CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 mars 2019

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CYPRUS   (Application no. 47920/12)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   26 March 2019     FINAL   26/06/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Haghilo v. Cyprus, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Branko Lubarda,   Helen Keller,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides,   María Elósegui, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 5 March 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 47920/12) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Iranian national, Mr Mustafa Haghilo (“the applicant”), on 9 October 2012. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms N. Charalambidou, a lawyer practising in Nicosia. The Cypriot Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Clerides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus. 3 .     A request was made that the Court, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, adopt an interim measure to prevent the applicant’s threatened deportation to Iran; that request was refused on 2 August 2012. 4.     The applicant alleged that his detention had been unlawful and that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal via which to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. He furthermore complained about the conditions of his detention in the detention facilities at the former Famagusta police station in Larnaca (“the Famagusta police station”), at Paphos Central police station (“Paphos police station”) and at Aradippou police station. He relied on Articles 3 and 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 5 .     On 7 September 2015 the above complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the applicant’s complaints (including those concerning the conditions of his detention at a fourth police station –namely Larnaca police station) were declared inadmissible, pursuant to Rule   54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently living in Armenia. 1.     The applicant’s first arrest and his detention from 28 March 2011 until 22 December 2011 7.     The applicant left Iran in March 2011 and travelled to Turkey. He entered Cyprus unlawfully through the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) on 21 March 2011. 8 .     On 28 March 2011 the applicant was arrested at Larnaca airport as he attempted to take a flight to London on a forged Romanian passport. He was arrested for the offences of (i) circulating a forged document (sections 331, 333, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154) – see A.H. and J.K. v.   Cyprus , nos. 41903/10 and 41911/10, § 114, 21 July 2015), (ii)   impersonation (section 360 of Cap. 154; ibid.) and (iii) unlawful entry into the Republic (section 12(1), (2) and (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105, as amended) – see Seagal v. Cyprus , no.   50756/13, §§ 91 and 93, 26 April 2016). He was placed in detention at Nicosia central prisons. 9.     On 29 March 2011 the applicant appeared before the Larnaca District Court, which ordered his detention on remand for three days. 10.     On 31 March 2011 criminal charges were brought against him (case no. 5220/2011). The Larnaca District Court adjourned the case until 5 April 2011 and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until that date. 11.     On 31 March 2011, however, the Attorney General decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings and gave instructions for the applicant to be deported. 12 .     In a letter dated 4 April 2011 sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Larnaca Police to the Aliens and Immigration Service, the issuance of deportation and detention orders against the applicant was recommended in order to ensure that the applicant would not abscond following the expiration of the detention order issued by the Larnaca District Court. 13 .     On 4 April 2011 detention and deportation orders were issued by the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior under section 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105) on the grounds that the applicant was a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of sections 6(1)(k) and   (l) of that law (see paragraph 97 below). A letter from the Ministry of the Interior dated 4 April 2011 was addressed to the applicant informing him (i) that he was an illegal immigrant under the above-mentioned provisions on the grounds of illegal entry and (ii) of the decision to detain and deport him. 14.     On that letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that the letter was served on the applicant on 5 April 2011 at 12:05 p.m. but that he refused to sign for it. 15.     The police also ascertained at the time that the applicant did not have a valid passport. 16.     The applicant was transferred to the holding facility for immigration detainees at Famagusta police station. 2.     The applicant’s asylum claim and all relevant proceedings 17.     On 12 April 2011, while in detention, the applicant applied for asylum. 18.     In view of that development, on 14 April 2011, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to suspend the deportation order pending the examination of the applicant’s asylum application. 19.     The application was dismissed by the Asylum Service on 30 April 2011. 20.     On 5 May 2011 the applicant was served with a letter informing him of the above decision, but he refused to sign for it. 21 .     On 1 June 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (“the Reviewing Authority”) against the Asylum Service’s decision. This was dismissed on 10 August 2011; the applicant was served with the relevant decision on 17 August 2011. 22.     On 21 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Paphos police station. 23 .     On 10 October 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (“judicial review proceedings”; recourse no.   1320/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article   146 of the Constitution, challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority. 24.     On 13 October 2011 the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service re-examined the applicant’s case and recommended that the authorities proceed with the applicant’s deportation following the dismissal of his asylum application by the Reviewing Authority (see paragraph 21 above). Bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, the Director decided that the principle of non-refoulement was not an obstacle to his removal. 3.     Habeas corpus proceedings 25.     On 9 November 2011 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application (application no.133/2011) with the Supreme Court (as the first-instance court) challenging the lawfulness of his detention owing to the length of its duration. 26.     On 11 November 2011 the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior instructed the police to proceed with the applicant’s deportation. According to an internal note subsequently sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to the Attorney General, the applicant’s deportation had not been possible as the applicant had not had a valid passport and had not co-operated with the authorities in order to secure one. 27.     On 25 November 2011, while the habeas corpus proceedings were pending, Amending Law   no.   153(I)/2011 to the Aliens and Immigration Law (transposing into national law Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Members States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals – “the EU Returns Directive” (see paragraph 100 below)) came into force. 28 .     On 29 November 2011 the Minister of the Interior decided to extend the applicant’s detention for up to eighteen months on the basis of section   18   ΠΣΤ(8)(α) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, as amended by Law no.   153(I)/2011 (see paragraphs 100 and 101 below). 29 .     On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered his immediate release. With regard to the preliminary issues raised, the Supreme Court firstly held that it had the authority to examine the application, as it had been called upon to examine the lawfulness of the applicant’s protracted detention and its extension, and not the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders. The Aliens and Immigration Law expressly provided that habeas corpus applications challenging the lawfulness of detention with a view to deportation could be lodged with the Supreme Court on length grounds. 30 .     The Supreme Court then examined the substance of the application and held that the applicant’s detention after 4 October 2011 – that is to say following a period of six months – had been unlawful under the EU Returns Directive, which at the time had had direct effect in domestic law. In this connection it held that the six-month period provided in Article 15   § 5 of the above-mentioned Directive had started to run on 4 April 2011 and had ended on 4   October 2011. Although Article 15   § 6 of the Directive provided for the possibility of extending detention for a period not exceeding a further twelve months if there was a lack of cooperation on the part of a third-country national, it provided that this should be applied in accordance with the provisions of the national law; however, there had been no such national law in force when the six-month period had expired in this case. As Law no. 153(I)/2011, transposing the Directive into national law had come into force only after the expiration of the six-month period it could not have applied to the applicant. Furthermore, the extension of the applicant’s detention by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of Law   no. 153(I)/2011 had been made after the expiration of the six-month period. It had therefore not fallen within the legal framework applicable at the time, and the Ministry of the Interior had not been entitled to retroactively validate the applicant’s detention. The authorities had not been entitled to cite the applicant’s refusal to cooperate as grounds for extending his detention after 4 October 2011. 31.     The Government did not lodge an appeal against this judgment. 4.     The applicant’s second arrest and his detention from 22 December 2011 until 25 October 2012 32 .     On 22 December 2011, following the judgment in his favour given by the Supreme Court on that date, the applicant (who was present at the court) was immediately released but was then rearrested a few minutes later upon his leaving the courtroom. 33 .     The applicant was arrested on the basis of new detention and deportation orders issued against him on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the first detention and deportation orders – that is to say under sections 6(1)(k) and   (l) and 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 13 above). The Government submitted that the decision to rearrest the applicant had been based on the Ministry of the Interior’s decision of 29 November 2011 to extend the applicant’s detention period to eighteen months (see paragraph 28 above). Upon his arrest, the police officers informed the applicant of his rights, pursuant to the 2005 Law on the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained (Law no. 163(I)/of 2005 – see Seagal, cited above, § 99). He was also served with a letter dated 22   December   2011 from the First Chief Administrative Officer of the Ministry of the Interior informing him that he was an illegal immigrant under sections 6(1)(k) and   (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the grounds (i) of his having illegally entered and stayed in the Republic of Cyprus and (ii) the decision to detain and deport him. 34.     On the letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that it had been served on the applicant on 22 December 2011 at 12:10 p.m. and that the contents had been explained to him but that he had refused to sign it. 35.     The applicant was taken back to Paphos police station. 36.     On the same date the applicant’s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Police, stating that the new detention and deportation orders were in conflict with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 22 December 2011 and infringed the provisions of the EU Returns Directive. She pointed out that the orders had been issued on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous ones and that the applicant’s detention had been found to be unlawful by the Supreme Court. She also stressed that the applicant had been detained despite the fact that he was an asylum seeker. She requested the applicant’s release. She also requested, in the event that the authorities continued to detain him, that the applicant be transferred to another facility; she lodged that request because the applicant was being held at Paphos police station, along with criminal suspects, in inhuman and degrading conditions. The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 37 .     On 28 December 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (no.   1724/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) challenging the lawfulness of the new detention and deportation orders on the basis of which he had been rearrested and detained. 38.     By a letter dated 15 March 2012 the applicant’s representative complained to the Minister of the Interior about the applicant’s detention and requested that the applicant’s detention order be reviewed, in accordance with section   18   ΠΣΤ(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that this letter had received no reply. 39.     By a letter dated 22 May 2012 the applicant’s lawyer complained again to the Minister of Justice and Public Order and to the Chief of Police about the applicant’s continuing detention, as well as the conditions of his detention at Paphos police station and the psychological and psychosomatic effects that those conditions had had on him. 40 .     On 25 May 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided on its continuation for another six months as the applicant did not have travel documents and continued to refuse to visit the Iranian Embassy in order to secure the issuance of a passport to him, thus hampering the deportation process. 41.     On 29 May 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 42 .     On 13 June 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it for six months on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous decision (see paragraph 40 above). 43.     On 14 June 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the applicant informing him of the above-mentioned decision taken by the Minister under section 18   ΠΣΤ(8)(α) of the Aliens and Immigration Law because of his refusal to cooperate with the authorities regarding his return to Iran (see paragraph 101 below). The Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service was also informed of this decision. 44 .     On 13 July 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s recourse. It found that the applicant’s main claims – namely that (i) the Aliens and Immigration Law, where it concerned the issuance of the deportation and detention orders, was unconstitutional, (ii) the deportation and detention orders had not been issued under the correct provision of that law, and (iii) he had the right under the Refugee Law to remain in the country pending the determination of his appeal by the Supreme Court (no.   1320/2011 – see paragraph 23 above) – had not been raised or dealt with adequately in the legal points of the recourse. 45 .     On 24 July 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40 and 42 above). 46 .     On 30 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (as the appellate revisional jurisdiction – appeal no. 156/2012) against the first-instance judgment on his recourse (see paragraph 44 above). 47.     On 11 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Aradippou police station. 48.     On 27 August 2012 and again on 25 September 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40, 42 and 45 above). 49.     In the meantime, on 12 September 2012 the applicant’s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior complaining about the period of the applicant’s detention and about the failure of the Minister of the Interior to review the applicant’s detention order every two months, as provided by section   18   ΠΣΤ(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 50.     On 15 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 51 .     Οn 18 October 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to annul the deportation and detention orders of 22   December 2011, as the applicant’s deportation had not been effected within the above-mentioned eighteen-month time-limit. 52.     On 25 October 2012 the applicant was released under conditions to which he agreed. The applicant was informed that he would be issued with a special residence/employment permit under the Aliens and Immigration Law and the relevant regulations for a period of six months from the date of his release. However, prior to the issuance of this permit he was obliged to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated to and approved by the Department of Labour. He was also asked to (i) report to the police once a week, (ii) report his residential address to his local branch of the Aliens and Immigration Police within fifteen days of his release, and (iii) contact the Iranian Embassy in Nicosia in order to make appropriate arrangements for the issuance of a passport. The applicant was informed that the residence permit would not be extended unless he obtained a valid Iranian passport. 53.     The last time the applicant presented himself at a police station, in line with the conditions of his release, was on 10 January 2013. 5.     Subsequent Developments 54.     The applicant was informed by a letter dated 4 January 2013 that the Reviewing Authority had decided to revoke its negative decision of 10   August 2011 and that it would re-examine his appeal and issue a new decision on his asylum application. Consequently, on 7 January 2013 the applicant withdrew recourse no. 1320/2011 (see paragraph 23 above). He provided the Reviewing Authority with a number of documents in support of his claims. 55.     The applicant subsequently left Cyprus without informing his lawyer. 56.     By a letter dated 14 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority requested him to attend an interview on 24 October 2014 and to provide original documents in support of his claims. The letter also stated that if he failed to contact the Authority he would be considered as non-co-operative and his application would be dismissed and his file closed, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Refugee Law (Law 6(I) of 2000, as amended). 57.     When his lawyer tried to contact the applicant she was informed by other Iranians in Cyprus that he had left the country. 58.     By a letter dated 20 October 2014 the applicant’s lawyer informed the Reviewing Authority that the applicant had left Cyprus and could not attend the interview. 59.     By a letter dated 30 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority informed the applicant’s lawyer that, following a second review, it had rejected his appeal under the above-mentioned provisions and that the first-instance decision of the Asylum Service had been upheld. 60.     In a letter dated 7 April 2015 the applicant’s lawyer informed the Registry that the applicant had left Cyprus through the “TRNC” and was living in Armenia but that his status there was undocumented. He informed her that he had left Cyprus because he feared he would be arrested and detained again and had no means of survival. 61.     On 27 February 2018 the Supreme Court gave its judgment on the applicant’s appeal in respect of the second deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 46 above). It upheld the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 44 above). In addition it noted that during the proceedings the applicant’s lawyer had informed the court that the applicant had in the meantime left Cyprus. As this had been of his own free will, without any coercion, pressure or reservations, the applicant no longer had any legitimate interest in challenging the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders; such a legitimate interest had to continue to exist up to the conclusion of the appeal. 6.     The conditions of the applicant’s detention 62.     The applicant submitted that during his detention in the various police stations he had felt disoriented in terms of space and time. Moreover, he had been suffering from memory loss since his detention. He had been detained immediately upon his arrival in Cyprus and had never lived in Cyprus before and had not known where each detention centre was. He had been completely disoriented when he had been transferred from one police station to another because he had not been given any information or explanations regarding his transferral. (a)     Famagusta police station (5 April 2011 - 21 September 2011) (i)     The applicant’s description of the conditions 63 .     The applicant stated that Famagusta police station, during the period of his detention there, must have contained about twenty detainees. He had shared a cell, which he estimated had measured approximately 20 or 25   sq.   m, with another eight detainees. 64.     The sanitary facilities had been poor: the detention facility had only had a few toilets and showers, which had not been properly cleaned or disinfected. The detainees had lacked basic hygiene products, such as toilet paper, soap and shampoo; these had been provided by the officers only after persistent requests lodged by detainees. 65.     The applicant had had to remain in his cell all the time: there had been no exercise yard and therefore no possibility for any outdoor activity. 66.     The food had been very bad, and the quantities thereof had been insufficient and had not met the dietary needs of Muslim detainees during the Ramadan period. 67 .     Furthermore, detainees had been handcuffed during visits. 68.     Lastly there had been violent incidents at the police station. He had informed a local non-governmental organisation, KISA, about one of these incidents; KISA had then reported it to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (“the Ombudsman”), resulting in a visit to the station by her office (see paragraph 120 below). (ii)     The Government’s description 69 .     The Government submitted that this detention facility had stopped operating and had been subsequently demolished in 2015 following the issuance of a report by the Ombudsman dated 3 October 2011 (see paragraphs 120-122 below). 70.     The applicant’s personal file concerning his detention in the said facility had been destroyed, pursuant to the applicable police rules. As a result, the Government did not have any records concerning the dimensions of the cells in which the applicant had been kept or the number of inmates kept with the applicant in the same cell. The Government therefore accepted the Ombudsman’s findings in her report of 3 October 2011 in this connection (see paragraph 121 below). 71.     According to a report submitted by the Government dated 18   October 2011 prepared by the police officer in charge of the detention facilities at the time, all cells had had access to natural light and ventilation. The cells had had windows measuring 1.5 by 2 metres which had been capable of being opened. The cells had also had sufficient artificial light. They had been equipped with a bed and a table with chairs. 72.     The cells had been open during the day and detainees had been able to move freely in the common areas of the facility. The common area had been equipped with chairs, tables, a satellite television and books in various languages. Detainees had also been able to exercise in the common area. 73.     The facilities had had an air cooling and heating system (referred to by the Government as “split units”). The detainees had been able to regulate the temperature as they wished. The sanitary facilities had been for common use. Detainees had been provided each day with toilet paper, soap and shampoo upon request. Detainees had been able to go outside for three and a half hours per day, accompanied by a police officer, in a yard measuring 5 by 5 metres. 74.     Detainees had been served three meals a day of adequate quantity, in line with their religious needs. They had also been able to order takeaway meals and receive food or other items from friends or relatives. 75.     Detainees had been allowed to have their telephones in their possession and they had been able to receive visitors at any time during the day. They had been able to meet with their visitors in the offices of police officers outside the facility. They had been handcuffed only during their transfer from the facility to the police offices and back. 76.     Detainees had been kept together according to their ethnic origin. (b)     Paphos police station (21 September 2011- 29 May 2012) (i)     The applicant’s description of the conditions 77 .     In this station the applicant had been in a cell on his own. The cell had measured between approximately 8 and 10 sq. m. There had been a toilet and a shower in the cell; these had not, however, been separated from the rest of the cell and had been visible to the staff. The cells had not had proper windows – just small glass windows that it not been possible to open. Thus, there had been no natural ventilation, and the cell had lacked adequate natural light. Furthermore, the police officers had often switched off the ventilation system as a form of punishment when detainees had protested about various issues in the facility. His lawyer stated that on one of her visits, the ventilation system had been turned off and the atmosphere – including in the visitors’ area – had become unbearable. The applicant had been brought to the visitation area handcuffed. 78.     The applicant had been responsible for cleaning his cell himself but no cleaning products had been given to the detainees. Apart from toilet paper, no other hygiene products had been provided. 79.     There had been an indoor exercise area. There had been no specific schedule for exercise and on some days detainees had not exercised at all and had remained in their cells. As a result of this the applicant had felt completely disoriented and had lost all sense of time. 80.     The food had been bad and the quantities inadequate: detainees had been provided with only two small meals per day. 81.     Furthermore, immigration detainees and criminal suspects had been held together. 82 .     The applicant submitted that the conditions at this station had been very harsh and had caused him great psychological distress, as well as prompting suicidal tendencies. For this reason his lawyer had sent letters to the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice and Public Order and the Chief of Police requesting his transfer to other facilities. (ii)     The Government’s description of the conditions 83.     The applicant had been kept alone in single-occupancy cells –specifically, cells nos. 32 and 29. Cell no. 32 had measured 11.7   sq.   m (4.50   by 2.60 metres), and cell no. 29 had measured 15.95 sq. m. (5.50 by   2.90 metres). All cells had had properly insulated windows measuring 120   cm by 76   cm and made of glass bricks that had allowed natural light to enter. Ventilation in the cells had been artificial. There had been two lamps in each cell, providing adequate artificial light. 84.     All cells had been equipped with a plinth, a fixed stool, a table and an in-cell toilet, sink and shower. The toilet, sink and shower had together accounted for about 2.1 sq. m. Detainees using the sanitary facilities in their cells had not been visible from the outside. There had been a central-heating and ventilation system which had operated twenty-four hours per day. During the summer, room temperature had been between 20˚C and 23˚C, and during the winter between 24˚C and 25˚C. 85.     Upon being placed in the cells, detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo, as well as with clean sheets and blankets. Each detainee had had the right to have additional hygiene products but this had had to be at their own expense or provided by their visitors. Each detainee had been offered sufficient cleaning materials with which to clean his or her own cell if they wished to do so. Common areas had been cleaned by the police station’s cleaners. The Government provided invoices for December 2011, April and May 2012 in respect of the purchase of , inter alia , cleaning materials and hygiene products (namely toilet paper and liquid hand soap) by the headquarters of the Paphos Divisional Police (which, the Government submitted, also covered the detention facility). 86.     During his detention, the applicant had been served with three meals a day (breakfast, lunch and dinner). The Government provided the contract with the company providing the meals for the relevant period and the weekly three-meals-a-day plan that it had followed. The applicant had not been served with food unacceptable to Muslims. In addition, he had had the right to obtain additional food at his own expense or from friends or relatives. 87.     The station’s detention facility had had an open courtyard where the applicant had been allowed to move around and exercise freely during the day, given his status as a long-term immigration detainee. During the day the applicant’s cell had been open and he had been able to move freely in the facility’s corridors and common areas. 88.     According to the entries in the station’s record ledger in respect of the period of the applicant’s detention at Paphos police station (which the Government submitted), the applicant had had a psychiatric condition for which he had been provided with prescribed medication and had received psychiatric care at Paphos General Hospital. It could also be seen from this ledger that the applicant had attempted to self-harm and to commit suicide and had also threatened to commit suicide if he was not transferred to another detention facility. (c)     Aradippou police station (11 August 2012 - 15 October 2012) (i)     The applicant’s description of the conditions 89.     The applicant had been detained in a cell which he estimated had measured approximately between 7 and 8 sq. m and which he had shared with another detainee. The sanitary facilities had been outside the cell and common to all detainees. There had been a television which detainees had been sometimes able to watch. There had been no natural light or ventilation and the hygiene conditions had been poor. The food had been bad and insufficient. (ii)     The Government’s description of the conditions 90.     The Government submitted that the applicant’s personal custody file concerning his detention at this station had been destroyed, in line with the applicable police rules. 91.     Cells in this facility had measured 7.08 sq. m (2.92 by 2.42 metres). As the applicant alleged that he had shared a cell with another detainee this meant that he would have had about 3.5 sq. m of personal space in his cell. All cells had had insulated windows measuring 1 by 0.8 metres, which it had been possible to open. The cells had had sufficient natural and artificial light. The station had had a central air-cooling and heating system. Room temperature during the summer had been between twenty and twenty-three degrees Celsius and during the winter between 24˚C and 25˚C. 92.     During the applicant’s detention the cells had been open during the day and the applicant had been allowed to move freely in the station’s common areas and interior yard. There had been benches and a television in the yard. Fresh drinking water (cold and hot) had also been available. 93.     Sanitary facilities had been for common use. There had been two toilets and two showers for every eight detainees. 94.     The detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo once a day 95.     Detainees had been offered three meals per day: breakfast and two cooked meals (lunch and dinner), prepared in line with their religious needs. In addition, detainees had been able to order takeaway food and to receive food from friends or relatives.   II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Entry, residence and deportation of aliens 1.     The Aliens and Immigration Law 96 .     The entry, residence and deportation of aliens are regulated by the Aliens and Immigration Law of 1959 (Cap. 105, as amended). 97 .     Under section 6(1) of the Law a person is not permitted to enter the Republic if he is a “prohibited immigrant”. This category includes (i) any person who enters or resides in the country in contravention of any prohibition, condition, restriction or limitation contained in the Law or in any permit granted or issued under the Law (section 6(1)(k)), and (ii) any alien who wishes to enter the Republic as an immigrant but who does not have in his or her possession an immigration permit granted in accordance with the relevant regulations (section 6(1)(l)). A “prohibited immigrant” can be ordered to leave the Republic under section 13 of the same Law. 98.     Unauthorised entry into and/or an unauthorised stay in Cyprus are criminal offences (section 19(1)(l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law). Until November 2011 they were punishable by imprisonment or a fine (section 19(2)) of the Aliens and Immigration Law). Amending Law no.   153(I)/2011, which entered into force in November 2011, removed the possibility of punishment by imprisonment for the above contraventions; however, they remained criminal offences that could be punished by a fine (section 18; see M.A. v. Cyprus , no. 41872/10, §   65, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). 99 .     Under the Law the deportation (and, pending which, the detention) of any alien who is considered “a prohibited immigrant” can be ordered by the Chief Immigration Officer, who is the Minister of the Interior (section   14). Section 4 of the Law allows the Minister to delegate the execution of his duties or other powers granted under this Law to any other official in his or her department. 100 .     The EU Returns Directive took direct effect in Cyprus when the two-year deadline for its transposition expired on 24 December 2010. In November 2011, Law no. 153(I)/2011 introduced amendments to the Aliens and Immigration Law with the aim of transposing the Directive into domestic law. Under section 18 ΠΣΤ(1) – unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively – the Minister of the Interior may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when: (a) there is a risk of the third-country national concerned absconding; or (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of his or her return or the removal process. Any detention shall be for (a) as short a period as possible, (b) only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress, and (c) executed with due diligence. 101 .     Under section 18 ΠΣΤ(7) detention shall be maintained for as long as the conditions set out above are in place, but for no longer than six months. Exceptionally, if a deportee refuses to cooperate with the authorities (section 18 ΠΣΤ(8)(a)) or there are delays in obtaining the necessary travel documents (section 18 ΠΣΤ(8)(b)), detention may be prolonged for a further twelve months by the Minister of the Interior, up to a maximum of eighteen months. The Minister of the Interior should review detention orders on his or her own initiative every two months and within a reasonable space of time following an application by the detainee (section   18 ΠΣΤ(4)). 2.     The Refugee Law 102 .     Asylum applications are lodged with the Asylum Service of the Ministry of the Interior’s Migration Department. Asylum seekers can appeal against decisions issued by the Asylum Service to the Reviewing Authority, which was established by the Refugee Law (Law 6 (I) of 2000, as amended). Procedures before the Asylum Service and the Reviewing Authority are suspensive: asylum seekers have the right under section 8 of the Refugee Law to remain in the Republic pending the examination of their claim and, if lodged, their appeal. Although the authorities retain the power to issue deportation and detention orders against an applicant during this period, such orders can only be issued on grounds which are unrelated to the asylum application (for example, the commission of a criminal offence), and they have a suspensive effect (see the Supreme Court’s judgment of 30   December 2004 in the case of Asad Mohammed Rahal v the Republic of Cyprus (2004) 3 CLR 741; see also M.A. v. Cyprus , cited above, § 74). 103.     At the material time a decision by the Reviewing Authority could be challenged before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) by way of administrative recourse under Article 146 § 1 of the Constitution (see M.A. v. Cyprus , cited above, §§ 67-70). Such a recourse is now examined at first instance by the Administrative Court, which was established by Law no. 131(I)/2015 (Establishment and Operation of the Administrative Court, Law of 2015). Any appeal must be lodged with the Supreme Court. 104.     Under section 8 of the Refugee Law, as applicable at the material time, an applicant no longer had the right to remain in the Republic following a decision by the Reviewing Authority. Any recourse to the Supreme Court did not have an automatic suspensive effect (see M.A. v.   Cyprus , cited above, §   75). Following the establishment of the Administrative Court, this section was amended, and recourse to that court now has a suspensive effect (Amending Law no. 106(I)/2016). B.     Challenging the lawfulness of immigration detention 1.     Recourse and habeas corpus proceedings 105 .     The legality of deportation and detention orders can only be challenged by way of administrative recourse brought under Article 146 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. At the material time such a recourse had to be brought before the Supreme Court (see M.A. v. Cyprus , cited above, § 67). Since the establishment of the Administrative Court, such a recourse must now be brought before the Administrative Court. An appeal must be lodged with the Supreme Court (appellate jurisdiction). 106 .     The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue orders of habeas corpus (Article 155 § 4 of the Constitution). The Supreme Court has held that the lawfulness of deportation and detention orders can only be examined within the context of a recourse and not within the context of a habeas corpus application (see M.A. v. Cyprus , cited above, § 70). However, applications for a habeas corpus order lodged with the Supreme Court challenging the lawfulness of detention with a view to deportation can be made on length grounds (section 18 ΠΣΤ(5)(a) of the Aliens and Immigration Law; as regards the previous situation, see Kane v. Cyprus (dec.), no.33655/06, 13 September 2011). Under section 18 ΠΣΤ(5)(γ), if such an application is granted by the Supreme Court, the Ministry of the Interior must immediately release the person concerned. 107 .     Res judicata obtains from successive habeas corpus applications that are based on the same facts without new intervening factors. This also applies to questions that could have been raised in the first habeas corpus claim but were not ( Refaat Barquwi , habeas corpus application no.   131/2003 (2004) 1 CLR 2004, judgment of 12 January 2004). 2.     Cases relied on by the parties concerning habeas corpus proceedings 108 .     In the case of Essa Murad Khlaief (habeas corpus application   91/2003, (2003) 1 (C) CLR 1402) the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application submitting, inter alia , that detention for the purposes of deportation could not be indefinite and that the Supreme Court could, within the context of a habeas corpus application, examine its lawfulness if it had exceeded a reasonable time. The applicant had also brought a recourse challenging the deportation and detention orders issued against him, which were still pending at the time of the examination of his habeas corpus application (recourse no. 802/2003). On 14 October 2003 the Supreme Court, at first instance, held that a detainee could challenge through a habeas corpus application the lawfulness of his or her protracted detention for the purpose of deportation. In such an application, the Supreme Court would not examine the lawfulness of the decisions ordering deportation and detention; rather, it would examine whether a detention that had initially been lawful had subsequently become unlawful by virtue of it exceeding a reasonably permissible length. In deciding whether the detention in question was excessively long the court would take the specific facts of the case into account. The Supreme Court furthermore held that detention under Article   11 § 2 of the Constitution for the purpose of deportation could not possibly be unlimited but was restricted to a reasonable period, taking into account all the circumstances of the deportation execution process. If deportation was not completed within a reasonable time, the grounds for detention would cease to exist. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that the administration had encountered difficulties in ascertaining the applicant’s identity and the country to which he should be deported. Considering all the circumstances of the case, it held that the applicant’s detention had not been unreasonably lengthy at that stage. 109 .     In the case of Mohammad Khosh Soruor (habeas corpus application no. 132/2011 (2011) 1 CLR 2170, judgment of 21 December 2011), which was decided one day before the present applicant’s habeas corpus application, the Supreme Court, at first instance, found in favour of the Mr   Soruor and issued a habeas corpus order. It found that his continuous detention beyond the end of the six-month period on the basis of deportation and detention orders had been illegal in the light of the EU Returns Directive, which at the time in question had had direct effect in domestic law. There had been no national law in force when the six-month period had expired and the Ministry of the Interior could not retroactively validate the applicant’s detention (see paragraph 30 above). On the same day, however, new deportation and detention orders were issued against Mr Soruor on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous ones; he challenged those new orders by bringing a recourse (no. 1723/2011). An application lodged by him in the course of those proceedings for a suspension of the deportation and detention orders was dismissed by the Supreme Court (the first-instance revisional jurisdiction). 110 .     In the case of Yuxian Wang (habeas corpus application 13/2012, (2012) 1 CLR 406, judgment of 15 March 2012) the applicant had been detained on the basis of deportation and detention orders that were subsequently annulled by the Supreme Court after she brought a recourse challenging their lawfulness. On the same day the judgment was delivered and while the applicant was still in detention, the authorities issued fresh deportation and detention orders on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous orders. The applicant brought a recourse against those orders but also lodged an application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of her continuing detention, which had exceeded the six-month period stipulated by Article 15 § 5 of the EU Returns Directive. The Supreme Court allowed the application and issued an order for her immediate release. It ruled that it had the authority to examine the application, given the fact the applicant was not challenging the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders but was rather challenging the lawfulness of her detention on