CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 juin 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s7BE5FA78 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s83BE5C30 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s39A7D870 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB9F7F539 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sBAD0D18F { width:1.87pt; display:inline-block } .s165BD465 { width:190.1pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block }       FOURTH SECTION               CASE OF D.R. v. LITHUANIA   (Application no. 691/15)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   26 June 2018     FINAL   26/09/2018   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of D.R. v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ganna Yudkivska, President,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Egidijus Kūris,   Iulia Motoc,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 29 May 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 691/15) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Ms D.R. (“the applicant”), on 23 December 2014. The Court decided that the applicant’s identity should not be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of Court). 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr D. Domikas, a lawyer practising in Tauragė. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė. 3.     The applicant alleged that the deprivation of her liberty for the purpose of conducting a psychiatric assessment and her involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation had breached Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 4.     On 29 June 2017 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tauragė region. 6 .     Since 1999 she has been diagnosed with several mental disorders, such as schizo-affective disorder, depression, mania, and panic disorder. She has been admitted to psychiatric hospitals multiple times. However, during the events described below, she retained full legal capacity (see paragraph   37 below). 7 .     From February to September 2014 the applicant was given administrative penalties for insulting another person in a public place (minor hooliganism under Article 174 of the Code of Administrative Offences), for threatening a teenager with an electroshock device and for scaring a minor (infringement of children’s rights under Article 181 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences). A.     Proceedings concerning the applicant’s compulsory treatment 1.     Pre-trial investigation 8 .     In 2013 the applicant bought a tear-gas dispenser. According to her, she had done so in order to defend herself against some inhabitants of her village who often insulted her because of her mental illness. On 16   November   2013, at around 7.30 p.m., the applicant sprayed tear gas at a fifteen-year-old called E. It appears that the tear gas caused E. physical pain but she did not suffer any injuries. 9 .     The Tauragė police opened a pre-trial investigation against the applicant for breach of public order under Article 284 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Between November 2013 and January 2014 the police interviewed E. and several other teenagers who had been with her on the evening of 16   November   2013. They all stated that on that evening they had been “hanging out” near one of the residential buildings in the village when E. had decided to go to another friend’s house. When she had started walking, the applicant had suddenly appeared from around the corner, quickly approached E. and sprayed her in the eyes with tear gas. E. herself and the other interviewed teenagers stated that although E. had had some verbal conflicts with the applicant in the past, on that evening she had not done anything to provoke the applicant. 10 .     On 18 December 2013 the police asked a court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda whether, in the light of the applicant’s history of mental illness, it was necessary for her to undergo a psychiatric assessment in order to determine whether she could be held criminally responsible for the offence. A psychiatric expert, having examined the applicant’s medical file, concluded that such an assessment was necessary. 11 .     On 10 January 2014 the applicant was served with an official notice that she was suspected of having committed the offence provided under Article   284   §   1 of the Criminal Code. She was given State ‑ guaranteed legal aid. She was interviewed on that same day and admitted to having sprayed tear gas at E. However, she claimed to have done so in self ‑ defence – she stated that on the evening of 16   November   2013 E. had kicked the door of her apartment and had thrown a stone at her window. 2.     Seizure by the police and psychiatric assessment 12 .     On 28 March 2014 the Tauragė district prosecutor informed the applicant and her lawyer that, in line with Article 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 42 below), it was necessary for the applicant to undergo a psychiatric assessment. The prosecutor appended a list of questions to be submitted to the psychiatric expert and informed the applicant and her lawyer that they had the right to submit additional questions and material for the assessment, as well as to ask for the appointment of a particular expert. The applicant and her lawyer did not respond. 13 .     On 3 April 2014 the Tauragė District Court ordered a psychiatric assessment of the applicant. A copy of that order has not been provided to the Court. The applicant later submitted to the domestic courts that she had not been notified of it (see paragraph 22 below). 14 .     It transpires from the parties’ submissions that on the morning of 15   April 2014 the applicant was present at the Tauragė police station for unspecified reasons, when two police officers handcuffed her, took her to a police car and drove her to the court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda, approximately 110   kilometres from Tauragė. 15 .     A report drawn up on that same day by one of the officers who had seized the applicant read as follows: “I hereby inform that on 15 April 2014 during the general morning meeting of the Prevention Sub-division, an oral instruction was received from [the chief] to execute the order of the Tauragė District Court, which ordered that [the applicant] be brought ( atvesdinti ) to the Klaipėda court psychiatric centre where she was to undergo a psychiatric assessment, in connection with an ongoing pre ‑ trial investigation. [The chief] announced that [the applicant] was waiting outside the Operative Management Division. At around 8.40 a.m., together with [Officer D.P.], we ordered [the applicant to] go with the police officers into a police car, so that she could be taken to the Klaipėda court psychiatric centre to undergo a psychiatric assessment. However, [the applicant] mockingly responded that police officers did not have the right to take her anywhere, and threatened to have everyone who touched her fired. It was repeated several times [to the applicant] that coercion and special measures could be used against her for refusing to comply with lawful orders of police officers. As [the applicant] was not paying attention to these warnings, I took her hand, but [she] tried to bite my left palm; she did not succeed, so I did not need medical help. [The applicant] began to resist by jostling, stiffening her hands, and trying to get away. By doing so [she] resisted and disobeyed lawful orders. As [the applicant] continued disobeying officers’ lawful orders, with the help of [three other officers] [she] was handcuffed and taken to a [police] car.” One of the other officers who had participated in the applicant’s seizure submitted a report with essentially the same wording. 16 .     It is not clear when the applicant was released from the court psychiatric centre and how she returned to her home. The Government submitted that the psychiatric assessment had been completed on the same day and the applicant had not been detained any longer (see paragraph   64 below). 17.     According to the applicant, the police officers did not explain to her why she was being seized and did not draw up a record of provisional arrest (see paragraph 61 below). 18 .     On 15 April 2014 the applicant was examined by two court ‑ appointed psychiatrists. The report of the assessment, drawn up on that same day, stated the following: “The patient was brought to the assessment by police officers. At the beginning of the assessment she was hostile, outraged by the behaviour of the police, she spoke in a raised voice and refused to provide her anamnestic data. Having calmed down, she provided information about the main events of her life but her narration was characterised by strong emotional reactions (afektas) [which were] inappropriate to the situation, elevated mood and overestimation of herself. She had no complaints about her health, she thought that she was healthy and did not need any help. ... The patient’s mental state during the assessment. [ She had] a complete grasp of the time, the place and herself ( orientuota pilnai laike, vietoje ir savyje ). [She was wearing] bright make-up and clothes. At the beginning of the assessment [she was] outraged and loudly expressed dissatisfaction that police officers had brought her to the assessment by force, without her consent. She understood the purpose of the assessment. She stated that she did not have any illnesses and did not require treatment. She actively expressed discontent with the law-enforcement authorities and the inhabitants of her area. The patient’s mental condition is characterised by angry mania: joyful moods [which are] not appropriate to the situation, accelerated [mental] associations, excessive activity, at the same time expressions of anger, irritation, short temper. When talking about the major events in her life, she overestimates herself, underlines her achievements in her former professional life, her significant role in educating children at school. She expresses anger at the lifestyle of asocial families in the neighbourhood and the wider area [and says that] she is ready to not put up with it and to fight against it. [She does not display] a critical view of her illness ( be esminės kritikos susirgimo atžvilgiu ). She speaks loudly about the criminal allegations against her, denies them and blames the victim, her parents and the surroundings.” 19 .     The report concluded that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder ‑ schizo-affective disorder with a type of mania ( lėtinis psichikos sutrikimas ‑ šizoafektinis sutrikimas, manijos tipas ), that because of that disorder she had been incapable of understanding and controlling her actions at the time of the alleged criminal offence, and that those circumstances persisted at the time of the assessment. The psychiatrists recommended that the applicant not be called before a court, nor subjected to any procedural measures, and that she be admitted to Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital for compulsory inpatient treatment. 20 .     On 22 April 2014 an administrative-violation report was drawn up against the applicant for having violently resisted police officers on 15   April   2014 (see paragraph   14 above). The Tauragė District Court held an oral hearing on 2 June 2014 in which the applicant was present. Relying on the abovementioned psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs   18 and   19 above), the court discontinued the administrative proceedings on the grounds that the applicant could not be held liable for the offence. 3.     Court proceedings 21 .     On 3 June 2014 the prosecutor referred the case to the Tauragė District Court and asked the court to order compulsory medical treatment for the applicant ( taikyti priverčiamąsias medicinos priemones ). 22 .     On 11 June 2014 the applicant sent a letter to the Tauragė District Court, stating that she was not aware whether there were any ongoing criminal proceedings against her and asking the court to inform her of any such proceedings and of her procedural status in them. She also stated that she had not been notified of any court order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will (see paragraph 13 above) and asked to be provided with a copy of such an order. The following day the applicant received a response from the court informing her of the proceedings concerning compulsory medical treatment (see paragraph 21 above). The court also stated that the file of that case did not contain any order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will. 23 .     On 17 June 2014 the applicant sent another letter to the Tauragė District Court. In it she asked to be given an opportunity to attend the court’s hearing in the case concerning compulsory medical treatment which would be held on 30 June 2014. She did not receive any response from the court. 24 .     On 26 June 2014 the applicant was voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Klaipėda. 25 .     On 30 June 2014 the Tauragė District Court held a hearing in the case against the applicant concerning compulsory medical treatment. The applicant was absent from the hearing but her lawyer was present. 26 .     The court heard one of the psychiatrists who had examined the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). He gave the following responses to the questions submitted to him by the judge and the applicant’s lawyer (the questions were not included in the minutes of the hearing): “I stand by my responses given in the assessment report.” “As of this moment, I cannot say if procedural steps can be conducted with [the applicant]. As I understand from [the documents provided by the court], she is currently undergoing treatment ... I understand that she underwent treatment already in May ... at a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was not effective because [later] she was hospitalised again. I think that it is necessary to order compulsory medical treatment.” “Right now I cannot say precisely if inpatient treatment at Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital is necessary because she is currently being treated at [Klaipėda hospital]. [It appears] that that treatment is not sufficiently effective. I recommend inpatient treatment.” The psychiatrist also stated that the treatment provided to the applicant at the Klaipėda hospital constituted “psychiatric supervision” ( psichikos priežiūra ) which was different from compulsory treatment; the applicant had undergone outpatient treatment before and it had not been effective. He further considered that compulsory treatment was necessary because the applicant lived alone and refused to take medication, and there was nobody to take care of her if her mental health deteriorated. 27 .     The applicant’s lawyer argued before the court that since the psychiatric assessment the applicant’s mental health had improved considerably because she was undergoing treatment (see paragraph   24 above). He submitted that it would not be appropriate to order compulsory treatment without examining the effects of that treatment and that it was therefore necessary to conduct a fresh psychiatric assessment. 28 .     On 1 July 2014 the Tauragė District Court adopted a one-and-a-half page decision ordering the applicant’s inpatient treatment under general supervision at Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital (see paragraph 46 below). The court held that the applicant’s guilt in respect of the criminal offence had been proved by witness testimonies and the applicant’s own statements (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). It then referred to the findings of the psychiatric assessment that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder which rendered her incapable of understanding and controlling her actions, unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation and the hearing, and for which she required hospitalisation (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The court also cited the statements of the psychiatric expert given during the hearing, who also recommended compulsory inpatient treatment for the applicant (see paragraph 26 above). It concluded that at the time of the offence, as well as at the time of the decision, the applicant could not be held criminally responsible ( buvo ir šiuo metu yra nepakaltinama ). The court exempted the applicant from criminal responsibility and ordered her hospitalisation at the psychiatric hospital in Rokiškis. 29 .     The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. She submitted that she had been informed of the possibility to subject her to compulsory treatment only on 12 June 2014 (see paragraph 22 above) and complained that she had not been summoned to the hearing, despite having expressed a wish to attend (see paragraph 23 above). She complained that the first ‑ instance court had not adequately assessed her mental condition because it had not examined her in person, had not heard evidence from the doctor treating her and had not ordered a fresh psychiatric assessment, despite the fact that since June   2014 she had been voluntarily undergoing psychiatric treatment. The applicant pointed out that the psychiatrist interviewed by the court had acknowledged that he had been unable to comment on her mental condition at the time of the hearing (see paragraph   26 above). The applicant further complained about the court’s decision to hospitalise her rather than order outpatient treatment. She submitted that the court had not assessed whether she had posed a danger to society   –   the applicant submitted that the offence which she had committed had not been serious and that she had committed it because of the pre ‑ existing conflict between E. and herself and not because of her mental disorder, so the disorder had not made her a danger to others. The applicant also complained about the court’s decision to commit her to a hospital in Rokiškis (more than 200   kilometres from Tauragė) and not one which was closer to her home. 30 .     In the appeal the applicant also raised complaints about being taken for a psychiatric assessment without her consent on 15   April   2014. She submitted that she had not been informed that a psychiatric assessment had been ordered and had not been provided with a court order to that effect, that a record of provisional arrest had not been drawn up, a lawyer had not been present during the assessment, and she had not been informed about her right to request the removal of experts. She also submitted that the experts’ conclusions had not indicated what kind of assessment had been performed and that they had not been adequately reasoned. 31 .     On 26 September 2014 the Klaipėda Regional Court held a hearing in which the applicant was absent but her lawyer was present. 32 .     On that same day the Klaipėda Regional Court adopted a decision which was slightly over two pages long and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established all the essential circumstances of the case and had adequately reasoned its findings. The court considered that the danger posed by the applicant to society had been proved by the conclusions of the psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs   18 and 19 above) and the psychiatrist heard by the first-instance court (see paragraph 26 above). It also observed that the applicant had been previously treated in psychiatric hospitals seventeen times, which demonstrated that the treatment had not led to any long-term improvement of her mental health. The court concluded: “All the aforementioned circumstances demonstrate that [the applicant] is a danger to society, her actions present a threat to others, [and] she cannot ensure adequate medical treatment and care for herself because she lives alone, so outpatient treatment would not be sufficient. The appellate court considers that the arguments in [the applicant’s] appeal confirm that she cannot critically assess her disorder [and] does not understand the danger presented by her mental condition, nor the need for treatment ( apeliaciniame skunde nurodomi argumentai patvirtina, jog ji nėra kritiška savo ligos atžvilgiu, nesuvokia savo psichinės būklės pavojingumo ir poreikio gydytis ).” The court did not address the arguments presented in the applicant’s appeal (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above) any further. 33.     On 31 October 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal on points of law submitted by the applicant on the grounds that it raised no important legal questions. 4.     The applicant’s hospitalisation 34 .     On 13 November 2014 the applicant was taken by the police to the psychiatric hospital in Rokiškis for compulsory treatment. On 22 May 2015 the Rokiškis District Court ruled, on the basis of the information provided by the hospital, that her mental health had not sufficiently improved, and extended the hospitalisation; the applicant did not appeal against that decision. On 6 November 2015 that same court found that the applicant’s mental health had sufficiently improved, ended her hospitalisation and ordered compulsory outpatient treatment. On 25   April   2016 the Tauragė District Court, relying on the recommendation of the doctor in charge of the applicant’s treatment, ended her compulsory outpatient treatment. B.     Subsequent proceedings concerning the applicant 35.     On 27 September 2016 the Klaipėda Psychiatric Hospital asked a court to order the applicant’s hospitalisation. It submitted that the applicant had been taken to the hospital by the police, at the referral of a psychiatrist in Tauragė, because her mental health had deteriorated. On that same day the Šilutė District Court ordered the applicant’s hospitalisation for thirty days. 36.     On 28 November 2016 the Tauragė District Court found the applicant guilty of terrorising others and breaching public order, but considered that she could not be held criminally responsible and thus ordered her psychiatric hospitalisation. However, on 13 April 2017 the Klaipėda Regional Court quashed that decision. It found that those offences had not been committed, and discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. 37 .     In May 2017 the social-care authorities of the Tauragė municipality applied to a court to restrict the applicant’s legal capacity in certain areas, relying on her mental disorder and her inability to take proper care of herself. The applicant objected to that request. On 10 August 2017 the Tauragė District Court, in a hearing in which the applicant and her lawyer were present, declared the applicant legally incapacitated in certain areas, and partly restricted her legal capacity in certain other areas. According to the information submitted to the Court, the applicant appealed against that decision and at the time of the present judgment the appellate proceedings were pending. C.     Other related proceedings 38.     On 17 November 2014 the Tauragė District Court found E. (see paragraph 8 above) guilty of hitting the applicant in the face and causing her minor bodily harm. The court found that on 3 April 2014 the applicant had tried to take E.’s mobile phone from her and had scratched her face, and E. had then hit her. The court considered that E.’s actions could not be characterised as self-defence but as a deliberate attempt to injure the applicant. E. was sentenced to four months’ deprivation of liberty. The applicant was awarded 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 87   euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     General provisions 39.     Article 20 of the Constitution provides, in its relevant part: “Human liberty shall be inviolable. No one may be arbitrarily apprehended or detained. No one may be deprived of his or her liberty otherwise than on the grounds and according to the procedures established by law. ...” 40.     Article 3 of the Law on Mental Health Care provides that individuals with mental disorders have all the political, economic, social and cultural rights, and cannot be discriminated against on the grounds of their mental health. B.     Psychiatric assessment during criminal proceedings 41 .     Article 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”) provides that when a pre-trial-investigation judge or a court decides that the examination of the case requires scientific, technical, artistic or other specialist knowledge, it can order an expert examination. 42 .     At the material time, Article 209 of the CCP read: Article 209. Ordering an expert examination “1.     When a prosecutor decides that it is necessary to order an expert examination, he or she must notify in writing the suspect, his or her lawyer and other individuals who have an interest in the results of the examination, setting a time-limit during which such individuals can propose questions to be submitted to the expert, request the appointment of a particular expert, and provide additional material for the examination. Afterwards the prosecutor submits the request for an expert examination to the pre-trial investigation judge. The requests submitted by the participants to the proceedings are appended to the prosecutor’s request, or it is noted that no such requests have been received. 2.     If a pre-trial-investigation judge decides that it is necessary to order an expert examination, he or she adopts a ruling ordering such an examination, and if the judge decides that an expert examination is not necessary, he or she adopts a ruling refusing to order an examination. 3.     A ruling ordering an expert examination must include the following: the circumstances of the criminal offence; the grounds for ordering the examination; the examining institution or expert; the questions to be submitted to the expert; [and] the material to be submitted to the expert. 4.     The ruling ordering an expert examination is forwarded to the examining institution or expert. Expert examinations are conducted in examining institutions in line with the regulations of those institutions.” 43 .     Paragraph 4 of the Internal Regulations of the National Forensic Psychiatry Centre under the Ministry of Health, approved on 29   December   2010 by order no.   12   P-40 of the Head of that Centre, reads: “4.     A [psychiatric] assessment of a person is carried out on the basis of an order of a pre-trial-investigation judge or a court. Individuals who need to undergo an assessment must appear at an office of the [Centre] at the time allocated to them. Individuals who refuse to appear can, in accordance with the law, be brought to the [Centre] by police officers, except when the consent of the person or his or her representative is obligatory (for example, in order to conduct an assessment of the defendant in civil proceedings, witnesses in civil or criminal proceedings, and so forth).” C.     Coercive measures in criminal proceedings 44.     Article 141 of the CCP provides: Article 141. Committal of a suspect to a medical institution “1.     Where during the investigation or hearing of a criminal case there is a need for a medical or psychiatric expert examination of a suspect, he or she shall be committed by a court decision to the examining institution until a medical report is submitted to a prosecutor or the court. The time spent at the institution shall be included in the detention term. 2.     If a psychiatric expert establishes that the suspect, because of his or her mental disorder, may be a danger to the public, the court may order an extension of his or her stay at the examining institution or the suspect may be transferred to another institution until the court decides upon the issue of compulsory medical treatment. 3.     A suspect shall be committed to an examining institution and his or her period of stay at the institution shall be determined and extended following the same procedure for ordering, extending or appealing against detention. 4.     During the pre-trial investigation the detained suspect shall be committed to an examining institution by the decision of a prosecutor. 5.     An accused may also be committed to an examining institution.” 45.     The relevant domestic law concerning provisional arrest is summarised in §§ 30-33 of Žekonienė v. Lithuania (no. 19536/14, 12   July   2016). D.     Compulsory medical treatment 46 .     Article 98 of the Criminal Code provides: Article 98. Compulsory medical treatment “1.     Individuals who, as per court ruling, cannot be held criminally responsible in full or in part, as well as individuals who, after committing a criminal act or having received a penalty, develop a mental disorder rendering them incapable of understanding or controlling their actions may be subject to a court order for the following compulsory medical treatment to be applied: 1)     outpatient observation under the conditions of primary mental ‑ health ‑ care; 2)     inpatient treatment under general observation at a specialised mental ‑ health ‑ care establishment; 3)     inpatient treatment under increased observation at a specialised mental ‑ health ‑ care establishment; 4)     inpatient treatment under strict observation at a specialised mental ‑ health ‑ care establishment. 2.     A court shall order outpatient observation where it is not necessary to subject the person in question to observation and inpatient treatment owing to the dangerousness of the committed act and his or her mental state, or where the person may continue outpatient treatment after his or her mental state improves following inpatient treatment. 3.     A court shall order inpatient treatment under general observation where a person needs to be under observation and undergo treatment at a specialised inpatient treatment establishment due to a mental disorder. 4.     A court shall order inpatient treatment under increased observation at a specialist establishment where a person has committed a dangerous act and has a mental disorder warranting such a measure. 5.     A court shall order inpatient treatment under strict observation at a specialist establishment where a person has made an attempt on a person’s life or health and is particularly dangerous to those around him or her owing to a mental disorder. 6.     A court shall not set any period of time for compulsory medical treatment. It shall be applied until the person is cured or his or her mental state improves and he or she no longer poses a threat to others. At least once every six months, a court must decide, on the basis of a report by a health-care establishment, on the extension of compulsory medical treatment, change of type thereof or discontinuation thereof. 7.     Where it is not necessary to subject a person to compulsory medical treatment, or where a court orders that such treatment be discontinued, the person may be transferred by the court into the custody or guardianship of his or her relatives or other individuals and may concurrently be subject to medical observation.” 47.     Article   393   §   1 of the CCP provides that regular criminal proceedings can be transformed into proceedings for compulsory treatment if during the pre-trial investigation or the examination of the case by a court it is established that the person cannot be held criminally responsible in full or in part ( nepakaltinamas ar ribotai pakaltinamas ), or that after the commission of the criminal offence he or she developed a mental disorder due to which he or she cannot understand or control his or her actions. 48 .     Article 395 of the CCP provides, in relevant parts: “During the proceedings concerning an offence committed by a person who cannot be held criminally responsible in full or in part ... the following circumstances need to be proved: ... 3)     whether the person who has committed the criminal offence has had mental illnesses in the past; the seriousness and nature of the mental disorder which that person had at the time when the offence was committed, at the time of the pre-trial investigation, [or] at the time of the examination of the case by a court...; 4)     [that person’s] actions before and after the commission of the offence; ...” 49.     Article 400 § 2 of the CCP provides that in proceedings concerning compulsory treatment the court holding a hearing must question victims and witnesses, examine other evidence that the accused person has committed a criminal offence, hear the expert’s conclusion as to whether that person can be held criminally responsible, and examine other important circumstances relevant for the decision whether to order compulsory treatment. 50 .     Article 399 § 2 of the CCP provides that in proceedings concerning compulsory treatment the judge examining the case has the right to request the presence of the person concerned if, according to the conclusion of a psychiatric expert, that is not precluded by his or her mental disorder ( jei tam nekliudo ligos pobūdis ). III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS A.     United Nations 51.     Article 14 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was ratified by Lithuania on 27 May 2010 and entered into force on 17 September 2010, reads: Article 14. Liberty and security of person “1.     States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others: (a)     Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person; (b)     Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty. 2.     States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of the present Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.” B.     Council of Europe 52 .     The relevant parts of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1235(1994) on psychiatry and human rights, adopted on 12   April   1994, read: “7.     The Assembly therefore invites the Committee of Ministers to adopt a new recommendation based on the following rules: 7.1.     Admission procedure and conditions: a.     compulsory admission must be resorted to in exceptional cases only and must comply with the following criteria: -   there is a serious danger to the patient or to other persons; -   an additional criterion could be that of the patient’s treatment: if the absence of placement could lead to a deterioration or prevent the patient from receiving appropriate treatment; b.     in the event of compulsory admission, the decision regarding placement in a psychiatric institution must be taken by a judge and the placement period must be specified ...” 53 .     The relevant parts of the Recommendation Rec(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member States concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders, adopted on 22   September 2004, read: Article 17. Criteria for involuntary placement “1.     A person may be subject to involuntary placement only if all the following conditions are met: i.     the person has a mental disorder; ii.     the person’s condition represents a significant risk of serious harm to his or her health or to other persons; iii.     the placement includes a therapeutic purpose; iv.     no less restrictive means of providing appropriate care are available; v.     the opinion of the person concerned has been taken into consideration. 2.     The law may provide that exceptionally a person may be subject to involuntary placement, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, for the minimum period necessary in order to determine whether he or she has a mental disorder that represents a significant risk of serious harm to his or her health or to others if: i.     his or her behaviour is strongly suggestive of such a disorder; ii.     his or her condition appears to represent such a risk; iii.     there is no appropriate, less restrictive means of making this determination; and iv.     the opinion of the person concerned has been taken into consideration.” Article 20. Procedures for taking decisions on involuntary placement and/or involuntary treatment Decision “1.     The decision to subject a person to involuntary placement should be taken by a court or another competent body. The court or other competent body should: i.     take into account the opinion of the person concerned; ii.     act in accordance with procedures provided by law based on the principle that the person concerned should be seen and consulted. ... 3.     Decisions to subject a person to involuntary placement or to involuntary treatment should be documented and state the maximum period beyond which, according to law, they should be formally reviewed. This is without prejudice to the person’s rights to reviews and appeals, in accordance with the provisions of Article   25. ...” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 54.     The applicant complained that she had been unlawfully deprived of her liberty on 15 April 2014 when the police took her to Klaipėda for a psychiatric assessment against her will. She invoked Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (b)     the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; ...” A.     Admissibility 1.     The parties’ submissions 55 .     The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies available to her under criminal and civil law. They firstly submitted that the applicant could have challenged the prosecutor’s request for a psychiatric assessment (see paragraph 12 above) and could have complained to the prosecutor about the actions of the police officers who had seized her (see paragraph 14 above). 56 .     The Government further argued that the applicant could have instituted civil proceedings against the State, claiming non-pecuniary damage for her allegedly unlawful seizure by the police. They submitted that the Court had acknowledged the effectiveness of that remedy in its judgments in Venskutė v. Lithuania (no. 10645/08, 11 December 2012) and Varnas v.   Lithuania (no. 42615/06, 9 July 2013). The Government provided several examples of cases from 2005-2010 in which compensation had been awarded to individuals for unlawful or excessively long detention on remand, one case from 2015 in which compensation had been awarded for unlawful and lengthy involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation, and one case from 2004 in which an individual had been awarded compensation for being placed in a psychiatric hospital against his will despite not having been diagnosed with a mental illness. The Government submitted that domestic courts, when assessing the lawfulness of detention, relied on the principles established in the Court’s case-law under Article   5   §   1 of the Convention. 57.     The applicant submitted that she had complained of the unlawful deprivation of her liberty to the Klaipėda Regional Court (see paragraph   30 above) but that court had dismissed her complaint (see paragraph 32 above). She therefore argued that the requirement to also exhaust civil-law remedies was excessive. 2.     The Court’s assessment 58.     The Court observes that the applicant complained about the deprivation of her liberty in her appeal against the Tauragė District Court’s decision ordering compulsory treatment (see paragraph 30 above). Although the Klaipėda Regional Court, which examined the applicant’s appeal, did not address that complaint, nothing in the text of its decision indicates that it did so because of the applicant’s failure to raise that same complaint at an earlier stage of the proceedings (see paragraph 32 above), nor did the Government argue otherwise. The Court therefore considers that the applicant made proper use of the available domestic remedy under criminal law. 59.     In this connection, the Court reiterates that if more than one potentially effective remedy is available, the applicant is only required to have used one remedy of his or her choice (see Tavares de Almeida Fernandes and Almeida Fernandes v. Portugal , no.   31566/13, § 37, 17   January 2017). Having found that the applicant properly raised her complaint in the court proceedings concerning compulsory treatment, it concludes that she was not required to use any other remedies, which had essentially the same objective. It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies. 60.     The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 61 .     The applicant argued that on 15 April 2014 she had been unlawfully seized by the police and deprived of her liberty in order to be taken to the court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda. She submitted that she had not been informed of the reasons for her seizure and that a record of provisional arrest had not been drawn up. 62 .     The Government did not dispute that the applicant’s seizure by the police on 15 April 2014 had amounted to deprivation of liberty. They submitted that the applicant had been taken to the court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda on the basis of the Tauragė District Court’s order of 3   April   2014 (see paragraph 13 above). That order had been adopted in line with Articles   208 and 209 of the CCP (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above), whereas the legal provisions concerning provisional arrest, invoked by the applicant (see paragraph 61 above), were not relevant. They further argued that the applicant had been aware of the necessity to undergo a psychiatric assessment because she had been informed of the prosecutor’s request for such an assessment to take place (see paragraph 12 above). The Government submitted that “in all probability” on the morning of 15   April   2014 the Tauragė police officers, being aware of the court order concerning a psychiatric assessment, “decided to assist the applicant” and “benevolently proposed” to take her to Klaipėda (about 110   kilometres from Tauragė). The Government stated that the internal regulations of the National Forensic Psychiatry Centre provided for the possibility that a person who refused to appear for a psychiatric assessment on his or her own free will could be brought by the police (see paragraph 43 above). However, they acknowledged that domestic law did not establish a mechanism of coercion with regard to individuals who refused to undergo a psychiatric assessment ordered by a court, and stated that the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty “should not have taken place”. 63 .     Nonetheless, the Government argued that that deprivation of liberty had been in line with Article   5   §   1   (b) of the Convention because its purpose had been to secure the fulfilment of the applicant’s obligation to undergo a psychiatric assessment ordered by a court. 64 .     They lastly submitted that the applicant’s seizure had been recorded in police officers’ reports (see paragraph 15 above) and the report of the psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), and that she had been released as soon as the assessment had been completed, so she had not been deprived of her liberty any longer than necessary to secure the fulfilment of her obligation (see paragraph 16 above). 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 65.     The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention enshrines a fundamental right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. In proclaiming the “right to liberty”, paragraph 1 of Article 5 contemplates the physical liberty of the person; its aim is to ensure that no one should be deprived of that liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see Creangă v. Romania [GC], no. 29226/03, §   84, 23 February 2012). 66 .     The Court further reiterates that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub ‑ paragraphs   (a) ‑ (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question of whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law (see Saadi v.   the   United   Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 67, 29 January 2008). This primarily requires