CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 29 mai 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sDEA336FF { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB042F7C6 { width:162.94pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block }   FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 65170/14 A against Norway The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 29   May   2018 as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Erik Møse,   Yonko Grozev,   Síofra O’Leary,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lәtif Hüseynov,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, A, is a Norwegian national who was born in 1990. He is represented before the Court by Mr H. Birkeland, a lawyer practising in Bergen. The Chamber decided of its own motion to grant the applicant anonymity pursuant to Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of Court. A.     The circumstances of the case 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 3.     On 6 June 2012 an indictment was lodged against the applicant for having engaged in sexual activity – intercourse – with a child who was under 14 years of age. The indictment stated that the applicant, on an occasion during June-July 2011, had inserted his penis into the vagina of X, born in 1998. 4.     The charges were heard by the District Court ( tingrett ) on 4 and 5   December 2012. The applicant argued that he and X had not had intercourse. On 12 December 2012 the District Court convicted the applicant, sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay X a sum of 80,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) (approximately 8,200   euros (EUR)) as civil redress. 5.     The applicant appealed against the assessment of evidence relating to the question of guilt ( “bevisvurderingen under skyldspørsmålet ”) and the award of redress to X. 6.     On 22 February 2013 the High Court ( lagmannsrett ) granted leave to appeal, and appeal hearings were held from 13 to 16 January 2014. By judgment of 17 January 2014, the jury acquitted the applicant. The civil claim submitted by X was to be decided by three professional judges, of whom a majority of two found that the conditions for civil liability had been met, and again awarded NOK 80,000. 7.     On the issue of the civil claim for redress – which was dealt with in a separate part of the judgment, under the heading “the High Court’s professional judges’ assessments of the civil compensation claim from [X]” (“ Lagmannsrettens fagdommeres vurderinger av det sivilrettslige erstatningskravet fra [X] ”) – the High Court judges unanimously stated as their starting point that the applicant had been completely cleared of the criminal accusations (“ fullstendig renvasket ”) and acquitted of the charges with no reservations (“ reservasjonsløst frifunnet for tiltalen “). He was unconditionally innocent under criminal law (“ ubetinget strafferettslig uskyldig ”). This was an acknowledgment of the factual situation and the judges had neither the right nor the wish to change this (“ som fagdommerne hverken er berettiget til å rokke ved eller har noe ønske om å endre ”). 8.     By way of introduction the majority in the High Court noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant was by then history (“ et tilbakelagt stadium ”) and that it would only consider the civil claim of X. It followed clearly from case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court that a civil compensation claim could be adjudicated subsequent to a criminal case having ended with acquittal. The majority went on to examine X’s claim for financial redress, recalling that the civil rules on evidence applicable to the case required a clear or qualified preponderance of likelihood (“ klar eller kvalifisert sannsynlighetsovervekt ”). Upon thereafter reciting the legal basis for X’s redress claim, section 3-5 of the Compensation Act (see paragraph 22 below), it noted that the only relevant open question (“ det eneste relevante åpne spørsmålet ”) in the case before it was whether intercourse had taken place between the parties. If that was the case, there were no questions concerning the applicant’s intention, the half-hearted consent of X or whether the applicant had been mistaken as to X’s age. 9.     Considering the evidence as a whole, the majority found clear preponderance of likelihood that the applicant had on one occasion had intercourse with X. Its starting point was X’s statement that had been taken by a judge ( dommeravhør ). X had told a friend of her own age about having had intercourse with the applicant some two-three months earlier. Her friend had told his mother, who had in turn notified the child welfare authorities. Misconceptions had at this point developed – it had been perceived that X had been raped two times by an adult – and X was ultimately contacted and asked what had happened. X had then explained that she and the applicant once had had intercourse; it had been voluntary, although she had been uncertain. X had emphasised that the applicant was kind and it was known to her family that she was in love with him. The two had also attempted to have intercourse on one other occasion, but had not carried this out. 10.     From X’s extensive statement it followed that the intercourse had taken place late night or early morning in a cabin. Besides the applicant, X’s nephew and a girlfriend of his had also been present. X had had a few glasses of cider. The nephew and his friend had gone into one bedroom; X and the applicant into another, where they had had intercourse. X had consistently upheld her statement, whereas the applicant had consistently denied it. 11.     The High Court’s majority found that decisive importance had to be attached to X’s statement. It had been consistent and, if anything, X had sought to downplay (“ underrapportere ”) the extent of what had happened and had pointed to the applicant’s positive sides when confronted with the notification that had been given to the child welfare authorities. As to that notification (see paragraph 9 above), there could be a number of reasons why it had misrepresented X’s story; X had herself been a child, who had confided in her friend – another child – who had in turn spoken to his mother. There was no evidence to indicate that X had told what the child welfare authorities had perceived. Even if it were the case that X had used the word “rape” when speaking of what had happened, this could not be decisive; also the legislator had used that term to describe intercourse with a minor. 12.     X had grown up under demanding circumstances; her parents had left each other, her mother was alcoholic and had numerous times been admitted to psychiatric treatment. The child welfare authorities had periodically placed X in care with her siblings. She had nonetheless done well, both socially and at school. Prior to the intercourse, she had to some degree harmed herself and this situation had since deteriorated considerably; she had started to cut her skin not only on her arms but also on her thighs to give vent to pain and sorrow. She had more or less gone into hiding at the attic, skipped school and also become a victim of considerable bullying. 13.     Also the applicant had had a difficult childhood. He had lived in a home characterised by intoxication and violence until, at the age of 13, after having been injured by a stepfather, he had packed a bag with clothes and departed for his grandmother, where he had remained. 14.     The High Court’s majority went on to state that there was “nothing to indicate” that X had been testifying incorrectly about the intercourse, “apart from” the fact that the applicant had denied having intercourse (“ [f]lertallet finner at det ikke er noe som tilsier at [X] har forklart seg uriktig om samleiet, bortsett fra at [the applicant] benekter samleie ”). X’s nephew had stated that he could not understand that his friend (the applicant) could do such a thing towards his aunt – a serious infringement of the friendship between himself and the applicant – but that he also could not rule it out. 15.     It was uncertain how long the two couples had been in the respective bedrooms during the night at the cabin, and when X had left. The majority of the High Court did not find that any importance could be attached to the nephew and his friend not having heard anything that indicated that an intercourse took place in the neighbouring room, although one could apparently “hear every sound” between the two rooms (“ det skal ha vært svært lytt mellom værelsene ”). 16.     Based on an overall assessment and attaching particular importance to X’s statement and her subsequent self-harm and isolating behaviour, the majority concluded that there was a qualified preponderance of likelihood for intercourse having taken place. There was accordingly a legal basis for awarding X a “purely civil-law compensation” (“ en rent sivilrettslig erstatning ”). 17.     The minority in the High Court noted in essence that the case only gave rise to the question of what had happened (“ actus reus ”), not the mental element (“ mens rea ”) of the accusations against the applicant. In the minority’s view, the majority, by finding that there had been a qualified preponderance of likelihood that intercourse had taken place, had in reality stated that it had found the evidence insufficient for criminal conviction, but sufficient for civil liability (“ det flertallet i realiteten har gjort er å si at de[t] mener det nok ikke var bevis tilstrekkelig til domfellelse bare til erstatningsansvar ”). This ran, in the minority’s view, contrary to the presumption of innocence. 18.     According to the minority, the question had also to be assessed in the light of the fact that the District Court had first given reasons for its conviction of the applicant, while the jury in the High Court had not given any reasons for its acquittal, and it was unknown how many had voted in favour of acquittal or conviction, respectively.     Furthermore, the reasons provided by the majority of the High Court judges in their decision on the civil claim were in reality a continuation (“ påbygging ”) of the reasons provided by the District Court. Moreover, the jury had not been asked a separate question on whether intercourse had taken place; instead a more complex question including all conditions for criminal liability had been asked. Lastly, although the question of civil claims had been decided subsequent to the decision to acquit the applicant of criminal liability, it was nonetheless decided in continuation of the criminal case. The minority concluded that it would not, given the specific circumstances in the present case, be possible to order the applicant to pay civil redress without impinging on his right to be presumed innocent. 19.     On 27 February 2014 the applicant appealed against the High Court’s ruling on the civil claim to the Supreme Court ( Høyesterett ). He submitted that the High Court’s reasons for awarding civil redress ran contrary to the presumption of innocence as set out in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and that it followed from Article 13 of the Convention that the High Court’s judgment, insofar as it concerned the civil claim, had to be quashed. 20.     On 4 April 2014 the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee ( Høyesteretts ankeutvalg ) declared that the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent as enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had been violated. The Committee first stated that the High Court had correctly explained the differences between the rules on evidence applicable to criminal and civil cases, respectively. It had also emphasised that the finding of civil liability did not affect (“ ikke rokket ved ”) the acquittal of criminal liability. The Committee went on to note that the High Court had stated as part of its reasons the above phrase that there had been “nothing to indicate that X had been testifying incorrectly about the intercourse, apart from the fact that the applicant had denied having intercourse” (see paragraph 14 above). In the Committee’s view, this phrase could give the impression that the High Court had not been in doubt that X’s testimony had been correct. In the light of the evidentiary situation in the case, the High Court had thereby cast doubt on whether the conditions for criminal liability had been met and hence violated the presumption of innocence. 21.     The Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee found that, in the circumstances (“ etter forholdene ”), it would be a sufficient remedy according to Article 13 of the Convention for it to declare that the presumption of innocence had been breached and to dissociate itself from the reasons provided by the High Court. It therefore unanimously found that neither the infringement of the presumption of innocence nor other submissions made by the applicant gave reasons to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 22.     Section 3-5 § 1 of the Compensation Act of 13 June 1969 ( skadeserstatningsloven ) read at the relevant time: “Section 3-5 (Compensation (redress) for non-financial injury) Anybody who intentionally or by gross negligence (a) injures any person or (b) commits an infringement or an act of misconduct as mentioned in section 3 ‑ 3 may, regardless of whether compensation for permanent injury under section 3-2 or standardised compensation under section 3-2a is paid, be ordered to pay the victim such non-recurrent amount as the court finds reasonable in compensation (redress) for injury of a non-financial kind. For offences or misconduct as mentioned in Articles 195, 196 and 200 § 3 of the Criminal Code, the nature of the act, the length of the matter, whether the act is an abuse of a relationship of relatives, care, dependency or trust, and whether the act is carried out in a particularly painful or hurtful way.” 23.     Section 30-4 of the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 ( tvisteloven ) reads: “Section 30-4 Leave to appeal against judgments (1) Judgments cannot be appealed against without leave. Leave can only be granted if the appeal concerns issues whose significance extends beyond the scope of the current case or if it is important for other reasons that the case be determined by the Supreme Court. (2) The issue of leave shall be determined for each appeal. Leave may be limited to specific claims and to specific grounds of appeal, including to specifically invoked errors in the application of law, procedure or the factual basis for the ruling. (3) The issue of leave shall be determined by the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court by way of decision. A decision to refuse leave or to grant limited leave requires unanimity.” 24.     The Supreme Court has several times dealt with cases in which the appellants have argued that the High Court, in the context of civil claims for compensation, had employed language incompatible with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In its judgment of 27 November 2003 ( Norsk Retstidende ( Rt. ) 2003 page 1671) it concluded that the High Court’s reasons ran contrary to Article 6 § 2, and went on to examine how to remedy that situation under Article 13. The appellant in that case had maintained that the High Court’s judgment insofar as concerned the civil claim, had to be quashed in order for him to be afforded an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court, observing that based on the evidentiary situation in the case, the High Court would certainly reach the same conclusion if the Supreme Court were to quash the judgment under appeal and the High Court, hence, would be confined with the task of pronouncing a new judgment. Since the civil liability did not require that the conditions for criminal liability be met, a decision to impose civil liability could be given without having to impute any criminal liability to the appellant. The Supreme Court considered that in such circumstances, quashing the High Court’s judgment would not give the appellant any further degree of reparation than if the Supreme Court declared that the High Court had breached the Convention and distanced itself from the High Court’s problematic reasons. The Supreme Court made reference to, inter alia , Adolf v. Austria , no. 8269/78, 26 March 1982. It also took account of how a crucial element in the Strasbourg Court’s finding of a violation of Article   6 §   2 in Y v. Norway , no. 56568/00, §§ 45-46, ECHR 2003 ‑ II (extracts), had been the Supreme Court’s failure to dissociate itself from troublesome statements in the High Court’s reasons in that case. This approach taken in Rt. 2003 page 1671 has since been followed in a number of Supreme Court decisions and judgments ( inter alia , Rt. 2004 page   970; 2007 page 40; 2008 page 1292; and 2009 page 1456). COMPLAINT 25.     The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not been afforded an “effective remedy” because the Supreme Court had not quashed the High Court’s judgment insofar as it concerned the civil claim for redress. THE LAW 26.     The applicant argued that he had not been afforded sufficient domestic remedies in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” He maintained that he had submitted a claim for a remedy in order to obtain reparation of a violation of his right to be presumed innocent, as enshrined in Article 6 § 2: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.” 27.     In the applicant’s view, the Supreme Court’s Appeals Committee’s finding that the High Court had given reasons which had violated his right to be presumed innocent, had not amounted to a sufficient remedy. As the High Court’s judgment had not been quashed, it had become final; accordingly, the reasons for imposing civil liability on the applicant entailed an ongoing breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In order for the remedy to have been sufficiently effective, it would have been necessary to quash the High Court’s judgment and require the High Court to re-examine the civil claim. If the High Court, upon examining the case anew, were to conclude that the conditions for civil liability had been met, it would have to provide reasons not in breach of the presumption of innocence. Were it unable to provide such reasons, it would have to rule in favour of the applicant on the question of civil liability. Removing the phrases contrary to Article   6 § 2 would in reality leave the applicant without any proper reasons as to why the conditions for civil liability had been met. References were in particular made to Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no.   75529/01, ECHR   2006 ‑ VII and Y v. Norway , cited above. 28.     Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no.   29217/12, § 55, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), the Court considers that the applicant’s complaint fall to be examined only under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 29.     The Court initially reiterates that, according to its case-law, the presumption of innocence is not only a procedural guarantee in the context of a criminal trial itself. As set out, inter alia , in Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, §§ 93-94, ECHR 2013, the presumption of innocence also has another aspect. Its general aim, in this second aspect, is to protect individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence charged. In these cases, the presumption of innocence has already operated, through the application at trial of the various requirements inherent in the procedural guarantee it affords, to prevent an unfair criminal conviction being imposed. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the fair ‑ trial guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have been concluded is the person’s reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public. To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this respect may overlap the protection afforded by Article   8 (ibid., § 94). 30.     In cases concerning the victim’s right to compensation from the applicant, who had previously been found not guilty of the criminal charge, the Court has held that where the decision on civil compensation contained a statement imputing criminal liability, this would create a link between the two sets of proceedings such as to engage Article 6 § 2 in respect of the judgment on the compensation claim (see, for example, Allen , cited above, §   101). In cases involving civil compensation claims lodged by victims, regardless of whether the criminal proceedings ended in discontinuation or acquittal, the Court has also emphasised that while exoneration from criminal liability ought to be respected in the civil compensation proceedings, it should not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict burden of proof. However, if the national decision on compensation were to contain a statement imputing criminal liability to the respondent party, this would raise an issue falling within the ambit of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (ibid., § 123). 31.     In the present case, the High Court had established civil liability for the applicant to pay compensation arising out of the same facts as had formed the basis of which he had been criminally tried – the alleged intercourse with X – on the basis of a less strict burden of proof. The Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee found that the High Court, by a phrase used in its reasons for the decision on the civil redress claim, had created a link to the criminal proceedings which had engaged Article 6 §   2 of the Convention. The High Court had stated that there was “nothing to indicate” that X had been testifying incorrectly about the intercourse, “apart from” the fact that the applicant had denied having intercourse (see paragraph 14 above). In the Committee’s view, this phrase could give the impression that the High Court had not been in doubt that X’s testimony had been correct. In the light of the evidentiary situation in the case, the High Court had thereby cast doubt on whether the conditions for criminal liability had been met (see paragraph 20 above). 32.     The complaint focuses not on the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee’s foregoing assessments of the High Court’s reasons, but the consequences that the Committee drew from its conclusion. In particular, the applicant has relied on Y v. Norway , cited above, and above all the following passages from that judgment: “45. This judgment was upheld by the majority of the Supreme Court (paragraph 16 above), albeit using more careful language. However, that judgment, by not quashing the former, did not rectify the issue, which in the Court’s opinion, thereby arises. 46. The Court is mindful of the fact that the domestic courts took note that the applicant had been acquitted of the criminal charges. However, in seeking to protect the legitimate interests of the purported victim, the Court considers that the language employed by the High Court, upheld by the Supreme Court, overstepped the bounds of the civil forum, thereby casting doubt on the correctness of that acquittal. Accordingly, there was a sufficient link to the earlier criminal proceedings which was incompatible with the presumption of innocence.” With reference to the above, the applicant has submitted that the Supreme Court should have quashed the High Court’s judgment insofar as it imposed civil liability on the applicant. 33.     The Court notes that Y v. Norway , cited above, concerned a situation in which the Supreme Court, after its Appeals Leave Committee had granted partial leave to appeal, had examined the High Court’s reasons and not found them problematic. The High Court had, upon having acquitted Y of criminal liability, stated in the context of civil liability that it found it “clearly probable” that Y had “committed the offences ... with which he was charged” (see Y v. Norway, cited above, §§ 13 and 44). The Supreme Court considered that this did not entail that the High Court had “base[d] its decision in the compensation claim on a finding of criminal guilt”, but used more careful language (ibid., §§ 16 and 45). The European Court of Human Rights disagreed. Unlike the Supreme Court, it was of the view that “the language employed by the High Court ... [had] overstepped the bounds of the civil forum, thereby casting doubt on the correctness” of the acquittal (ibid., § 46). The Supreme Court had subsequently “upheld” the High Court’s “judgment” – not quashed it – and it had “[upheld] the language employed by the High Court” – not found any issues with it. When the case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights, it concluded, accordingly, that there was a sufficient link to the criminal proceedings which was incompatible with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 45-46). 34.     In the present case, unlike the situation in Y v. Norway , cited above, the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee did not accept the High Court’s language. Instead, the Committee found that the language employed in one of the phrases in the High Court’s reasons – in light of the overall evidentiary situation in the case – was not compatible with the presumption of innocence, as it, in the light of the evidentiary situation in the case, could cast doubt on whether the conditions for criminal liability had been met (see paragraph 20 above). As measures to rectify that situation, the Committee declared that the High Court’s reasons, by the use of that phrase, had impinged on the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent under Article   6 §   2 of the Convention and dissociated itself from the troublesome phrase. 35.     The Court, for the sake of completeness, initially remarks that the Committee’s own choice of words in the instant case is clearly not liable to attract any critical views from the angle of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, nor has that been claimed by the applicant. 36.     As to the High Court’s judgment, it appears that the High Court deliberately strived to distance its reasoning on civil liability from the criminal proceedings (see, similarly, N.A. v. Norway , no. 27473/11, § 47, 18 December 2014); the civil claim was dealt with in a separate part of the judgment and it was emphasised, inter alia , that the applicant had been “acquitted”, “completely cleared” of criminal accusations, was “unconditionally innocent” and that the criminal case had become “history” (see paragraphs 7-8 above). The High Court also set out how the civil rules on evidence differed from those applicable to criminal cases (see paragraph   8 above); and posed what it coined as an “open question” of whether intercourse had taken place (ibid.) before it, upon a lengthy discussion, concluded that there was a legal basis for awarding a “purely civil-law” compensation (see paragraph 16 above). Nonetheless, in the course of its examination of whether the evidence entailed that the standard for civil liability had been met in the specific circumstances of the instant case, it employed the sentence concerning how there was “nothing to indicate” that X had testified falsely, “apart from” the applicant’s denial of intercourse having taken place (see paragraph 14 above). 37.     The Court reiterates that in all cases and no matter what the approach applied, the language used by the decision-maker will be of critical importance in assessing the compatibility of the decision and its reasoning with Article 6 § 2 (see Allen , cited above, § 126). Thus, in a case where the domestic court held that it was “clearly probable” that the applicant had “committed the offences ... with which he was charged”, the Court found that it had overstepped the bounds of the civil forum and had thereby cast doubt on the correctness of the acquittal. Similarly, where the domestic court indicated that the criminal file contained enough evidence to establish that a criminal offence had been committed, the language used was found to have violated the presumption of innocence (ibid.). 38.     In the instant case, the High Court made references neither to guilt or criminal liability, nor to offences, charges, or indictments. It spoke instead of the evidentiary value of X’s statements and discussed whether intercourse (“ samleie ”) had taken place. Thereby, it did not employ any terms reserved for the criminal-law sphere – or even the legal sphere in general – (see, mutatis mutantis , N.A. v. Norway , cited above, § 48) and the Court notes that it was not the terms used to describe the facts, but the implied degree of certainty that in the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee’s view ran contrary to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 39.     The Court further reiterates that it has held that when regard is had to the nature and context of the particular proceedings, even the use of some unfortunate language may not be decisive (see Allen , cited above, §§   125 ‑ 126). The Court’s case-law provides some examples of instances where no violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention has been found even though the language used by domestic authorities and courts was criticised (ibid., with references to Reeves v. Norway (dec.), no. 4248/02, 8 July 2004; and A.L. v.   Germany , no. 72758/01, §§ 31-33, 28 April 2005). The application in Reeves was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded because – although the domestic court’s reasons contained an unfortunate statement to the effect that there was a “clear probability that the defendant is guilty of setting the fire as described in the indictment” – when reading the reasons as a whole, one could not be “left with any doubt as to the meaning of the judge’s reasoning on compensation: while the evidence was insufficient for establishing criminal liability, it was sufficient for ascertaining civil liability to pay compensation”. The instant case was one in which it was the language employed by the High Court’s majority in one phrase (see paragraph 14 above), which formed part of otherwise careful and detailed grounds (see paragraphs 7-16 above), that was – according to the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee – problematic, because it could indicate a degree of certainty with respect to the facts, that could be taken to meet the criminal-law standard of proof (see paragraph 20 above). 40.     On the issue of whether the High Court’s judgment on the civil claim should nonetheless have been quashed, the Court bears in mind that as exoneration from criminal liability does not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict burden of proof (see paragraph 30 above), the operative part of the High Court’s judgment – the order to pay redress as such – did not in itself run contrary to the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In a situation where the operative part of a judicial decision, viewed in isolation, is not in itself troublesome in the light of Article 6 §   2, whereas the reasons adduced for it is, the Court has recognised that the decision must be read with and in light of that of another court which has later examined it (see Adolf , cited above, § 40). Where such a reading demonstrated that the individual’s innocence was no longer called into question, the domestic case was considered so as to have ended without any finding of guilt and there was no need to proceed with any hearing in the case or examination of evidence for the domestic proceedings to be found in accordance with Article 6 § 2 (see, mutatis mutandis , Adolf , cited above, §   40). 41.     In the instant case, the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee expressly set aside the problematic wording of the imputed statement in the High Court’s reasons (see paragraph 21 and, more generally, paragraph   24 above), and the operative part of the High Court’s judgment did not imply any finding of guilt (see paragraph 40 above). The Court accepts that the presumption of the applicant’s innocence was not called into question after the domestic proceedings had come to an end, regardless of the High Court’s judgment not having been quashed. 42.     Against the above background, the Court considers that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 21 June 2018. Claudia Westerdiek   Angelika Nußberger   Registrar   President