CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 20 novembre 2018

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RUSSIA   (Application no. 44873/09)                 JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   20 November 2018     FINAL   06/05/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Ognevenko v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Dmitry Dedov,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking,   María Elósegui, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 October 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 44873/09) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Aleksey Anatolyevich Ognevenko (“the applicant”), on 28 July 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by the Centre for Social and Labour Rights, a law firm based in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin. 3.     The applicant complained under Article 11 of the Convention about his dismissal from Russian Railways for participation in a strike organised by his trade union. 4.     On 17 January 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Region. 6.     The applicant was a locomotive driver with Russian Railways in the Moscow Region. He was a member of one of the railway workers’ trade unions, Rosprofzhel (“the trade union”). 7.     On 7 April 2008 the trade union entered into negotiations with Russian Railways, seeking a general pay raise and the introduction of long ‑ service bonuses for the relevant staff. As the negotiations failed, the trade union decided to organise a strike. On 25 April 2008 the trade union committee decided that the staff of Russian Railways in two suburban Moscow sectors should participate in the strike as from 4 a.m. on 28   April 2008. The trade union committee’s decision referred to minimum services which would be provided during the strike, although the parties have not made any submissions in this regard. 8.     Russian Railways did not apply to the courts for the strike to be declared unlawful. On 28   April 2008 the applicant took part in the strike. He came to work but refused to take up his duties. The strike caused delays in circulation of the trains in the sector where the applicant worked. 9.     On 9 July 2008 the applicant was dismissed for two breaches of disciplinary rules. The first breach ascribed to him had had no relation to his trade union activities. (A year previously, on 8   June 2007, the applicant had been officially reprimanded for having stopped the train 50 metres after the platform). The second breach was the applicant’s refusal to take up his duties during the strike on 28   April 2008. 10.     The applicant complained to a court that he should not have been dismissed for having participated in the strike organised by his trade union. 11.     On 19 August 2008 the case was heard by the Meschanskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”). The court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant’s dismissal for a repeated failure to properly perform his professional duties. Regarding the applicant’s participation in the strike, the court relied on the Railway Acts of 1995 and 2003 (Articles 17 and 26 (2) respectively – see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). The Acts prohibited strikes of railway workers responsible, inter alia , for the circulation of trains, shunting, and services to passengers. The court stressed that those limitations were aimed at securing safety on the railway and that railway workers were subjected to stricter disciplinary rules than workers in other sectors of industry. The applicant was a locomotive driver; therefore, his work was directly linked to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers. The District Court concluded that the applicant had been precluded from participating in the strike. Relying on a report dated 29 April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor’s Office, the District Court furthermore noted that the strike had caused a number of cancelled and delayed trains which had resulted in “massive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights”. The strike had also “contributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety”. Given the above and the applicant’s earlier transgression, his dismissal had been justified. The District Court did not discuss the question of whether advance notice of the strike had been given or other issues related to the lawfulness of the strike of 28 April 2008. 12.     On 29 January 2009, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court confirmed the judgment of 19 August 2008. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Constitution of Russia (of 1993) 13 .     The relevant provisions are as follows: Article 17 “... 3. The exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms shall not violate the rights and freedoms of other people. Article 30 1. Everyone shall have the right to association, including the right to create trade unions for the protection of his or her interests. ...” Article 37 “... 4. The right to individual and collective labour disputes [involving] the use of methods to resolve them which are established by federal law, including the right to strike, shall be recognised.” Article 55 “... 3. Human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the basis of the constitutional regime [or] the morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other people, [or] to secure the defence of the country and State security.” B.     Labour Code of Russia (of 2001) 14 .     The relevant provisions read as follows: Article 21. Main rights and duties of the employee “An employee shall have the right to: ... resolve individual and collective labour disputes, including the right to strike, in accordance with the procedure set by the present Code [and] other federal laws; ...” Article 81. Discontinuation of a labour contract at the employer’s initiative “A labour contract may be discontinued by the employer in cases of: ... 5) the repeated failure by an employee to fulfil labour duties without justifiable reasons if he has already been reprimanded; ...” Article 401. Conciliation procedures “The order to resolve a collective labour dispute consists of the following stages: examination of the collective labour dispute by a conciliation commission, examination of a collective labour dispute with the participation of a mediator and (or) in a labour arbitration. ... No party to a collective labour dispute has the right to avoid participating in conciliation procedures. ...” Article 409. Right to strike “In accordance with Article 37 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the right of workers to strike as a means of resolving collective labour disputes is recognised. ...” Article 410 “... The employer must be notified in writing about the beginning of a forthcoming strike not later than ten calendar days beforehand. ...” Article 413. Unlawful strikes “In accordance with Article 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, strikes shall be considered unlawful and prohibited: a) during periods when martial law, a state of emergency, or special measures are declared in accordance with legislation on emergency situations; within the organisations and bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [and] other military, militarised and other organisations ... directly involved in national defence, national security, emergency life-saving, search-and-rescue [and] fire-fighting operations and the prevention or management of natural disasters and emergencies; in law enforcement agencies; and in organisations ... directly involved in servicing especially hazardous types of industrial works or equipment and emergency and urgent medical assistance centres; b) in organisations ... directly related to the provision of essential services to the population (energy supply, heating and heat supply, water supply, gas supply, air, rail, and water transportation, communications, and hospitals) in cases where strikes would threaten national defence, State security, and the lives and health of people. ... The right to strike may be restricted by federal law. During a collective labour dispute, a strike shall be unlawful if it was declared in disregard of the time-limits, procedures, and requirements stipulated in the present Code. The decision to declare a strike unlawful shall be made by the supreme court of a republic, territory or region, a court of a city of federal importance, or a court of an autonomous region or district, upon a petition by an employer or prosecutor. The court decision shall be made known to the workers through the body leading the strike, which shall be required to immediately inform the strike participants of the court’s decision. Once it becomes effective, a court decision to declare a strike unlawful shall be subject to immediate execution. Workers shall be required to halt the strike and resume work no later than the day after a copy of the above-mentioned court decision is served on the body leading the strike. If there exists a direct threat to people’s lives and health, a court shall be entitled to postpone an imminent strike for a period of up to thirty days, or to suspend one that has begun for that same period. ...” Article 414. Guarantees and the legal position of workers when a strike is held “A worker’s participation in a strike may not be considered a violation of labour discipline and grounds for terminating his labour contract, with the exception of instances of a failure to fulfil the obligation to halt a strike in accordance with Part 6 of Article 413 of this Code. It shall be prohibited to apply disciplinary measures against workers who participate in a strike, with the exception of the cases stipulated in Part 6 of Article 413 of this Code. ...” C.     Federal Acts on Railway Transport (of 1995 and 2003) 15 .     Federal Law of 25   August 1995 no. 153-FZ “On the Federal Railway Transport” (“the 1995 Railway Act”) was replaced by Federal Law of 10   January 2003 no. 17-FZ “On Railway Transport in Russia” (“the 2003 Railway Act”), with the exception of Article 17, which provides as follows: “Work stoppage as a means of resolving collective labour disputes on the railway is not permitted. Such work stoppages are a serious breach of labour discipline and are subject to disciplinary sanctions.” 16 .     Article 17 of the 1995 Railway Act is to remain in force until the legislature adopt a federal law listing categories of railway workers prohibited from participating in strikes (Part 2 of Article 34 of the 2003 Railway Act). 17 .     The 2003 Railway Act provides as follows: Article 1 . Fundamental principles regarding the functioning of railway transport in Russia “1. Railway transport in Russia is an integral part of the unified transport system of Russia. Railway transport in Russia, in cooperation with organisations [providing] other means of transport, is called upon to ensure, in a timely and thorough manner, the needs of individuals, legal entities and the State in respect of railway transport services, to promote the development of the economy and to support the unity of Russia’s economic territory. ... 3. The functioning of railway transport is based on the following principles: the continuity of the work of the railway transport [services]; the accessibility, safety and quality of the provided services; the development of competition and the achievement of a mature market in railway transport services; the coherence of the functioning of the unified transport system of Russia. ...” Article 26. Labour discipline on public railway transport “... 2. A strike as a means of resolving collective labour disputes by those workers ... whose activities are connected to the circulation of trains, shunting, [the provision of] services to passengers, and of freight services on the public railway service and [those] whose list of occupations is defined by federal law, is unlawful and prohibited.” D.     Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Russia (of 2007) 18 .     On 8   February 2007 the Constitutional Court issued Ruling no.   275 ‑ O-П, which provided, where relevant, as follows: “2. Article 37 § 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation recognises the right to [conduct] individual and collective labour disputes [involving] the use of methods to resolve them which are established by federal law, including the right to strike. A strike is thus considered as a means of resolving a collective labour dispute; the federal legislature has the right to determine when and under what conditions [a strike] is possible and when it is unacceptable, performing the necessary balancing exercise between the protection of the professional interests of employees and respect for the public interests to which the strike could cause damage. The possibility to restrict the right to strike of certain categories of workers, taking into account the nature of their activities and the consequences of work stoppage [on their part], directly arises from Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which stipulates that the exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms should not violate the rights and freedoms of others, and Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, under which human and civil rights and freedoms can be limited by federal law only to the extent that is necessary in order to protect the basis of the constitutional regime [or] the morality, health, rights and lawful interests of others, [or] to ensure the country’s defence and State security. Restrictions on the right to strike do not contravene the generally recognised principles and norms of international law. Thus, it follows from the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 (ratified by the USSR on 18 September 1973) that a prohibition on the right to strike is permissible in respect of members of the armed forces, police and the State administration (Article 8 § 2); in respect of other people restrictions are possible if they are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of State security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Article 8 § 1 (c)). ... 3. Under Article 413 of the Labour Code of the Russian Federation [(“the LC”)], strikes are not allowed in organisations engaged in providing essential services to the population (electricity, heating and heat supply, water supply, gas supply, aviation, railway and water transport, communications, and hospitals) if [such] strikes threaten the country’s defence and State security [or] the life and health of people (§ 1 (b)); the right to strike may be limited by federal law (§ 2). While using the right provided by Article 413 § 2 [of the LC] in order to ensure the normal functioning of this sector of the economy, the federal legislature must at the same time comply with the criteria for restricting the right to strike, which are established in paragraph 1 of the same article and are based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 55 § 3) ... Moreover, in the field of the regulation of labour relationships, the [LC] has priority; other federal laws containing labour-law norms should not contradict its provisions; specific rules reducing the level of guarantees available to employees and restricting their rights may be established only by this Code or in cases and in accordance with the procedure established by it (Articles 5 and 252). Therefore, the federal legislature, introducing by a special law the restriction of railway workers’ right to strike, is bound by the requirements of Article 413 §1 (b) of the [LC] and has the right to ban a strike only when it threatens the country’s defence and State security or the life and health of people. 4. Railway transport is an integral part of the unified transport system of the Russian Federation; it is one of the vital sectors of the economy of the country and its objective is, in cooperation with organisations of other means of transport, to meet, in a timely and thorough manner, the transportation needs of individuals, legal entities and the State, to create conditions for economic development and to ensure the unity of the Russian Federation’s economic territory. The functioning of this mode of transport is based on the principles of the operational continuity, accessibility, safety and quality of the services provided, and the coherence of the functioning of the unified transport system of the Russian Federation (Article 1 of the [2003 Railway Act]). In addition, vehicles used on the railway are a source of higher potential danger. Accordingly, any circumstances that could disrupt the normal functioning of railway transport affect both the interests of individuals and the State; this gives grounds for imposing restrictions on the exercise of the right to strike of certain categories of railway workers, a temporary work stoppage by whom may threaten the country’s defence and State security, and the life and health of people. 5. Thus, Article 26 § 2 of the 2003 Railway Act, read together with Articles 5, 252 and 413 of the [LC], does not imply an unjustified restriction on the right to strike of ... locomotive personnel ... whose activities are related to the circulation of trains and shunting work, and therefore cannot be considered to contradict Articles 17 §3, 37 §4 and 55 §3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. ...” III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS A.     International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (of 1966) (“ICESCR”) 19 .     Article 8 of the ICESCR reads as relevant: “1. The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to ensure: (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; ... (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. 2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State ...” B.     International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) material 1.     ILO principles concerning the right to strike 20.     In its Digest of decisions and principles (fifth (revised) edition, 2006) the ILO Committee of Freedom of Association (“the CFA”) stated as follows in the Section entitled “Right to strike” (the quotations below are provided without the references to specific cases): “541. The Committee has stated on many occasions that strikes at the national level are legitimate in so far as they have economic and social objectives and not purely political ones; the prohibition of strikes could only be acceptable in the case of public servants exercising authority in the name of the State or of workers in essential services in the strict sense of the term, i.e. services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. ... 587. The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: ... – transport generally; ... – railway services; ... 592. By linking restrictions on strike action to interference with trade and commerce, a broad range of legitimate strike action could be impeded. While the economic impact of industrial action and its effect on trade and commerce may be regrettable, such consequences in and of themselves do not render a service “essential”, and thus the right to strike should be maintained. ... 595. Where the right to strike is restricted or prohibited in certain essential undertakings or services, adequate protection should be given to the workers to compensate for the limitation thereby placed on their freedom of action with regard to disputes affecting such undertakings and services. 596. As regards the nature of appropriate guarantees in cases where restrictions are placed on the right to strike in essential services and public services ... should be accompanied by adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings in which the parties concerned can take part at every stage and in which awards, once made, are fully and promptly implemented. ... 621. The transportation of passengers and commercial goods is not an essential service in the strict sense of the term; however, this is a public service of primary importance where the requirement of a minimum service in the event of a strike can be justified. ... 628. Responsibility for declaring a strike illegal should not lie with the government, but with an independent body which has the confidence of the parties involved. ... 666. The use of extremely serious measures, such as dismissal of workers for having participated in a strike and refusal to re-employ them, implies a serious risk of abuse and constitutes a violation of freedom of association.” 2.     Relevant case-law in respect of Russia 21.     In its Report no. 333, March 2004, on case no. 2251 the CFA found in respect of Russia as follows: “993. ... The Committee recalls that the right to strike may be restricted or prohibited: (1) in the public service only for public servants exercising authority in the name of the state; (2) in essential services in the strict sense of the term (that is, services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population); and (3) in the event of an acute national emergency [see Digest, op. cit., paras. 526 and 527]. ... As concerns the abovementioned categories of workers, who, according to the relevant federal laws, cannot recourse to a strike action, the Committee notes that the list includes employees of railway, which does not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Committee therefore requests the Government to amend its legislation so as to ensure that railway employees ... enjoy the right to strike.” 22.     The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (“the CEACR”) similarly reiterated in respect of Russia that the right to strike may be restricted or prohibited only in respect of public servants exercising authority in the name of the State and in essential services in the strict sense of the term – that is to say services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. 23.     The CEACR also reminded Russia that railway transport did not constitute an essential service in the strict sense of the term whereby strikes could be prohibited and that instead, a negotiated minimum service could be established. It continues to request Russia to ensure that railway workers can exercise the right to strike. C.     European Social Charter (revised version of 1995) 1.     General principles concerning the right to strike 24.     The relevant provisions read as follows: Article 6 – The right to bargain collectively “With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Contracting Parties ... ... recognise: 4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike. ...” Article G – Restrictions “The rights and principles set forth in Part I when effectively realised, and their effective exercise, as provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any restrictions or limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health, or morals. ...” Appendix to the Social Charter Article 6, paragraph 4 “It is understood that each Contracting Party may, in so far as it is concerned, regulate the exercise of the right to strike by law, provided that any further restriction that this might place on the right can be justified under the terms of Article G.” 2.     Relevant case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (“the ECSR”) 25 .     In its Digest of the case-law of 1 September 2008, the ECSR stated in the Section “Interpretation of the different provisions” as follows (the quotation below is provided without the footnotes, which contain references to specific cases): 3. Specific restrictions to the right to strike “The rights and principles set forth in Part I when effectively realised, and their effective exercise as provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any restrictions or limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health, or morals. i. Restrictions related to essential services/sectors Prohibiting strikes in sectors which are essential to the community is deemed to serve a legitimate purpose since strikes in these sectors could pose a threat to public interest, national security and/or public health. However, simply banning strikes even in essential sectors – particularly when they are extensively defined, i.e. “energy” or “health” – is not deemed proportionate to the specific requirements of each sector. At most, the introduction of a minimum service requirement in these sectors might be considered in conformity with Article 6 § 4. ...” 26 .     On 5 December 2014 the European Committee of Social Rights reiterated the above principles in its conclusions on the situation in Russia as regards collective action (2014/def/RUS). D.     PACE Resolutions 27.     PACE Resolution 2033 (2015) “Protection of the right to bargain collectively, including the right to strike”, adopted on 28 January 2015, reads, where relevant, as follows: “1. ... The rights to organise, to bargain collectively and to strike – all essential components of this dialogue – are not only democratic principles underlying modern economic processes, but fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163). ... 7. The Assembly therefore calls on the member States to take the following measures to uphold the highest standards of democracy and good governance in the socio-economic sphere: 7.1. protect and strengthen the rights to organise, to bargain collectively and to strike ...” 28 .     PACE Resolution 2146 (2017) on “Reinforcing social dialogue as an instrument for stability and decreasing social and economic inequalities”, adopted on 25 January 2017, provides, where relevant, as follows: “5. ... the Assembly calls on member States to: ... ... 5.4. keep legal limitations on the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike to the strict minimum, as provided for by well-established ILO and European standards; ...” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION 29.     The applicant complained that his dismissal for his participation in a strike had been in breach of Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “ 1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.” A.     Admissibility 30.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Submissions of the parties (a)     The Government 31.     The Government submitted that the right to freedom of association was not absolute and might be subject to restrictions, as provided by Article   11   §   2 of the Convention. They reiterated that, in accordance with the norms and principles of public international law, the right to strike could also be restricted. For instance, Article   8   §   2 of the ICESCR (see paragraph   19 above) allowed the banning of strikes by members of the police, army and State administration, and permitted restrictions on the right to strike of other people when it was necessary in a democratic society. 32.     The Government furthermore submitted that the right to strike was recognised under the Russian Constitution (see paragraph 13 above) and under other legislation, such as the Labour Code. This right might be restricted by federal law in order to balance the conflicts with the public interest. Russian federal laws restricted the right to strike, depending on the nature of the activities of certain categories of occupations. Thus, the right to strike of workers of organisations directly engaged in providing essential services to the population (electricity, heating and heat supply, water supply, gas supply, aviation, rail and water transport, communications, and hospitals) might be restricted, but only if such strikes would threaten the national defence and security, life and health of people. 33.     In particular, Article 26   §   2 of the 2003 Railway Act prohibited participation in strikes by public railway transport workers whose activities were related to the circulation of trains and shunting work, as well as the provision of services to passengers and of freight services. The Constitutional Court of Russia had declared that the above provision did not contravene the Russian Constitution (see paragraph 18 above). Specifically, the Constitutional Court had held that railway transport formed an integral part of the complex, interconnected transport system of the country and that railway transport bolstered the economy and ensured the needs of people, legal entities and the State. Accordingly, any circumstances capable of disrupting the normal functioning of railway transport could affect the interests of the people and the State and thus, justified the restrictions on the right to strike of certain categories of railway workers on whose part a temporary work stoppage could threaten the country’s defence and State security, and the life and health of people. 34.     On the basis of the above the Government concluded that the Russian legislation prohibiting strikes by railway workers had a legitimate aim. In particular, the ban on the right to strike of public railway transport service workers whose activities were connected with the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers and of freight services sought to protect the health, rights and freedoms of other people. 35.     The Government furthermore submitted that the legal provisions regulating the right to strike complied with the Court’s “quality of law” criterion in that they were clear, precise and foreseeable. 36.     Under Article 1   § 3 of the 2003 Railway Act the functioning of railway transport was based on the principles of accessibility, safety and quality of services (see paragraph   17 above). Transport workers had to comply with higher requirements in respect of their professional duties because breaches of discipline in respect of railway transport endangered the life and health of people, the safe circulation of trains and of shunting work, and the preservation of freight, luggage and other possessions, and also led to breaches of contract. In view of the above, Article 26 § 2 of the 2003 Railway Act declared strikes by railway workers whose activities were related to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers and of freight services on the public railway transport service, and whose occupations were defined by federal law, to be unlawful and prohibited. 37.     The Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that Article   26 § 2 of the 2003 Railway Act prohibited strikes not by all railway workers, but only by certain categories – in particular those whose activities related to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers and of freight services on the public railway transport service. The Government conceded that there was still no federal law listing the exact categories of those railway workers whose right to strike was prohibited. However, they claimed that it was obvious that the applicant’s occupation (that of locomotive driver) was related to the circulation of trains, shunting and the provision of services to passengers and that his participation in the strike had thus been unlawful and prohibited. 38.     The Government claimed that the reason why the applicant had been dismissed had been not his participation in the strike, but his failure to perform his work duties. Under Article 81   § 5 of the Labour Code, if a worker deliberately failed or improperly fulfilled his or her professional duties and such failure happened more than once, his contract could be terminated. The applicant had worked as a locomotive driver and his job had been directly related to the circulation of trains, shunting and the provision of services to passengers. Despite the existing ban on his participating in a strike, the applicant had participated in it and had thus not performed his professional duties. As he had committed an earlier transgression, his dismissal after his second failure to perform his professional duties had been lawful. 39.     The Government reminded the Court that the examination of particular circumstances and the assessment of evidence was primarily a task for the national courts and that the Court could only review those courts’ decisions from the perspective of the Convention. They considered that the national courts had properly examined and reasonably dismissed the applicant’s objections relating to both of the incidents that had served as the basis for his dismissal. 40.     The Government also noted that the national courts had verified the proportionality of the penalty imposed (dismissal) to the applicant’s transgressions. According to the report of 29   April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor’s Office, the applicant’s “refusal to perform his work duties [had] resulted in massive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights”. Moreover, he had contributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety”. 41.     Moreover, the Government argued that the applicant had participated in an “action” which was not a strike de jure . The applicant’s trade union did not represent all Russian Railways workers in Moscow and was not entitled to submit claims to their employer on behalf of all the workers. Thus, the employer’s refusal to comply with the trade union’s demands could not be considered as constituting a collective labour dispute. Consequently, the action organised by the trade union on 28 April 2008 in the Moscow section of Russian Railways, could not be deemed to have constituted a strike under the Labour Code. 42.     Given all the above considerations, the Government considered that the State had fulfilled its positive obligations and that the State’s interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 11 of the Convention had been based on law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been proportionate to the offence committed and necessary in a democratic society for protection of the health, rights and freedoms of other people. (b)     The applicant (i)     Existence of interference 43.     The applicant claimed that his dismissal from work for participation in the strike had constituted an interference with his rights under Article 11 of the Convention (see Karaçay v. Turkey , no. 6615/03, § 28, 27   March 2007, and Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey , no. 68959/01, §   24, 21   April 2009). 44.     The applicant asserted that the State had the positive obligation to secure to him the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article   11 of the Convention (see Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 30668/96 and 2 others, § 41, ECHR 2002 ‑ V, and Gustafsson v. Sweden , 25 April 1996, § 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ II). He considered, in particular, that it was the authorities’ primary obligation to enact legislation governing the effective execution of railway employees’ right to strike. However, Parliament had failed to enact a federal law listing those categories of railway workers who were prohibited from participating in strikes under Article 26   §   2 of the 2003 Railway Act. (ii)     Prohibition of the right to strike for certain categories of railway workers is incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention 45.     The applicant reiterated that the Court had held – for instance, in National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (27 October 1975, § 39, Series   A no. 19) – that the Convention safeguarded freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by engaging in trade union action, the conduct and development of which the Contracting States had to both permit and make possible. Article 11 of the Convention nevertheless left each State a free choice as to the means to be used towards this end. The granting of the right to strike represented without a doubt one of the most important of these means, but there were others. Such a right, which was not expressly enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, might be subject under national law to regulation of a kind that limited its exercise in certain instances (see, for instance, Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden , 6 February 1976, § 36, Series   A no. 21). 46.     The applicant disagreed that the prohibition on participating in strikes for certain categories of railway workers was compatible with Article   11 of the Convention. He alleged that the right to strike could be restricted, but not completely prohibited. Furthermore, such restrictions had to be “prescribed by law”, pursue a “legitimate aim” and be “necessary in a democratic society”, as provided by Article 11 § 2 of the Convention and Article 8 § 1 (a) and (d) and § 2 of the ICESCR. The applicant argued that (in violation of Article 26   §   2 of the 2003 Railway Act) no federal law had specified for which categories of railway workers strikes were prohibited and unlawful. In any event, the applicant asserted that the right to strike of the railway workers and locomotive drivers could not be restricted to such an extent as to impose a blanket prohibition (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, §   82, ECHR 2005 ‑ IX). The applicant submitted that the Russian courts should have examined the particular circumstances of his case, such as specific nature of his duties (see, for instance, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §   107, 12   November 2008), whether his participation in the strike had indeed affected the railway traffic and whether it had been possible to replace him by other workers not participating in the strike. (iii)     The interference was not prescribed by law and had no legitimate aim 47.     With reference to the Court’s principles set out in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen (cited above, §   26) the applicant claimed that the interference with his rights under Article 11 had not been prescribed by law. In particular, Article   55   §   3 of the Russian Constitution (see paragraph 13 above) stipulated that constitutional rights could be restricted only by federal law to the extent necessary to protect the constitutional regime or the morality, health or the rights or interests of others. While the right to strike was a constitutional right set out in Article 37   of the Russian Constitution, no federal law provided an exact list of those categories of railway workers whose right to strike was prohibited. As no such federal law existed, any sanctions or penalties for participation in strikes applied to locomotive drivers (including the applicant) had no legal basis and were arbitrary. 48.     The applicant furthermore asserted that the strike of 28   April 2008 had been organised in compliance with the requirements of Article 413 of the LC. In particular, he claimed that the strike had been lawful under Article   413   § 1 because it had not threatened the country’s defence and State security or the life and health of people. The applicant could not agree with the Government that any circumstances affecting regular train circulation and infringing someone’s interests would necessarily threaten the country’s defence, State security or the life and health of people and would thus justify a ban on certain categories of railway workers’ right to strike. The applicant alleged that the Russian authorities had failed to demonstrate and provide any solid evidence of the alleged threat to the country’s defence, State security, or the life and health of people posed by strikes by locomotive drivers in general and by the strike of 28   April 2008 in particular. As regards the latter, the applicant noted that the strike of 28   April 2008 had started at 4   a.m. By the time the applicant had arrived at his place of work at 10.30 a.m., the locomotive drivers participating in the strike had been already replaced by replacement drivers. Thus, the applicant believed that his participation in the strike had not affected railway traffic, as traffic controllers had had an opportunity to replace him with other workers. 49.     The applicant also stressed that the employer could have contested the lawfulness of the strike before a court, as required by Article 413 of the   LC, but failed to do so. 50.     He thus concluded that the strike itself and his participation in it had been lawful and that his dismissal had consequently not been in accordance with the law. 51.     On the basis of the lack of any evidence of the alleged threat to the country’s defence, State security or the life and health of people posed by strikes, the applicant also considered that the restriction on his right to strike had had no legitimate aim. (iv)     The interference was not necessary in a democratic society 52.     The applicant reiterated that the test of necessity in a democratic society required the Court to determine whether the interference complained of had corresponded to a “pressing social need”, whether it had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it had been relevant and sufficient (see, for instance, Federation of Offshore Workers’ Trade Unions and Others v.   Norway (dec.), no. 38190/97, ECHR 2002-VI). The applicant considered that his dismissal from work had not been proportionate to his participation in a lawful strike. He also relied on the ILO CFA