CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 15 mai 2018

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RUSSIA   (Applications nos. 6312/13 and 60902/14)           JUDGMENT           STRASBOURG   15 May 2018     FINAL   08/10/2018   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Lutskevich v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Helena Jäderblom, President,   Dmitry Dedov,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking,   María Elósegui, judges, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 10 April 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in two applications (nos.   6312/13 and 60902/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Denis Aleksandrovich Lutskevich (“the applicant”), on 11 January 2013 and 2   September 2014 respectively. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr D. Agranovskiy, a lawyer practising in Elektrostal. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin. 3.     The applicant complained about his prosecution and conviction for participation in mass disorder. He submitted that his pre-trial detention had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and complained that various aspects of his detention had amounted to degrading treatment. The applicant further alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression and his right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 4.     On 19 December 2013 and 13 October 2014 the applications were communicated to the Government. The applications were granted priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Lobnya, Moscow Region. A.     Demonstration of 6 May 2012 6.     The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§   7-65, 5   January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.     On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it transpired that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers, and there were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.     On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 §   1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. B.     The applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention 9.     At the time of the events the applicant was a first-year student at the faculty of culture studies of the State Academic University for the Humanities. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. According to him, he was beaten up by the police as they were dispersing the demonstration. 10 .     At 4 a.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant was admitted to the emergency ward of Sklifosovskiy hospital where he was examined by a trauma doctor and a neurosurgeon. The examination revealed multiple bruises on the applicant’s chest, spine, shoulders, knees and head. 11.     After the events of 6 May 2012 the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his studies. On 9 June 2012 he was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder and of using violence against the police during the demonstration of 6 May 2012. On the same day the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 9 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and information about the applicant’s personality. The District Court noted, in particular, that the applicant’s father was a Ukrainian national living in Ukraine, and that the applicant might therefore flee to avoid the investigation and trial. It concluded that those circumstances gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant, if he were at liberty, was likely to continue his criminal activity, influence witnesses, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, which was at an initial stage. 12.     On 18 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 § 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence) and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having torn a protection helmet off a police officer’s head. 13.     On 11 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 9 June 2012. 14.     On 7 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow examined an investigator’s request for an extension of the applicant’s pre ‑ trial detention. The applicant requested that an alternative preventive measure be applied pending trial, such as house arrest or a written undertaking not to leave a specified place. On the same day the District Court found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed and extended the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2012. On 5 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision. 15.     On 2 November 2012 the Basmannyy District Court authorised a further extension of the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2013. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. On 3   December 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision. 16.     On 21 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were reformulated. It was additionally stated that the applicant had shouted insulting slogans and used metal barriers to obstruct the police; that at least three times he had thrown stones and pieces of tarmac at police officers and had once punched a policeman; and that he had also grabbed a police officer’s uniform and had snatched a protection helmet from his hands. 17.     On 29 November 2012 Police Officer P. identified the applicant during an identification parade as a participant in the mass disorder and the person who had twice thrown pieces of tarmac at the police and tried to snatch the protection helmet from a policeman’s hands. He specified that he had not seen whether the applicant had in fact succeeded in snatching the helmet or not. 18.     On 7 December 2012 the investigator of the Zamoskvoretskiy Inter ‑ district Investigation Committee of Moscow refused to open a criminal case into allegations made by the applicant that he had been subjected to ill ‑ treatment by the police during his arrest. The investigator considered that the use of force by the police had been justified by the behaviour of the protesters, including the applicant, who had actively resisted their arrest and thrown various objects at the police officers. 19.     On 27 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s detention until 9 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as earlier, noting that the applicant’s state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. That decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 March 2013. 20.     On 22 April 2013 the Moscow City Court authorised a further extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 July 2013. The court noted that even though the applicant and his lawyer had already finished reading the case file, other defendants had not. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 21.     On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 22.     On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The Moscow City Court upheld that extension order on 2 July 2013. 23.     On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court examined an investigator’s request for an extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. The applicant presented a personal guarantee from a member of the State Duma in support of an undertaking by him to appear before the investigating authorities and the courts for the examination of his case. However, the District Court did not consider that guarantee and ordered that the applicant and his co-defendants be detained until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. C.     Conditions of detention 24.     From 20 June 2012 until his conviction the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/5 in Moscow. There he was detained in cells no.   403 (until 20 May 2013, then from 27 May 2013 to 19 June 2013, and from 29   June 2013 to January 2014), no.   12 (until 25 May 2013), no.   317 (until 27 May 2013), and no.   4 (until 29 June 2013). 25 .     The cells had the following characteristics: - cell no.   403: 40 sq. m. and ten sleeping places; - cell no.   12: 6.1 sq. m. and one sleeping place; - cell no.   317: 32.9 sq. m. and eight sleeping places; - cell no.   4: 48 sq. m. and twelve sleeping places. 26.     The parties agreed that the number of inmates in the cells had not exceeded the design capacity. They also agreed that the size of the cells and the number of detainees had allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 27.     The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in the cells. According to the applicant, prison cell no. 403 measured approximately 7 by 5 metres and housed ten inmates, including himself. The cell was inadequately lit and ventilated, was excessively hot in the summer and cold in the winter. The windows were too high to give sufficient light for reading or working with documents. A shower was allowed once a week and the lavatory pan was separated from the living space only by a plastic partition. The bed linen was old, and the beds were small for a man of his height. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. 28 .     According to the Government, all of the cells had sanitary units with wash stands and the necessary furniture. The cells were equipped with ventilation, heating and lighting; the state of the sanitary facilities had been satisfactory; the bedding had been changed once a week; and the cells had been disinfected and subjected to pest control regularly. The applicant had been able to shower once a week and entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise per day. D.     Transfer between the detention centre and the courthouse 29.     The applicant’s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back, and the Government’s submissions in that regard, were identical to those in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 69-73). 30 .     As regards the conditions of detention in the holding room of the Moscow City Court, the applicant submitted that the room had been poorly lit and that access to a toilet had been limited to once an hour. In addition, he had been required to strip naked and to perform sit-ups during the body search conducted in the holding room. E.     Conditions in the courtroom 31 .     The court proceedings began on 6 June 2013 in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued in hearing room no.   303 at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow. In January and February 2014 they took place in hearing room no. 410 at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (eight from 19   December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 32.     For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms, see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). F.     The applicant’s trial 33.     On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participating in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the trial on the merits. 34.     On an unspecified date Police Officer T., the alleged victim of the applicant’s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that at some point he had been surrounded by the crowd and subjected to violence. T.   stated that the applicant had tried to snatch the protection helmet from his hands. Another officer, M., also questioned as a witness, stated that the applicant had shouted something and thrown a stone or a piece of tarmac at a policeman. 35 .     On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows: “Between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property. On the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ... Moreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw pieces of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ... Between 5.05 p.m. and 10 p.m. [the applicant] ... shouted insulting slogans and used metal barriers to block the police’s movement ... thus preventing the arrest of the participants in the acts of mass disorder ... [The applicant], acting intentionally, at least three times threw stones and pieces of tarmac at police officers in a targeted manner ... and used violence against an unidentified police officer which did not endanger his life or health ... unidentified participants in the acts of mass disorder, acting intentionally, tore a protection helmet off an unidentified police officer’s head and punched and kicked him several times in the head and body, meanwhile [the applicant] ... punched this police officer at least once. [The applicant] ... used violence against Police Officer T. which did not endanger his life or health ... ... unidentified participants of the acts of mass disorder intentionally tore off [T.’s] protection helmet, which [T.] continued to hold in his hands, and punched him in the head and body, whereupon [the applicant] intentionally grabbed [T.’s] uniform and ... snatched the helmet from his hands. [The applicant] pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he had decided to attend the public gathering on 6 May 2012 ... When leaving the Malyy Kamennyy Bridge [the applicant] saw a lot of police officers equipped with bullet-proof vests, helmets and truncheons, which filled him with indignation. As nothing was happening on the stage, [the applicant] decided to return ... when leaving the venue he saw the police officers randomly arresting people while hitting them with truncheons ... [The applicant] was hit in the back three times with a truncheon. When he saw these violent acts by the police, [the applicant] approached the barriers where other protestors were standing and expressed his indignation ... Then ... he tried to leave the venue ... when somebody tore off his shirt. ... At some point [the applicant] came across police officer [T.] ... who was not wearing any helmet. [The applicant] tried to leave, but suddenly police officers ran up to him and started to beat him in the head and body, then they arrested him and ... took him to a police vehicle. [The applicant] insisted that he had committed no acts in respect of police officer [T.], had not seen his helmet and had snatched nothing from his hands. ... the court considers the [defendants’] arguments that they were protecting somebody from police officers or happened to be victims of the police’s use of force as farfetched and aimed at mitigating their responsibility ...” 36.     The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article   212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year under Article 318 § 1. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 37.     The applicant appealed. He complained, in particular, that he had not used metal barriers to block the police’s movement and insisted that he had been standing close to those barriers before the protestors had started to be arrested. The applicant also pointed out that the video records proved that he had not taken T.’s helmet and had not used violence against him. In his opinion, the first-instance court had not assessed his statements about ill ‑ treatment by the police. 38.     On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. G.     Correspondence with the Court 39.     The applicant was represented by a lawyer, Mr D., throughout the criminal proceedings at domestic level. On 11 January 2013 Mr D. sent the Court an introductory letter containing the outline of the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the police on 6 May 2012 and of unjustified pre-trial detention. 40.     On 24 January 2013 the Registry of the Court acknowledged receipt of the introductory letter, registered under application no. 6312/13. The applicant was invited to return the completed application form within eight weeks of receipt of the Court’s letter but no later than 21 March 2013. As no further correspondence had been received from the applicant, on 28   August 2013 the Registry of the Court asked him whether he was still being represented by Mr D. and reminded him to return the completed application form. 41.     On 18 September 2013 the Court received the completed application form, signed by a different lawyer, Mr Agranovskiy. It contained complaints about the conditions of detention in the remand prison, in the courtroom and during transfers to and from the prison, and of unjustified pre-trial detention. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 42.     The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides as follows: Article 212. Mass disorder “1.     The organisation of mass disorder, accompanied by violence, riots, arson, destruction of property, the use of firearms, explosives and explosive devices, as well by armed resistance to a public official, shall be punishable by four to ten years’ deprivation of liberty. 2.     Participation in the types of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punishable by three to eight years’ deprivation of liberty. 3.     The instigation of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article, or the instigation of participation in such acts, or the instigation of violence against citizens, shall be punishable by a restriction of liberty for up to two years, or community service for up to two years, or deprivation of liberty for the same term.” Article 318. Use of violence against a public official “1.     The use of violence which does not endanger life or health, or the threat to use such violence against a public official or his relatives in connection with the performance of his or her duties shall be punishable by a fine of up to 200,000 roubles or an equivalent of the convicted person’s wages for 18 months, or community service for up to five years, or up to five years’ deprivation of liberty ...” 43.     For a summary of the relevant domestic law provisions governing pre-trial detention and for the practice of the domestic courts in that matter, see the case of Zherebin v. Russia (no. 51445/09, §§ 16-25, 24 March 2016). 44 .     For a summary of the applicable regulations and the European standards for prison conditions, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia (nos.   42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 55 et seq., 10 January 2012). THE LAW I.     JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 45.     Given their common factual and legal background, the Court decides that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. II.     THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION 46.     The Government submitted that the applicant had returned the completed application form, registered under no. 6312/13 and containing all his complaints, eight months after the submission of the initial communication. His application could not, therefore, be regarded as duly lodged. 47.     The Court reiterates that, in accordance with its established practice and Rule 47 § 5 of the Rules of Court, as in force at the relevant time, it normally considers the date of the introduction of an application to be the date of the “first communication” indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the application. Such first application would in principle interrupt the running of the six-month time-limit. Nonetheless, an applicant’s failure to pursue his or her application with reasonable expedition after an initial introductory contact may lead the Court to decide that the interruption of the six-month period is to be invalidated. The date of the submission of the completed application will therefore be considered as the date of its introduction (see Yartsev v.   Russia (dec.), no. 13776/11, §§ 21-22, 26 March 2013). 48.     The Court observes in the present case that the applicant’s initial communication of 11 January 2013 contained the outline of his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention of ill-treatment by the police on 6 May 2012 and under Article 5 of unjustified pre-trial detention. It considers that it is not necessary for it to reach a conclusion as regards the complaint under Article 3 at this point, since it is inadmissible in any event for the reason given below (see paragraphs 51-52 below). As regards the complaint under Article   5, the Court reiterates that a person alleging a violation of Article   5 §   3 of the Convention with respect to the length of his or her detention is complaining of a continuing situation which should be considered as a whole (see Kokoshkina v. Russia , no. 2052/08, § 68, 28 May 2009). It notes that following his placement in custody on 9 June 2012, namely seven months preceding the submission of the initial communication, the applicant remained continuously in detention until 21 February 2014, which is five months after lodging the completed application form. The Court therefore finds that it has competence to examine the entire period of his detention and dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection in that regard. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION DURING PRE-TRIAL DETENTION 49.     The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention of the poor conditions of his detention in IZ-77/5, in the holding room at the Moscow City Court and during transfers to and from the prison. He also alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police during the dispersal of the demonstration on 6 May 2012 and that there had been no effective investigation following his complaint about it. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     Admissibility 50.     The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment during the dispersal of the demonstration. In particular, he had not challenged before a court the investigator’s decision of 7 December 2012 refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The Government also submitted that the complaint about the conditions of detention in the holding room of the Moscow City Court did not contain sufficient details. 51 .     The Court has previously established that an appeal to a court against an investigating authority’s decision dismissing an applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment would be a normal avenue of exhaustion in respect of an Article   3 complaint (see, for example, Belevitskiy v. Russia , no. 72967/01, §   61, 1 March 2007, and Trubnikov v. Russia (dec.), no.   49790/99, 14   October 2003). The applicant, who was represented by a lawyer throughout the criminal proceedings against him, did not furnish any explanation for his lawyer’s failure to lodge, or advise the applicant to lodge, a judicial appeal against the investigator’s decision (see, mutatis   mutandis , Radzhab Magomedov v. Russia , no. 20933/08, §   66, 20   December 2016). 52 .     The Court therefore finds that the applicant’s complaint of ill ‑ treatment by the police during the dispersal of the demonstration must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§   1 and 4 of the Convention. 53.     As to the remainder of the complaints under Article 3, the Court notes that the grievances about the conditions of the applicant’s detention and the conditions during the prison transfer, including those in the holding room at the Moscow City Court, are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. The Court further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Conditions of detention in the remand prison 54.     The applicant alleged that the poor conditions of his detention had been in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The parties’ submissions as regards the material conditions of detention have been summarised in paragraphs 25-28 above. 55.     The main facts relevant to the assessment of the conditions of detention, in particular the size of the cells, the number of inmates detained there at the same time as the applicant, and the sanitary and hygiene arrangements were not in dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, the parties disagreed on whether those conditions had amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant maintained, in particular, that four square metres of personal space had been insufficient to avoid overcrowding in IZ-77/5, and that it had been aggravated by other factors, such as inadequate ventilation and lighting, incomplete separation of the lavatory from the living space and restrictions on outdoor exercise and showering. The Government, on the contrary, contended that the applicant’s conditions of detention had been in conformity with the applicable standards for personal space, light, room temperature, sanitary facilities and hygiene arrangements. 56.     The Court recently reiterated the general principles governing the application of Article 3 of the Convention to conditions of detention, as well as the principles concerning prison overcrowding, in Muršić v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 96-141, ECHR 2016). In particular, the Court confirmed that the requirement of three square metres of floor space per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation should be maintained as the relevant minimum standard for its assessment under Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 110 and 114). 57.     In the present case, the Court observes that during the whole period of his detention the applicant was held in cells that allowed him four square metres of personal space, which complies with the minimum standard. The applicant was always provided with an individual bed; he has not alleged that the layout of the cells or the arrangement of fixtures such as tables, beds and toilets, impeded him from moving freely within the cell (compare Vladimir Belyayev v. Russia , no.   9967/06, § 34, 17   October 2013; and, by contrast, Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia , no.   41833/04, § 87, 27 January 2011; and Manulin v. Russia , no.   26676/06, § 46, 11 April 2013). 58.     As regards other aspects of the physical conditions of detention in the remand prison, the Court notes that the applicant was allowed one hour of outdoor exercise per day. Also, each cell where the applicant was detained had unobstructed access to natural light. The windows were not fitted with metal shutters or other devices preventing natural light from entering the cell. Even if two windows were located high up, that arrangement could not significantly reduce the provision of natural light to the cell (compare Vlasov v. Russia , no. 78146/01, § 82, 12 June 2008). The cells were additionally equipped with artificial lighting, heating and ventilation. The lavatories in the cells were separated from the living space, although the partition did not reach the ceiling. It must be noted that the frequency of showers limited to once per week has been considered by the Court as manifestly insufficient for maintaining proper bodily hygiene (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, § 158, 10   January 2012 with further references). However, the applicant did not complain about the other practical arrangements for showering, such as a limited number of functioning showerheads or a lack of privacy due to the fact that inmates were taken to shower halls in groups (ibid.). The Court has also taken note of the photographs showing the interior of the remand prison cells and their sanitary facilities, which do not appear to be in an especially bad state of repair or cleanliness. 59.     It may be that some aspects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention fell short of the Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the European Prison Rules and the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. Those include, in particular, the restrictions on hot showers and on out-of-cell activities. Nevertheless, taking into account the cumulative effect of those conditions, the Court does not consider that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, although far from adequate, reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for similar reasoning, Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, §   98; Fetisov and Others v.     Russia , nos.   43710/07 and 3 others, §§   137-38, 17   January 2012; and compare Vladimir Belyayev , cited above, § 36). 60.     The Court therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of detention in the remand prison. 2.     Conditions of transfer to and from court 61.     The applicant alleged that his transfers from the remand prisons to court and back had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He complained about the frequency and length of the transfers, of appalling conditions in the court holding room and the police vans, and of the intensity of the schedule, which had not left him sufficient time to sleep. He argued that the combination of the above factors had led to physical exhaustion and mental distress. 62.     The Government submitted that the applicant had been transferred seventy-nine times from the remand prison to the court-house and back during the hearing of his criminal case. The applicant did not contest the number of transfers. 63.     The Court examined the conditions of transfer to and from court, which were common to the applicant and his co-defendant, in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 103-11). It found that they amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment that was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of a lack of sufficient rest and sleep on the days of court hearings; overcrowding and generally poor conditions in the holding cells at the Moscow City Court; lengthy transfers between the remand prisons and the court, and poor conditions during the transfers. The Court sees no reason to depart from those findings in the present case. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that respect. IV.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONFINEMENT IN GLASS CABINS AND METAL CAGES DURING COURT HEARINGS 64.     The applicant complained that his confinement in glass cabins and metal cages during the court hearing had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     Admissibility 65.     The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention had been lodged out of time. They repeated the submissions they had made in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, § 113) in that regard. 66.     The Court observes that the alleged ill-treatment took place during the first-instance hearing, which finished on 21 February 2014, and that the applicant did not submit that it had continued during the appeal hearing. It reiterates that the applicant’s confinement in glass cabins and in metal cages occurred in two distinct periods with materially different conditions of detention, which cannot be regarded as a continuous situation for the purposes of calculating the six-month time-limit set forth in Article   35 § 1 of the Convention (ibid., §   114). Furthermore, the Court has previously accepted that no remedy was available to applicants in relation to courtroom arrangements and that the six-month time-limit should be calculated from the date the alleged ill-treatment ceased (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v.   Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 87, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). 67.     As regards the alleged ill-treatment by placement in glass cabins, the Court notes that it began on 6 June 2013 and ended on an unspecified date in the middle of September 2013, when the proceedings moved to the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (see paragraph 31 above). The applicant lodged his complaint about his placement in glass cabins on 18   September 2013, shortly after the proceedings had moved to a courtroom equipped with metal cages. The alleged ill-treatment owing to confinement in metal cages ceased on 21 February 2014, but the complaint about that treatment was not lodged until 2 September 2014. 68.     The Court therefore considers that the applicant has missed the time ‑ limit for lodging the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention about his placement in metal cages. It must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Grishin v.   Russia , no.   30983/02, § 83, 15   November 2007). 69.     By contrast, the Court finds that the applicant has complied with the six-month rule as regards the complaint about being placed in glass cabins. It notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 70.     The Court summarised the principles on confinement in glass cabins in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 120-22). It examined the conditions of detention in hearing rooms nos. 338 and 635 at the Moscow City Court, which were common to the applicant and his co ‑ defendants, including Mr   Belousov (ibid., §§ 123-28), and found a violation in respect of issues identical to those in the present case. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, but no violation of Article 3 as regards the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 635. V.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION 71.     The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... ... (c)     ... the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ... ... 3.     Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph   1   (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.” A.     Admissibility 72.     As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention, the Court notes that the court which ordered that measure was the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow and that it subsequently extended his detention on several occasions. After the case had been sent for trial, the detention order was issued by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The domestic courts acted within their powers in making those decisions and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid or unlawful under domestic law. Accordingly, the applicant’s detention was imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. 73.     As regards the allegation that the applicant’s detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed criminal offences, his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention overlaps to a large extent with his complaint under Article 5 § 3 of a failure by the authorities to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the extensions of his detention pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that while Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention is mostly concerned with the existence of a lawful basis for detention within criminal proceedings, Article 5 § 3 of the Convention deals with the possible justification for such detention. Moreover, according to the Court’s established case-law under the latter provision, the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a sine qua non for the validity of continued detention (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 87, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). The Court therefore deems it more appropriate to deal with this complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kovyazin and Others v. Russia , nos. 13008/13 and 2 others, § 71, 17   September 2015; Taranenko v. Russia , no. 19554/05, § 46, 15 May 2014; and Khodorkovskiy v.   Russia , no. 5829/04, § 165, 31 May 2011). 74.     Furthermore, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint of a violation of Article 5 § 3 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 75.     The parties made essentially the same submissions under Article 5 of the Convention as in Kovyazin and Others (cited above, §§ 73-74). The relevant general principles applicable in this case were summarised by the Court in that judgment (ibid., §§ 75-78). 76.     The period of detention to be taken into consideration in this case started on 9 June 2012, the date of the applicant’s arrest, and ended on 21   February 2014, when he was convicted. Accordingly, the period in question is one year and eight months. The Court also notes that the criminal trial in the applicant’s case began on 18 June 2013, which is one year after his arrest. Having regard to the considerable length of detention in the light of the presumption in favour of release, the Court finds that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for maintaining that measure against the applicant. 77.     It can be seen from the applicant’s detention orders and the Government’s observations that the primary reason for his detention was the gravity of the charges. The domestic courts considered that the applicant, faced with the risk of prison, was likely to abscond, influence witnesses, or interfere with the administration of justice. In addition, they relied on the fact that the applicant’s father was living in Ukraine as a reason to believe that the applicant might flee to avoid the investigation and trial. 78.     The Court reiterates that the danger of an accused absconding must be assessed with reference to a number of factors. Those include, in particular, the character of the person involved, his morals, his assets, his links with the State in which he is being prosecuted and his international contacts (see Smirnova v. Russia , nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 60, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX (extracts)). It was not disputed that the applicant had a permanent residence in Moscow Region and was studying at the university. The authorities did not indicate any circumstance, other than his father’s residing in Ukraine, to suggest that, if released, the applicant would abscond. In the Court’s view, this fact in itself cannot speak in favour of a danger of absconding, given that the applicant had strong links with the country in which he was prosecuted. Moreover, the risk of flight necessarily decreases with the passage of time spent in detention (see Melnikova v. Russia , no.   24552/02, § 82, 21 June 2007). By the time the case was submitted to the court, the risk had waned owing to the probability that the length of detention would be deducted from (or would count towards) the term of imprisonment which the applicant could expect if convicted (see Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia , no. 23691/06, § 112, 18 June 2009). Lastly, the courts gave no valid reasons for dismissing the applicant’s requests for an alternative preventive measure to be applied. 79.     The Court has previously examined similar complaints lodged by the applicant’s co-defendants and found a violation of their rights set out in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kovyazin and Others , cited above, §§   82-94, and Yaroslav Belousov , cited above, §§ 133-38). The Court noted, in particular, the domestic courts’ reliance on the gravity of the charges as the main factor for the assessment of the potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice, and their reluctance to pay proper attention to a discussion of each applicant’s personal situation or to have proper regard to factors in favour of release. It also noted the use of collective detention orders, without a case-