CEDHCASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG23
CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 20 mars 2018
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0320DEC003894810
- Date
- 20 mars 2018
- Publication
- 20 mars 2018
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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source officiellePartly inadmissible
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.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s7E985A65 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:1pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sAB0FFF87 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-after:avoid } .s39A7D870 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB042F7C6 { width:162.94pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s3695F815 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .sE8934522 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s8F670191 { font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; list-style-position:inside } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 38948/10 Simeon Borisov SAKSKOBURGGOTSKI and Others against Bulgaria and 2 other applications (see list appended)   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20 March 2018 as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Erik Møse,   André Potocki,   Síofra O’Leary,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Lәtif Hüseynov, judges,   Maiia Rousseva, ad hoc judge, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Mr Yonko Grozev, the judge elected in respect of Bulgaria, withdrew from sitting in the Chamber (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Ms Maiia Rousseva to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article   26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29). Having regard to the above applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The numbers and dates of introduction of the present applications and the applicants’ particulars are indicated in the appendix. 2.     In application no. 38948/10 the applicants were represented by Mr   M.   Ekimdzhiev and Ms K. Boncheva, lawyers practising in Plovdiv, and Ms   E. Hristova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. In the two other applications the applicants were represented by Mr Ekimdzhiev and Ms Boncheva only. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants and as apparent from documents available to the public, may be summarised as follows. 1.     The Bulgarian monarchy 4.     The modern Bulgarian State was created in 1878 as a principality ( Княжество ) and after 1908 a kingdom ( Царство ). Its first monarch, Prince Alexander I, ruled until 1886. 5.     In 1887 an Austrian prince, Ferdinand, was crowned as Prince ( Княз ) Ferdinand I. In 1908 he became King ( Цар ). 6.     Ferdinand I abdicated in 1918 and his son Boris acceded to the throne as King Boris III. In 1930 the King married the Italian princess Giovanna di Savoia. Their daughter, Maria-Luisa (the second applicant), was born in 1933 and their son, Simeon (the first applicant), in 1937. 7.     King Boris III passed away on 28 August 1943 and the first applicant acceded to the throne as King Simeon II. 8.     In 1944 the communist party took power in Bulgaria. On 15   September 1946 the communist authorities held a referendum on the form of government. After more than 90% of the participants voted for a republic, the monarchy was abolished. The royal family left the country on 16 September 1946. They went to Egypt and after 1951 settled in Spain. The Queen Mother, Giovanna, passed away in 2000. 9.     Under the Constitution of the Kingdom, the King received a yearly sum of money to cover his expenses and those of his household. That money became known as “the Civil List”. The Civil List and the properties of the Crown were managed by the Intendancy of the King’s Civil List (hereinafter “the Intendancy”), created in 1890 by King Ferdinand I. The Intendancy would also represent the King in civil transactions. 10.     As already mentioned, the first applicant is the former King Simeon   II. The second applicant is his sister. The third to seventh applicants in application no. 38948/10 (see the Appendix) are the remaining heirs of Ferdinand I (abdicated in 1918 – see paragraph 6 above), who passed away in exile in 1948. 2.     The royal properties after 1946 11.     After the abolition of the monarchy in Bulgaria, in December 1947 Parliament passed the Act on Declaring State Property the Properties of the Families of the Former Kings Ferdinand and Boris and Their Heirs (see paragraph 112 below hereinafter “the 1947 Act”). 12.     In September 1946 the Intendancy prepared a list of the royal properties on the basis of which the 1947 Act was later implemented. It was validated by the then Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev and known subsequently as “the Kimon Georgiev list”. The list included a part entitled “Personal properties owned by the former King”, which included the properties described in paragraphs 23-47 below and others. It also mentioned 452 hectares of forest land in the Samokov area, but it is unclear whether that land was the subject of the Samokov land commission’s decisions described in paragraph 48 below. Lastly, the property referred to in paragraphs 20-22 below was listed separately, as it was considered to have been the personal property of Ferdinand I’s daughter, Princess Evdokia. 13.     After 1947 the former royal properties were used by the Bulgarian State. 3.     Judgment no. 12 of 4 June 1998 of the Constitutional Court 14.     In early 1998 the Chief Public Prosecutor, acting under Article 150 §   1 of the 1991 Constitution (see paragraph 117 below), applied to the Constitutional Court to have the 1947 Act declared unconstitutional. 15.     In judgment no. 12 of 4 June 1998 ( Решение № 12 от 4 юни 1998 на КС на РБ по к.д. № 13/1998 г. hereinafter “the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court”, see paragraphs 123-24 below) the Constitutional Court allowed the application, holding unanimously that the 1947 Act contradicted certain provisions of the Constitution, namely those guaranteeing the right to property and prohibiting discrimination. 16.     According to media reports, after the judgment at issue in the beginning of 2001 the Government discussed a bill, proposing to add to already existing restitution legislation provisions on the restitution of the properties of the former Kings. However, the bill was abandoned. 4.     The first applicant’s return to Bulgaria 17.     The first applicant visited Bulgaria in 1996 and on several occasions thereafter. In 2001 he returned to the country indefinitely. 18.     In 2001 he founded a political party, which won the general elections. On 24 July 2001 he was sworn in as Prime Minister. He remained in this post until 2005. The next Government, in power between 2005 and 2009, were formed by a coalition of three parties, including the first applicant’s party. 5.     Properties claimed by the applicants and the return of some of them 19.     After the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court the applicants sought the return of some of the properties used previously by the royal family. Their claims concerned the following properties. (a)     Princess Evdokia’s house in Sofia 20.     Before leaving Bulgaria in 1946 with the first and second applicants and their mother, Princess Evdokia had lived in a two-storey house, built on a plot of land in Sofia measuring 7,185 square metres. She had bought it from a private party in 1937. 21.     In a decision of 12 December 1999 (amended by a further decision on 23 November 2000) the mayor of Sofia, referring to the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, removed the property from the list of municipal properties and ordered that possession be transferred to the heirs of Kings Ferdinand I and Boris III. 22.     In 2001 the applicants sold the property to a private investor, who demolished the house and constructed residential buildings on the site. (b)     The Vrana Estate 23.     The Vrana Estate, on the outskirts of Sofia, consists of a park (a   botanical garden) measuring 992,672 square metres, a palace measuring 2,013 square metres and several auxiliary buildings. The estate was created at the beginning of the twentieth century and the palace itself was built between 1909 and 1912. After 1947 it was considered to be State property, and in 1999 it was registered as private municipal property of the Sofia municipality. 24.     In a decision of 23 January 2001 (amended on 7 August 2001) the mayor of Sofia, referring to the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, removed the property from the list of municipal properties and ordered that possession be transferred to the heirs of Kings Ferdinand I and Boris III. 25.     In August 2001 the first and second applicants donated 968,097   square metres of the park to the Sofia municipality, on condition that it be maintained as a botanical garden and open to the public. On 18   September 2001 they obtained a notary deed, recognising them as owners of a plot of 21,372 square metres and not mentioning buildings. 26.     According to the media, the first applicant currently uses the Vrana palace as his principal residence. Its address is also given as his permanent address on his identity card. 27.     On 24 March 2011 the State has brought proceedings claiming that it is the owner of the Vrana estate (see paragraph 111 below). (c)     The Banya estate 28.     In the Kimon Georgiev list (see paragraph 12 above) it was indicated that the estate consisted of a building measuring 355 square metres and a plot of land. However, in a 2004 decision of the regional governor (see paragraph 31 below), the property was described as consisting of two buildings, one two-storeys and measuring 90 square metres and the other one-storey and measuring 100 square metres. The estate is situated in Banya, a thermal resort in the vicinity of Karlovo, and includes a plot of land measuring 10,598 square metres. The land was acquired by King Boris   III between 1928 and 1935 and the buildings were constructed around 1930. The property was registered as State-owned in 1996. 29.     Boris III’s property rights to this estate were said to have been “incontestable” in a report prepared by a parliamentary commission set up to inquire into the “royal restitution” and presented to Parliament on 17   August 2006 (see paragraph 52 below). 30.     In 2001 the first and second applicants requested the return of this property. According to media reports, they had in fact been allowed to use it even before that. The property’s address is given as the second applicant’s permanent address on her identity card. 31.     In a decision of 28 December 2004 the governor of the Plovdiv region, referring to the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court and notary deeds from 1928 and 1929, removed the property from the list of State properties and ordered that possession be transferred to “those entitled”. 32.     According to media reports, in 2014 the first and second applicants put the property up for sale. (d)     The Bistritsa estate 33.     The estate consists of a palace covering an area of 550 square metres, a number of auxiliary buildings and a plot of land measuring 197,923 square metres. It is situated in the resort of Borovets in the foothills of Rila Mountain. The palace was constructed between 1898 and 1914. 34.     On an unspecified date the property was registered as public State property. On 14 October 2002 the Government took a decision to register it as private State property. 35.     In a decision of 18 October 2002 the governor of the Plovdiv region removed the property from the list of State properties and ordered that possession be transferred to “those entitled”. He relied on the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Government decision mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the decisions of the Samokov land commission described in paragraph 48 below. 36.     On 24 March 2011 the State has brought proceedings claiming that it is the owner of the Bistritsa estate (see paragraph 111 below). (e)     The Sitnyakovo estate 37.     The estate consists of a palace covering an area of 580 square metres, auxiliary buildings and land measuring 20,368 square metres. It is situated on Rila Mountain. 38.     In 1981 the palace was declared a cultural monument. 39.     In 1995 the Government authorised the use of the estate by the Union of Bulgarian Writers. 40.     On 19 June 2003 the buildings were registered as private State property. 41.     In a decision of 17 November 2003 the governor of the Sofia region, referring to the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, removed the buildings from the list of State properties and ordered that possession be transferred to “those entitled”. The decision noted that the buildings had been constructed on forest land, without specifying who owned it. (f)     The Saragyol complex 42.     The complex consisted of a hunting lodge covering an area of 292   square metres and two auxiliary buildings. All the buildings were constructed between 1904 and 1914 on land which is currently part of the Rila National Park. 43.     After 1947 the property was used by a hunting association, and after 1956 – by a State body. In 1987 it was registered as State property, and in 2001 was once again registered as public State property. The first and second applicants requested the transfer of possession to this property in 1998, but no decision was taken at the time. 44.     On 14 October 2002, by a decision of the Government, the complex was registered as private State property. On 18 October 2002, the governor of the Sofia region, referring to that decision and the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, removed the buildings from the list of State properties and ordered that possession be transferred to “those entitled”. (g)     The Krichim estate 45.     That estate consists of a palace covering an area of 770 square metres, numerous auxiliary buildings and land measuring 371,500 square metres, situated in the foothills of Rhodopi Mountain in the Plovdiv region. It was constructed in 1901. 46.     In 2007 the property was registered as public State property. It is currently used by a government body. 47.     On an unspecified date the first and second applicants requested the governor of Plovdiv region to remove the property from the lists of State properties. This was refused on 24 July 2007. After the applicants applied for the judicial review of the refusal, in a final judgment of 10 November 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court found their application inadmissible, noting that registration and deregistration of properties as private or public property of the State were “internal” and “technical” actions for the administration and could not in themselves affect any rights the applicants could have had. If the applicants claimed to be the owners of the estate, they had to seise the civil courts of their claims. (h)     Forest land 48.     In six decisions adopted between 30 June 2000 and 29 December 2003 the Samokov land commission (after 2002 the Agriculture and Forestry Department) recognised the right of the heirs of Ferdinand I and Boris III to the restitution of plots of forest land in the area measuring approximately 1,650 hectares. For some of the plots restitution in kind was provided, while for the others the heirs were allocated other plots as compensation. 49.     In November 2009 the State brought rei vindicatio proceedings against the applicants concerning those properties, which are still pending (see paragraph 110 below). 6.     Parliamentary motions before 2009 and parliamentary decision of 18 December 2009 50.     In January 2004 several members of Parliament introduced a bill which proposed the stay of all procedures concerning the restitution of properties of the former Kings and prohibiting any transfer of the properties already in possession of their heirs and of any commercial exploitation of the forests and the agricultural land. It also stated that any property rights of the heirs of the former Kings were to be regulated by an Act adopted by Parliament. However, the bill was never scheduled for examination by Parliament. 51.     In July 2005 members of Parliament introduced another bill declaring null and void all administrative decisions considered to restore property rights to the royal family. This bill was never put up for examination by Parliament as well. 52.     In 2006 a parliamentary commission was set up with the task of inquiring into the “royal restitution”. Its report, presented to members of Parliament on 17 August 2006, described the properties transferred to the heirs of the former Kings and the administrative procedures concerning them. It presented the conflicting opinions of its members, in particular on two questions: 1) the legal status of the Intendancy and whether it had acquired properties for the State or for the Kings in their private capacity, and 2) any restitution effect of the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court. After discussion, Parliament adopted a decision stating that it accepted the report, rejecting proposals on the part of the opposition to conclude on its basis that it considered the “royal restitution” contrary to law. 53.     On 18 December 2009 Parliament adopted a decision, ordering the stay of: “any transfer[s] of land, agricultural land, forests, buildings and movables for which there are decisions recognising and restoring the property rights, or which are given in compensation to the heirs of the former Kings Ferdinand I and Boris III”. 54.     It also ordered the stay of any “commercial exploitation and construction” on these properties. In addition, it stated that those in possession of the properties were to take good care of them, or would otherwise be liable for any damage. Lastly, the decision specified that the measures at issue would remain in force until “the enactment of special legislation” regulating the matter. 55.     On 28 December 2009 the national Ombudsman challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court. He argued, firstly, that Parliament had not been competent to take a decision concerning specific individuals and that the decision at issue was “purely political”. He further argued that the decision had been adopted in breach of the principle of separation of powers, because it was not Parliament but the courts which were competent to order injunctions. He also considered that the decision breached the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to property and prohibiting discrimination (see paragraph 114 below). 56.     In a decision of 9 February 2010 ( Определение № 1 от 09/02/2010   г. по к.д. № 19 от 2009 г. ) the Constitutional Court declared the challenge inadmissible, reasoning that the Ombudsman was only competent to challenge legislative acts and not decisions of Parliament. 7.     Judicial proceedings (a)     Concerning the Krichim estate (i)     The applicants’ claims 57.     On 29 May 2008 the first and second applicants brought rei   vindicatio proceedings against the State, contending that they owned the Krichim estate, the only property claimed by them for which possession had not been transferred to them (see paragraph 47 above). 58.     The applicants relied mainly on the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court. They argued that the quashing of the 1947 Act meant that the State had ceased to be the owner of the properties concerned by it, and that their own property rights had been restored. They further argued that the 1947 Act had been aimed at the expropriation of the properties “specifically enumerated” in the Kimon Georgiev list (see paragraph 12 above), which had placed the Krichim estate in the group of “personal properties owned by the former King”. In addition, they claimed that the 1947 Act had represented recognition on the part of the State that the properties concerned had not until then been State property, but personal property of the King. 59.     The applicants also claimed that their father, King Boris III, had acquired ownership through adverse possession, the property having been in the possession of the Intendancy in his name after his accession to the throne in 1918. The applicants argued that the Intendancy had not been a State body, but had only represented the “civil personality” of the King. (ii)     Judgment of the Plovdiv Regional Court 60.     The Plovdiv Regional Court gave a judgment on 9 July 2010, dismissing the applicants’ claims. 61.     It dealt, firstly, with the legal effects of the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court. It pointed out that section 22(4) of the Constitutional Court Act stipulated that the consequences of the quashing of a legal provision found to contradict the Constitution had to be regulated by the body having enacted that provision (see paragraph 118 below), which in the case at hand meant Parliament. Accordingly, in the absence of an Act of Parliament dealing with the possible restitution of the former Kings’ property, the 1998 judgment could not in itself provide a basis for the restoration of any property rights the applicants could have had. It was also significant in that regard that the Constitution provided for no right to restitution, and restitution was possible only in the scope and manner decided on by Parliament, as stated in judgment no. 15 of the Constitutional Court of 9 June 1998 (see paragraph 125 below). 62.     The Plovdiv Regional Court then turned to the question of the legal status of the Intendancy. It dismissed claims that the Civil List (see paragraph 9 above) represented a kind of “salary” or private revenue of the King, pointing out that its purpose was to “guarantee the representativeness and dignity” of the monarchy. In addition, the claimants had not even shown that the construction of the buildings claimed by them had been financed by the Civil List; on the contrary, there was evidence that they had been financed by the State, through the Ministry of Public Works. While there had been occasions where the King could acquire property through the Intendancy only in his private capacity, his intention to do so had been specifically stated. This had not been the case with the property claimed by the applicants. It had been in the possession of the Intendancy, which could have acquired it through adverse possession, but on behalf of the State. 63.     Lastly, the domestic court dismissed the applicants’ claim that the Kimon Georgiev list mentioning that the estate at issue was personal property of the King (see paragraph 12 above), could be valid and sufficient proof of their property rights. It pointed out that the “incorrect” classification in the list had been disproved by the remaining evidence in the case. (iii)     Judgment of the Plovdiv Court of Appeal 64.     The applicants lodged an appeal. 65.     In a judgment of 10 March 2011 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal dismissed it, confirming the findings of the Plovdiv Regional Court. It pointed out that the 1947 Act had not affected the status of the property claimed, because it had been and remained State property. As to the 1998   judgment of the Constitutional Court, it had merely declared that the 1947 Act was unconstitutional, and this declaration meant that the Act was no longer applicable afterwards, but could not substitute the legislature’s decision on the former Kings’ properties. Such a conclusion also took into account judgment no. 15 of the Constitutional Court of 9 June 1998, according to which the scope and manner of restitution could only be decided on by Parliament and no right to restitution stemmed directly from the Constitution (see paragraph 125 below). 66.     The Plovdiv Court of Appeal also dealt with the legal status of the Intendancy, concluding that it had been a State body with its own legal personality, which meant that not all properties managed by it were private properties of the King. Lastly, referring to the Kimon Georgiev list (see paragraph 12 above), it noted that the property’s characterisation as personal property of the King could have been “propaganda”, “typical for that historical moment”. (iv)     Judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation 67.     The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 68.     In a decision of 2 February 2012 the Supreme Court of Cassation (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”) accepted it for examination, considering it necessary to adjudicate on the question concerning the legal status of the Intendancy. 69.     In a judgment of 8 June 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Plovdiv Court of Appeal. On the question accepted for examination, it held: “Under section 3 of the Rules of the Intendancy ... the Intendancy is the body representing the royal Court under civil law ... It is tasked with a wide range of functions aimed at ensuring the activities of the King, as Head of State, which means that it is a State body ... and that it has acquired, since the moment of its creation, legal personality and capacity enabling it to secure and carry out the rights and obligations assigned to it under its Rules as the body responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the King, precisely as Head of State, and his family.” 70.     Pointing out that the Intendancy’s budget was usually much higher than the Civil List (see paragraph 9 above) and the apanage provided to the other members of the King’s family, the Supreme Court continued: “This undoubtedly means that the Intendancy ... cannot be equated to the Civil List itself and does not operate merely with the amount representing the Civil List. The Intendancy ... which, among many other functions related to the maintenance of the monarch as Head of State, managed his Civil List, should be distinguished from the Civil List itself – the sum paid by the State budget for the King’s personal expenses, for his upkeep as a private individual and [that] of his family. [Thus] the Intendancy was not created merely and only to manage the King’s Civil List”. 71.     On the basis of the above general considerations, the Supreme Court concluded that in the case at hand the applicants had not shown that the Intendancy had been in adverse possession of the property claimed by them for the King and not for the State. Their claims thus had no merit. (b)     Concerning the Saragyol complex (i)     The State’s claims against the applicants 72.     On 30 May 2011 the Minister of Public Works, acting on behalf of the State, brought an action against all heirs of Ferdinand I and Boris III (all seven applicants in application no. 38948/10) for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the State owned the Saragyol complex, occupied by the first and second applicants on the strength of the decision of the regional governor of 18 October 2002 (see paragraph 44 above). The claim was specifically based on the fact that the buildings had been constructed on State land and had thus become the property of the State ( приращение ). The Minister also brought a rei vindicatio action, seeking that the State recover possession of the property. In addition, he sought damages from the first and second applicants for their use of the property between 2006 and 2011. 73.     The first and second applicants contested the claims. They brought a counterclaim asking, were they to be ordered to surrender possession, to be allowed to retain the property until the State reimbursed the expenses incurred by them for maintaining the property. 74.     The other defendants (the third to seventh applicants in application no. 38948/10) made an admission acknowledging that the State owned the disputed property. They pointed out that they were not in possession of it. (ii)     Judgment of the Sofia Regional Court 75.     The Sofia Regional Court gave a judgment on 28 August 2014, supplemented by an additional judgment on 22 December 2014. 76.     Analysing the legislation in force at the time when the disputed buildings had been constructed, namely between 1904 and 1914 (see paragraph 42 above), it concluded that the land they had been constructed on had been State property. Even though there were no documents certifying its rights, the State enjoyed “residual” ownership, as there were no claims that the land had been private or municipal. The applicants’ predecessors had not acquired the right to construct on the land ( право на строеж ), which would have allowed them to gain ownership of the buildings. This meant that at the time of their construction the buildings had become State property as well. The former Kings could not have acquired them through adverse possession; even if it could be acknowledged that they had established such possession, the running of the relevant time-limits (twenty years at the time) had been interrupted by law and had not expired by the time the royal family had left Bulgaria. 77.     The Sofia Regional Court then dealt with the effect of the quashing of the 1947 Act by the Constitutional Court in 1998. It pointed out that the 1947 Act had had a one-off effect, which meant that the 1998 judgment, which only had an effect ex nunc , could not retroactively annul its consequences and thus had “no legal effect in practice”. 78.     As to the first applicant’s argument that he and his sister had acquired the disputed property on the basis of other restitution legislation, namely section 2(2) of the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Immovable Property Act (hereinafter “the Restitution Act”, see paragraphs   119-20 below), the Regional Court pointed out that the provision was inapplicable, as it spoke of the taking of property “not under statutory conditions”, which was not the case, the State having passed the 1947 Act. 79.     Lastly, the first and second applicants claimed that they could have acquired the disputed property through adverse possession, having occupied it since 2002. The Sofia Regional Court dismissed this argument as well. It pointed out that the 2002 decision of the regional governor to transfer possession of the property to the applicants (see paragraph 44 above) could not have given rise to property rights, which meant that the first and second applicants could not claim to be bona fide possessors and the period of adverse possession applicable to them was ten years (compared to five years if the applicants had indeed been bona fide possessors); that period had not expired by the time the State had brought its action. 80.     On the basis of the considerations above, the Sofia Regional Court found, in respect of all defendants, that the State owned the disputed property. It ordered the first and second applicants to surrender possession. 81.     As to the State’s claim for damages against the first and second applicants (see paragraph 72 above), the domestic court dismissed it, noting that the State had itself taken the erroneous decision to allow them to use the property. Lastly, it also dismissed the first and second applicants’ claim to be allowed to retain the property until the reimbursement of the expenses incurred by them for maintaining the buildings after 2002. (iii)     Judgment of the Sofia Court of Appeal 82.     The first and second applicants brought an appeal. The Minister of Public Works also lodged an appeal, contesting the dismissal by the Sofia Regional Court of the State’s tort claim against them. The remaining defendants did not appeal and in respect of them the Regional Court’s judgment became final. 83.     The Sofia Court of Appeal gave a judgment on 30 July 2015, upholding the lower court’s findings as to the State’s property rights. 84.     In contrast, it reversed the lower court’s judgment in so far as it concerned the State’s claim for damages. It allowed this claim, awarding the State 30,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN). In addition, it acknowledged that the first and second applicants had incurred expenses necessary for maintaining the buildings, amounting to BGN 13,099. Deducting this from the sum awarded to the State, it ordered the first and second applicants to pay the State BGN 16,901. (iv)     Judgment of the Supreme Court 85.     The first and second applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 86.     In a decision of 8 February 2016 the Supreme Court accepted it for examination, noting that it had to examine several questions raised by them. 87.     The Supreme Court gave a judgment on 14 July 2016. On the first question raised by the applicants, concerning the State’s property rights to forest land under the legislation in force between 1904 and 1914, it held that it had not been necessary for a particular plot of land to have been formally registered as State property; it was such in all cases where it was not the property of private individuals or a municipality. Thus, in the case at hand, the land on which the disputed buildings were constructed was State property. The Supreme Court was prepared to accept that those buildings could have been constructed with King Ferdinand I’s own money. However, as he had not acquired the right to construct on the land allowing him to gain ownership of the buildings, the buildings had nevertheless become State property. 88.     The Supreme Court then examined whether, under the Constitution and the legislation of the Kingdom, the King could, in principle, acquire any property through adverse possession. It held that this was possible, but only where the King was acting in a private capacity and not as Head of State. In addition, after a King had abdicated, any adverse possession established by him could not be continued by the next King, the abdication having only public-law and not private-law implications. Applied to the facts of the present case, this meant that any adverse possession established by Boris III could not be joined to that of Ferdinand I, and that when Boris III acceded to the throne in 1918 the relevant time-limits started running anew. Neither of the two Kings had been in adverse possession of the property for the period of time required by statute (twenty years), after 1918 due in particular to the different interruptions of the running of the time-limits by operation of the law. 89.     On the next question, concerning the legal effect of the 1998   judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court held that that judgment could not “undo” any property rights acquired by the State on the basis of the 1947 Act and could not restore the situation existing prior to the enactment of that Act. This was so because the 1947 Act had had a one-off effect, which had been completed at the time of its enactment. Only the body having passed the 1947 Act, Parliament, could take a new decision on the question of the former Kings’ property, where it judged it appropriate and in the manner it judged appropriate. The subject matter of the 1947 Act, the former Kings’ property, had not been expressly regulated prior to that Act’s adoption and that is why the only legal provisions applicable after its being found incompatible with the Constitution were the general provisions of civil law, which did not guarantee the right to restitution of property in all cases, but only where Parliament had legislated on it; this had been clearly stated in the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 15 of 9 June 1998 (see paragraph 125 below). Accordingly, the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court relied on by the applicants could not, alone, restore any rights that their predecessors might have had. When legislating on the matter, Parliament could take its conclusions into account, but it remained more akin to a “moral assessment” (“ морална декларация ”), demonstrating the Constitutional Court’s view on the “historical compatibility or incompatibility of an Act which is no longer applicable with the values of the modern Constitution”. 90.     The Supreme Court held further that the applicants could not claim to have had their rights restored on the basis of section 2(2) of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 120 below), as its preconditions had not been met: the applicants had not shown that their predecessors had owned the property claimed, and in any event that property had not been taken by the State “not under statutory conditions”, as required by that section. 91.     The 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court could not lead to the first and second applicants being considered as bona fide possessors of the property after 2002, justifying, arguably, the application of the shorter, five ‑ year period of adverse possession, which would have expired in 2007. This was so because the 1998 judgment could not restore any property rights the applicants could have lost, and the 2002 decision of the regional governor transferring possession of the property to them (see paragraph 44 above) was even less capable of doing so. Thus, the applicants’ possession after 2002 was based on no valid legal grounds and the longer, ten-year period of adverse possession applied, which had not expired by 2011 when the State had brought an action against them. 92.     On the basis of the above, the Supreme Court confirmed the lower courts’ judgments, in so far as they had allowed the State’s rei vindicatio action against the applicants. 93.     Unlike the Sofia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court held that the first and second applicants were not liable to pay compensation to the State for having used the property at issue after 2002. It reasoned that even if the State had allowed them to use the property without valid legal grounds, this was its own error, and holding the applicants liable for damage would have amounted to a disproportionate measure, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1. 94.     Lastly, the Supreme Court confirmed that the State was to reimburse the first and second applicants the expenses incurred by them for maintaining the buildings after 2002, and authorised them to retain the property until that sum was paid to them. (c)     Concerning the Sitnyakovo estate (i)     The State’s claims against the applicants 95.     On 24 March 2011 the Minister of Public Works, representing the State, brought a rei vindicatio action against all heirs of Ferdinand I and Boris III (all seven applicants in application no. 38948/10), claiming that the Sitnyakovo estate buildings had been constructed “to meet the needs of the Bulgarian State and not to be private property of the ruling Kings”. He further argued that the State had acquired those buildings through adverse possession, established by a State body, the Intendancy. The Minister pointed out that the land the buildings were standing on was wrongly considered to be property of the Samokov municipality. In addition, he sought damages from all heirs of Ferdinand I and Boris III in compensation for their use of the property between 2003 and 2011. 96.     The first and second applicants contested the claims. They brought a counterclaim asking to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred by them for maintaining the property after 2003, and requesting to be allowed to retain the property until payment was made by the State. 97.     The other defendants (the third to seventh applicants in application no. 38948/10) made an admission acknowledging that the State owned the disputed property. They pointed out that they were not in possession or liable to pay damages to the State because they had not used it. 98.     Following a request by the claimant, in a decision of 20 June 2011 the Sofia Regional Court imposed an interim injunction preventing the defendants from transferring or damaging the disputed property. It considered that the 2009 parliamentary decision phrased in similar terms (see paragraphs 53-54 above) was unspecific and did not preclude the need for an injunction, with the legal effects provided for by law. (ii)     Judgment of the Sofia Regional Court 99.     In a judgment of 31 October 2014 the Sofia Regional Court acknowledged, in respect of all defendants, that the State owned the disputed property, and ordered the first and second applicants to surrender possession. 100.     It held, firstly, that it had not been proved that the land of the estate was owned by the Samokov municipality, because the latter had sought the restitution of plots of land in the area, but not this one. The applicants had not claimed to be the owners of that land and it was State property. 101.     As to the buildings, the Sofia Regional Court pointed out that the State claimed to have become their owner on the strength of adverse possession. The buildings had been in the possession of the Intendancy, whose status had already been examined by the Supreme Court in its judgment of 8 June 2012 (in the proceedings concerning the Krichim estate, see paragraphs 69-71 above). The Intendancy had been a State body, exercising rights on behalf of the State. Thus, the State had become the owner of the property after the expiry of the relevant period of adverse possession. It had not been established that Ferdinand I or Boris III had themselves been in adverse possession of the property. 102.     In any event, the royal family had lost any right to property that they might have had with the enactment of the 1947 Act. Their rights had not been restored by virtue of the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court, as it only applied ex nunc and could not “wipe out” the effects of the 1947 Act. In addition, restitution could only be decided on by Parliament. Moreover, the applicants could not claim to have had their property rights restored to them under section 2(2) of the Restitution Act introduced in 1997 (see paragraph 120 below), as its preconditions had not been met. Neither could the first and second applicants rely on adverse possession running after 2003, because they had not been bona fide possessors of the disputed property and the ten-year prescription period applied to them, which had not expired by 2011. 103.     The Sofia Regional Court also held that the first and second applicants were entitled to retain the property until the State reimbursed the expenses incurred by them for maintaining the disputed property. It dismissed the State’s claim for damages brought against all heirs of the former Kings (see paragraph 95 above in fine ), pointing out that they had not profited from the use of the property (in 2003, when the first and second applicants had entered into possession, the buildings had been in such a bad state of repair that they had been deemed unusable) and in any event the first and second applicants had occupied it with the knowledge and consent of the rightful owner, the State. (iii)     Judgment of the Sofia Court of Appeal 104.     The first and second applicants brought an appeal. The Minister of Public Works also lodged an appeal, contesting the dismissal by the Sofia Regional Court of the State’s claim for damages. The remaining defendants did not appeal and in respect of them the Regional Court’s judgment became final. 105.     The Sofia Court of Appeal gave a judgment on 2 July 2015, upholding the lower court’s findings as to the State’s property rights. It also discussed the legal effect of the Sofia regional governor’s decision of 17   November 2003 to remove the disputed property from the list of State properties (see paragraph 41 above), holding that removal from the list could not in itself transfer or create property rights. 106.     The Sofia Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s judgment in so far as it concerned the State’s claim for damages. It allowed the claim, awarding the State BGN 13,064, deducting that sum from the amount due to the first and second applicants for maintaining the building after 2003. (iv)     Judgment of the Supreme Court 107.     The first and second applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 108.     In a decision of 29 July 2016 the Supreme Court accepted it for examination, only in so far as it concerned their liability for damage. 109.     It gave a judgment on 28 December 2016. Referring to its findings in the previous judgment, given in the proceedings concerning the Saragyol complex (see paragraph 93 above), and once again to Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1, it held that the applicants were not liable to pay damages to the State. (d)     Other proceedings 110.     In November 2009 the Minister of Agriculture, acting on behalf of the State, brought rei vindicatio proceedings against all heirs of Ferdinand I and Boris III, seeking the return of some of the plots of forest land returned to them by the Samokov land commission (see paragraph 48 above). The course of these proceedings is unclear. 111.     On 24 March 2011 the State also brought proceedings claiming the Vrana and Bistritsa estates (see paragraphs 23 and 33 above), but the applicants have not provided any further information on the matter. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     The 1947 Act 112.     After the abolition of the monarchy in Bulgaria, in December 1947 Parliament passed the Act on Declaring State Property the Properties of the Families of the Former Kings Ferdinand and Boris and Their Heirs ( Закон за обявяване държавна собственост имотите на семействата на бившите царе Фердинанд и Борис и на техните наследници – “the   1947   Act”). It comprises two sections, which read as follows: “1.     All movable and immovable properties, located on the territory of Bulgaria and owned by the families of the former Kings Ferdinand and Boris and their heirs, personally acquired or inherited, shall be the property of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. 2.     The use of those properties shall be governed by Regulations, adopted by the Council of Ministers upon a proposal by the Minister of Finance.” 2.     The 1991 Constitution aCitations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG
- Formation
- 23
- Date
- 20 mars 2018
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0320DEC003894810
Données disponibles
- Texte intégral