CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 30 octobre 2018

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TURKEY   (Applications no. 1759/08, 50766/10 and 50782/10)                   JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG     30 October 2018     FINAL   18/03/2019     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Robert Spano, President,   Ledi Bianku,   Işıl Karakaş,   Valeriu Griţco,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Ivana Jelić, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 30 October 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 1759/08) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr İbrahım Özden Kaboğlu and Mr Baskın Oran (“the applicants”), on 10 January 2008 (application no. 1759/08) and 15 July 2010 (applications nos. 50766/10 and 50782/10) respectively. 2.     The applicants were represented by Ms O. Aydın Göktaş, a lawyer practising in Ankara. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent. 3.     The applicants complained, in particular, of infringements of their rights to respect for private life and freedom of expression. 4.     On 26   January 2017 notice of the complaints concerning violations of the applicants’ rights to respect for private life and freedom of expression was given to the Government, and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule   54   §   3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1950 and 1945 and live in İstanbul and Ankara respectively. They are university professors specialising, inter alia , in human rights protection. A.     The facts common to the three applications 1.     The applicants’ appointment to the Consultative Council on Human Rights 6.     On 5 February 2002 the applicants were appointed as members of the Consultative Council on Human Rights (“the Consultative   Council”), a public body answerable to the Prime Minister which was set up under Law No. 4643 of 12 April 2001 and is responsible for providing the Government with opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on the whole range of issues relating to the promotion and protection of human rights. 7.     At its first meeting on 26 February 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Kaboğlu as its chairman. At its second meeting on 9 May 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Oran chairman of the Working Group on issues relating to minority and cultural rights. 2.     Report on minority and cultural rights 8.     On 1 October 2004 the General Assembly of the Consultative Council discussed and adopted a report on minority and cultural rights (“the report”), presented by the above-mentioned working group. On 22   October 2004 the report, as amended by Mr Oran in line with the comments put forward by members of the Consultative Council at the meeting on 1 October 2004, was submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Human Rights Affairs. The report first of all dealt with the concept and definition of and the historical background to the protection of minority and cultural rights in worldwide and in Turkey. It then went on to consider issues relating to the protection of minorities in Turkey, relying on the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, national legislation and practice and the case-law of the higher courts. According to the report, there were two primary reasons for the problematical situation of minorities in Turkey: a theoretical reason tending to define the supra-identity in terms of “race” ( ırk ) and religion as Turkish ( Türk ) and not as Türkiyeli (“coming from Turkey”, “citizen of Turkey”), which resulted in alienating the infra-identities of citizens who do not belong to the Turkish “race” or the Muslim religion; and an historical/political reason stemming from the paranoia ( paranoya ) inherited from the dismantling of the country in the recent past, a syndrome referred to in the report as “the Sèvres syndrome” [1] . 9.     Having explained that the Governments in the 1920s and 1930s had attempted to create a homogeneous and monocultural nation, the report stated that, having regard to the presence in the country of a patchwork of different cultures and identities, and in the light of global developments as regards the organisation of society up until the 2000s, now was the time to revise the citizenship concept and to adopt, like all the European nations, a multi-identity, multicultural, democratic, liberal and pluralist societal model. It consequently proposed rewriting the Constitution and the relevant legislation from a liberal, pluralist and democratic angle, including the participation of the organised fringes of society; guaranteeing the rights of persons laying claim to different identities and cultures to preserve and develop those identities on the basis of equal citizenship; making central and local administrations more transparent and democratic such as to ensure participation and oversight by the citizens; signing and unreservedly ratifying the international treaties laying down the universal standards of human rights, and in particular the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; and, as regards international treaties, discontinuing the practice of entering reservations or interpretative declarations tending to negate infra-identities in Turkey. 3.     Reactions and events following the adoption of the report 10.     Following the publication of the report, several articles were published in broadly ultranationalist newspapers disparaging the text and criticising the applicants. Furthermore, a number of political leaders and senior officials criticised the report and its authors. On 26 October 2004, for example, an MP speaking in the National Assembly used, with regard to the authors of the report in question, expressions such as “hired boffins” ( entel devşirme ), “individuals spitting their venomous saliva”, “people in the pay of foreigners”, “persons who hate the words ‘Turkish   nation’”, “traitors”, “those who want to split up the Republic of Turkey”, and “enemy of the Turks”. The Deputy Prime Minister spoke of a “marginal report by marginal people”, claiming that the authors had drawn it up without informing the Government of its content. The Minister of Justice described the report as “sowing intellectual discord”. The Deputy Chief-of-Staff also criticised the report, declaring that the unitary structure of the State was beyond question. Moreover, the Director of Human Rights at the Prime Minister’s Office questioned the validity of the report by alleging that there had been no quorum when it had been adopted by the Assembly of the Consultative Council. 11.     On 1 November 2004 Mr Kaboğlu, in his capacity as Chairman of the Consultative Council, organised a press conference in order to reply to the criticisms of the report in question. At the beginning of the conference, which was shown on television, an ultranationalist trade unionist, F.Y., who was also a member of the Consultative Council, interrupted the meeting by ripping up a copy of the report in front of Mr   Kaboğlu and saying “this report is fake and unlawful, we will not allow it to be read.” 12.     In February 2005 the Prime Minister’s Office informed the applicants and twelve other members of the Consultative Council that their term of office would end on 5 February 2005. The Consultative Council has not been reconvened by the Government since that date. 13.     On 14 November 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor brought proceedings against the applicants on charges of incitement to hatred and hostility and denigration of the State judicial organs on account of the content of the report. After criminal proceedings lasting some four years and seven months, the applicants were acquitted on the charge of incitement to hatred and hostility; as regards the charge of denigration of the State judicial organs, since the Justice Minister had not consented to the opening of criminal proceedings – a legal precondition for that particular offence – the case was struck off the list. 14.     In that context, the applicants received death threats from ultranationalist groups and individuals by mail and email. In view of the threats and at the request of counsel for Mr   Kaboğlu, the Istanbul Police Department granted him personal protection as from 2007, which protection has been renewed every year since that date. In January 2007 the Ankara police department decided ex officio to task a police officer with protecting Mr Oran. In January 2013 the measure was converted into one of on-call protection. B. Application no. 1759/08: proceedings concerning the articles authored by N.K.Z., B.A. and A.T. 1.     Civil proceedings against N.K.Z. 15.     On 28 October 2004 the daily newspaper Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman published an article by N.K.Z. on the subject of the report on minority and cultural rights. In the article, the author stated the following: “These people should not be considered as   liberal intellectuals. Some of them may be bona fide liberals. But their ringleaders are nothing less than traitors ...; there are no two ways about it: the Turkish nation, the Turkishness of Turkey and the Republic of Turkey are facing all-out treason ...; if [the country’s Turkish majority] begins to growl, shout and roar, the traitors will find no hiding or breathing place ...; you obscurantists ( karanlıkçılar ) who present yourselves as liberal intellectuals ..., you can stick your phoney minorities up your Europe ( siz o uydurma azınlıklarınızı alın da gidin Avrupa’nıza sokun )! ... I would warn some of [those who are going too far] not to play with fire.” 16.     On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the author of the article and the newspaper publishers. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they had sustained on account of the insulting and threatening language used by the author of the article against them. 17.     By judgment of 25 January 2005 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim. The court ruled that the impugned article had not directly targeted the claimants since their names had not been cited, and that it was only to be expected that opinions which had been set out in a scientific report designed to guide government policies, but which had prompted concern about the preservation of Turkey’s unitary structure, should be severely criticised. 18.     On 20 April 2006 the applicants appealed on points of law. They submitted that since the author of the article had referred to their report he had obviously been directing his insults and threats at them and not at any unnamed persons. They further argued that the court’s refusal to condemn the impugned article, which, they submitted, had comprised insults and incited to violence against them, had amounted to an infringement of their right to freedom of expression. 19.     On 14 June 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 10 July 2008. 2.     Civil proceedings against B.A. 20.     On 27 October 2004 the daily newspaper Yeniçağ published an article relaying statements made by B.A., the Chairman of the Public Employers’ Union Confederation, Kamu-Sen , concerning the applicants’ report. B.A. had said: “This report is a real piece of treachery, and those who wrote it should have it ripped to shreds over their heads. Those who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with.” 21.     On 8 November 2004 the daily newspaper Ortadoğu also published B.A.’s statements, including the following: “This   report is the result of a line of thought that has been put about for years with a view to dividing and separating us ... I would appeal to those responsible, and I swear that the price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed.” 22.     On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought civil proceedings against B.A. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they considered they had sustained on account of the insults and threats against them contained in those two statements. 23.     By judgment of 25 July 2006 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim on the grounds that their report was the subject of public debate, that in view of their social status they should tolerate criticism, including virulent critiques, and that B.A.’s statements had remained within the bounds of acceptable criticism. The court also considered that the expression “the price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed” was a popular saying which meant that people could lay down their lives for their country, rather than being a threat to the applicants. Furthermore, the statement “those who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with” was only a criticism of the opinions expressed in the report. 24.     The applicants appealed on points of law. They argued that the impugned statements by B.A. had amounted to a clear and concrete call to violence, and had been intended to intimidate them and single them out as targets. 25.     On 22 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 26 November 2007. 3.     Civil proceedings against A.T. 26.     On 26 October 2004 A.T. published an article in the daily newspaper Yeniçağ including the following passages: “The rapporteur for the second set of Sèvres negotiations, Prof. Dr Baskın Oran ...”, “the treasonous report ( ihanet raporu ) penned by Baskın Oran”, “when the time is ripe, they will be held to account for having prepared a treasonous   report ...” 27.     Another article by A.T., published on 31 October 2004 in the same newspaper, contained the following passage: “... The report, concerning minority and cultural rights, [was drafted by] twenty-four leftist, separatist, subversive [persons] unhappy about the unity of the country [who deserve] the death penalty ...” 28.     On 4 November 2004 the Yeniçağ newspaper published another article signed by A.T. which included the following sentences: “F.Y. vehemently protested against İbrahim Kaboğlu and Baskın Oran, who had prepared and defended a report which might as well be called the ‘report on the second set of Sèvres negotiations’”; “the leaders of the traitor networks say that there are millions of ülkücü [‘idealists’, extreme right-wing activists] ...: so all these people are idiots and you are intelligent, is that it? Kaboğlu’s and Oran’s bad faith has been revealed on many occasions. Irregularities in the operation of the Consultative Council have been exposed. Why do these gentlemen ignore the protests against the irregularities committed during the preparation of this report, [and why] do they prefer to attack those who exercise their right to tear up this bumph dubbed as a ‘report’?” 29.     In another article published on 5 November 2004 in the same paper, A.T. stated the following: “... The lickspittles with their report on minorities and cultural rights are threatening the country’s integrity ... İbrahim Kaboğlu says ‘Atatürk did not say Türk , he said Türkiyeli ’ ... Anyone who goes so far as to hijack the words of Mustafa Kemal shows his bad faith, separatist aims and treachery...” 30.     Another article by A.T., published on 6 November 2004 in Yeniçağ , contained the following statements and expressions: “Within the Prime Minister’s office people are working on dismantling Turkey, and when we intervene we are accused of using brute force ...; be careful, twenty-four persons did vote for this report, but they did not sign it. The traitors are emerging when Turkey is weakened. ... The main pro-Sèvres cheerleader, Kaboğlu, ... was going to present the report to the public ... No one sees the unlawfulness, the deviousness, the betrayal underlying this case. They condemn as brutal F.Y.’s act of snatching the report from the hands of the pro-Sèvres cheerleader and ripping it up. If someone had kicked and punched the pro-Sèvres leader and his treacherous assistants, that would have been brutality. In my view, if those individuals had been beaten up, people would have been relieved. The Sèvres apologists deserved a good thrashing... No punches were thrown, and yet they consider the ripping up of the bumph as a brutal act ...” 31.     On 7 November 2004, A.T. wrote the following in his article published in the same newspaper: “... No one mentions the fact that the intention had been to publish the treasonous document [clandestinely]. They pay scant attention to the treachery, but on the other hand they consider that in tearing up the report F.Y. had committed a brutal act ... just because they sup from the same dog-bowl as İbrahim Kaboğlu and Baskın Oran.” 32.     On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought an action for damages against A.T. and the company owning the newspaper having published the impugned articles. 33.     By judgment of 25 July 2006, the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim on the grounds that the statements in the impugned articles fell within the ambit of the provisions protecting their author’s freedom of expression. The court held that insofar as the report in issue contained virulent criticism of the governments of the Republic and dismissed those who objected to their ideas as paranoiacs, the applicants should also tolerate the same kind of criticism, or indeed even more virulent criticism, short of actual violence. 34.     The applicants appealed on points of law. They complained that the Regional Court had failed to protect them in the exercise of their freedom of expression and had considered that the insults against them had fallen within the ambit of the legal provisions protecting freedom of expression. 35.     By judgment of 12 November 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the impugned judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. In a dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation considered that A.T.’s articles had overstepped the bounds of the right to criticism as protected under the right to freedom of expression, on the grounds that those articles had comprised insulting expressions explicitly targeting the applicants. The judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 2 January 2008. C.     Applications nos. 50766/10 and 50782/10: proceedings relating to S.K.’s article 36.     In an article published in the daily newspaper Akşam on 27 October 2004, S.K. wrote the following on the subject of the applicants’   report: “... After the European Union’s ‘never make any progress’ report of 6 October 2004, it was expected, as a ‘conditioned reflex’, that those in the pay of the wild west ( vahşi batının beslemeleri ), almost all of whom are former ... communists, would follow their masters, and even surpass them. The comparison is perfectly apt. Like little dogs rolling over and wagging their tails when their food is served in their dog-bowls or when [they are promised] a bone, they begin their subtle attacks ... Those who pose as the eyes, ears and spleen of the Trojan horse infiltrating our country, the fools and idiots posing as smart alecs ...; in this report on minorities prepared by this insolent, perfidious and pathetic minority, the losers, who would never have dared commit this type of treason before, are clearly targeting the indivisible integrity of the State and the nation ...; some losers who, their whole lives long, have never got rid of their paranoia about Turks ... designate as ‘Sèvres paranoia’ the watchful and persevering attitude of those who represent the heart, head and intelligence of our nation against the new Sèvres dictates and are attempting to insult them, driven on by their wilfulness; their shared characteristic is apostasy ...; someone has said ‘he who is not a communist at the age of twenty is an ass, and he who is not a capitalist at the age of thirty is the ass’s son’. Being a liboş [a derogatory word for liberals in Turkey] under the auspices of the [European Union] suits these ex-communist apostates perfectly. Just look at this assailant ( baskıncı [2] eleman ) who drew up this scandalous report on minorities on behalf of the Consultative Council on Human Rights ... This is the treacherous dagger which this man, ... disguised as a scientist, and the minority which he is using, has perfidiously stabbed into the heart of the Republic of Turkey and into the unity and peace of our nation...! And there is another man whose life depends on the fact of eating and swallowing; the more dogfood he eats, the more applause he attracts ... A miserable spy and apostate. Are his windows flung open not to the world, but to his stomach? Alongside a Statesman, the miniature poodle aspires to the status of a large poodle. Now he constantly growls. Perhaps he thinks [that if he continues to] bark ever more loudly, his western masters will one day make a man of him. Oh the poor little chap! God has made him a dogfood gobbler. Calm down a little, [you might scratch] the Rolex on your front paw. Carry on anyway with your bird-brain dividing, dismantling and growling. In any case we are not forced to listen to you. The most you will manage to do is tug at the backs of a few trouser legs. We have seen lots of crawlers like you, you know, and how many have we stoned? If someone like you, rootless and without a pedigree, can [bark] at people, how unfortunate for you! Oh crack-voiced, short-breathed bootlicker! Go on then! Waste your saliva! What a pity [you are allowed to] talk, what a shame [you are listened to and people are allowed] to listen to you ...” 37.     On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought an action for damages for insult and defamation against the author of that article and the company owning the newspaper which had published it. 38.     By judgment of 8 June 2006 the Ankara Regional Court upheld the applicants’ claim. Considering that the impugned article overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism and infringed the dignity of the applicants, the court ordered the defendants to pay the latter damages in respect of the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 39.     By judgment of 31 January 2008 the Court of Cassation (4 th Civil Chamber) quashed the first-instance judgment. It found that the first section of the impugned article had consisted of severe criticism of the attitude of Turkish intellectuals to national issues, that the second section on Baskın Oran had amounted to a statement of a critical opinion on the report in question, and that the expressions used in the last section had not concerned the applicants. The Court of Cassation consequently considered that the article in question had comprised not any gratuitous attacks on the applicants but a series of acerbic and virulent critiques of their report, and that it had not overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism. In a separate dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation expressed the view that the first-instance judgment should be confirmed. 40.     On 20 November 2008 the Ankara Regional Court decided not to follow the Court of Cassation’s judgment and to uphold the judgment which it had delivered on 8 June 2006. 41.     On 3 June 2009 the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, upholding the arguments put forward in the cassation judgment of 31   January 2008, set aside the Ankara Regional Court’s judgment. 42.     By judgment of 3 December 2009 the Ankara Regional Court, bound by the judgment of the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers, dismissed the action brought by the applicants. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 28 January 2010. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Additional section 5 of Law no. 4643 43.     Additional section 5 of Law no. 4643 of 12 April 2001 provides: “The Consultative Council on Human Rights, attached to a State Minister appointed by the Prime Minister, is set up in order to ensure dialogue between the State authorities and the relevant civil society organisations and to act as an advisory body on national and international issues relating to human rights. The Consultative Council is composed of representatives of the ministries, public institutions and professional associations concerned by human rights, representatives of civil society organisations working in the human rights field and persons having worked and published in this sphere. The chairman of the Consultative Council shall be elected from among its members. The secretarial services of the Consultative Council shall be provided by the human rights directorate. The Consultative Council shall be financed from the budget of the Private Office of the Prime Minister.” B.     Judgment delivered by the Constitutional Court on 18 April 2018 44.     The Constitutional Court delivered a judgment on an individual appeal lodged by the applicant Baskın Oran (appeal no. 2014/4645) concerning the criminal proceedings brought following that applicant’s complaint about the death threats which he had received after the publication of the report on minority and cultural rights. After those criminal proceedings, which had lasted some five years and nine months, the criminal courts had sentenced the instigator of the threats, opting for the minimum penalty allowed for the offence in question, to one year and eight months’ imprisonment, before staying the delivery of that judgment. Since the criminal proceedings in question had closed on 5 March 2014, that is to say after the entry into force of the law on individual appeal before the Constitutional Court on 23 September 2012 (for the relevant provisions of Law no. 6216 introducing individual appeal before the Constitutional Court, see Hasan Uzun v.   Turkey (dec.), no. 10755/13, § 25, 30 April 2013), the applicant had had the option of lodging an individual appeal with that court in order to put forward his complaints concerning the said criminal proceedings. In his individual appeal the applicant alleged a violation of his rights to life and freedom of expression, arguing that the criminal proceedings in question had not been effective owing to their excessive length and the failure to actually penalise the instigator of the threats. 45.     By judgment of 18 April 2018, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights to life and to freedom of expression on the grounds that the judicial authorities’ reaction to the death threats issued against the applicant had had no deterrent force. As regards the applicant’s freedom of expression, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the positive obligations in the sphere of freedom of expression required States, in particular, to establish an effective mechanism for the protection of writers and journalists in order to create an environment conducive to the involvement in public debate of all those concerned, so that they could voice their opinions and ideas without fear. The Constitutional Court further noted that the applicant had been working on minority rights for much of his career and that he was continuing to work on similar matters. It noted that as regards the judicial authorities’ ineffective investigations into the death threats issued against the applicant on account of his work on minority rights, he had not benefited from an environment conducive to the safe pursuit of that work. Considering that the ineffective judicial investigations and proceedings had had a chilling effect on the applicant’s exercise of his freedom of expression, the Constitutional Court found that in his case the authorities had failed in their positive obligations in relation to freedom of expression. 46.     In the section of its judgment on the relevant international law, the Constitutional Court referred, inter alia, to the judgments in the European Court cases of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (no. 23144/93, ECHR 2000 ‑ III) and Dink v. Turkey (nos. 2668/07 and 4 others, 14 September 2010) in order to clarify the principles relating to the State’s positive obligations in terms of freedom of expression. THE LAW I.     JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 47.     Given the similarity of the three applications in factual and legal terms, the Court decided to join them in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 48.     Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complained that they had been unable to obtain compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained on account of the press articles which they claimed had comprised insults, threats and hate speech directed against them, infringed their dignity and been part of a “lynching campaign” geared to stirring up public feeling against them. 49.     Further relying on Article 2 of the Convention, the applicants alleged, in the framework of application no. 1759/08, that the authorities had failed to take the requisite action to protect them from the lynching campaign against them which had endangered their lives. They explained that it was customary practice in Turkey to intimidate, to frighten, to endanger, indeed to eliminate, persons who had voiced opinions different from that of the majority in society, singling them our as targets, and that various academics and journalists murdered in recent years, such as Fırat Dink, provided concrete examples of that practice. They therefore accused the national authorities of having left them without protection vis-à-vis the hate speech and calls to violence against them set out in the press articles at issue, and of thus having helped encourage the death threats which they had received. 50.     The Court notes that, as regards the applicants’ allegation concerning the authorities’ failure to protect them against the death threats and violent reactions, the applicants have not provided evidence of any possible concrete acts of violence perpetrated against them in the wake of the impugned articles. It reiterates, in this regard, that treatment which does not reach a level of severity sufficient to bring it within the ambit of Articles 2 and 3 may nonetheless breach the private-life aspect of Article 8, if the effects on the applicant’s physical and moral integrity are sufficiently adverse (see Király and Dömötör v.   Hungary , no. 10851/13, § 42, 17 January 2017). It also notes that the only remedy which the applicants seem to have used in the present case was the civil action for damages which they lodged in respect of the impugned articles. 51.     The Court considers that with their complaints under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, the applicants are complaining primarily of the domestic authorities’ failure to protect their physical and moral integrity against the infringement constituted by those articles. It reiterates that, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, the Court is not bound by the characterisation given by the parties. In the present case, having regard to the wording of the applicants’ complaints and the nature of the proceeding which they had brought against the outcome of the latter, the Court considers that the facts in issue should be assessed solely under Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” A.     Admissibility 52.     The Government raised an inadmissibility objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In that regard, they submitted that the applicants had not used their right to publish a reply correcting the articles, which procedure the Government claimed should, in principle, be considered as an effective remedy in cases of allegations of unlawful interference with the right to protection of reputation. The Government referred, in that connection, to a relevant Constitutional Court decision. 53.     The applicants replied that the right to publish a reply did not constitute an effective remedy for them inasmuch as the impugned articles had comprised insults, offensive remarks and threats against them, and not mere erroneous information to be corrected. 54.     The Court reiterates that an applicant must have made normal use of domestic remedies which are likely to be effective and sufficient and that, when a remedy has been pursued, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], no.   2334/03, § 40, 19 February 2009). It also reiterates that according to domestic law as interpreted and implemented by the Constitutional Court, the effective and appropriate remedy in domestic law for complaints of infringements of the right to protection of reputation is a civil action for damages before the civil courts (see Yakup Saygılı v.   Turkey (dec.), no. 42914/16, § 39, 11 July 2017). The Court further observes that the right-of-reply procedure laid down in domestic law for cases of publication of information contrary to the truth or infringing the honour and dignity of persons is an exceptional emergency procedure (see Eker v. Turkey , no. 24016/05, §§   15   and   29, 24 October 2017). 55.     In the instant case, the Court notes that the applicants lodged actions for damages with the civil courts alleging interferences with their private lives on account of the insulting and threatening content of the impugned articles. It further notes that the question which the applicants brought before the domestic courts was not whether factual errors in the impugned articles could be quickly corrected, but rather whether the publication of the articles overstepped the bounds of the freedom of the press and infringed the applicants’ private lives. Finally, it observes that the action for damages brought by the applicants enabled them to seek a finding of the breaches committed by the aforementioned articles of their right to respect for private life and to obtain appropriate compensation. 56.     The Court considers therefore that in the circumstances of the present case, the remedy which would have provided them with optimum redress was indeed the civil action for damages. It follows that the Government’s objection must be rejected. 57.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Parties’ submissions (a)     The applicants 58.     The applicants submitted that their report, which had focused on such issues as minority status, citizenship, identity, equality and the prevention of discrimination, had not been such as to revive the trauma of Turkey’s geographical break-up. 59.     They considered that the State authorities had failed to take all the requisite precautions to protect them against the insulting and threatening writings of ultranationalist authors, who, they claimed, had been encouraged by the criticism levelled at them by a number of political leaders and officials. They added that the impugned articles, which they submitted had contained serious insults and threats rather than mere critical opinions, could not be deemed to have remained within the bounds of freedom of expression. (b)     The Government 60.     The Government submitted that, having regard to the duties discharged by the applicants in the Consultative Council on Human Rights – a public body – and in view of that body’s mission, which was to guide and influence governmental policies in the human rights field, the applicants had held an atypical status akin to that of politicians, and that they could not therefore be considered as ordinary civil servants. Consequently, having regard to the applicants’ duties within an official body attached to the Prime Minister’s office, the Government considered that the applicants should have been more open to criticism. Furthermore, they argued that the criticism prompted by the report prepared by the applicants in the framework of their activities in the Consultative Council had been levelled not at the applicants but at their positions within the Consultative Council – a governmental body operating under the supervision of the Prime Minister’s office. 61.     The Government further argued that the “revolutionary” content of the report on such controversial topics as citizenship, identity, mother tongue and equality, which had been perceived as the expression of the applicants’ ideological stance, combined with alleged irregularities in the adoption of the text, had drawn public attention. They therefore considered that the impugned articles had contributed to a public-interest debate. 62.     Moreover, the Government submitted that the criticisms and comments set out in the impugned articles had amounted to value judgments and that they had not been devoid of any factual basis. They explained that the proposals set out in the report concerning minority status, the definition of citizenship, the concepts of supra- and infra-identity and the issue of the official State language had provided the factual basis for the impugned articles. Furthermore, as regards the factual basis of the criticism levelled at the applicants, the Government referred to statements by certain political leaders to the effect that they had not requested such a report and that irregularities had been committed during the adoption of the text, adding that the applicants’ ideological stance was a matter of public knowledge. The authors of the impugned articles had resorted to some degree of exaggeration, which was permissible for journalists under the Court’s case-law. 63.     The Government further considered that the unfavourable reactions to the applicants had not been caused by the impugned articles but had derived inevitably from the trauma caused by the “dismantling of Turkey” in the recent past. They argued that the authorities had provided the applicants with adequate protection. 64.     Finally, the Government considered that the domestic courts had carried out a balancing exercise compatible with the Court’s case-law, taking into account the contribution of the impugned articles to a public-interest debate, the background to the publication of the articles, the applicants’ positions within the Consultative Council, the radical change of paradigm in public policies adumbrated by the proposals in the report, and the attack which the applicants had allegedly launched in their report against their ideological adversaries by presenting them as paranoid. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 65.     The Court first of all reiterates that the concept of private life is a broad notion which extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name, picture or physical and moral integrity (see Von Hannover v. Germany , no. 59320/00, § 50, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI). The case-law of the Court accepts that a person’s right to protection of reputation is covered by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG v.   Germany [GC], no.   39954/08 , § 83, 7 February 2012; Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 137, ECHR 2015; Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 72, ECHR 2016; and Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v.   Bosnia ‑ Herzegovina [GC] , no. 17224/11, § 76, ECHR 2017). The Court has already ruled that a person’s reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of his or her private life (see Pfeifer v. Austria , no. 12556/03 , § 35, 15   November 2007, and Petrie v.   Italy , no.   25322/12, § 39, 18   May 2017). The same considerations apply to a person’s honour (see Sanchez Cardenas v. Norway , no.   12148/03 , § 38, 4 October 2007, and A. v. Norway , no. 28070/06 , § 64, 9   April 2009). In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG , cited above, § 83; Delfi AS , cited above, §   137; Bédat , cited above, § 72; and Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others , cited above, § 76). 66.     The Court further reiterates that the freedom of the press fulfils a fundamental and essential function in a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others and the need to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest, including those relating to the administration of justice. Thus the national authorities’ margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog” (see, among many other authorities, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 59, ECHR 1999-III; Thoma v. Luxembourg , no. 38432/97, § 45, ECHR 2001-III; and Amorim Giestas and Jesus Costa Bordalo v. Portugal , no. 37840/10, § 25, 3   April 2014). Nevertheless, journalists must act in good faith in order to provide “accurate and reliable” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no.   29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999-I; Radio France and Others v. France , no.   53984/00, § 37, ECHR 2004-II; and July and Sarl Libération v. France , no.   20893/03, § 69, ECHR 2008). That having been said, journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Fressoz and Roire , cited above, § 45, and Mamère v. France , no.   12697/03, § 25, ECHR 2006-XIII). 67.     The Court nevertheless acknowledges that distorting the truth, in bad faith, can sometimes overstep the bounds of acceptable   criticism: a correct statement can be qualified by additional remarks, by value judgments, by suppositions or even insinuations, which are liable to create a false image in the public mind (see, for example, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia , no. 57829/00, § 45, 27 May 2004). Thus the task of imparting information necessarily includes duties and responsibilities, as well as limits which the press must impose on itself spontaneously. That is especially so where a media report attributes very serious actions to named persons, as such “allegations” comprise the risk of exposing the latter to public contempt (see Falakaoğlu and Saygılı v.   Turkey , no. 11461/03, § 27, 19 December 2006). 68.     The Court also reiterates that in the judgments in the cases of Lingens v. Austria (8   July 1986, § 46, Series A no. 10) and Oberschlick v. Austria (( no. 1 ), 23   May 1991, § 63, Series A no. 204), inter alia , it drew a distinction between facts and value judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof, and in that case a requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 of the Convention (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium , 24 February 1997, §   42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I). However, in the case of a value judgment, the proportionality of an interference may depend on whether there exists a sufficient factual basis for the impugned statement: otherwise, that value judgment may itself be excessive (see De Haes and Gijsels , cited above, § 47; Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2) , 1 July 1997, § 33, Reports 1997-IV; Brasilier v. France , no. 71343/01, § 36, 11 April 2006; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, §   55, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV). In order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value judgment it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the remarks (see Brasilier , cited above, § 37), bearing in mind that assertions about matters of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements o