CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 25 septembre 2018

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UKRAINE   (Application no. 76639/11)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   25 September 2018         This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Denisov v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President,   Angelika Nußberger,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Helena Jäderblom,   Robert Spano,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Erik Møse,   André Potocki,   Yonko Grozev,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Marko Bošnjak,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 18 October 2017 and 13 June 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 76639/11) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Anatoliy Oleksiyovych Denisov (“the applicant”), on 8 December 2011. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms J. Gavron and Mr A. Halban, lawyers practising in London. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his dismissal from the position of president of a court of appeal had not been carried out in conformity with Article 6   §   1 of the Convention and constituted an unlawful and disproportionate interference with his private life, contrary to Article   8 of the Convention. 4.     On 15 January 2014 the Government were given notice of the application. 5.     On 25 April 2017, after having consulted the parties, a Chamber of the Fifth Section of the Court, composed of Angelika Nußberger, President, Erik Møse, Ganna Yudkivska, André Potocki, Yonko Grozev, Carlo   Ranzoni, Mārtiņš Mits, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in the above case, neither of the parties having objected to such relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72 of the Rules of Court). 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 7.     The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. In addition, third-party comments were received from the International Commission of Jurists, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3). 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 18 October 2017. There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   I. Lishchyna ,   Agent , Ms   O. Davydchuk , Office of the Government Agent, Ministry of Justice, Ms   N. Rybachok , Office of the Government Agent, Ministry of Justice,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Ms   J. Gavron , Mr   A. Halban ,   Counsel .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Lishchyna, Ms Gavron and Mr   Halban and their replies to the questions from its members. 9.     At the Court’s request, the applicant, in a letter of 24 November 2017, amended his claims for costs and expenses to take into account the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. The Government submitted their comments on his revised claims on 11 December 2017. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 10.     The applicant was born on 6 July 1948 and lives in Kyiv. 11.     The applicant’s judicial career started in 1976, when he was first elected to the post of judge of a district court. During his judicial career the applicant held the position of president in several courts. 12.     On 22 December 2005 the applicant was elected to the post of judge of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal by the Ukrainian Parliament. 13 .     On 10 November 2006 the applicant was appointed, by the President of Ukraine, as acting president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. On 6 February 2009 he was appointed president of that court by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (a body of judicial self-governance). He was appointed for a five-year term, it being understood that he would reach the retirement age in July 2013, before the end of that term. A.   Preliminary inquiry into the applicant’s performance as president of the court 14.     In February 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges (another body of judicial self-governance) decided, among other issues, to review the functioning of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. The review was carried out in February and March 2011 and concerned the years 2009 and 2010, as well as the period between January and February 2011. 15 .     On 24 May 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges, chaired by Judge K., made a submission to the High Council of Justice (“the HCJ”) proposing the applicant’s dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal for failure to perform his administrative duties properly. The proposal was based on the results of the aforementioned review. B.   Proceedings before the HCJ 16.     The HCJ scheduled hearings on 30 and 31 May 2011 and the applicant was invited to attend them. However, in view of information received from the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal on 27 May 2011 that the applicant was on annual leave until 8 July 2011, the HCJ adjourned the examination of the case. It sent the applicant a summons for the next hearing, which was scheduled on 14   June 2011. In reply, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal informed the HCJ once again that the applicant was on holiday until 8 July 2011. 17.     On 14 June 2011 the HCJ examined the case in the applicant’s absence and decided to dismiss him from the post of president of the court, relying on section 20 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and section 32-1 of the High Council of Justice Act. The HCJ noted that “significant shortcomings, omissions and errors, and grave violations of the foundations of the organisation and administration of justice set forth by law [had] been found in the organisation of the work of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal”. It stated that “the improper organisation of the court’s work was the result of the failure by the president of the court, Mr A.   Denisov, to comply with the provisions of the applicable laws concerning the fulfilment of his administrative duties”. It also found that “administrative documents issued by Mr A. Denisov regarding the distribution of duties between the vice-presidents of the court, the setting-up of court chambers and panels and the distribution of cases among judges, as well as personnel-related and other documents in certain cases, [violated] the provisions of [the domestic legislation]”. It lastly stated that the applicant’s failures as president of the court involved a “lack of proper planning, control and effective use of human resources”. 18 .     The decision was voted on by the HCJ, whose members present on that occasion included Judge K., the Prosecutor General and other judicial and non-judicial members. Out of the eighteen members present, eight were judges. Fourteen votes were cast in favour of the applicant’s dismissal. 19 .     According to the applicant, the composition of the HCJ in his case included two members who on earlier occasions had initiated proceedings for his dismissal from the post of judge for an alleged “breach of oath”. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the President of the HCJ and another member of the HCJ had previously communicated with him, attempting – albeit without success – to influence him in the course of his professional activities. 20 .     On 17 June 2011 the President of the HCJ asked the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal to ensure that the HCJ’s decision on the applicant’s dismissal was executed and that information about its execution was provided to the HCJ immediately. On 23   June 2011 the applicant was dismissed from his administrative position, remaining in office as a judge of the same court. C.   Proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court 21.     The applicant challenged the decision of the HCJ before the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), arguing that the decision on his dismissal was unlawful and unfounded. In his claim the applicant submitted that the HCJ had failed to comply with the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal. He emphasised that those requirements were part of the procedural safeguards provided for by Article 6 of the Convention, which was applicable to his case in its civil limb because the impugned decision had substantially affected his right to work and his professional dignity. The applicant further argued that his right to participate in the hearings had not been secured. He alleged that the decision of the HCJ was worded in general terms and that it did not refer to any specific facts or indicate a specific time when those facts had taken place. The applicant then asked the HAC to take into account the fact that his judicial career had exceeded thirty-five years, that he had held positions of president at several courts for twenty-five years, that he had been given awards for his judicial service and that during the initial period of his presidency of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal that court had moved from a demolished military barracks to premises in the city centre with proper equipment and a sufficient number of hearing rooms. 22 .     The applicant also claimed compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the ensuing reduction in his remuneration, which, at the date of the claim, had amounted to 4,034.33 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) [1] in relation to the period which had elapsed in July and August 2011. 23.     On 25 August 2011 the HAC held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and decided to dismiss his claim in respect of pecuniary damage without considering it. The HAC adopted a decision to that effect, stating that it had no jurisdiction to determine that issue. 24.     On 11 October 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim concerning his dismissal from the administrative position as unsubstantiated. In its decision the HAC specified, in particular, that it had competence to review whether the impugned decision had been taken lawfully, reasonably, proportionately and, among other requirements, impartially. The HAC stated that the applicant had not contested the facts forming the grounds for his dismissal and therefore those facts had been taken as established. The HAC then reiterated the failings attributed to the applicant and concluded that the HCJ’s decision had been lawful and that the applicant’s right to participate in the proceedings in person had not been violated because the HCJ had taken all the necessary measures to inform him about the hearings and the applicant had not had any valid reason for being absent from the hearings. The HAC found that the HCJ had acted in accordance with the Constitution, the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and the High Council of Justice Act. It had also complied with the Rules of the HCJ, which provided that one of the grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position was a “breach of official duties”. In conclusion, the HAC stated that the HCJ had not violated the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine. 25.     Following his dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, the applicant continued to work as a regular judge in the same court until 20   June 2013, when Parliament dismissed him from the post of judge after he had tendered a statement of resignation. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.   Constitution of 28 June 1996 as worded at the relevant time 26 .     The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows at the relevant time: Article 6 “The State power in Ukraine is exercised on the basis of its separation into legislative, executive and judicial branches. ...” Article 126 “... A judge shall be dismissed from office by the body which elected or appointed him or her in the event of: ... (2) the judge’s attainment of the age of sixty-five ...;” Article 131 “The High Council of Justice shall operate in Ukraine. Its tasks shall comprise: (1) making submissions on the appointment or dismissal of judges; (2) adopting decisions with regard to the violation by judges and prosecutors of the requirements concerning judicial incompatibility; (3) conducting disciplinary proceedings in respect of judges of the Supreme Court and judges of higher specialised courts, and considering complaints against decisions imposing disciplinary liability on judges of courts of appeal and local courts and on prosecutors. The High Council of Justice shall consist of twenty members. The Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Assembly of Judges of Ukraine, the Assembly of Advocates of Ukraine, and the Assembly of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Establishments and Scientific Institutions, shall each appoint three members to the High Council of Justice, and the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors shall appoint two members to the High Council of Justice. The President of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General shall be ex officio members of the High Council of Justice.” B.     Code of Administrative Justice of 6 July 2005 as worded at the relevant time 27.     The relevant provisions of the Code read as follows at the relevant time: Article 161 – Questions to be determined by a court when deciding on a case “1.     When deciding on a case, a court shall determine: (1)     whether the circumstances referred to in the claim and objections took place and what evidence substantiates these circumstances; (2)     whether there is any other factual information relevant to the case and evidence in support of that information; (3)     which provision of law is to be applied to the legal relations in dispute; ...” Article 171-1 – Proceedings in cases concerning acts, actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges “1.     The rules set down in this Article shall apply to proceedings in administrative cases concerning: ... (2)     acts of the High Council of Justice; ... 2.     Acts, actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges may be challenged before the Higher Administrative Court. For this purpose a separate chamber shall be set up in the Higher Administrative Court. ... 5.     Following the consideration of the case, the Higher Administrative Court may: (1)     declare the act of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice or the High Qualification Commission of Judges unlawful in full or in part; (2)     declare the actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice or the High Qualification Commission of Judges unlawful and oblige [it or them] to take certain actions. ...” C.     The Judiciary and Status of Judges Act of 7 July 2010 (in force at the relevant time) 28 .     The relevant provisions of this Act read as follows at the relevant time: Section 20 – Procedure for appointing judges to administrative positions “1. The administrative positions in a court are the positions of president and deputy president(s) of the court. 2. The president of ... the court of appeal ... [appointed for a five-year term from among the judges of the same court] may be dismissed from that position by the High Council of Justice on an application by the relevant council of judges. ... 6. The dismissal of a judge from an administrative position shall not entail removal from his or her judicial post. ...” Section 29 – President of the court of appeal “1. The president of the court of appeal shall: (1) represent the court as a body of State power in relations with other State bodies, local self-government bodies, natural persons and legal entities; (2) determine the administrative powers of the deputy presidents of the court of appeal; (3) monitor the efficiency of the non-judicial staff at the court, and make proposals to the Head of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine regarding the appointment of the head and deputy head of the non-judicial staff at the court, their dismissal from office and any incentives or disciplinary measures to be applied in respect of them in accordance with the law; (4) issue relevant orders on the basis of decisions on the election or dismissal of a judge; (5)   notify, within ten days, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine about available vacancies at the court of appeal; (6) ensure the implementation of decisions taken at meetings of judges of the court of appeal; (7) oversee the collection and analysis of judicial statistics, organise the examination and summarising of judicial practice, and provide information and analytical support to judges in order to improve the quality of justice; (8) ensure the ongoing training requirements for judges of the court of appeal; (9) exercise other powers envisaged by law.” Section 113 – Objectives of judicial self-governance “1. Judicial self-governance shall be established in Ukraine as a means of independent collective resolution by judges of issues relating to the internal activity of the courts. ...” Section 114 – Organisational forms of judicial self-governance “1. The organisational forms of judicial self-governance shall be the meetings of judges, the councils of judges, the conferences of judges, and the Assembly of Judges of Ukraine. ...” Section 115 – Meetings of judges “... 2. Meetings of judges [of a court] shall be convened by the president of the court on his own initiative or at the request of at least one-third of the judicial staff of the court. ...” Section 122 – Councils of judges “1. In the period between conferences of judges the functions of judicial self-governance shall be performed by the relevant council of judges. ... 3. The council of judges shall be composed of eleven judges ... 6. The council of judges shall: (1) oversee the organisation of the functioning of the relevant courts, examine reports on those issues by presidents of courts ...; ... (3) make submissions to the High Council of Justice on the appointment of judges to administrative positions at the courts and their dismissal from such positions; ...” D.     The High Council of Justice Act of 15 January 1998 (in force at the relevant time) 29.     The relevant provisions of this law read as follows at the material time: Section 3 – Powers of the High Council of Justice “ The High Council of Justice shall: ... (1-1) following the submission of a proposal by the relevant council of judges, ... dismiss judges from the positions of president and deputy president of courts ...; ...” Section 32-1 – Dismissal of judges from the positions of president and deputy president of a court “... The question of dismissing the president or deputy president of a court shall be examined at a hearing of the High Council of Justice, following the submission of a proposal by the relevant specialised council of judges. The president or deputy president of the court concerned shall be invited to attend the hearing. If the president or deputy president of the court cannot participate in the hearing for a valid reason, he or she shall be entitled to make written submissions, which shall be included in the case file. The written submissions by the judge shall be read out at the hearing before the High Council of Justice. A second failure on the part of the president or deputy president of the court to attend a hearing shall be grounds for considering the case in his or her absence. A decision of the High Council of Justice to dismiss the president or deputy president of a court shall be taken by a majority of the constitutional composition of the High Council of Justice.” 30.     Other relevant provisions of this Act can be found in the judgment in the case of Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (no. 21722/11, §§   65-71, ECHR 2013). E.   Rules of the HCJ of 4 October 2010 (in force at the relevant time) 31.     Paragraph 3.2 (1) of the Rules provided that a judge could be dismissed from the position of president or deputy president of a court by the HCJ following the submission of a proposal by the relevant council of judges. 32.     Paragraph 3.2 (2) of the Rules provided the following grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position: (i)   dismissal from the judiciary; (ii)   submission of a statement of resignation from the administrative position; (iii)   expiry of the period of appointment to the administrative position; (iv)   transfer of the judge to another court; (v)   breach of official duties. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 33.     The relevant extracts from the European Charter on the statute for judges (Department of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, 8-10   July 1998, DAJ/DOC (98)23) read: “ 1. General Principles ... 1.3. In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary. ... 5. Liability 5.1. The dereliction by a judge of one of the duties expressly defined by the statute, may only give rise to a sanction upon the decision, following the proposal, the recommendation, or with the agreement of a tribunal or authority composed at least as to one half of elected judges, within the framework of proceedings of a character involving the full hearing of the parties, in which the judge proceeded against must be entitled to representation. The scale of sanctions which may be imposed is set out in the statute, and their imposition is subject to the principle of proportionality. The decision of an executive authority, of a tribunal, or of an authority pronouncing a sanction, as envisaged herein, is open to an appeal to a higher judicial authority.” 34.     In the conclusions to its “Report on the Independence of the Judicial System, Part I: The Independence of Judges”, adopted at its 82nd plenary session on 12 and 13 March 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)004), the Venice Commission found as follows: “82. The following standards should be respected by states in order to ensure internal and external judicial independence: ... 4. It is an appropriate method for guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council have decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career of judges. While respecting the variety of legal systems existing, the Venice Commission recommends that states not yet having done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council. In all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition, with a substantial part if not the majority of the members being judges. With the exception of ex-officio members these judges should be elected or appointed by their peers. ... 6. Judicial councils, or disciplinary courts, should have a decisive influence in disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of an appeal to a court against decisions of disciplinary bodies should be provided for. ...” 35.     The relevant parts of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 at the 1098th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) read as follows: “ Chapter IV – Councils for the judiciary 26. Councils for the judiciary are independent bodies, established by law or under the constitution, that seek to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and of individual judges and thereby to promote the efficient functioning of the judicial system. 27. Not less than half the members of such councils should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary. 28. Councils for the judiciary should demonstrate the highest degree of transparency towards judges and society by developing pre-established procedures and reasoned decisions. ... Chapter VI – Status of the judge Selection and career ... 46. The authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. 47. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice. 48. The membership of the independent authorities referred to in paragraphs 46 and 47 should ensure the widest possible representation. Their procedures should be transparent with reasons for decisions being made available to applicants on request. ... Chapter VII – Duties and responsibilities ... Liability and disciplinary proceedings ... 69. Disciplinary proceedings may follow where judges fail to carry out their duties in an efficient and proper manner. Such proceedings should be conducted by an independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with the right to challenge the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate.” 36.     The Consultative Council of European Judges, at its 11th plenary meeting (17-19 November 2010), adopted a Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) summarising and codifying the main conclusions of the Opinions it had already adopted. The section entitled “Body in charge of guaranteeing independence” reads as follows: “13. To ensure independence of judges, each State shall create a Council for the Judiciary or another specific body, itself independent from legislative and executive powers, endowed with broad competences for all questions concerning their status as well as the organisation, the functioning and the image of judicial institutions. The Council shall be composed either of judges exclusively or of a substantial majority of judges elected by their peers. The Council for the Judiciary shall be accountable for its activities and decisions.” 37.     Further relevant international texts can be found in Baka v.   Hungary [GC] (no. 20261/12, §§ 72-73 and 82-86, ECHR 2016). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE PRINCIPLES OF AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL 38.     The applicant complained under Article 6   §   1 of the Convention that the proceedings before the HCJ and the HAC concerning his removal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal had not been compatible with the requirements of independence and impartiality. He complained, in addition, that the HAC had not provided a sufficient review of his case, thereby impairing his right of access to a court. 39.     The relevant part of Article 6 §   1 reads as follows:   “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” A.     Admissibility 1.   The parties’ submissions 40.     Relying on the principles developed in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v.   Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007 ‑ II), the applicant submitted that Article 6   §   1 of the Convention applied to his case under the civil limb. The national law did not expressly exclude access to court: his case had been examined by the HCJ performing a judicial function, and had subsequently been reviewed by the HAC, an ordinary court within the domestic judicial system. Therefore, the domestic law did not exclude access to a court for cases of this kind and the first limb of the test set out in Vilho Eskelinen and Others was not satisfied. Furthermore, the applicant’s dismissal from his administrative position had caused him pecuniary loss, by way of a reduction in his salary, as well as non-pecuniary loss in view of his demotion in status. In his original application form the applicant submitted that Article 6 was also applicable under the “criminal” limb. However, in his submissions before the Grand Chamber he stated that the applicability of Article 6 was limited to its civil aspect. 41.     The Government submitted that the civil limb of Article 6 was not applicable since there was no “civil” right at issue. The dispute had been entirely within the sphere of public law and the claim submitted by the applicant in respect of pecuniary damage concerned a small amount (see paragraph 22 above), which had not constituted a significant disadvantage for him. On those grounds the Government submitted that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention. 2.   Third-party intervener 42.     The third party, the International Commission of Jurists, submitted that the principle of independence of the judiciary necessarily implied security of tenure in the office of court president. In order to ensure such security of tenure and to maintain both the independence of individual court presidents and their capacity to uphold the independence of judges in their courts, proceedings for removal from the position of court president had to provide the same guarantees of independence and fairness as those for removal from the office of judge. The third party contended that the applicability of Article 6 in the present case had to be determined on the basis of the Vilho Eskelinen test, which had been applied by the Court in cases concerning judges including Baka (cited above). 3.   The Court’s assessment 43.     It is common ground between the parties that Article 6   §   1 is not applicable under its criminal limb. Indeed, the proceedings at issue did not relate to the determination of a criminal charge, and for this reason the criminal limb does not apply (see, mutatis mutandis , Oleksandr Volkov , cited above, §§   93-95). (a)     The general requirements for the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6   §   1 (i)     The relevant principles 44.     For Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb to be applicable, there must be a “dispute” regarding a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among many other authorities, Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no.   37575/04, § 90, ECHR 2012; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no.   22251/08, § 42, ECHR 2015; Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v.   Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 71, ECHR 2016; and Regner v. the Czech Republic GC, no. 35289/11, § 99, ECHR 2017). 45.     Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for (civil) “rights and obligations” in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State concerned (see, for example, Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 117, ECHR 2005 ‑ X). The starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (ibid., § 120; see also Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no.   56665/09, § 62, ECHR 2017, and Regner , cited above, § 100). The Court would need strong reasons to differ from the conclusions reached by the superior national courts by finding, contrary to their view, that there was arguably a right recognised by domestic law (see Károly Nagy , cited above, § 62). 46.     Although there is in principle no right under the Convention to hold a public post entailing the administration of justice (see Dzhidzheva ‑ Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 12628/09, § 38, 9   October 2012, and Harabin v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 62584/00, 29 June 2004), such a right may exist at the domestic level. In Regner (cited above) the Court reiterated that there can be no doubt about the fact that there is a right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 where a substantive right recognised in domestic law is accompanied by a procedural right to have that right enforced through the courts. The mere fact that the wording of a legal provision affords an element of discretion does not in itself rule out the existence of a right. Indeed, Article 6 applies where the judicial proceedings concern a discretionary decision resulting in interference in an applicant’s rights (ibid., §   102). In some cases, national law, while not necessarily recognizing that an individual has a subjective right, confers the right to a lawful procedure for examination of his or her claim, involving matters such as ruling whether a decision was arbitrary or ultra vires or whether there were procedural irregularities. This is the case regarding certain decisions where the authorities have a purely discretionary power to grant or refuse an advantage or privilege, with the law conferring on the person concerned the right to apply to the courts, which, where they find that the decision was unlawful, may set it aside. In such a case Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable, on condition that the advantage or privilege, once granted, gives rise to a civil right (ibid., §   105). While access to employment and to the functions performed may constitute in principle a privilege that cannot be legally enforced, this is not the case regarding the continuation of an employment relationship or the conditions in which it is exercised (ibid., §   117). In Baka , for instance, the Court recognised the right of the President of the Supreme Court to serve his full term of six years under Hungarian law (see Baka , cited above, §§   107-11). (ii)     Application of these principles to the present case 47.     Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observes, first of all, that there was a “dispute” concerning the exercise of the right to hold the position of president of a court. As regards the issue of whether such a “right” could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised in domestic law, it has to be noted that the applicant was appointed to the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal for a five ‑ year term (see paragraph 13 above) and his appointment for such tenure was not disputed at the domestic level. The applicant was provided with specific remuneration for his service as president of the court and his dismissal from this position was subject to certain substantive and procedural conditions. In the light of the above, and given that there was no dispute between the parties as to the existence of the right in question, there is no ground for considering that the applicant’s right to serve in that administrative position was not recognised under domestic law. Despite his appointment for a five-year period, the applicant’s right to hold the position of president of the court was limited in time by the fact that he was due to reach the retirement age in 2013, before the expiry of that period (see Article 126 of the Constitution cited in paragraph 26 above). 48 .     The Court further observes that the dispute was “genuine” as the parties differed as to whether the applicant could continue to hold his administrative position. Moreover, the dispute was “serious”, having regard to the role of the president of a court (see section 29 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act, cited in paragraph 28 above) and to the direct pecuniary consequences for the applicant resulting from his removal from that administrative position. In that regard the Government’s argument that the reduction in salary was insignificant for the applicant is not convincing. The applicant’s calculation of pecuniary damage in his domestic claim was limited only to the short period (see paragraph 22 above) which had elapsed at that stage, because the principal purpose of the claim was to secure his reinstatement in the position of president of the court. However, the pecuniary consequences were not insignificant from the perspective of the whole period which remained for the applicant to serve as president. 49.     Lastly, the dispute was “directly decisive” for the right at issue because it resulted in the premature termination of the applicant’s exercise of that right. (b)     As to the “civil” nature of the right in dispute 50.     The Government contested the applicability of Article 6, arguing that the dispute was in the area of public law and that, consequently, there was no “civil” right at issue. (i)     The relevant principles 51.     In this connection it has to be noted that the scope of the “civil” concept in Article 6 is not limited by the immediate subject matter of the dispute. Instead, the Court has developed a wider approach, according to which the “civil” limb has covered cases which might not initially appear to concern a civil right but which may have direct and significant repercussions on a private pecuniary or non-pecuniary right belonging to an individual. Through this approach, the civil limb of Article 6 has been applied to a variety of disputes which may have been classified in domestic law as public-law disputes. These examples include disciplinary proceedings concerning the right to practise a profession (see Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium , 23 June 1981, §§ 47 and 48, Series   A no. 43, and Philis v. Greece (no. 2) , 27 June 1997, § 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ IV), disputes involving the right to a healthy environment (see Taşkın and Others v. Turkey , no. 46117/99, § 133, ECHR 2004 ‑ X), prisoners’ detention arrangements (see Ganci v.   Italy , no.   41576/98, §   25, ECHR 2003 ‑ XI, and Enea v. Italy [GC], no. 74912/01, § 103, ECHR 2009), the right of access to investigation documents (see Savitskyy v.   Ukraine , no. 38773/05, §§   143-45, 26 July 2012), disputes regarding the non-inclusion of a conviction in a criminal record (see Alexandre v. Portugal , no. 33197/09, §§   54 and 55, 20 November 2012), proceedings for the application of a non-custodial preventive measure (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 154, ECHR 2017 (extracts)), and the revocation of a civil servant’s security clearance within the Ministry of Defence (see Regner , cited above, §§ 113-27). 52.     Besides the above-mentioned development of the case-law, the scope of the “civil” limb has been substantially extended in relation to public-employment disputes, a field which is directly relevant to the present case. In Vilho Eskelinen and Others (cited above) the Court, having regard to the existing state of affairs in the Contracting States and in view of non-discrimination considerations in relation to civil servants as compared to private employees, established a presumption that Article 6 applied to “ordinary labour disputes” between a civil servant and the State and that it would be for the respondent Government to show that a civil servant did not have a right of access to a court under national law and that this exclusion of the rights under Article   6 was justified (ibid., § 62). On the basis of the principles set out in Vilho Eskelinen and Others , Article 6 has been applied to employment disputes involving judges who were dismissed from judicial office (see, for example, Oleksandr Volkov , cited above, §§   91 and 96; Kulykov and Others v.   Ukraine , nos. 5114/09 and 17 others, §§ 118 and 132, 19 January 2017; Sturua v. Georgia , no. 45729/05, § 27, 28 March 2017; and Kamenos v.   Cyprus , no. 147/07, § 88, 31 October 2017), removed from an administrative position without the termination of their duties as a judge (see Baka , cited above, §§   34 and 107-11) or suspended from judicial office (see Paluda v. Slovakia , no. 33392/12, § 34, 23 May 2017). It has also been applied to employment disputes involving civil servants who had lost a remote-area allowance which had been added to their salaries as a bonus (see Vilho Eskelinen , cited above, §§ 40 and 41) or who had been transferred to another office or post against their will, resulting in a decrease in salary (see Zalli v. Albania , no. 52531/07, 8 February 2011, and Ohneberg v.   Austria , no. 10781/08, 18 September 2012). Furthermore, in Bayer v.   Germany (no. 8453/04, 16 July 2009), which concerned the removal from office of a State-employed bailiff following disciplinary proceedings, the Court held that disputes about “salaries, allowances or similar entitlements” were only non-exhaustive examples of “ordinary labour disputes” to which Article 6 should in principle apply under the Vilho Eskelinen test (ibid., § 38; see also Regner , cited above, § 108). (ii)     Application of these principles to the present case 53.     In the light of the above principles, the Government’s argument that the civil limb of Article 6   §   1 is not applicable for the sole reason that the applicant’s dispute falls within the field of public law and there is no “civil” right at stake is not convincing. As shown above, a public-law dispute may bring the civil limb into play if the private-law aspects predominate over the public-law ones in view of the direct consequences for a civil pecuniary or non-pecuniary right. Furthermore, the Court follows the criteria set out in Vilho Eskelinen and Others and applies a general presumption that such direct consequences for civil rights exist in “ordinary labour disputes” involving members of the public service, including judges (ibid., §   62 and Baka , cited above, § 104) . 54.     Indeed, the present case concerned an “ordinary labour dispute” given that it essentially affected (i) the scope of the work which the applicant was required to perform as an employee and (ii) his remuneration as part of his employment relationship (compare Ohneberg , cited above, §   25). Having regard to these two aspects, there is no reason to conclude that there was no “civil” element in the applicant’s dispute or that such an element was insufficiently significant to bring the “civil” limb of Article   6 into play. 55.     Applying the Vilho Eskelinen test further, it is not disputed that domestic law provides for access to a court in the case of claims concerning dismissal from administrative positions in the judiciary. Accordingly, Article 6 applies under its civil head. 56.     It follows that the Government’s preliminary objection as to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be dismissed. 57.     The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.   The parties’ submissions 58.     The applicant submitted that the HCJ did not constitute an “independent and impartial tribunal” owing to the manner of its composition, the subordination of its members to other State bodies and the lack of objective impartiality and the existence of personal bias on the part of some of its members. Furthermore, the obligation to provide an “independent and impartial tribunal” had not been satisfied by the HAC either. 59.     The Government submitted that the requirements of Article 6   §   1 had been met and that there was no indication of bias on the part of the national authorities. They emphasised that the HAC’s judgment had been bas