CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 19 juillet 2018

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BULGARIA (Application no. 43503/08)           JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 19 July 2018     FINAL   19/10/2018         This judgment became final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Aleksandar Sabev v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Erik Møse,   André Potocki,   Yonko Grozev,   Síofra O’Leary,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Lәtif Hüseynov, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 26 June 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 43503/08) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian national, Mr Aleksandar Asenov Sabev (“the applicant”), on 3 September 2008. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms G.P. Petkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms A. Panova, Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his right to a tribunal guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been violated on account of the fact that the courts which had examined his appeal against his dismissal had not had been sufficiently competent to hear and determine the case before them, which, in his view, had prevented them from assessing all the decisive issues for the outcome of the case. 4.     On 4   January 2017 the Government were given notice of the application. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Sofia. 6.     At the material time the applicant was an army officer holding the rank of major who had been working for the Military Intelligence Service for several years. 7.     On 27 May 2005 the applicant’s security clearance to access classified information at the national level was withdrawn, of which fact he was duly notified. The order merely mentioned the legal provision on which the measure had been based, that is, section 59 (1) (2) of the Law on the protection of classified information. 8.     On the same date the applicant lodged an administrative appeal against that decision with the State Commission on Information Security (“the State   Commission”), asserting that he had not infringed the aforementioned legal provision. 9.     By letter of 22 July 2005 the State Commission informed the applicant that his appeal had been examined and dismissed on 15 July 2005. The letter gave no details concerning the Commission’s deliberations or its reasoning. 10.     On 8 August 2005 the applicant was relieved of his duties in the Military Intelligence Service, and on 30 September 2005 he was transferred to the Intelligence Unit at the Army Headquarters. 11.     By letter of 29 August 2006 the State Commission informed the Head of the Intelligence Unit at the Army Headquarters that on 22 August 2006 it had cancelled the applicant’s clearance to access classified information from NATO, and that he also no longer had clearance to access classified information at the national level. It stated that the applicant’s transfer to the Intelligence Unit had consequently been contrary to section 59 (6) of the Law on the protection of classified information. The letter gave no details concerning the State Commission’s deliberations or its reasoning. 12.     On 30 August 2006 the applicant took cognisance of that letter. 13.     On 11 September 2006 the Head of the Intelligence Unit contacted the Commission on the Status of Officers in the Army Headquarters, which met that same day and found that the applicant failed to satisfy the legal conditions for his post on account of the cancellation of the two aforementioned security clearances to access classified information. It proposed terminating his employment contract after the expiry of six   months’ notice. 14.     On 12 September 2006 the applicant took cognisance of that letter. 15.     Between September and December 2006 the applicant applied to several State bodies in an attempt to discover the precise reason for the cancellation of his clearances. The State Commission replied that it could not supply that information and that it would not reconsider its decision. The Defence Minister informed him that his complaint was ill-founded, and the National Assembly told him that the issue lay outside its jurisdiction. 16.     By order of 23 March 2007 the Defence Minister terminated the applicant’s contract for failure to satisfy the legal conditions for his post. The applicant was given notice of that decision on 12 April 2007. 17.     On 23 April 2007 the applicant appealed against the order for his dismissal before the Supreme Administrative Court (“CAS”), complaining of the lack of reasoning of the order, as well as several procedural errors. He complained, in particular, that the order had failed to mention any fact justifying his dismissal. 18.     By judgment of 19 November 2007 a three-judge trial bench of the CAS dismissed the applicant’s appeal. That judgment stated that the impugned order had been sufficiently reasoned, in particular in relation to the other documents in the file; it had been established that the applicant’s clearances to access classified information had been withdrawn, as confirmed by the State Commission; pursuant to the legislative provisions in force, no reasons had to be given for the withdrawal of such clearance, and the relevant order was not subject to judicial review; the withdrawal of the clearances meant that the applicant could no longer hold a post entailing access to classified information for three years; in ordering his dismissal, the Defence Minister had been bound by the facts found by the State Commission. Moreover, the CAS trial bench found no evidence of any procedural error. 19.     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with a five-judge bench of the CAS. He repeated his plea that his dismissal had been unlawful and unreasoned. He alleged that he had not committed any offence and had never been informed of the precise reason for the withdrawal of his clearances to access classified information. He invited the CAS to order the military authorities to supply him with the documents that had been used in evidence in the procedure for the withdrawal of the clearances in question. 20.     By judgment of 6 March 2008 a five-judge bench of the CAS upheld the lower court’s decision. The CAS bench held, in particular, that the applicant’s dismissal had been justified by the State Commission’s withdrawal of the applicant’s clearances. It pointed out that the withdrawal itself did not have to be reasoned and was not subject to judicial review. It considered that that the Defence Minister therefore had been required to comply with the decision of the specialist administrative authorities and to order tale applicant’s dismissal, which he had done. It added that the applicant had taken cognisance of the circumstances justifying his dismissal on 30 August 2006, when he had been informed of the State Commission’s decision to withdraw his security clearances to access classified information. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Access to classified information 21.     The Law on the protection of classified information governs the protection and storage of an access to classified information. The State Commission is the authority responsible for applying that Law. The Commission is made up of five members elected for a five-year term by the Council of Ministers, as proposed by the Prime Minister. 22.     Access is only possible to classified information if the person concerned has been given security clearance (sections 36 and 38 of the Law). 23.     Pursuant to section 59 (1) (2) of the Law, clearance to access classified information must be withdrawn if the person concerned has infringed the Law or any instruments enacted for its application, to the actual or potential detriment of the interests of the State and the authorities having access to the classified information. Pursuant to section 59 (3), no reasons must be given for decisions to withdraw security clearance. Persons from whom clearance has been withdrawn are debarred from holding a post enabling them to access classified information for three years following the withdrawal (section 59 (6)). 24.     Clearance withdrawal may be contested before the State Commission (section 62 of the Law). Under section 68 of the Law as worded prior to 2016, the Commission’s decision was final. 25.     On 13 September 2016 section 68 of the Law was amended. It now allows the persons concerned to contest the State Commission’s decision before the CAS. B.     Dismissal of regular members of the armed forces 26.     Pursuant to section 128b (1) (1) of the 1995 Law on defence and the armed forces, which has now been revoked, the Defence Minister could dismiss a regular member of the armed forces if he or she failed to satisfy the conditions for the post in question. Dismissal orders issued by the Minister could be contested before the CAS (section 132 of the same Law). 27.     Under Regulation 199 (1) (2) of the Regulations on regular service in the armed forces as in force at the material time, a serviceman failed to satisfy the conditions for his post if he lacked access to classified information. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 28.     The applicant complained of a violation of his right of access to a tribunal with full jurisdiction to determine the civil dispute to which he was a party. He relied, in that regard, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Admissibility 1.     The parties’ submissions 29.     The Government contested the admissibility of the applicant’s complaint on two counts. First of all, with reference to the decision in the case of Danawar and Others v.   Bulgaria (dec.), no. 25843/07, 20 January 2015, they raised an objection as to inadmissibility based on non-compliance with the six-month time-limit. They pointed out that the applicant’s dismissal had been based on the withdrawal by the State Commission of his clearances to access classified information and that that decision had been final. They explained that, consequently, the six-month time-limit had started on the date of notification of the State Commission’s decision, that is to say 30 August 2006, and that the applicant had lodged his application on 3 September 2008, two years later. 30.     In the alternative, the Government raised an objection regarding the applicant’s lack of victim status. They argued that pursuant to the domestic legislation in force at the material time, persons whose security clearance to access classified information had been withdrawn could not hold a post allowing them to access such information for three years following the withdrawal of their clearance. The Government pointed out that in the applicant’s case, that three-year period had ended on 30 August 2009. They argued that the applicant therefore had lost his status as victim of the violation of which he had complained on that date, with the lifting of the restriction on holding a post similar to the one which he had held at the time of his dismissal. 31.     The applicant submitted that the six-month time-limit for applying to the Court had begun on the date of the last decision given by the domestic courts concerning his dismissal, that is, on 6 March 2008. As the Court has affirmed in its recent judgment in the case of Miryana Petrova v.   Bulgaria , no. 57148/08, § 32, 21 July 2016, the applicant argued that the issue at stake in his case had not been his right to access classified information but rather his right to hold a civil service post, which had been infringed by the withdrawal of his security clearances. He considered that his dismissal had been the subject of proceedings conducted by courts which had not held full jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of that dismissal, and that the six-month time-limit had actually started running at the end of those proceedings. 32.     The applicant argued that his application was not manifestly ill-founded and that it satisfied all the other admissibility conditions set out in Article 35 § 2 of the Convention. 2.     The Court’s assessment 33.     The Court considers that it should first of all examine the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s loss of victim status, to the effect that after the expiry of the maximum period of prohibition of holding a post necessitating access to classified information, the applicant had no longer been affected by the alleged violation of the Convention (see paragraph   30 above). 34.     The Court, however, reiterates that the subject matter of the present case is the limited scope of the examination conducted by the domestic courts in the framework of a dismissal procedure, and not the lawfulness and necessity of the dismissal itself, which falls within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts. Consequently, the fact that the applicant is no longer prevented from applying for a post involving access to classified information has not deprived him of his status as a victim of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. 35.     The Government also raised an objection as to inadmissibility regarding non-compliance with the six-month time-limit. They considered that the starting point for that time-limit had been the date of notification of the State Commission’s decision, with which no further appeal lay, confirming the withdrawal of the applicant’s clearance to access classified information, to wit 30 August 2006 (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant contested the Government’s position by arguing that that time-limit only started running on the date of the courts’ final decision in the framework of the proceedings aimed at challenging his dismissal (see paragraph   31 above). 36.     The Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the present case, the parties’ arguments on this matter are so closely linked with the substance of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that is to say the allegation that the courts lacked jurisdiction to determine all the decisive points for the outcome of the proceedings against the applicant’s dismissal, that this objection as to inadmissibility should be joined to the merits of the case. 37.     The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits 1.     The parties’ submission (a)     The applicant 38.     The applicant submitted that the dispute between his employer and himself concerned the determination of a civil right, that is to say his right to continue to hold a civil service post in the Intelligence Unit at the Army Headquarters. He explained that under domestic law he was allowed to contest the lawfulness of his dismissal from the post in question, which he had done. He stated that, as a consequence, in accordance with the criteria laid down by the Court in its judgment in the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no.   63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007 ‑ II, the guarantees laid down under the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention were applicable in the framework of the judicial proceedings against his dismissal. 39.     The applicant submitted that the administrative courts which had examined his case had not considered all the issues which he deemed relevant. He alleged, in particular, that they had refused to assess the validity of the factual circumstances which had been used as a pretext to withdraw his clearances to access classified information. He considered the latter as a fundamental issue for the outcome of the dispute, because, in his view, he had been dismissed essentially as a result of the withdrawal of the clearances. The applicant added that the domestic courts had merely referred to the specialist commission’s decision on the matter without considering the validity of the grounds used by that commission, which grounds the applicant argued had never been communicated to him. 40.     The applicant alleged that the clearance withdrawal procedure before the specialist commission had not provided for the guarantees required by Article 6 of the Convention because it was a procedure conducted by an administrative body which was neither independent nor impartial. 41.     He submitted that under those circumstances, the domestic courts’ refusal to consider a question which was essential to the outcome of the case had deprived him of the right of access to a tribunal with full jurisdiction to determine his right to employment. (b)     The Government 42.     The Government contested the applicant’s arguments and invited the Court to find that in the present case there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They stated from the outset that the right to a tribunal as secured under that provision was not absolute but could be made subject to restrictions pursuing a legitimate aim and respecting a fair balance of proportionality between the means used and the aim sought to be achieved. 43.     The Government submitted that in the present case the dispute concerning the determination of the applicant’s civil rights had been dealt with by a tribunal which had been established by law, which was competent, independent and impartial, and which adjudicated in the framework of fair proceedings. 44.     They pointed out that the applicant’s clearances to access classified information had been withdrawn from him pursuant to section 59 (1) of the Law on access to classified information. That decision had not been reasoned and was not subject to judicial review. That legislative approach had been based on the need to protect national security and the interests of the State. 45.     The Government explained that on taking note of the clearance withdrawals in question, and in accordance with section 128b of the Law on defence and the armed forces and Regulation 199 of the regulations on regular service in the armed forces, the Defence Minister had decided to dismiss the applicant on the grounds that he failed to satisfy the requisite conditions for holding his post. They added that the domestic procedure for such dismissal had been observed and that the applicant had been informed of the reasons for his dismissal. 46.     The Government argued that the applicant had availed himself of his right of access to a tribunal by contesting his dismissal before the relevant administrative courts. The latter had conducted a full, in-depth assessment of the lawfulness of the dismissal, and had established all the factual circumstances relevant to the outcome of the dispute, in particular the withdrawal of the applicant’s clearances to access classified information. The Government added that the clearances had actually been withdrawn by a specialist body, the State Commission, whose decisions were binding on the Minister. In that connection, they explained that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not prevent the domestic courts from referring, in their decisions, to the findings of experts where necessitated by the specific nature of the issues submitted to them. 47.     The Government pointed out that on the basis of the evidence gathered, the domestic courts had reached the conclusion that the applicant’s dismissal had been in conformity with domestic legislation and that those courts had given full reasons for their decisions. The applicant had therefore had access to a tribunal with competence to examine all the issues relevant to the outcome of the dispute. 48.     The Government submitted that the circumstances of the present case differed from those in the cases of Fazliyski v. Bulgaria (no. 40908/05, 16 April 2013) and Miryana Petrova v. Bulgaria (no.   57148/08, 21 July 2016), in which the Court had found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They alleged that the applicant had participated actively in the impugned proceedings and had taken cognisance of the reasons for his dismissal. They argued that in the instant case there had been a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the restriction on the jurisdiction of the domestic courts and the need to protect national security, which was in keeping with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, ever since 2016, decisions to withdraw clearance to access classified information had been subject to judicial review before the administrative courts. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 49.     In Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no.   63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007 ‑ II the Court held that in principle, ordinary labour disputes involving civil servants fall within the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, under its civil head. It stipulated that there would be a presumption that Article 6 applied, and laid down two conditions for the respondent State to be able to rely before it on an applicant’s civil servant status in order to exclude him or her from the protection afforded under Article 6: the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question, and that exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State’s interest (ibid.). 50.     The Court reiterates that everyone has the right to have any claim relating to his “civil rights and obligations” brought before a court or tribunal. Thus Article 6 § 1 of the Convention embodies the “right to a court”, of which the “right of access”, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect (see Golder v. the United Kingdom , 21   February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18). 51.     Article 6 § 1 of the Convention requires, in principle, the “tribunal” in question to have   jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the   dispute before it   (see Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands , 17 December 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ VI). This means, in particular, that the court must have the power to examine point by point each of the litigant’s grounds on the merits, without refusing to examine any of them, and give clear reasons for their rejection. As to the facts, the court must be able to examine those that are central to the litigant’s case (see Bryan v.   the United Kingdom , 22 November 1995, §§ 44-45, Series A no. 335 ‑ A). (b)     Application of those principles in the present case 52.     The Court observes from the outset that the issue at stake for the applicant in the present case was not his right of access to State secrets, which is not guaranteed by the Convention (see Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 109, ECHR 2017 (extracts)), but his right to hold a civil service post, which had been affected by the withdrawal of his security clearances to access classified information. Domestic law permitted the applicant to contest his dismissal from the post which he had held in the Intelligence Unit at the Army Headquarters (see paragraph 26 in fine above), and the Government did not dispute the applicability of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention to the procedure for contesting the applicant’s dismissal. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case and in accordance with the criteria established in its case-law (see paragraph   49 above), the Court considers that the dispute in question concerned the determination of a “civil   right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that that provision, under its civil head, is therefore applicable to the judicial proceedings for contesting the applicant’s dismissal. 53.     The Court must emphasise that it was after the end of those judicial proceedings and within a period of no longer than six months that the applicant lodged his application with it (see paragraphs 1 and 20 above). It must therefore reject the objection as to non-compliance with the six-month time-limit raised by the Government and joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 36 above). 54.     The Court must then determine whether the dispute in question was assessed by a tribunal competent to deal with all the relevant factual and legal issues. 55.     Turning to the facts of the case, it observes that in dismissing the applicant from his post, the Defence Minister was not exercising his discretion. Evidently he was required to dismiss the applicant because he no longer had clearance to access classified information, which was a sine qua non for discharging his duties at the Army Headquarters (see paragraphs 18, 20 and 27 above). 56.     It follows that the lawfulness of the applicant’s dismissal depended entirely on the answer to the question whether the withdrawal of his clearance to access classified information had been justified (see Ternovskis v.   Latvia , no. 33637/02, § 44, 29 April 2014, and Miryana Petrova , cited above, §   31). That question had been examined by the State Commission, which had dismissed the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 9 above). However, the Court considers that that procedure had not provided the guarantees set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: the State Commission was not a body independent from the executive, given that its members were elected by the Council of Ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister (see paragraph   21 above); the Commission had at no stage informed the applicant of the reasons for the withdrawal of his clearances (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above), and it had taken its decision on 22 August 2006 without the applicant’s knowledge (see paragraph 11 above). 57.     The Court notes that the applicant contested his dismissal before the CAS, alleging, in particular, that the withdrawal of his security clearances had been incompatible with domestic legislation, that he had committed no offence justifying the withdrawal of his clearance to access classified information and that he had never been informed of the reasons for the withdrawal. It cannot be overlooked that at no stage in the proceedings before the two different trial benches did the Supreme Administrative Court consider the question whether the withdrawal of the security clearances had been justified by the fact that the applicant had committed an offence. It merely referred to the State Commission’s decision, emphasising that the latter had not been reasoned and that it was not subject to any legal remedy (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). The Court considers that this renders the applicant’s situation similar to that of the applicants in the cases of Myriana Petrova (cited above, §§ 40-44) and Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Ohers and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom , 10 July 1998, §§ 76-79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ IV, in which it found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the refusal by the domestic courts to examine issues which were vital to the outcome of the disputes between the applicants and the administrative authorities, which refusal had been based on the fact that those questions had been determined in advance by the administrative authorities in such a way as to force the courts to accept their factual findings. 58.     The Court considers that a distinction must be drawn between the present case and that of Regner, cited above, in which the Court concluded that the guarantees laid down in Article 6 of the Convention were applicable to judicial proceedings concerning the withdrawal of security clearance which had been vital for the applicant to fully discharge his duties and be able to obtain a new post in the civil service, and in which the proceedings conducted by the domestic courts had provided for adequate guarantees meeting the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, in the case of Regner cited above and unlike the CAS in the present case, the Czech Supreme Administrative Court had had full jurisdiction to determine the dispute between the applicant and the administrative authorities: it had had access to all the classified documentation on file which had served to justify the authorities’ decision; it had been able to assess the justification of the failure to communicate specific classified documents and if necessary to order their communication; its jurisdiction had not been confined to considering the arguments put forward by the applicant; and it had been able to assess the existence of any circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the applicant’s clearance to access secret information (ibid., §§ 152, 153, 154 et 156). 59.     In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the dispute concerning the applicant’s dismissal was not examined by a tribunal with “full jurisdiction” to assess all the relevant factual and legal circumstances of the case. There has accordingly been a violation of Article   6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE   41 OF THE CONVENTION 60.     Article   41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” Damage 61.     The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 62.     The Government submitted that that sum was excessive and unjustified. 63.     The Court considers that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation of his right secured under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It considers it appropriate to award him EUR 2,400 under this head. Costs and expenses 64.     The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be transferred directly into his lawyer’s bank account. 65.     The Government contested that claim. 66.     According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers the claim reasonable and awards it to the applicant. It also accedes to the latter’s request to pay the sum directly into the bank account of his lawyer, Ms Petkova. Default interest 67.     The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Rejects the objection raised by the Government as regards the loss of victim status; Joins to the merits and rejects the objection raised by the Government as regards compliance with the six-month time-limit; Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article6 § 1 of the Convention; Holds (a)     that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article   44   §   2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs, at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: i.     EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; ii.     EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly into the bank account of his legal representative, Ms Petkova; (b)     that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in French, and notified in writing on 19 July 2018, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and   3 of the Rules of Court. Claudia Westerdiek   Angelika Nußberger   Registrar   President