...’ V.Š.: ‘So I can call you and simply say one word. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow.’” The applicant asked V.Š. to make sure that G.T. did not tell anyone about the agreement and V.Š. assured him that G.T. would not ask any questions. 8 .     On 31 January the STT asked a prosecutor to apply to a pre-trial judge for authorisation for G.T. and V.Š. to offer and give a bribe to L.D. and the applicant, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law. The prosecutor also sought permission to make video and/or voice-recordings, to take pictures and to allow three officers to monitor L.D.’s and the applicant’s telephone conversations. The prosecutor also asked the Vilnius City Second District Court on the STT’s behalf to authorise covert surveillance of the applicant and L.D. for two months. The STT additionally informed the prosecutor that a pre-trial investigation had been opened against L.D. and the applicant. 9 .     On the same day the Vilnius City Second District Court authorised taps on the telephones of L.D., V.Š., G.T. and the applicant and allowed G.T. and V.Š. to perform actions which imitated criminal conduct for two months, until 31 March 2011. V.Š. was allowed to use various types of telecommunications and electronic network measures. 10 .     On 31 January 2011 V.Š. was transferred to a unit with lighter security, based on good behaviour and active participation in the commemoration of the Day of the Defenders of Freedom. 11.     On 31 January 2011 G.T. was questioned by the STT. He stated that he had visited V.Š. earlier in January 2011 and that the latter had asked him whether he could give LTL 2,000 to someone. G.T. had agreed. 12 .     On 1 February 2011 V.Š. and G.T. signed documents stating that they were not allowed to incite someone to commit an offence. 13.     On the same day the applicant visited V.Š. and they talked about the situation of V.Š. 14.     Later that day G.T. called the applicant and agreed to meet him the following day. After the meeting G.T. left LTL 2,000, given to him by the STT officers, in the side pocket of the applicant’s car. 15 .     On 3 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and asked how matters were proceeding. The applicant said that he would call back, but later asked to call the following Tuesday. On 10 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and said that they would be in touch; he also asked if the applicant would pay him a visit and the applicant said that he would come at some point in the future. On 14 February 2014 V.Š. called the applicant and said that he had received a character reference from the psychologist and the applicant stated that he would be in touch. V.Š. then asked the applicant whether he should call him and the applicant said that he could call when the documents for his transfer to a unit with lighter security were ready. On 19 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and informed him that the documents for the court had already been prepared. The applicant stated that he would be in touch and would come to visit V.Š. because they could not talk on the telephone. The applicant said that V.Š. could call him the following Wednesday or Thursday but then decided that Wednesday would be the best day. On 1-3 March 2011 V.Š. called L.D. and complained that he could not reach the applicant and asked for help in finding him. On 3   March 2011 L.D. called a certain A. and asked him where the applicant was. A. told him that it was not the first time that the applicant had disappeared. 16 .     On 7 March 2011 L.D. called the applicant and said that people were looking for him. The applicant said that V.Š.’s case was still in progress. L.D. asked the applicant to come and meet V.Š. and the applicant said that he had understood. V.Š. then called the applicant, who said he was going to visit him in a few hours and that they would talk in person. V.Š. again called the applicant later that day and asked whether he should bring the medical certificate to the meeting and the applicant said that he was already in the correctional facility. During the visit they discussed the fact that V.Š.’s case had not yet been transferred to court. V.Š. asked whether the applicant still had the necessary access [in the Kaunas Regional Court]. The applicant confirmed that he did, that the person concerned was coming back from Austria the following Monday and that without that person the matter could not be settled there. The applicant asked whether V.Š. wanted him to participate in a hearing before the court of first instance and V.Š. said yes. Then they talked about someone else’s situation and the applicant said that he knew the prosecutor and had bought him. The applicant further said that not every prosecutor could be bought but there were two he could buy. V.Š. said that he had LTL   30,000 (approximately EUR 8,689) and it did not matter for what [court] he had to pay. The applicant then asked V.Š. to speak quieter. He also asked V.Š. to call him from time to time. V.Š. asked whether he would have to pay something before the hearing in the Kaišiadorys District Court and the applicant said he would not have to give much because the chances were fifty-fifty. The applicant also stated that the rest of the money would be held in reserve for Kaunas [Regional Court] and he would take LTL 1,000 for Kaišiadorys [District Court]. Later in the same conversation he mentioned LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434). The applicant asked V.Š. to get in touch with his contact person, who was to call and meet the applicant in the evening. After the applicant had left the correctional facility V.Š. called him and told him that the papers had been sent to the court on the twenty-third. The applicant asked V.Š. to call him in an hour. When V.Š. called, the applicant told him that the hearing would take place on 23 March and that the applicant would participate in it; he also asked to call him in the evening. 17 .     On 9 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who said that he would write him a message. On 14 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and they again discussed V.Š.’s situation. On 17 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and the applicant said that they would keep in touch after the following Sunday, and V.Š. was asked to call on Monday after lunch. On 18   March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who said that he would not participate in the hearing at the court of first instance regarding V.Š.’s release on probation and that if something happened he would inform V.Š. On 21 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who confirmed his intention as regards the court of first instance because he did not expect anything good to come out of it. However, he said he would try to talk to someone and V.Š. said he would not forget his debt to the applicant. On 23 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and informed him that the Kaišiadorys District Court had decided not to release him on probation. The applicant then said that he would visit V.Š. so he could sign an appeal. On 23 March 2011 V.Š. called L.D. and asked him to ask the applicant about his chances to be released on probation. L.D. called the applicant the same day and asked how matters were proceeding with their client. The applicant said that he would come on Friday and that they would talk then. On 25 March 2011 the applicant visited V.Š., who signed some blank pieces of paper, on which the applicant said he would later write an appeal. V.Š. asked whether they would be covered by the amount they had discussed before. The applicant said that he would see, that he had talked with the men in question and asked them to do everything and that they would receive some money. V.Š. then told the applicant that his contact person would come the following Monday. After that, they discussed amounts and the applicant told V.Š. that the entire sum discussed would be necessary. V.Š. asked whether they were talking about thirty [thousand] and whether that amount included the applicant’s share and the applicant said it did. The applicant also said that before that amount would have guaranteed his release on probation one hundred percent but that now there was some trouble. The applicant then told V.Š. to call his contact person and ask him to meet the applicant on Monday. V.Š. asked whether his person (G.T.) should bring thirty   (thousand) and the applicant confirmed that he should. 18.     On 29 March 2011 the applicant and G.T. met in the applicant’s car, where LTL 30,000 was given to the applicant so that he could secure V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant was arrested by STT officers immediately afterwards and the money was found in the side door pocket of the applicant’s car. 19.     V.Š. was questioned additionally on 30 March 2011. He stated that L.D. had talked of the applicant as a reliable person who had access to prosecutors and judges. V.Š. also showed that L.D. had been the first one to start a conversation about the possibility of V.Š. being released on probation and that L.D. had told him several times before that “serious men pay money and are released and do not sit in prison” ( rimti vyrai moka pinigus ir eina į laisvę, o ne sėdi kalėjime ). 20.     On 8 April 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed V.Š.’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision not to release him on probation. 21.     On 9 August 2011 a bill of indictment was drawn up against L.D. and the applicant. The applicant was accused of promising to influence L.D. and the judges at the Kaišiadorys District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court with a bribe so that V.Š. would be released on probation. He was also accused of taking a bribe of LTL 2,000 and LTL   30,000 respectively on two   occasions. 22.     On 31 August 2011 the Court of Appeal examined an application by the prosecutor to transfer the criminal case from the Kaišiadorys District Court. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had stated that he could influence two judges in Kaišiadorys and thus decided to transfer the case to the Kėdainiai District Court so that the proceedings would be fair. 23.     On 19 October 2011 the Vilnius City Third District Court approved an application by V.Š. to be released on probation. The court held that at that time V.Š. was serving his sentence in Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had taken part in the social rehabilitation, legal and social education programmes and had provided information that he would be employed on release. 24 .     By a judgment of 18 July 2012 the Kėdainiai District Court found the applicant guilty of bribing an intermediary and sentenced him to sixty   days in prison. The court found it established that G.T. had given the applicant LTL 2,000 and LTL 30,000 respectively during their meetings on 2 February and 29 March 2011 in return for a promise that the applicant would help in the proceedings for V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant pleaded not guilty and stated that an act of provocation had been organised against him. He also stated that the money he had received was remuneration for his services as V.Š.’s lawyer. The applicant said that although no agreement on the provision of legal assistance had been concluded, he had intended to conclude one after the proceedings for V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant refused to provide comments on the recordings and stated that his conversations with V.Š. were irrelevant because he had only wanted to show that he was working on his case. Those conversations had not been of any consequence as he had not been able to influence L.D. or the judges at Kaišiadorys District Court and Kaunas Regional Court ( Pokalbių telefonu ir įrašu su V.[Š . ] nekomentuoja, paaiškindamas, kad visi jo pokalbiai su V.[Š.] buvo dėl akių, kadangi kažką kalbėti su V.[Š.] reikėjo, tad nieko nereiškiančiais pokalbiais jis tik siekė parodyti, kad dirba, tačiau tuo jis nesiekė sukelti jokių pasekmių, kadangi negalėjo paveikti nei L.[D.], nei Kaišiadorių apylinkės ar Kauno apygardos teismo teisėjų ). G.T. stated that he had known V.Š. since 2000 and that V.Š. had called him and asked for help. When G.T. had gone to Pravieniškės Correctional Facility, V.Š. had told him that the applicant required money and that V.Š. doubted that the money would be used in the proper way. The court’s conclusions were based on the evidence given by V.Š., G.T., L.D. and other employees of Pravieniškės Correctional Facility. It also addressed the secret recordings of the applicant’s conversations, including those recorded prior to the authorisation for actions imitating criminal conduct. The court held that the transcripts of the conversations between the applicant and V.Š. showed that the applicant had been the first to indicate the amounts of money to be paid. The applicant’s statement that he had been going to conclude an agreement on legal services after he had taken LTL   30,000 were refuted by his conversation with G.T., where the applicant had stated that in case of failure he would keep 20% of the money and return the rest. The video-recordings showed that the applicant had not counted the money and that he had indicated to G.T. to put it in the side pocket of the car door. That allowed the court to draw the conclusion that the applicant realised that the money was remuneration for his criminal activity. The court further held that V.Š.’s testimony, voice and video ‑ recordings showed that the applicant had not been incited to take a bribe and that the criminal conduct simulation model had been applied within the limits prescribed by the court (see paragraph 12 above). By the same judgment the Kėdainiai District Court found L.D. guilty of abuse of office and forgery, which had allowed V.Š. to be transferred to a unit with lighter security (see paragraph 10 above). It ordered L.D. to pay a fine of LTL 12,480 (approximately EUR   3,614). L.D. pleaded guilty, but stated that V.Š. had named the applicant as a lawyer that could help him obtain release on probation. The court decided to return the recorder watch to V.Š. 25 .     The applicant and L.D. lodged an appeal. The applicant argued that the provisions of domestic law had been applied incorrectly, that V.Š. and G.T. used undue pressure, and that V.Š. had used unauthorised equipment, the recorder watch, which he had not been allowed to have in prison. The applicant asked the appellate court to question V.Š. and ask him how he had acquired such a watch in a correctional facility. The applicant also stated that L.D. had overseen matters relating to V.Š.’s transfer to a unit with lighter security and that there was no evidence that he had tried to bribe L.D. The applicant also stated that he had never named any specific person in the courts whom he would have bribed because he had not intended to perform such an act. He had only talked to V.Š. about the outcome of the proceedings for release on probation because V.Š. had called him constantly. 26.     On 23 October 2012 the Court of Appeal approved an application by the prosecutor to transfer the case to Panevėžys Regional Court from Kaunas Regional Court for examination on appeal in order to have a fair trial. 27 .     The Panevėžys Regional Court held an oral hearing where several witnesses, including V.Š., had been questioned. On 13 June 2013 the Panevėžys Regional Court held that V.Š. had purchased the watch for his personal use and that the provisions of domestic law did not directly prohibit the use of such equipment in prison. The court also held that the initial contact between V.Š. and the applicant had been arranged by L.D., that V.Š. had not known the applicant beforehand and had not had any motive to incite him to commit a crime. The court also found that no agreement on the provision of legal services had been concluded between the applicant and V.Š. and that the applicant’s argument that he had intended to conclude one later had been dismissed as an attempt to improve his situation. On the basis of the audio-recordings, the court also observed that the applicant had been the first to say that he could settle the matter for money. The court also found that there had been no incitement and that the authorities had not put any active pressure on the applicant to commit an offence. On the contrary, the applicant had incited V.Š. to give him an amount that would be sufficient for himself, an intermediary and three court judges. The court also held that at the time the offence had been committed, Article 226 § 1 of the Criminal Code provided for two alternative sentences for bribery of an intermediary: arrest or imprisonment for up to three years. On 5 July 2011 the Criminal Code had been amended and the applicant’s offence had then satisfied the requirements of Article 226 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which provided for various sentences: a fine, arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. As the provision in force provided for a more lenient sentence, the court decided to impose a fine of LTL 65,000 (approximately EUR 18,825). The court dismissed L.D.’s appeal by the same judgment. 28 .     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He again argued that he had been incited to commit an offence, that V.Š., as a convicted prisoner, was not allowed to have recording equipment, that he had been provided with that equipment by the STT, and that the transcripts of the recordings should not have been used as evidence against him in the case. The applicant also alleged that the LTL 2,000 had been remuneration for his legal services and that he had not actually taken the LTL 30,000 from G.T., who had simply left the money in his car. The applicant further complained that the court of first instance had not even assessed whether the evidence had been lawfully collected. The appellate court, in turn, had approved evidence that had been gathered unlawfully and had misinterpreted domestic law. The applicant also argued that V.Š.’s testimony had contradicted itself: it was not clear who had informed the STT about the alleged crime. 29 .     On 28 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The court held that the pre-trial investigation had been opened on 28 January 2011 upon the request of V.Š. Together with his testimony, V.Š. had given the authorities his voice-recording watch, where he had recorded his conversations with L.D. and the applicant. The court held that convicted prisoners who used voice recorders breached internal prison regulations, but that did not mean that officers who carried out a pre ‑ trial investigation and obtained information from such a voice recorder acted unlawfully. The court also held that the finding of the applicant’s guilt had not been based solely on the evidence obtained from V.Š.’s watch. The court observed that L.D. had suggested the applicant as a lawyer because he knew the prosecutors and judges dealing with V.Š.’s case, while L.D. had not incited the applicant to take bribes. By the same judgment the Supreme Court left an appeal on points of law by L.D. unexamined because therein he had raised arguments that had not been raised before the appellate court. 30.     On 19 December 2014 the Supreme Court examined an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings. It decided not to do so, but reduced the fine to LTL   13,000 (approximately EUR 3,765). II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Pertinent domestic legislation 31.     Article 226 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the provision on bribery applicable at the time of the offence, provided for the punishment of someone who, by taking advantage of his or her social status, office, powers, family ties, contacts or other possible influence on a State or municipal institution or agency, international public organisation or a civil servant or similar person, promised to influence the respective authority, civil servant or similar person in return for a bribe to persuade them to act in a certain manner, either lawful or unlawful, or not to act. The sanction was either arrest or imprisonment for up to three years. From 5 July 2011, the punishment under Article 226 § 1 for the same acts, including offers of bribes to a third person, whether directly or not, or where one was promised, agreed, or given, was changed to a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest or imprisonment for up to four years. Article 226   § 2 applied to the same acts, carried out on a person’s own behalf or for someone else, where a person promised to take a bribe or required one. The sanction was a fine, arrest or imprisonment of up to five years. 32.     Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that evidence in criminal proceedings was material obtained in a manner provided for by law. The admissibility of evidence had to be decided by a judge or a court examining the matter on a case-by-case basis. Only material obtained in a lawful manner which could be verified by procedural actions established in the Code of Criminal Procedure could be admitted as evidence. Judges assessed the evidence according to their inner convictions, based on a detailed and impartial assessment of all the circumstances of the case in accordance with the law. 33.     Article 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that in order to investigate crimes of abuse of office and bribery, among others, pre-trial officers could carry out an investigation without disclosing their identity. The actions of such officers had to be authorised by a pre-trial judge and could only be carried out if there was enough information about a criminal activity. The pre-trial judge had to take a decision after receiving a request from a prosecutor. The decision had to indicate the persons who were authorised to perform undercover activities; the person against whom the actions were to be performed; information about the criminal activity; the specific acts that could be performed; the ultimate aim; and the duration of the undercover activities. It was prohibited to incite a person to commit an offence. Pre-trial officers could not apply restrictive measures in the absence of a separate decision, unless there was an urgent need. In extraordinary circumstances, the undercover activities could be performed by persons who were not pre-trial officers if it was not possible to establish who the guilty persons were. Those persons could be questioned as witnesses and be provided with anonymity. 34.     Article 159 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that a prosecutor who had received information that a person had been asked to commit a crime or participate in one could ask an investigating judge to authorise acts simulating criminal conduct ( nusikalstamą veiką imituojančius veiksmus ). Article 159 § 2 provided that a pre-trial judge had to authorise such acts. The decision had to indicate the person who could perform the acts; the person against whom they were directed; information about the criminal activity in question; the specific actions that could be performed; the ultimate aim; and the duration of the acts. Article 159 § 3 provided that it was prohibited to incite a person to commit an offence in the course of acts simulating criminal conduct. 35.     Article 3 § 20 of the Law on Operational Activities, in force at the material time, defined a criminal conduct simulation model ( nusikalstamos veikos imitacijos modelis ) as a set of actions entailing the elements of an offence, performed in order to protect personal rights and freedoms, property, or the security of society and the State from criminality. 36.     Article 6 § 5 of the Law on Operational Activities provided that units carrying out operational activities were prohibited from provoking people into committing criminal offences. Provocation was defined as pressure, active incitement or instigation to commit a criminal act by restricting a person’s freedom of action, where it results in committing or attempting to commit a criminal act which the person had not planned to commit before. 37.     Article 12 § 1 of the Law on Operational Activities provided that the criminal conduct simulation model had to be authorised by the Prosecutor General or a deputy, or a regional chief prosecutor or his or her deputy. Application first had to be made by the head of the unit of operational activities or his or her deputy. The application had to include the name, surname and the duties of the officer applying for authorisation; information on the necessity to apply the criminal conduct simulation model; information about the people against whom the model was to be used; the limits of the conduct intended to be simulated under a specific provision of the Criminal Code or the Code of Administrative Offences; the people who were to simulate the criminal conduct; the duration of the simulation; and the ultimate aim. 38.     Annex no.   1 to the Code for the Execution of Sentences at the material time read that prisoners were prohibited from having voice recorders. 39.     Recommendations approved by the Prosecutor General on the Application of the Law on Operational Activities and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 12 October 2007 provided that it was prohibited to incite a person to commit an offence while performing a criminal conduct simulation model. Prior information as to a person’s intention to commit an offence was necessary and a person authorised to perform acts within a criminal conduct simulation model had to be made familiar with the ruling of the pre-trial judge indicating the specific acts allowed. B.     Pertinent domestic case-law 40.     On 8 May 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled on the compatibility of the provisions of the Law on Operational Activities with the Constitution. The court relied on the practice of the Court, where it had been established that the use of clandestine measures, as such, was not contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, as long as such measures were based on legislation that was clear and foreseeable in effect and were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The Constitutional Court emphasised that the criminal conduct simulation model was only allowed when used to “join” ( prisijungti ) ongoing criminal activities because such activities were happening without any effort from people taking part in undercover operational activities. The undercover agents only simulated acts as part of a criminal activity that was planned or had already commenced. It was prohibited to incite someone to commit a new offence or one that had been commenced but later terminated during the use of the criminal conduct simulation model. The criminal conduct simulation model was unlawful if the limits that had been set for it were exceeded or if someone had been incited to commit an offence. The assessment of those circumstances was a matter for the court. It was for the courts of ordinary jurisdiction dealing with allegations of incitement or other forms of abuse of the model to establish in each particular case whether the investigating authorities had gone beyond the limits of the legal framework within which the model had been authorised. 41 .     In an unrelated case, the Supreme Court established rules to be followed to determine whether the use of the criminal conduct simulation model or similar special investigative techniques had involved incitement. It held that actions like the criminal conduct simulation model could only be performed when there was objective evidence suggesting that a person was predisposed to commit an offence (rumours were not enough). Private individuals could only act as undercover agents after they had informed the authorities about a criminal act that was likely to be committed. A conclusion of incitement could be drawn even if the officers’ act of instigation was not intense or insistent, or if the suspect had been contacted through unsuspecting third persons. It was for the authorities to prove that there had been no incitement. If there had been incitement, all the evidence obtained as a result of such an act had to be excluded from the case (decision of 16 December 2008, no. 2A-P-6/2008). 42.     In an unrelated case, the Supreme Court held that the sole fact that a convicted prisoner used a voice recorder that was prohibited in a correctional facility did not mean that the pre-trial investigation officers in the case had acted unlawfully by obtaining voice recordings from that inmate. An important factor was that the recording was not the only evidence in the case (decision of 12   February   2013, no. 2K-75/2013). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 43.     The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial in the determination of the criminal charge against him. In particular, he stated that he had been incited to commit the offence of taking a bribe, for which he had been sentenced by the domestic courts. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ...” A.     Admissibility 44 .     The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The applicant 45.     The applicant noted that the grounds for opening a pre-trial investigation were the recordings which V.Š. had made with a watch that he had been prohibited from having in a correctional facility. The first set of acts of provocation had been performed before the court had authorised actions imitating criminal conduct (see paragraphs 7-9 above). The applicant also submitted that G.T. was a former police officer. The applicant added that V.Š. had been a secret police informant on the illegal possession of drugs in the correctional facility and that he had worked with the police before. 46 .     The applicant further submitted that he had not initiated any meetings with V.Š. and G.T. and that they had actively sought him out and constantly called him. The money given to him by G.T. had been remuneration for his legal services. Although no agreement on the provision of such services had been concluded, he had orally agreed to represent V.Š.’s interests and had planned to sign all the necessary documents when the proceedings regarding his release on probation were over. The specific amount of LTL 30,000 had been proposed by V.Š. as a bribe for the judges at the Kaunas Regional Court and the applicant thought that it was a clear incitement exceeding the limits of authorised actions imitating criminal conduct. 47.     Finally, V.Š. had been released on probation by the Kaišiadorys District Court on 19 October 2011. The applicant submitted that that had happened because V.Š. had successfully performed the task set for him by the authorities of inciting the applicant to commit the offence in question. (b)     The Government 48.     The Government stated that the authorities had confined themselves to investigating the criminal activity in question in an essentially passive manner because the information that the applicant might be taking bribes had come from V.Š., who was a private individual. Although V.Š. had provided his recording watch, which had his conversations with the applicant, the pre-trial judge had authorised actions simulating criminal conduct three days after the authorities had been informed about the alleged criminal activity. That meant that from the very beginning the use of such actions had been supervised by the prosecutor and the pre-trial judge, which provided more extensive procedural guarantees than the ones provided for under the criminal conduct simulation model. The procedure for the authorisation of investigative measures was also clear and foreseeable. 49.     The Government further submitted that V.Š. had begun collaborating with the authorities after the applicant had approached him with a proposal to arrange his release on probation. The actions imitating criminal conduct had therefore been used to join a criminal act that had already commenced. In contrast to the case of Ramanauskas v.   Lithuania   ([GC], no.   74420/01, ECHR 2008), the authorities’ role had been limited to prosecuting the applicant on the basis of information handed to them by a third party. V.Š.’s calls to the applicant could not lead to a conclusion that the applicant had been incited. During those conversations the applicant had spoken in vague terms, had mentioned that he had already been “burnt” and had only “got things straight” in Strasbourg, which, in the Government’s view, was a clear indication that he had understood that his actions were unlawful. 50.     The Government argued that after the Grand Chamber judgment in Ramanauskas (ibid.), the authorities and the national courts had started assessing the lawfulness of the authorisation and implementation of the criminal conduct simulation model and similar actions more thoroughly. The Government argued that throughout the proceedings against the applicant the criteria formulated by the Court and later followed by the domestic courts had been scrupulously followed (see paragraph 41 above). The acquisition of the voice recordings made by V.Š. prior to the authorisation of the actions simulating criminal conduct had been analysed by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 27 and 29 above). The Government also submitted that the applicant had been able to put clear arguments about incitement before the domestic courts and they had provided reasoned responses. Witnesses were called and examined during the hearings and the applicant and his lawyer had been able to ask them questions. 51.     Finally, the Government submitted that V.Š. had been released on probation in October 2011 because by that time he had spent nine months in the unit with lighter security and was serving his sentence in Vilnius Correctional Facility. There, he had taken part in the social rehabilitation, legal and social education programmes and had provided information that he would be employed on release. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 52.     The Court has recognised in general that the rise in organised crime and difficulties encountered by law-enforcement bodies in detecting and investigating offences has warranted appropriate measures being taken. It has stressed that the police are increasingly required to make use of undercover agents, informants and covert practices, particularly in tackling organised crime and corruption (see Ramanauskas , cited above, § 49). The Court has consistently accepted the use of undercover investigative techniques in combatting crime. It has held on several occasions that undercover operations per se did not interfere with the right to a fair trial and that the presence of clear, adequate and sufficient procedural safeguards set permissible police conduct aside from entrapment (see ibid., §§ 51 and   53, Ciprian Vlăduț and Ioan Florin Pop v. Romania , nos. 43490/07 and   44304/07, § 77, 16 July 2015, and Nosko and Nefedov v. Russia , nos.   5753/09 and 11789/10, § 50, 30 October 2014, with further references). 53.     The general principles concerning the issue of entrapment are set out in the case of Ramanauskas (cited above, §§ 49-61). 54.     In so far as police incitement is concerned, the Court held that the right to a fair trial would be violated where police officers had stepped beyond an essentially passive investigation of a suspect’s criminal activities and had exercised an influence such as to incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been committed (see Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal , 9 June 1998, § 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions   1998 ‑ IV). In Vanyan v. Russia (no.   53203/99, §§ 45-50, 15   December 2005) the Court went further and considered that the issue of entrapment could be relevant even where the operation in question had been carried out by a private individual acting as an undercover agent, when it had actually been organised and supervised by the police. 55.     In its extensive case-law on the subject the Court has developed criteria to distinguish entrapment breaching Article 6 § 1 of the Convention from permissible conduct in the use of legitimate undercover techniques in criminal investigations. While it is not possible to reduce the variety of situations which might occur in this context to a mere checklist of simplified criteria, the Court’s examination of complaints of entrapment has developed on the basis of two tests: the substantive and the procedural test of incitement. The relevant criteria determining the Court’s examination in this context are set out in the case of Bannikova v. Russia (no. 18757/06, §§   37-65, 4   November 2010). They were recently summarised in the case of Matanović v.   Croatia (no.   2742/12, §§ 123-135, 4 April 2017). (i)     Substantive test of incitement 56.     When examining an arguable plea of entrapment by an applicant, the Court will attempt, as a first step, to establish on the basis of the available material whether the offence would have been committed without the authorities’ intervention, that is to say whether the investigation was “essentially passive”. In deciding whether the investigation was “essentially passive” the Court will examine the reasons underlying the covert operation, in particular, whether there were objective suspicions that the applicant had been involved in criminal activity or had been predisposed to commit a criminal offence until he was approached by the police (see Furcht v.   Germany , no. 54648/09, § 51, 23   October   2014) and the conduct of the authorities carrying it out, specifically whether the authorities exerted such an influence on the applicant as to incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been committed, in order to make it possible to establish the offence, that is, to provide evidence and institute a prosecution (see Ramanauskas , cited above, § 55; Furcht , cited above, § 48; Morari v.   the Republic of Moldova , no. 65311/09, §   31, 8 March 2016; and Matanović , cited above, § 123). The Court reiterates that where police involvement is limited to assisting a private party in recording the commission of an illegal act by another private party, the determinative factor remains the conduct of those two individuals (see Milinienė v.   Lithuania , no. 74355/01, § 38, 24   June   2008). 57.     Lastly, the Court has also emphasised the need for a clear and foreseeable procedure for authorising investigative measures, as well as for their proper supervision. It has considered judicial supervision as the most appropriate means in cases involving covert operations (see Matanović , cited above, § 124, with further references). (ii)     Procedural test of incitement 58.     As a second step, the Court will examine the way the domestic courts dealt with an applicant’s plea of incitement, which is the procedural part of its examination of the agent provocateur complaint (see Bannikova , cited above, §§ 51-65, with further references). 59.     As the starting point, the Court must be satisfied with the domestic courts’ capacity to deal with such a complaint in a manner compatible with the right to a fair hearing. It should therefore verify whether an arguable complaint of incitement constitutes a substantive defence under domesti