CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 10 avril 2018

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RUSSIA   (Applications nos. 54381/08 and 5 others – see appended list)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   10 April 2018       FINAL   10/09/2018   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Helena Jäderblom, President,   Branko Lubarda,   Helen Keller,   Dmitry Dedov,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 20 March 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in six applications (nos.   54381/08, 10939/11, 13673/13, 69739/14, 70724/14 and 52440/15) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by six Russian nationals, whose names and dates of birth are listed below and in the Appendix, on various dates also listed there. 2.     The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that post, Mr   M. Galperin. 3.     On 13 September 2016 the complaints under Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASES A.     Ms Tsvetkova (application no. 54381/08) 4.     This application was lodged on 20 October 2008 by Svetlana Ivanovna Tsvetkova, who was born in 1972 and lives in Irkutsk. 5.     At 10 p.m. on 1 January 2008 Officer S. escorted the applicant to the police station, in accordance with Article   27.2 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) (see paragraph 67 below), on suspicion of shoplifting. 6 .     Officer B. compiled an arrest record under Article 27.3 of the CAO (see paragraph 69 below). The administrative arrest record reads as follows: “I, Officer B., ... compiled the present administrative arrest record in respect of: [the applicant’s name, date of birth, address] ... who has been escorted to ... on 1   January 2008 at 10 p.m., on account of an administrative offence under Article [blank] of the CAO. Reasons for the arrest (Article 27.3 of the CAO): [blank] ...” 7.     According to the applicant, after she had been taken away by the police, her minor son (who had apparently been with her in the shop) had been left unattended in the cold. The applicant was then subjected to a humiliating body-search procedure and was asked to take off her clothes, remaining in her underwear. She was then kept with drunk people in a small cell with no seats and no toilet. 8.     In her application to the Court, the applicant specified that she had been released at 3 a.m. on 2 January 2008. In her observations before the Court, she specified that she had been released “after 4 a.m.”. According to the Government, the applicant was released at 0.35 a.m. 9.     The applicant was not subsequently prosecuted for an administrative offence or a criminal offence. 10 .     Considering that the police actions in respect of her and the degrading treatment to which she had been subjected were sufficiently serious so as to amount to a criminal offence, on 27 May 2008 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against officer S., referring, inter alia , to the unlawful deprivation of liberty. 11.     On 16 June 2008 an investigator refused to open a criminal case, finding that the officer had not committed any abuse of power, which was a criminal offence punishable under Article   286 of the Criminal Code. The investigator referred to a statement from B. affirming that the applicant had been taken to the police station on suspicion of theft. 12.     On 20 June 2008 a superior officer overruled the refusal to open a case. A new refusal was issued on 30 June 2008 by the same investigator. That was also then overruled. 13.     A further refusal was issued on 11 December 2008 and the applicant sought a judicial review. On 19 January 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk confirmed the refusal. On 26 February 2009 the Irkutsk Regional Court set aside the judgment, considering that the applicant’s allegations concerning the unlawfulness of her arrest had not been examined. 14.     The District Court then declined jurisdiction in favour of another court, but that was declared unlawful on appeal. 15 .     On 8 May 2009 the District Court discontinued the case because on 7   May 2009 the impugned refusal to prosecute had been overruled by a superior officer. However, a new refusal was issued on 12 November 2009 as regards offences under Articles 285, 286 and 293 of the Criminal Code. This refusal was then upheld by a final judgment of the Regional Court on 9   September 2010. B.     Mr Bgantsev (application no. 10939/11) 16.     This application was lodged on 28 January 2011 by Aleksandr Vitalyevich Bgantsev, who was born in 1958 and lives in Volgograd. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms Y. Lepilina, a lawyer practising in the Volgograd Region. 17.     On 30 August 2010 the applicant’s superior, Mr I., called the police to report that the applicant had used (unspecified) foul language at his work place. Officer O. ordered the applicant to accompany him to the police station. The applicant refused and said that nothing prevented the officer from compiling an administrative-offence record on the spot. The officer insisted, stating that it would be more convenient for him to do it at the police station. The applicant obeyed and was escorted to the police station at around 1 p.m. (in accordance with Article 27.2 of the CAO). At 3.40 p.m. he was subjected to the arrest procedure (Article 27.3 of the CAO). The arrest record reads as follows: “[The applicant] was escorted to the police station at: 3.40 p.m. On account of: an administrative offence under: Article 20.1 of the CAO For the purpose(s) of Article 27.3 of the CAO: for taking a decision.” 18.     Officer O. compiled the administrative-offence record, which reads as follows: “[The applicant] used foul language in the presence of Mr I. and continued his unruly behaviour, despite being asked to stop. Thus, [the applicant] committed an offence under Article 20.1 of the CAO. Witnesses to the offence: Mr K.; Mr M.” 19.     The applicant spent the night at the police station. 20.     On 31 August 2010 the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace, who held a hearing at which he examined the applicant, as well as I., K. and M. On the same day, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of minor hooliganism (Article 20.1 of the CAO) and sentenced him to five days of detention. 21.     The applicant started to serve the sentence on the same day, in the police station. Between 30   August and 4 September 2010 he was locked in cells measuring six square metres and accommodating, on average, four detainees. Each cell was equipped with two benches some 35 cm in width. There was no window and no ventilation system. The other detainees smoked cigarettes, which caused discomfort to the applicant, who was not a smoker. There was no bed or bedding. The applicant was not provided with food or allowed outdoors. Access to a toilet (which was apparently outside the cell) was available every four hours (or sometimes every eight hours). The applicant submitted written statements from three co-detainees in support of his allegations. 22.     The applicant was released at 3.40 p.m. on 4 September 2010. 23 .     On 4 October 2010 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court of Volgograd held an appeal hearing and examined the applicant, I., K., M. and Officer O. The appellate court upheld the judgment of 31 August 2010. On 3   November 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgments following a review. C.     Mr Andreyev (application no. 13673/13) 24.     This application was lodged on 1 February 2013 by Pavel Vladimirovich Andreyev, who was born in 1989 and lives in Syktyvkar. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms I. Buryukova, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. 25.     On 9 December 2011 the applicant distributed leaflets in various police stations, urging the police not to use force to disperse public gatherings which were to be held on 10 December 2011, after the contested elections to the State Duma earlier that month. 26.     At 11 p.m. the traffic police took the applicant to the police station on suspicion of evading military service. At 11.50 p.m. the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO on account of an unpaid fine of 300   roubles (RUB) (equivalent to 7   euros (EUR)) for a traffic offence. The charge concerning evasion of military service was not pursued. 27.     The arrest record reads as follows: “[The applicant] was escorted to the police station: at 11.30 p.m. On account of an administrative offence: under Article 20.25 of the CAO. For the purposes of Article 27.3 of the CAO: for compiling an administrative record.” 28.     The applicant was not released after the administrative-offence record had been drawn up, but was instead placed in a detention centre at 2   a.m., for reasons which were not specified. 29.     At 3 p.m. on 11 December 2011 the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace, who then sentenced him to two days of detention for the offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO. The applicant was then taken back to the detention centre and was released at around 11.30 p.m. 30.     The applicant appealed. On 31 January 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the conviction. 31 .     The applicant brought proceedings, under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”), to challenge the deprivation of his liberty from 2   a.m. on 10 December 2011 to 3   p.m. the next day. By a decision of 12   May 2012, the Town Court discontinued the proceedings. On 2   August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the decision. On 4   March 2013 the cassation instance of the same court confirmed it. The courts considered that while neither the CCP nor the CAO set out a separate procedure for challenging the measures of being escorted to the police station or of administrative arrest, arguments concerning those measures could be raised during an examination of the related CAO charges against the applicant, as well as in an appeal against a decision that had been taken on such charges. 32 .     In separate proceedings, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation, arguing that Article 27.4 required that a record of administrative arrest was to specify reasons for the arrest; the record of his arrest referred to the need to compile the administrative-offence record; such record had been compiled late at night on 9 December 2011; thereby the justification for his arrest had been exhausted and could no longer justify his continued deprivation of liberty on 10 and 11 December 2011. The applicant concluded from the above that the unlawful deprivation of liberty on those dates served as a legal basis for obtaining compensation on account of the non-pecuniary damage suffered. 33 .     By a judgment of 19 September 2012, the Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court considered that the matters relating to his being taken to the police station and the ensuing administrative arrest had been examined in the CAO case and there were therefore no reasons to award compensation. On 20 December 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment. On 27 May 2013 the same court dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant, stating as follows: “... [The applicant] was escorted to the police station for the compiling of a record of administrative offence ... With a view to the correct and expedient examination of the case, he was subjected to the measure of administrative arrest ... The actions of the police officers relating to the escorting and the arrest procedures were assessed by the courts dealing with the administrative charge and were, in substance, declared lawful ... The claimant’s argument that the courts in a civil case should assess the lawfulness of the police actions is based on a wrong interpretation of the law ... It is not appropriate to challenge the procedure of administrative arrest within the procedure under Chapter   25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where there is a decision to engage the liability of a person for an administrative offence ...” D.     Mr Dragomirov (application no. 69739/14) 34.     This application was lodged on 5   September 2014 by Aleksey Olegovich Dragomirov, who was born in 1980 and lives in Roslavl in the Smolensk Region, Russia. 35.     On various dates between 2001 and 2008, including from 9 to 11   June 2008 (see below), the applicant was kept in a temporary detention centre. According to him, the cells had no toilet; he had had to relieve himself in a bucket; there was no running water available in the cells, and no access to shower facilities. 36.     According to a written report by Officer S., at 2.45 p.m. on 9   June 2008 he arrested the applicant for being drunk and looking untidy in a public place, and took him to the police station where he then remained until he sobered up. It appears, however, that the applicant was actually arrested (apparently, by another officer) and then tested for alcohol intoxication around 6 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. respectively (see paragraph 38 below). On 10   June 2008 before a justice of the peace the applicant admitted that he had consumed vodka with a friend in the morning the day before but denied that he had appeared untidy at 2.   45 p.m. or had been drunk or otherwise behaving in a manner offending public morals or human dignity. On the same day, referring to S.’s report, a medical report (the contents of which are not clear) and an arrest record, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of an administrative offence under Article 20.21 of the CAO on account of being drunk in a public place at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 while having an untidy appearance, thus offending human dignity and public morals. The justice of the peace sentenced him to five days of administrative detention. 37.     The applicant started to serve his sentence on 10 June 2008. 38 .     The applicant appealed. On 11 June 2008 the Bolsheukovskiy District Court quashed the conviction and discontinued the case for lack of any evidence to confirm the facts as imputed to the applicant. The appeal court considered that there had been nothing to suggest that the applicant had had an untidy appearance which offended human dignity or public morals; around the same time the applicant had had an appointment at the prosecutor’s office and no complaint had been made concerning his appearance or any state of drunkenness. The appeal decision reads as follows: “The defendant was convicted of being drunk and looking untidy in a public place at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 ... [The applicant] stated that he had consumed vodka with a friend in the morning of 9   June 2008; had then attended a sauna, had put clean clothes, had had lunch and had then gone to attend a meeting in the district prosecutor’s office; he had not seen any police officer at 2.45 p.m. ... Mr Se. stated before the appeal court that he had had a meeting with [the applicant] at 3 p.m. While he could see that [the applicant] had consumed alcohol, he conducted himself, looked and spoke properly ... Officer S. stated that he had been told on 9 June 2008 of [the applicant] being drunk but he had actually not seen him at 2.45 p.m. and had actually not effected his arrest at that time ... The file contains a medical report compiled at 10.45 p.m. and the arrest record indicating that the defendant had been arrested at 6.05 p.m. There is no other evidence in the file. The trial court relied on S.’s report, the medical report and the arrest record. However, it has now been established that the defendant was examined and arrested much later than at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 ... S.’s presentation of facts is not truthful and contradicts his earlier report. Shortly after that time the defendant was at the district prosecutor’s office and testified before an investigator [Se.]. His appearance and conduct did not offend human dignity and public morals ... So it has not been established that the defendant committed any offence under Article 20.21 of the CAO ... The proceedings should be discontinued for lack of a corpus delicti ...” 39.     The applicant was released on 11 June 2008. 40 .     The applicant brought civil proceedings, seeking compensation in the amount of RUB 100,000 (equivalent to EUR 2,000) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage owing to the conditions of his detention and the unlawful penalty of administrative detention. By a judgment of 5   March 2014, the District Court awarded the applicant RUB   5,000 (EUR   100 according to the Bank of Russia rate on the relevant date) on the basis of the fact that the prosecution had been discontinued. On 4 June 2014 the Omsk Regional Court upheld that judgment. E.     Mr Torlopov (application no. 70724/14) 41.     This application was lodged on 24 October 2014 by Viktor Grigoryevich Torlopov, who was born in 1963 and lives in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms   I.   Buryukova, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. 42.     Section 8 of the Public Events Act of 2004 banned public gatherings “in the immediate vicinity of court buildings”. Relying on that provision of the Act, in 2011 the Syktyvkar town administration decided to ban the holding of public events within a radius of 150 metres of any court, to be measured from the entrance to each court building in the town. 43.     At 9 a.m. on 12   October 2011, as part of a series of solo demonstrations held in late 2011, the applicant placed himself within a fenced-off area around the building housing the prosecutor’s office. He was holding a poster that read “The prosecutor’s office should return Stefanovskaya Square to demonstrators!”. 44.     After ten minutes the police ordered the applicant to stop the demonstration because it was being held in the vicinity of the Town Court building. He was handcuffed and, allegedly, physical force was used against him. He was then taken to the police station and subjected to the measure of administrative arrest. The relevant record reads as follows: “[The applicant] arrived at the police station at ‘11.25’ in connection with offences under: ‘Article 20.2, Article 19.3 of the CAO’ For (among the grounds listed in Article 27 of the CAO): for compiling a record of administrative offence ...” 45.     The applicant was released at 8.30   p.m. He was later admitted to hospital. 46 .     By a judgment of 6 December 2011, a justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 500 (equivalent to EUR   12 at the time). On 14 March 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment. However, on 23 August   2013 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic set aside the above judgments and discontinued the case. The court considered that there had been no evidence that the place where the applicant had stood was assigned to the territory of the Town Court under the applicable laws and regulations. 47 .     The applicant brought civil proceedings for compensation on account of the unlawful deprivation of his liberty on 12 October 2011. By a judgment of 12   February 2014, the Town Court dismissed his claim. On 24   April 2014 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment. The court observed as follows: (a)     Having regard to Articles 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention and the ruling of the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia dated 27 June   2013 (concerning the application of the Convention by courts of general jurisdiction), the police’s action in taking the applicant to the police station had been proportionate and had pursued a legitimate aim; it had been of short duration, and had not involved any recourse to physical force. (b)     The measure of taking the applicant to the police station had been aimed at ensuring prosecution for an administrative offence, including the drawing up of an arrest record. F.     Mr Svetlov (application no. 52440/15) 48.     This application was lodged on 30 September 2015 by Kirill Valentinovich Svetlov, who was born in 1990 and lives in Cherepovets in the Vologodsk Region. 49.     On 4 September 2015 the applicant’s car was stopped by the police. The applicant was accused of an administrative offence under Article   12.7 of the CAO because he had no valid driving licence. The applicant was taken to the police station where he went through the procedure of being placed under administrative arrest. His mobile telephone was seized. 50.     According to the applicant, he was not informed of his procedural rights, including the right to remain silent, when he was pulled up by the police, or at the police station. 51.     On 6 September 2015 (a Sunday) the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace. At the hearing, the applicant asked for a lawyer. The judge adjourned the hearing for thirty minutes to allow the applicant to contact a lawyer. According to the applicant, during the break in the hearing, a guard took him to a metal cage where defendants were kept; the applicant had no access to a telephone. According to the Government, the applicant was not kept in a metal cage but in a room measuring some twelve square metres. 52.     According to the Government, after the adjournment the applicant waived his right to legal assistance and opted to defend himself. The applicant submitted that he had not made any such statement. 53.     The justice of the peace convicted the applicant of the offence and sentenced him to five days of administrative detention, to be counted from 4   September 2015. The justice of the peace stated that the applicant’s guilt was confirmed by, inter alia , the record of administrative offence compiled by the police as well as by the applicant’s guilty plea. The justice of the peace had dismissed as unsubstantiated his argument that as a military officer, he could not be sentenced to administrative detention. 54.     The applicant began his sentence the same day. 55.     On 8 September 2015 the applicant appealed. In his statement of appeal he mentioned that he had had difficulties with legal assistance since no law firms would be open on a Sunday. He was released on 9   September 2015. 56.     On 18 September 2015 the Cherepovets Town Court examined the applicant and upheld the judgment against him. It stated, inter alia , that the justice of the peace had not been provided with any proof that the applicant was a military officer. It is unclear whether the applicant adduced the relevant evidence in the appeal proceedings. 57.     The applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint. By decision no.   2732-O of 19 November 2015, the Constitutional Court held that the immediate execution of the sentence of administrative detention had not contravened the Constitution (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, paragraph 79 below). 58.     On 26 November 2015 the Vologda Regional Court dismissed an application by the applicant for review of the court decisions of 6 and 18   September 2015. 59.     On 1 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed a further application for review lodged by the applicant. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Causes of action under Russian law 1.     Judicial review under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) 60 .     Until 15 September 2015 the procedure for examining complaints about decisions, acts or omissions of State and municipal authorities and officials was governed by Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act (Law no. 4866-1 of 27 April 1993 on judicial review of decisions and acts violating citizens’ rights and freedoms). Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act both provided that a citizen had a possibility to lodge a complaint before a court about an act or decision by any State or municipal authority or official if he considered that the act or decision had violated his rights and freedoms (Article 254 of the CCP and section 1 of the Judicial Review Act). The complaint might concern any decision, act or omission which had violated the citizen’s rights or freedoms, had impeded the exercise of rights or freedoms, or had imposed a duty or liability on him (Article 255 of the CCP and section 2 of the Judicial Review Act). For a more detailed description of the Chapter 25 procedure, see Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no.   47143/06, §§ 92-100, ECHR 2015, and Lashmankin and Others v. Russia , nos.   57818/09 and 14   others, §§ 280-85, 7 February 2017. 2.     Tort actions under the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 61 .     Damage caused to the person or property of a citizen shall be compensated in full by the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor is not liable for damage if he or she proves that the damage has been caused through no fault of his or her own (Article 1064 §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Code). State and municipal bodies and officials shall be liable for damage caused to a citizen by their unlawful actions or omissions (Article 1069 of the Civil Code). Irrespective of any fault by State officials, the State or regional treasury is liable for damage sustained by a citizen on account of (i) unlawful criminal conviction or prosecution; (ii) unlawful application of a preventive measure, and (iii) unlawful sentence of administrative detention (Article 1070 § 1 of the Civil Code). 62 .     A court may impose on the tortfeasor an obligation to compensate non-pecuniary damage (physical or mental suffering). Compensation for non-pecuniary damage is unrelated to any award in respect of pecuniary damage (Articles 151 § 1 and 1099 of the Civil Code). The amount of compensation is determined by reference to the gravity of the tortfeasor’s fault and other significant circumstances. The court also takes into account the extent of physical or mental suffering in relation to the victim’s individual characteristics (Article 151 § 2 and Article 1101 of the Civil Code). Irrespective of the tortfeasor’s fault, non-pecuniary damage shall be compensated for if the damage was caused (i) by a hazardous device; (ii) in the event of unlawful conviction or prosecution or unlawful application of a preventive measure or unlawful sentence of administrative detention, and (iii) through dissemination of information which was damaging to honour, dignity or reputation (Article 1100 of the Civil Code). B.     Police powers 63.     Under the old Police Act (Federal Law no. 1036-I of 18 April 1991), applicable until 2011, the police were empowered to carry out an administrative arrest. 64.     Under the current Police Act (Federal Law no. 3-FZ of 7   February 2011) the police are empowered to check an individual’s identity documents where there are reasons to suspect the person of a criminal offence or if his or her name is on a wanted persons list; where there is a reason for prosecuting him or her for an administrative offence; or where there are other grounds, provided for by federal law, for arresting the person (section   13 of the Act). The police are also empowered to take the person to a police station in order to decide whether he or she should be arrested, if that cannot be done on the spot (section 13(13) of the Act); to apply measures listed in Article 27.1 of the CAO, such as administrative escorting ( административное доставление ) or administrative arrest ( административное задержание ) (section 13(8) of the Act). 65.     It is pertinent to take into account the statutory conditions, aims and grounds for taking a person to a police station (for instance, by way of administrative escorting), as well as the specific circumstances of a given situation when it is applied. Thus such a measure should not be arbitrary and should “take account of the proportionality as regards the scope of limitations on one’s rights (for instance, as the case may be, freedom of expression or freedom of assembly) vis-à-vis the actual necessity arising from the circumstances as well as the practicability of attaining the aim pursued by the measure” (Ruling no.   8-P of 17 March 2017 by the Russian Constitutional Court in relation to section 13(13)   of the Police Act of 2011). After a record of escorting has been compiled and if the grounds for escorting are no longer compelling, the person must be released without delay. Continued retention of the person in that case may become arbitrary, thus violating his or her right to liberty and personal security as protected by Article   22 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the European Convention. Individuals have the right to challenge the measure of escorting applied to them (ibid.). C.     Administrative escorting to a police station and administrative arrest 1.     General provisions 66 .     Article 27.1 of the CAO provides for a number of measures, including administrative escorting ( административное доставление ) of a suspect to a police station and administrative arrest ( административное задержание ). Such measures may be used for the purpose of putting an end to an administrative offence; to establish an offender’s identity; to compile an administrative-offence record, where this cannot be done on the spot; to ensure a timely and correct examination of a case; and to enforce a decision taken in a case. 2.     Administrative escorting 67 .     Article 27.2 of the CAO defines the procedure of escorting someone to a police station as being that by which an offender is compelled to follow the competent officer for the purposes of compiling an administrative ‑ offence record when it cannot be done on the spot. 68 .     The Constitutional Court has held that this measure of compulsion, which amounts to a temporary restriction of a person’s freedom of movement, should be applied only when it is necessary and within short time frames (Decision no.   149-O-O of 17 January 2012). Subsequently, the Constitutional Court stated that both administrative escorting and administrative arrest amounted to “restrictions imposed on [a person’s] liberty” (see, for instance, Ruling no. 14-P of 23 May 2017). 3.     Administrative arrest 69 .     Pursuant to Article 27.3 of the CAO, in exceptional cases ( в исключительных случаях ) relating to the need ( необходимо для ) for a proper and expedient examination of an administrative case or for securing the execution of any sentence imposed for an administrative offence, the person concerned may be placed under administrative arrest. 70 .     It is unclear whether, in addition to the specific aims listed in Article   27.3, administrative arrest may be applied in exceptional cases for the aims listed in Article 27.1 (see paragraph 66 above), such as to put an end to an administrative offence, to establish a person’s identity or to compile the administrative-offence record if it is not practicable to do so on the spot (see, however, Ruling no.   25-P of 17   November 2016 by the Constitutional Court of Russia). While dealing in that ruling (paragraph 3) with the requirement of an “exceptional case”, the Constitutional Court mentioned that this requirement means that administrative arrest may only be applied where it is necessary in view of the specific situation, which objectively indicates that without such a measure it would be impossible ( невозможно ) to establish the person’s identity, to clarify the circumstances of the offence or to ensure the expedient and correct examination of the case or to enforce the penalty. 71.     The duration of administrative arrest must not exceed three hours. Administrative arrest for a longer period, not exceeding forty-eight hours, is permissible only for persons subject to administrative proceedings concerning an offence punishable by administrative detention or offences involving the unlawful crossing of the Russian border. Under Article 27.5 of the Code, the term of arrest starts to run as soon as the person has been escorted to the police station in accordance with Article   27.2. 72.     The arrestee should be informed of his rights and obligations and this notification should be mentioned in the arrest record. 73 .     The Constitutional Court has ruled that administrative arrest amounts to “deprivation of liberty” as it is understood by the European Court within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the European Convention (Ruling no.   9-P of 16   June 2009). Administrative arrest must be effected in compliance with the goals listed in subparagraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, that is it must be effected for the purpose of bringing an individual before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so (Ruling no.   9-P of 16 June 2009). Lawfulness of the arrest requires assessment of the essential features affecting such “lawfulness”, which includes assessment of whether the measure was justified ( обоснованной ) in view of the goals pursued and in view of whether it was necessary and reasonable ( разумной ) in the specific circumstances of the situation in which it was applied. Administrative arrest is lawful if it is justified on account of the nature of the offence and is necessary for ensuring execution of the judgment in the administrative ‑ offence case (Decision no. 1049-O of 2 July 2013 by the Constitutional Court). The assessment of the reasons/grounds listed in the record of administrative arrest (as was relevant, in respect of a claim for compensation relating to such arrest) includes the assessment of whether the arrest was the only possible measure in respect of the defendant (ibid.). 74 .     In Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009 the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia (paragraph 7) stated that the procedure under Chapter 25 of the CCP was not applicable to challenges against actions, omissions or decisions for which the CAO did not provide for a review procedure and which, being intrinsically linked to a given case of administrative-offence charges, were not amenable to a separate review. The above statement was relevant for evidence in cases such as the record of certain measures, for instance a record of administrative escorting or a record of administrative arrest. In such circumstances, arguments relating to the inadmissibility of a piece of evidence or a measure could be presented during examination of the administrative-offence case or on appeal against a decision in such a case. However, where CAO proceedings were discontinued, any actions taken during such proceedings could then be challenged under Chapter 25 of the CCP, if such actions impinged upon the person’s rights or freedoms, created obstacles to their being exercised, or unlawfully imposed liability. The same approach was applicable where no CAO proceedings were instituted. This Ruling ceased to be applicable in September 2016. 75 .     The Constitutional Court held that the special rules contained in Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Civil Code (concerning State liability, without the need to prove a public official’s guilt) had to be interpreted as affording individuals a possibility to claim compensation for being placed under administrative arrest in the context of offences punishable by administrative detention or administrative removal (that is where Article   27.5 § 3, allowing the police to hold an arrested person for up to forty-eight hours, was applicable) (Ruling no.   9-P of 16 June 2009). The courts must assess both the formal lawfulness of the measure and the reasons for it, in terms of its fairness and proportionality (Decision no.   149 ‑ O-O of 17 January 2012). With regard to the reasons cited in the administrative-arrest record, the courts must ascertain whether arrest was the only acceptable measure in the circumstances (Decision no. 1049-O of 2   July 2013). D.     Presumption of innocence 76 .     Article 49 of the Russian Constitution provides that anyone who is accused of a criminal offence is presumed innocent until his guilt is proven, pursuant to the procedure prescribed by federal statute, and is established by a final judgment in a criminal case. The accused is not obliged to prove his innocence. Any doubts about the guilt of a person must be interpreted in favour of the accused. 77.     Article 1.5 of the CAO provides for the presumption of innocence. The official or the court dealing with the administrative-offence case should establish whether the person concerned is guilty or innocent (Ruling no. 5 of 24 March 2005 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia). E.     Sentence of administrative detention 78.     Law-enforcement officers should execute a sentence of administrative detention ( административный арест ) immediately after the delivery of the relevant judgment by a court (Article 32.8 of the CAO). 79 .     By decision no. 2732-O of 19 November 2015, the Constitutional Court held that the immediate execution of a sentence of administrative detention did not contradict any provision of the Constitution, including Articles 15, 17, 22 and 49 (presumption of innocence), for the following reasons: (i)     Penalties provided for by the CAO, except for administrative detention, are executed (if imposed by a court) following the expiry of the time-limit for an appeal, or after an appeal has been examined. (ii)     While being the strictest penalty under the CAO, a sentence of administrative detention is imposed only in “exceptional circumstances” and only for certain listed offences. The execution of such a sentence is accompanied by guarantees of judicial protection: the sentence must be imposed by a court; that court must provide reasons for imposing such a sentence; the sentence must be notified to the defendant without delay; an appeal against the sentence can be submitted to a higher court without delay and must be examined within one day; and the period of administrative detention is counted from the time of administrative arrest. One judge expressed a separate opinion. He found that the applicable legislation meant that a person who had not yet been found guilty was compelled, in the absence of a final judgment having the quality of res judicata , to serve a period of administrative detention. He pointed out that Article 49 of the Constitution provided that everyone should be presumed innocent until his or her guilt had been proven by a final criminal judgment. That principle was applicable to the CAO, in particular having regard to the European Court’s approach in applying the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention to the CAO or to similar cases. In this connection he referred to Mikhaylova v. Russia (no.   46998/08, 19   November 2015). Noting that the Convention was an integral part of the Russian legal system and had “priority over national statutes when they conflict”, he stressed that Russia’s obligations under Article 6 of the Convention required strict compliance with the presumption of innocence, both in criminal cases and in cases under the CAO. In his view, the safeguards referred to by the majority of the court were not sufficient to ensure respect of the presumption of innocence and appeared to sit ill with the constitutional guarantee of judicial protection of rights and judicial protection against unfair prosecution and punishment. In fact, although it dealt with less serious cases, the CAO was stricter than the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which a sentence of imprisonment was only executed following an appeal judgment . F.     Compensation in relation to prosecution under the CAO 80 .     Article 1070 of the Civil Code provides for a possibility to claim compensation on account of unlawful prosecution where it resulted in the imposition of the penalty of administrative detention. Pursuant to Ruling no.   5 of 24 March 2005 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia, claims in respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage caused by unlawful prosecution for an administrative offence are examined under the rules of civil procedure (paragraph 27). 81 .     A claim for compensation failed where the court decision setting aside the conviction did not contain findings relating to the defendant’s innocence but was reasoned with reference to the expiry of the prosecution period rather than, for instance, the absence of corpus delicti (Appeal decision no.   33-44053/2016 of 10 November 2016 by the Moscow City Court; see also Appeal decision no. 33-273/2015 of 9 February 2015 by the Lipetsk Regional Court). In certain circumstances a claim for compensation may be examined and granted under the general rules of tort liability under Articles 1069 and 1070 of the Civil Code (Cassation review decision no.   77 ‑ KG16-2 of 13 September 2016 by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Russia). G.     Other relevant legislation 82 .     Section 8 of the Federal Law on Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, Processions and Pickets, no.   FZ-54 of 19 June 2004 (“the Public Events Act”) prohibited public events in the immediate vicinity of a court. The perimeter of the zones in the immediate vicinity of buildings or other constructions was to be determined by a decision of the regional or municipal executive authorities issued in accordance with the land and urban planning legislation on the basis of the land or urban planning register (section 3). The Constitutional Court of Russia specified that having regard to the wording of the above-mentioned sections, it was appropriate to have regard also to the relevant provisions of the Land Code, in particular, relating to the borders of plots of land (Decision no. 573-O-O of 17   July 2007). The Supreme Court of Russia further confirmed that approach, indicating that when determining areas “in the immediate vicinity” of buildings within the meaning of the Public Events Act, it was incumbent on the regional authorities to take due account of the land actually used (for instance, by a specific court) and the official borders of the relevant plot of land (Decision no. 11-G09-17 of 11 November 2009). THE LAW I.     JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 83.     In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their factual and legal similarities. It considers that joining these applications will highlight the recurring nature of the intertwined issues arising in the cases at hand and underscore the general nature of the Court’s findings as set out below. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 84.     The applicants complained that they had been unlawfully and arbitrarily subjected to the measures of administrative escorting and administrative arrest. 85.     Mr Dragomirov (application no. 69739/14) also complained that, in view of the findings by the appeal court, there had been a separate violation of this Article on account of the sentence that he had served in part. 86.     Article 5 § 1 of the Convention reads in the relevant parts as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a)     the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; ... (c)     the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ... ” A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government 87.     As regards Ms Tsvetkova, Mr Bgantsev and Mr Svetlov, the Government referred to decision no. 440-O of 4   December 2003 by the Russian Constitutional Court and argued that the applicants should have used the procedure under Chapter 2