CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 8 novembre 2018

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border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sA30831E3 { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top }     FIFTH SECTION CASE OF HÔPITAL LOCAL SAINT-PIERRE D’OLÉRON AND OTHERS v. FRANCE (Application no. 18096/12 and 23 others – see appended list)           JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 8 November 2018   FINAL   08/02/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hôpital local Saint-Pierre d’Oléron and Others v. France, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Yonko Grozev,   André Potocki,   Síofra O’Leary,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Lәtif Hüseynov,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 8 November 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in twenty-four applications (nos. 18096/12, 53601/12, 23542/13, 32194/13, 39165/13, 39173/13, 39180/13, 39184/13, 49923/13, 57424/13, 58995/13, 59003/13, 68908/13, 68916/13, 68918/13, 76512/13, 76519/13, 76527/13, 76530/13, 5485/14, 23544/14, 30287/14, 46819/14, 46862/14) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by twenty-four legal persons in France (“the applicants”), on various dates between 20 March 2012 and 19 June 2014. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr S. Pappas, a lawyer practising in Brussels. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Alabrune, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the grounds of the enactment of a new law during their judicial proceedings. In applications nos. 18096/12 and 53601/12 the applicants also complained that no reasons had been given in the Court of Cassation’s judgments. 4.     On 11   September 2015 the Government were given notice of the application. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     Origin of the cases 5.     The applicants are institutions which accommodate dependent elderly persons (EHPAD - Etablissements   d’Hébergement pour Personnes Agées Dépendantes ), hospitals incorporating EHPADs, and an association operating reception centre for persons with disabilities. The Unions de recouvrement des cotisations de security social et d’allocations familiales (URSSAF – “Social Security   and Family Allowance Contribution Collection Offices”) constitute a network of private bodies to which a public service has been delegated and which help maintain the social welfare system by collecting and distributing national insurance contributions, which serve to fund the general social security system. The URSSAF network operates under the dual umbrella of the Ministry responsible for Social Security and the Ministry of the Budget. 6.     All the applicants applied to the URSSAF for reimbursement of the employers’ share of the social contributions in respect of their employees, arguing that they had been providing residents in their institutions with home-help services as exempted under Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code (CSS). Paragraph I of that provision exempts from employers’ contributions the remuneration of specific types of home help provided to elderly or disabled persons, where the personnel in question are genuinely employed “for their   personal service, at their home or at the home of members of their families” by six categories of persons. Article L. 241-10 III provided for the same exemption in respect of the remuneration of home-help providers employed by   : (1)   associations and enterprises authorised under Article   L.   129-1 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 44 below) to exercise activities relating to childcare or assistance for elderly or disabled persons; (2) municipal or inter-municipal social welfare centres; (3) agencies which are officially authorised to provide social assistance or have concluded an agreement with a social security body, for the part paid in return for the performance of work in the homes of (“ chez ”) the persons mentioned in section I (see paragraph 43 below). 7.     The applicants’ requests for reimbursement were rejected. They applied to the Social Security Court. Most of the first-instance and appellate courts applied to took the view that the exemption provided for in Article L. 241-10 III only applied to the remuneration of employees working in the elderly person’s private home, and not to those working in an EHPAD, a collective accommodation centre which is not considered as the elderly person’s home for the purposes of Article L.   241-10 CSS. The applicants argued that the word “ domicile ” (“private home”) was not used in paragraph III of Article L. 241-10 CSS but rather the preposition chez (“at the home of”), which, in their view, referred to the place where the elderly person resided, with the accommodation occupied by the residents of EHPADs constituting their “private homes”. 8.     While the first appeal on points of law was pending before the Court of Cassation (application no. 18096/12, see paragraphs 9 et seq. below), the legislature enacted a law, section 14 of which provided that “[i)n the first indent of paragraph III of Article L 241-10 of the Code of Social Security, the words “ chez les ” [“at the home of the”] shall be replaced with the words “ au domicile à usage privatif des ” [“at the private home of the”]. B.     The applications 1.     Application no. 18096/12 9.   The applicant is a public healthcare institution comprising an accommodation centre for dependent elderly persons (EHPAD). This former old age home acquired EHPAD status by concluding an agreement with the Prefect and the President of the Department Council under Article L. 313-12 of the Social Action and Family Code. By letter of 20 May 2008, considering that the EHPAD was the private home of the elderly persons residing in it, the applicant, relying on Article L. 241-10 III CSS, requested exemption from employers’ contributions to the Charente ‑ Maritime URSSAF. It requested the reimbursement of 242,419.56   euros (EUR) in respect of social security contributions which it contended had been unduly paid out of the salaries of members of its staff who were employed to perform home-help work for elderly residents between May 2005 and April 2008. 10.     On 2 June 2008 the URSSAF, and then on 18 December 2008 the Friendly Settlements Board, rejected the applicant’s request on the grounds that “an old people’s home is a collective accommodation centre which is not considered as the elderly person’s private home for the purposes of Article   L.   241-10 CSS”. 11.     The applicant appealed to the La Rochelle social-security appeal tribunal (TASS). It submitted that the accommodation occupied by EHPAD residents constituted their homes for the purposes of Article 102 of the Civil Code (CC), which provides that “the domicile [private home] of a French person, as to the exercise of his civil rights, is at the place where he has his main establishment....”, given that it was their actual and real place of residence, that they were visited by their families there, that they furnished it as they pleased, that it was their residence for tax and electoral purposes and that they received their housing benefits there. 12.     By judgment of 1 December 2009 TASS dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the private home ( domicile ) concept did not extend to collective   accommodation structures: “[Article L. 241-10 III] provides for cases of exemption [from contributions] in conformity with the municipal policy of helping elderly persons to remain in their own homes, “home” meaning the ordinary residence before hospitalisation. The Tribunal notes from this very lengthy article that the exemption applies to home-helps employed under fixed-term contracts, and ordinary acts relating to everyday life. Moreover, exemptions are granted at the request of the (elderly) persons concerned, which was not the case in the present case, since it was the institution that requested exemption. Exemption is allowed only where the ordinary actions relating to everyday life are carried out in the home, which cannot be the healthcare institution. Furthermore, whenever legislation mentions a collective structure accommodating elderly persons, the Social Action and Family Code is only referring to institutions which provide accommodation for elderly persons, and not private homes. The legislature prioritises helping elderly persons to remain in their private homes because that is a better solution for elderly persons, and the exemption in question is, precisely, aimed at encouraging them to remain in their homes, which offsets the dearth of places in institutions. In short, [the applicant] is not eligible for exemption.” 13.     The applicant appealed against that judgment. It complained of the Tribunal’s erroneous interpretation of Article L. 241-10 CSS, arguing that the “private home ( domicile )” concept should be analysed in the light of Article 102 CC, relying on a judgment delivered by the Social Affairs Division of the Pau Court of Appeal on 18 December 2008 to this effect, which judgment had become final in the absence of an appeal on points of law from the URSSAF (see paragraph 46 below). It also referred to judgments delivered by several TASS’s which had relied on Article 102 CC to treat EHPADs as being equivalent to the elderly persons’ private homes, including the Bobigny TASS’s judgment of 16   March 2010 (see paragraph 34 above). The applicant also mentioned the Law of 21 July 2009 reforming the hospital system and concerning patients, health and the regional and local authorities, which provided that “private home” ( domicile ) could mean the place of residence or an institution providing accommodation under the Social Action and Family Code. Finally, the applicant complained of the discrimination exercised by the URSSAF, which accepted that residential homes, which were collective accommodation structures like the EHPADs, were eligible for the exemption even though there was no difference between those two types of institution in terms of the healthcare provided. This, it submitted, created flagrant inequality among elderly persons living in collective accommodation structures. 14.     By judgment of 8 June 2010, the Poitiers Court of Appeal upheld the judgment: “... contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the provisions whose implementation he sought cannot apply to the actual staff of the retirement home, whose purpose is, precisely, to accommodate dependent elderly persons while providing them with all the services necessary for their survival, whereas the provisions clearly concern outside employees working in elderly persons’ homes with a view to enabling them to remain autonomous in their own or their relatives’ homes or in a residential home, which provides a limited set of collective services, by supplying them with personal services which do not exist in their homes for everyday actions which they cannot carry out on their own. It should be added that [the applicant] is not empowered to provide social assistance under the aforementioned provisions because, given that the fact that the residents are in receipt of welfare assistance in defraying their accommodation expenses in the retirement home does not confer on it the status of ‘home-help employer’.” 15.     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a single four-pronged ground of appeal it alleged a violation of Article L.   241 ‑ 10 III CSS and Article 102 CC, criticising the trial judges for having concluded that: -     it was a body empowered to accommodate persons benefiting from social assistance and not a body empowered to provide social assistance even though those two designations were synonymous; -     elderly persons could not have their “private home” ( domicile ) at the hospital; -     the exemption did not apply to the retirement home staff; -     only the elderly persons in question could apply for the exemption, and not the institutions as such. 16.     On 21 December 2010, when the appeal on points of law was still pending, Law no. 2010-1594 of 20 December 2010 on social security funding for 2011 (hereafter “the 20 December 2010 Law”) was published in the Official Gazette of the French Republic (Official Gazette no. 295 of 21   December 2010). Section 14 of that Law provided: “in Article   L.   241-10 III (1) of the Code of Social Security, the words “at the home of” shall be replaced with “at the private home of”. 17.     In the meantime that Law had been referred to the Constitutional Council by Deputies who considered that by ruling out the impugned exemption of persons residing in institutions, section 14 of the 20 December 2010 Law was in breach of the equality principle. Conducting a preliminary review, by decision of 16   December 2010 as reasoned below, the Constitutional Council declared section   14 cited above in conformity with the Constitution:                          “... Considering that the exemption from employers’ contributions provided for in Article   L. 241-10 of the Social Security Code is intended to enable dependent persons to continue to live in their own homes; that making entitlement to such exemption dependent upon the private nature of the home of the beneficiary of the said assistance is directly linked to the purpose of that Article; that, therefore, the provisions of Article 14, reiterating that purpose, do not infringe the principle of equality before the law”. 18.     In its defence pleadings lodged on 29 December 2010 before the Court of Cassation, the URSSAF emphasised that the aim of the exemption provision was to enable elderly persons to continue to live at home. It relied on the interpretative nature of section 14 of the 20   December 2010 Law, which was aimed solely at confirming that the exemption from contributions did not apply to persons employed by institutions providing collective accommodation for dependent persons and preventing the latter from misusing the provisions of Article L. 241-10 III CSS. The URSSAF pointed out that the 20 December 2010 Law was an interpretative law and that section 14 was directly applicable to the ongoing proceedings, including those before the Court of Cassation. 19.     In his report entitled “In view of the non-admission of the appeal on points of law in the absence of any arguable grounds of appeal”, the reporting judge argued, first of all, that the interpretation of the initial text by the trial judges had been consistent with the legislature’s intentions, and, secondly, that by providing a definition of “private home” ( domicile ) for the purposes of the impugned text, the legislature had clearly wished to confer an interpretative nature on section 14 of the 20   December 2010 Law, rendering that decision applicable before the Court of Cassation. The reporting judge concluded his report as follows: “[c]onsequently, the decision taken by the Court of Appeal cannot be validly challenged by an argument which has become ineffective, such that the appeal on points of law cannot be allowed”. The Advocate General’s opinion concluded that the appeal on points of law should be dismissed: “The dispute is based on the interpretation of the provisions of Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code concerning exemption from the employer’s social security contributions relating to home help, in the version in force at the material time. Are those provisions applicable to persons in a retirement home, the aim of which is, precisely, to accommodate dependent elderly persons who have not remained in their personal, private homes, while providing them with all the services necessary for their survival? The question is based on the interpretation of the text: the parliamentary debates on the occasion of the discussion of the [20 December 2010] Law ... clearly establish the grounds on which the legislature intended to amend the text. It should be remembered that from the outset, the law had been designed to enable elderly dependent persons to continue living in their private homes and that some individuals, by applying for the assistance in question ‘blatantly distort the spirit of the law ...’. Since the amendment effected by the words ‘at the   private home of the’ replacing the words ‘at the home of’ are interpretative, it perfectly reflects the meaning of the version of the text in force at the material time in the present case. We are dealing, precisely, with a law which ‘confines itself to recognising, without innovating, an existing law which had been rendered potentially controversial because of an imperfect definition’ (Civ., 9 December 2008, no.   08-10.061).” 20.     In its reply, the applicant submitted that that law was not interpretative but had effected an amendment, to the extent that it had changed the original wording of the impugned provision to confer a different meaning on it. It pointed out that in the version prior to the enactment of the 2010 Law, Article L. 241-10 III had never prompted any controversy and that the Court of Cassation had never ruled on the EHPADs’ eligibility for the exemption in question. Therefore, intervention by the legislature to influence ongoing disputes had been unjustified. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant stated that section 14 of the 20 December 2010 Law had clearly and explicitly pointed to interference by the legislature with the course of justice in order to influence the judicial processing of a case by depriving of its legal basis the action which had been brought before that Law had entered into force, in breach of the principle of the separation of powers and the right to a fair trial. It took the view that there was no public-interest imperative to justify that interference in the administration of justice, given that the purpose of section 14 was to ensure that the State, through the intermediary of the URSSAF, could eliminate any risk of a finding against it. The applicant’s reply did not comprise any arguments under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1. 21.     By judgment of 22 September 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law in the following terms: “However, whereas the judgment notes that Article L. 241-10 III ... provides that the remuneration of home-helps who are employed under the conditions set out in that text are exempted from employers’ contributions in respect of the part paid for work performed at the homes of the persons mentioned in paragraph I of the same Article; Whereas the Court of Appeal rightly deduced from that fact that the exemption could only apply to remuneration for employees working in the elderly person’s private home and its decision was justified in law on those sole grounds ...” 2.     Application no. 53601/12 22.     The applicant, a public institution, runs the “Le Bon Accueil” retirement home. The latter acquired EHPAD status by concluding an agreement with the Prefect and the President of the Département Council. By decision of 31 October 2008 the applicant’s claim for the reimbursement of the sum of EUR 120,655 in respect of the impugned employers’ contributions was rejected by the URSSAF. The latter relied on two ministerial letters of 26 August 1987 and 22 June 1993 stating that no collective accommodation structures were eligible for the exemption in question apart from residential homes, on the grounds that the “private home ( domicile )” criterion had not been met. 23.     By judgment of 12 April 2010 the Ain Département TASS dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. By judgment of 23 December 2010 the Lyon Court of Appeal upheld that judgment: “... The parties disagree solely on the question whether a retirement home can be considered as a private home ( domicile ). Article 102 of the Civil Code defines the home ( domicile ) as the principal place of residence. Elderly persons permanently accommodated, on a non-temporary basis, in a retirement home do indeed have their home ( domicile ) in that institution within the meaning of the Civil Code. However, the legislation on exemption from national insurance contributions clearly refers to an interpretation of ‘home ( domicile )’ which is completely different from the legal concept as defined in the Civil Code. Indeed, Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code explicitly refers to Article L. 7231-1 of the Labour Code as regards the type of activity entitling legal or natural persons to exemption; however, that provision governs assistance for elderly persons who require personal help at home or mobility assistance in their local area to help them continue to live in their private homes. The persons accommodated in the ‘Le Bon Accueil’ retirement home, a   public institution, sign a residence contract which is subject to the provisions of the Social Action and Family   Code; Article L. 231-4 of that code provides that ‘any elderly person who cannot be properly assisted at home may be placed ... either in a healthcare institution or in a public medical institution or retirement home, or failing that, in a private institution.’ Therefore, where elderly persons are concerned, the ‘remaining at home’ concept is completely different from with the ‘institutional placement’ concept. [The applicant] does not help elderly persons to remain in their private homes, it accommodates them; it is therefore ineligible for exemption from national insurance contributions ...” 24.     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In its single ground of appeal it submitted that only the version as it stood after the 19 December 2007 Law was applicable to the dispute (see paragraph 43 below), and not the 20   December 2010 Law (mistakenly designated in submissions as Law no.   2010 ‑ 1657 of 29 December 2010 on the 2011 budget). It added that the new law could not have been interpretative in nature, justifying its retroactive application to ongoing proceedings, because it replaced the conditions for exemption set out in the previous law with more restrictive ones, which previous law had not required the existence of an exclusively private home ( domicile ) as a condition for granting exemption from contributions. The applicant thus emphasised that “even   supposing that the Court of Appeal had implicitly intended to hide behind the interpretative nature of the 29 December 2010 Law [ sic ] in order to apply to the present case the provisions of Article L. 241-10 III CSS in the version as amended by that Law, the impugned decision would be in breach of Article 2 of the Civil Code read in conjunction with Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”. 25.     In his report, the reporting judge set out the following observations: “As stated in the supplementary memorial, it is incumbent on the Court of Cassation to determine the question of principle concerning the scope of the provisions of Article L. 241-10 III of the Code of Social Security as it stood prior to the amendments effected under the 20 December 2010 Law (also erroneously referred to as Law no. 2010-1657 of 29   December 2010 on the 2011 budget). The question was whether the exemption from employers’ contributions vis-à-vis the remuneration of persons providing home-help services to dependent elderly persons was applicable to the wages of EHPAD employees. The Second Civil-Law Division, being called upon to determine that question in a dispute between the Saint-Pierre d’Oléron local hospital, which comprises an EHPAD, and the Charente-Maritime URSSAF, gave its decision in a judgment of 22   September 2011 (no. 10-19.954), which is currently being published. In that judgment dismissing the institution’s appeal on points of law, the Court of Cassation approved the Court of Appeal’s deduction from Article L. 241-10 III, in the version applicable to the present case, to the effect that the exemption only applied to the remuneration of employees working in elderly persons’ private homes. Having regard to that determination, the present appeal on points of law cannot be admitted, in the absence of any arguable grounds of appeal.” 26.     By judgment of 16 February 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible. 3.     Applications nos. 23542/13, 32194/13, 39165/13, 39173/13, 39180/13, 39184/13, 49923/13, 57424/13, 76512/13, 76527/13, 76519/13, 76530/13, 46862/14 and 46819/14 27.     All the applicants’ requests for exemption from employers’ contributions under Article L.   241 ‑ 10   III CC were dismissed by judgments which were subsequently upheld by the appellate courts. They lodged no appeals on points of law in view of the decision of the Court of Cassation in application no. 53601/12 declaring the appeal inadmissible (see paragraph 26 above). 4.     Applications nos. 58995/13 and 30287/14 28.     In application no. 58995/13 the applicant’s request for exemption from employers’ contributions was dismissed. In its ground of appeal it had argued that the legislature’s interference in the administration of justice was incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It did not rely on Article 14 of the Convention. By judgment of 14 March 2013 the Court of Cassation dismissed its appeal on points of law as follows: “Whereas, however, Article L. 241-10 III of the version of the Code of Social Security applicable to the dispute ... only applies to the remuneration of employees working in such persons’ private homes, to the exclusion of non-private or collective premises occupied in an institution ...; And whereas the Court of Appeal noted, in reply to the ground of appeal without going into detail on the parties’ arguments, and using a literal interpretation of the word ‘ chez ’ (at the home of), and leaving aside partly ineffective but obiter grounds, on the one hand, that the institution managed by the hospital was a collective accommodation structure, implying that the service provided was not aimed at enabling persons to remain in their private homes, and that the official residence of the persons accommodated in the EHPAD corresponded to a collective ‘domicile’ rather than an individual home as in the case of a private dwelling which had been purchased or rented; that it had thus legally justified its decision under Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code, devoid of any failure to respect Article 6 of the Convention ..., any infringement of the legitimate expectation protected by Article 1 of the additional protocol to the same Convention, or any retroactive application of section 14 of Law no. 2010-1594 of 20 December 2010 on the social security budget for 2011 in breach of Article 2 of the Civil Code ...;” 29.     The applicant in application no. 30287/14 is an association managing a nursing home for adults with disabilities. By judgment of 20   May 2011 the Ille-et-Vilaine Département TASS rejected its claim for the reimbursement of the impugned contribution on the grounds that it was a collective structure which did not provide assistance to ensure that the persons in question could continue to live in their homes. The tribunal argued in that regard that the situation of a resident in the nursing home was very different from that of a person residing in a residential home, which type of accommodation pursued the aim of enabling persons to remain at home, which the exemption from the employers’ contribution was, precisely, geared to encouraging. By judgment of 19 June 2012 the Rennes Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, emphasising the specific features of the different types of home help: “...the fact that this exemption applies to home-helps working in residential homes ... does not amount to discrimination inasmuch as the conditions of accommodation in residential homes differ from those in such an accommodation structure as a nursing home ... in that, although it is indeed a type of collective residence, it comprises both private premises and shared areas earmarked for community living, whereby the occupants hold tenancy agreements”. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law relying on grounds of appeal concerning the violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. By judgment of 10 October 2013, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law as follows: “Whereas, however, by considering, for the application of Article L. 242-10-III, that eligibility for the exemption in respect of the remuneration of a home-help, the latter term refers to work in a private home ( domicile ), on the one hand, that those provisions, which are aimed at exempting employers from contributions, must be seen solely in the framework of the legislature’s desire to encourage persons with disabilities to remain in their homes by affording them the necessary assistance to retain their personal autonomy and prevent their accommodation in a collective structure, and on the other hand, that the word ‘ chez ’ (‘at the home of’) and the requirement on stating the address implies home-help work in a private home, whereas, when the person must be provided for in a collective accommodation structure, even if he or she has an individual bedroom, the work performed by the employees of the accommodation structure amounts to services provided to the person and not at the home of the person, the Court of Appeal quite rightly decided that the association was not eligible for the exemption requested; ...”. 5.     Applications nos. 59003/13, 68916/13 and 5485/14 30.     The applicants in applications nos. 59003/13 and 68916/13 lodged appeals on points of law without relying on a violation of their right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 or of the rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 14 of the Convention. By judgment of 14 March 2013 (no. 12-12.280) the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant in case no. 59003/13. By judgment of 25 April 2013 (no. 12-19.614) the Court of Cassation declared the appeal lodged by the applicant in case no. 68916/13 inadmissible. 31.     The applicant in application no. 5485/14 lodged an appeal on points of law, failing to submit any ground of appeal concerning a violation of the Convention, apart from complaining of a misinterpretation by the court of appeal of the CSS provision applicable at the material time. By judgment of 11 July 2013 (no. 12-20.583) the Court of Cassation dismissed his appeal on points of law. 6.     Applications nos. 68908/13 and 68918/13 32.     As regards application no. 68908/13, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against a judgment delivered by the Grenoble Court of Appeal. It relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. By judgment of 25   April 2013 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible. 33.     The applicant in application no. 68918/13 lodged an appeal on points of law alleging a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. By judgment of 25 April 2013 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible. 7.     Application no. 23544/14 34.     By judgment of 16 March 2010 the Bobigny TASS allowed the applicant’s request for exemption from employers’ contributions as follows: “... the preposition ‘ chez ’ (‘at the home of’) refers to the concept of the person’s private home ( domicile ). Therefore, the ‘private home’ concept is ‘a condition for the exemption provided for in Article   L.   241-10 III of the Social Security Code. Consideration should accordingly be given to whether the ‘private home’ condition has been met in the present case. In the present case [the applicant] ... accommodates elderly residents requiring the help of third persons, offering them a healthcare programme aimed at preventing and treating impairments, and a ‘life project’ geared to limiting the social disadvantages of the loss of autonomy. Having regard to their age and level of dependency, the residents of [the applicant] can no longer remain in their original private homes. The residents have all signed an indefinite residence agreement with the retirement home, and take their meals in the institution, where they also sleep, are visited by their relatives and conduct most of their everyday activities. Furthermore, the elderly persons residing in the retirement home ... are resident for tax purposes in the rooms which they occupy there. Similarly, they receive and send their mail at/from their address at the retirement home ... and the address on their polling cards is that of the institution. The fact of their residing in the EHPAD entitles them to housing allowance payable for dwellings occupied as their habitual place of residence. That being the case, there can be no doubting the residents’ intention to live there or the fact that the EHPAD is their permanent place of abode. Moreover, Article 2 of the Charter of the Rights and Freedoms of Dependent Persons provides that any elderly person who has a disability or is dependent must be able to choose a living environment – an individual or collective home – appropriate to his needs and expectations. The Charter also lays down that where an elderly dependent person lives in an institution, the latter becomes his new private home ( domicile ). Thus [the applicant] has produced evidence to show that the beneficiaries of the impugned services have established their private home ( domicile ) in its institution for the accommodation of elderly dependent persons in order to make it their principal place of abode. The URSSAF refuted the concept of a domicile as defined in Article 102 of the Civil Code on the basis of the ministerial letter of 26 March 1993 distributed via ACOSS [ Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale ] circular of 22 June 1993, of a ministerial letter of 26 August 1987 and of a collective letter of 16 December 2008. Those circulars have no statutory force. Furthermore, the 1993 circular rules out the application of the provisions of Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code to retirement homes, thus adding to the legal provisions. Article L. 241-10 III ..., which is clear and brooks no interpretation, provides for no exclusion from its scope in respect of services provided to elderly dependent persons in collective accommodation. Consequently, since [the applicant] constitutes its residents’ private home ( domicile ), the exemptions from contributions laid down in Article L. 241-10 III of the Social Security Code are applicable to it. ...” 35.     By judgment of 28 June 2012 the Paris Court of Appeal set aside the judgment. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law alleging a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. By judgment of 19 September 2013 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Background to the mechanism for helping elderly and disabled persons to continue to live at home, as described by the Government 36.     According to the Government, the system for helping elderly and disabled persons to remain at home by exempting employers from their insurance contributions in respect of the salaries of home-helps was introduced under section 38 of Law no. 87-39 of 27 January 1987 concerning various emergency measures. Initially, the exemption only applied to home-helps recruited directly by the persons benefiting from their services. 37.     Law no. 93-121 of 27 January 1993 partly extended the exemption mechanism to home-helps employed by associations approved under Article L. 129-1 of the Labour Code, associations exclusively responsible for providing services to private individuals at home and approved agencies providing social assistance or having concluded an agreement with a social security organisation. The exemption was limited to 30% of the employers’ social security contributions. 38.     Law no. 98-1194 of 23 December 1998 on the social security budget for 1999 revised Article L. 241-10 of the Social Security Code, which had been amended several times since 1987, in order to clarify it, and in particular to harmonise the exemption mechanism without discriminating between home-helps employed under private agreements by the beneficiaries of the service and those employed by agencies placing them at the elderly persons’ disposal. That law was also designed to extend access to the exemption to municipal and inter-municipal social welfare centres. 39.     The law was nevertheless revised with the initial aim of the mechanism in mind, that is to say to ensure that elderly persons could continue to live in their homes. The ministerial letters of 26 July 1987 and 26 March 1993 reiterated that in order to qualify for the exemption from social security contributions, the persons concerned had to remain in their homes, which ruled out collective accommodation in nursing homes. 40.     Both before and after the 23 December 1998 Law, therefore, exemption from contributions exclusively concerned the remuneration of home-helps working in elderly persons’ private homes. 41.     After the modification of Article L. 241-10 III under the 26   July 2005 Law, which was essentially aimed at standardising home-help and personal assistance services, the meaning of the provision was once again further clarified. 42.     Thus, Letter 2008-262 of 16 December 2008 from the “ Direction de la réglementation du recouvrement et du service ” (DIRRES – Department regulating recovery and service) pointed out that the legal provisions on exemption from contributions for the employment of home-helps did not apply to any collective structures apart from residential homes, and that the legislature’s aim had been to enable the person to remain in his or her personal home in order to offset the shortage of available and affordable places in the collective accommodation sector. B.     Article L. 241-10 CSS 43.     The version of Article L. 241-10 of the Social Security Code as amended by the 19   December 2007 Law, which the applicants consider applicable to the facts of the present cases, reads as follows: Article L. 241-10 “I.- The remuneration of a home-help shall be exempted from employers’ social insurance and family allowance contributions, where such person is actually employed in their personal service, at their private home or at the homes of members of their family, by: (a)     Persons having reached a specific age, observing, for each individual home and for all the remunerations paid, an upper limit on remuneration fixed by decree; (b)     Persons with a dependent child entitling them to the additional allowance for children with disabilities as set out in Article L. 541-1 or to the compensatory benefit under the conditions set out in Article   L.   245-1 III 1 of the Social Action and Family Code. (c)     Beneficiaries: -     either of the compensatory benefit mentioned in Article   L.   245-3 (1) of the Social Action and Family Code; -     or of an increased allowance for dependent persons payable under disability insurance, pursuant to legislation on occupational accidents, under a special social security scheme or under Article L. 18 of the Code of   Military Invalidity   and War   Victims’ Pensions; (d)     persons who find themselves, under the conditions defined by decree, forced to have recourse to the assistance of a third person in performing everyday actions, provided that they have reached the official age established by decree; (e)     persons satisfying the loss-of- autonomy condition set out in Article L.   232-2 of the Social Action and Family Code under the conditions defined by decree. ... With the exception of the case mentioned in indent (a) above, exemption is granted at the person’s request by the body responsible for the recovery of contributions under the conditions established by ministerial decree. Entitlement under those provisions cannot be combined, in the case of the same home-help, with the free-choice-of-childcare complement to early childhood benefit paid in respect of home childcare allowance. II.- Natural and legal persons who have concluded an agreement in conformity with Articles L. 442-1 and L. 444-3 of the Social Action and Family Code on homecare by individuals, for valuable consideration, of the persons mentioned in indents I (a), (c), (d) and (e) of the present article shall be exempted, under the conditions set out in the penultimate indent of paragraph I, from the employers’ contributions to social security and family allowances payable from the remuneration which they pay to those kinship carers. III.- Remuneration of home-helps employed on an indefinite or fixed-term contract to replace employees who are absent or whose contract of employment has been suspended under the conditions set out in Article   L.   122 ‑ 1-1 of the Labour Code by associations and enterprises which are authorised, pursuant to Article L. 129-1 of the Labour Code, to perform activities relating to childcare or assistance to elderly or disabled persons, municipal and inter-municipal social welfare centres and agencies which are officially authorised to provide social assistance or have concluded an agreement with a social security body, for the part paid in return for the performance of work in the homes of the persons mentioned in paragraph I or beneficiaries of domestic assistance services for elderly or disabled persons in respect of legal social assistance or in the framework of an agreement concluded between those associations or agencies and a social security body ...”. 44.     Article 129-1 of the Labour Code as mentioned in Article L. 241-10 III, replaced in July 2010 by a different Labour Code provision, concerns associations and enterprises whose activities include providing assistance to elderly persons, to persons with disabilities and to other persons “who require personal help at home or mobility assistance in their lo