CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 9 avril 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s6CCEAD68 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s64E792FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s3290BD4E { width:171.26pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .s1CBBD6E0 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sCAA154B1 { margin-left:33.01pt; padding-left:2.99pt; font-family:Arial } .s3985515B { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt }     THIRD SECTION           CASE OF V.D. AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA   (Application no. 72931/10)               JUDGMENT               STRASBOURG   9 April 2019     FINAL   09/09/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of V.D. and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Branko Lubarda,   Helen Keller,   Dmitry Dedov,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 72931/10) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Russian nationals (listed in the appendix) (“the applicants”), on 6 December 2010. The first applicant also lodged the present application on behalf of R., a Russian national born in 2000. 2.     The first applicant represented herself and the remaining seven applicants. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr   G.   Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by Mr V. Galperin, his successor in that office. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the annulment of the first applicant’s guardianship over R. and his transfer to his biological parents’ care and the refusal to allow them access to R. had violated their right to respect for their family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 26 September 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. 5.     On 19 March 2019 the Chamber, of its own motion, granted anonymity to the application (Rule 47   §   4 of the Rule of Court). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicants live in Astrakhan. 7.     The first applicant has been or is a guardian (a foster parent) of the second to eighth applicants. R. was a minor, who remained in the first applicant’s care from 20 July 2001 until 26 July 2010. 8.     At birth R. was diagnosed with several serious health conditions. He spent the first eight months of his life in hospital. As his condition remained very serious and unstable, his natural parents considered themselves unfit to attend to his needs and agreed for their son to be put into the care of the first applicant, who had qualifications in medicine and was an experienced paediatrician. 9.     On 20 July 2001 the first applicant took R. from hospital and brought him at her place of residence. 10 .     On 23 November 2001 the Trusovskiy District Council in Astrakhan appointed the first applicant to act as R.’s guardian. The decision stated that R.’s parents were unable to ensure proper care of their child, who had serious congenital diseases, and that therefore they gave their consent in writing to the first applicant’s guardianship over R., and to his transfer into her care. 11 .     Eventually, at various dates in the period from 2003 to 2009 the first applicant also was appointed guardian to the second to eighth applicants. 12.     Between 2001 and 2007, the first applicant and R.’s parents maintained good relations. 13.     In 2007 R.’s state of health became more stable, and his parents expressed their wish to take him back into their care. The first applicant refused to return the boy. A.     Proceedings concerning deprivation of parental authority 14.     On an unspecified date the first applicant brought a claim against R.’s parents in an attempt to have them deprived of their parental authority over him. She argued that they had left R. in the children’s hospital shortly after his birth; that they had not expressed any interest in his life, health and development; that they had not visited him; and that financial support they had given had been inadequate given the child’s special needs. According to the first applicant, R.’s parents were now interested in the boy only with a view to improving their living conditions, as having a disabled child in their care could entitle them to better social housing. The first applicant thus insisted that R.’s parents had evaded their parental duties and thus should be divested of their parental authority over R. 15 .     In the proceedings before the first-instance court, the Ministry of Education and Science of Astrakhan Region (hereinafter “the childcare authority”) provided an expert report on the issue, in which they considered that R.’s parents “[did] not show any interest in his life or health condition, they [did] not participate in his upbringing, they [did] not provide any financial maintenance and [had] chosen not to fulfil their parental duties”. The report concluded that they should be deprived of their parental authority. 16 .     On 11   November 2008 the Trusovskiy District Court of Astrakhan (“the District Court”) dismissed the first applicant’s claim. In particular, it rejected as unfounded the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents had abandoned him in the children’s hospital; it observed in this connection that no evidence had been submitted to it – in the form of a written statement by R.’s parents or certificates from any health institutions – to show that R.’s parents had ever formally renounced their parental authority over the boy. The court further observed that the decision to transfer their son under the first applicant’s guardianship had been taken by the child’s parents at a very difficult time of their lives, when they had faced a very stressful situation of being unable, on their own, to attend to their son’s needs. 17.     The District Court also rejected the first applicant’s allegation concerning R.’s parents’ unwillingness or failure to visit their son in the absence of any obstacles. In the latter connection, the court observed that the first applicant had had a negative attitude towards R.’s parents’ unexpected visits, and she had never informed them of the child’s absence from his place of residence (for outings and trips abroad). Also, R.’s parents had been unable to obtain information about R.’s heath from the relevant healthcare institutions, as the latter had refused give them any such information at the first applicant’s written request. 18 .     The court also referred to statements of a number of witnesses which confirmed that R.’s parents had helped the first applicant with his maintenance, both financially and by providing various services requested by the first applicant; in particular, they had had maintenance and repair work in the first applicant’s housing done; they had ensured private transport for R.’s visits to medical appointments; they had supplied medicine and food for R.’s special diet; they had taken his clothes for cleaning and brought him clean clothes. 19 .     The court further considered the deprivation of parental authority to be an extraordinary measure that could only be applied on the grounds established in Article 69 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 68 below). In the circumstances of the case, the court did not discern any grounds justifying such a measure. At the same time, the court urged R.’s parents “to change their attitude towards [R.’s] upbringing” and imposed on the competent childcare authority an obligation to monitor their compliance with their parental obligations”. It also noted that the financial support provided by R.’s biological parents was insufficient and ordered that they pay the first applicant one quarter of their monthly income as child maintenance. 20.     On 12   March 2009 the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. B.     First set of proceedings concerning the determination of R.’s place of residence 21.     On 26   February 2009 the District Court dismissed an application by R.’s parents to have their son returned to them. 22 .     It established, in particular, that the first applicant had been taking good care of R.; that she had actively involved relevant specialist healthcare professionals to ensure that he had received the necessary medical treatment and constant care; she had created all conditions necessary for his life and development, taking into account his special needs. The court also noted that for the period when R. had remained in the first applicant’s care, there had been improvements in his state of his health and progress in his physical and psychological development. It furthermore referred to the evidence confirming that the first applicant’s foster children lived in good living conditions; that they played as a group; that their leisure activities were well organised, and included group nature outings. 23 .     The District Court also established, with reference to the available written evidence and witness statements, that, until that moment, R.’s parents had not maintained contact with R., and had never enquired as to his health. 24 .     It further observed, with reference to the opinions of healthcare professionals and representatives of the childcare authority who had monitored R., that an abrupt change of surroundings, separation from the people he knew and immediate transfer to his biological parents could seriously traumatise the boy, endanger and harm his psychological state and thus aggravate his conditions. The boy would need a lengthy adaptation period to get used to his natural parents. 25.     The court thus concluded that it would be in the child’s best interests to continue living with the first applicant for the time being. 26.     The judgment became final on 13 March 2009. C.     Proceedings concerning R.’s parents’ access to him 27.     On an unspecified date, R.’s parents brought a claim against the first applicant. They complained that she had been obstructing their contact with R. and requested that the court grant them access to the boy, and determine the manner in which they could exercise their contact rights. 28 .     By a judgment of 7 May 2009 the District Court determined R.’s parents’ rights of contact with the boy. It established that they should have access to him each Friday from 4.30 to 5.30 pm at the first applicant’s home, and each Sunday from 2 to 4 pm at their home in the first applicant’s presence. 29.     On 10 June 2009 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 30 .     The case file reveals that R.’s parents complied with the established order of their contact with R. D.     Second set of proceedings concerning the determination of R.’s place of residence 31.     On an unspecified date R.’s parents brought another claim against the first applicant and the childcare authority before the District Court. They asked for their son’s return and termination of the first applicant’s guardianship over him. 32 .     In the ensuing proceedings both parties were represented by lawyers. 33.     In the context of those proceedings, two reports were drawn up by psychologists of the childcare authority. They reflected the results of monitoring by psychologists of contact sessions between R. and his parents. 34 .     The first report dated 29 December 2009 described two contact sessions that had taken place at various times on 25-27 December 2009. It stated, in particular, that R.’s parents had established good psychological contact with the child, and that they had showed a caring and loving attitude towards the boy. The report furthermore stated that, in view of R.’s special condition and the considerable delay in his physical and psychological development, his interaction with the adults was very limited; however, the parents managed to establish tactile and emotional contact with him. Overall, in so far as his conditions made it possible to ascertain, the child felt psychologically comfortable and calm in the presence of his parents. At the same time, the experts pointed out that the child was very fragile and that, for his psychological comfort, he constantly needed the presence of the first applicant. The experts also stated that R.’s parents had insufficient understanding of their son’s emotional state and interests, the particularities of his psychological condition and his capabilities. The report concluded that it was necessary to continue the process of the child’s adaptation to his parents and to that end the duration of the contact sessions between R. and his parents should be extended. 35 .     The second report dated 4 May 2010 described two contact sessions that had taken place on 29 and 30 April 2010. It noted the child’s very serious condition, which greatly limited his interaction with the outside world. It further stated, in particular, that R.’s parents had successfully established psychological contact with their son; that they understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. According to the report, when with his parents, R. felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, R.’s parents had created a warm and beneficial environment propitious for the child’s development. 36 .     In the proceedings before the court, the childcare authority expressed a generally favourable opinion regarding R.’s return to his biological parents, but pointed out that, in view of R.’s state of health, his integration into his family should be gradual. In particular, the duration of his contact sessions with the parents, which to then had taken place twice a week in daytime, could be extended and could include night-time contact. 37.     On 4   May 2010 the District Court allowed R.’s parents’ claims. 38.     It examined in detail the circumstances of R.’s transfer to the first applicant’s care and the relations between the first applicant, R.’s parents and R. from that time forward. It pointed out, in particular, that R.’s parents had surrendered their son to the first applicant’s care given his very serious condition and her experience as a paediatrician; at that time they had considered themselves incapable of ensuring the specialist care he needed. 39 .     It rejected as untenable on the facts the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents had abandoned their son in the hospital without valid reasons. It noted in this connection: “Neither the statements made by [R.’s] parents nor relevant medical documents [to confirm that argument] were presented to the court. The [defendants] denied this fact. They submitted that they had not abandoned their child. On the contrary, they wanted him to get better and to return to his family. It follows from the material in the case file that [R.] was given into the care of the guardian after his parents’ futile attempts to provide him with due medical care and in the child’s [best] interests ... [R.’s parents] did not intend to abandon their child ... Even though he was under the [first applicant’s] guardianship, [his] family took an interest in his life and health, they provided ... financial support.” 40 .     The District Court further referred to statements of various witnesses. In particular, eleven witnesses described the first applicant as a kind, caring and empathetic person, who helped other families with children with disabilities. They also stated that she had taken good care of R., that as a paediatrician she had attended to his needs, and that his condition had visibly improved owing to her efforts. The witnesses furthermore stated that the first applicant went with her foster children on trips, within the country and abroad. With respect to those statements the District Court noted that they confirmed only the first applicant’s good and caring attitude towards R. and the fact that she had duly performed her obligations towards him. However, in the court’s view, those statements did not show that R.’s parents were unable to take good care of the boy, nor that in view of R.’s physical and psychological condition he should continue living with the first applicant. 41.     The court also referred to statements of Ms Z., a paediatrician, who submitted that she had known and been treating R. since he had been eight months old when he had been given into the first applicant’s care. The child had suffered from a serious congenital illness and had spent considerable time in hospital. At that time, his condition was stable, yet serious owing to his diagnosis – a central nervous system disorder and mobility impairments. The child needed constant appropriate care and supervision rather than mere medical treatment. The child had grown in ten years, had changed emotionally. He reacted to the people around him. However, he could not take care of himself. He could not eat, drink or walk on his own. He was in need of constant care. Ms Z. also added that she had accompanied the first applicant when she had taken R. to Austria for medical treatment. The boy had had a different reaction when the first applicant had held him in her arms and when Ms Z. had held him in her arms. 42 .     Ms M., one of the psychologists who had drawn up the reports of 29   December 2009 and 4 May 2010 (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above), submitted that it had been established in the course of monitoring that R.’s parents had learnt to identify and adequately understand specific psychological and physical particularities of their son. They showed genuine interest in the child and surrounded him with truly parental attention, love and care. They regularly consulted psychologists concerning the psychological condition of a child with developmental difficulties, asking about the requisite material and toys for, and how they should build communication, with such a child. 43 .     The District Court went on as follows: “Accordingly, as a result of monitoring of the contact sessions, it has been established that [R.’s] parents communicated with [him] in a calm, sincere and benevolent manner. They successfully established psychological contact with him. They understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. When with his parents, [R.] felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, they created a warm and beneficial environment favourable for the child’s development. According to the report on the plaintiffs’ living conditions ... in a two-room flat, the conditions were found satisfactory and corresponding to the family’s needs and favourable for children’s upbringing and living. [R.’s] parents provided the conditions necessary for [his] living and upbringing. ... The adduced materials reveal that [R.’s] parents are a stable ... family. They are well-to-do and make an adequate living. They have permanent employment [and a] stable income. They provided positive personal references from their employers and from their place of residence. They do not have a history of psychiatric diseases or criminal records. Accordingly, they meet all the conditions and can raise the child and provide him with due care.” 44 .     The court dismissed the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents were seeking to cancel her guardianship in order to obtain better social housing. According to the court, this allegation had been refuted in the course of the proceedings by the explanations provided by R.’s parents, and by the evidence proving that their minor children, including R., owned shares in their flat. 45.     It further rejected the argument advanced by the childcare authority that the child should be gradually integrated into his parents’ family (see paragraph 36 above). In the court’s view, such gradual integration would have a negative impact on the child’s psychological state. Furthermore, it would interfere with his right to live and be brought up in his family. The court further stated that R.’s parents were his natural parents; they showed due care and love for him, and had by that time established psychological contact with him on the basis of contact sessions that had taken place over a considerable period of time, in particular in their flat. The child understood that his mother and father were his parents, in so far as his psychological development allowed it. The court also pointed out that the childcare authority had admitted that the reunification of R. with his family ultimately served his interest. 46 .     The District Court thus considered that “no convincing evidence [had been] submitted to show that [R.’s] parents [had been] unable to bring up their child with due care and attention”, and concluded as follows: “Regard being had to the above, the court holds that the plaintiffs’ claim should be granted and they should be reunited with their child in order for them to continue exercising their parental rights in respect of the child’s education and development. ... the court holds that the [administrative] decision ... [of] 23   November 2001 ... should be terminated as no longer needed.” 47.     The first applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. 48 .     On 23   June 2010 the Regional Court examined the first applicant’s appeal submissions, where she and her lawyer made their case in person. 49 .     It then upheld the judgment of 4 May 2010 on appeal. It considered that the District Court had thoroughly examined the case and accurately established the relevant circumstances; that on the basis of various pieces of written evidence, the report of 4 May 2010 regarding the effects of R.’s parents’ contact with him and a report on their living conditions being amongst their number, as well as on the basis of numerous witness statements, the first-instance court had taken a justified and well-reasoned decision that R.’s transfer to his biological family had been in his best interests. 50.     On 26 July 2010 R. was transferred to his parents. E.     Proceedings concerning the applicants’ access to R. 51.     On an unspecified date the first applicant brought an action against R.’s parents on behalf of herself and on behalf of the other applicants in an attempt to gain access to R. She averred, in particular, that for the nine years during which R. had remained in her care, she and her foster children – the other applicants – had formed a family with a special bond existing between them; she further complained that, after R.’s transfer to his parents, there had been no contact between R. and the applicants, as R.’s parents had obstructed their attempts to maintain contact. 52.     On 19   April 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan (“the District Court”) dismissed the applicants’ claim. 53.     It observed, in particular, that Article 64 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 65 below) vested the authority to represent and protect a child’s interests in his or her natural parents, unless the latter’s interests stood in conflict with their child’s. The District Court stated, with reference to the available evidence and witness statements, that after R.’s transfer to his biological parents, they had established all the requisite conditions for the boy’s life and education, and had been fully able to attend to his needs. In particular, R. had undergone all the necessary medical examinations; and his parents had complied with healthcare professionals’ recommendations as regards his care and medical assistance. The court concluded that R.’s parents were acting in his interests. 54.     The District Court further noted that R.’s parents as well as the childcare authority objected to the applicants’ communication with R. It also observed that it was impossible to find out R.’s opinion on the matter in view of his medical conditions. 55 .     The District Court went on to observe that the first applicant was not a member of R.’s family or a relative, within the meaning of Article 67 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 66 below), nor did she have any legal ties with him after her guardianship over the boy had been terminated by a court decision, with the result that she did not pertain to the category of individuals entitled to seek access to the child under the Russian Family Code. In the court’s view, statements of a number of witnesses confirming R.’s attachment to the first applicant and her taking good care of him “were not grounds for including the first applicant in the category of individuals entitled under the relevant legal provision to claim access to the child”. 56.     The first applicant appealed arguing, in particular, that the first ‑ instance court had erred, in the absence of a forensic expert examination of the matter, in its finding that the second applicant had been incapable of having and forming attachments to her and the other applicants; she complained that her request to have such an expert examination ordered had been rejected by the District Court. The applicant also argued that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy, as the relationship between the applicants and R. had been similar to that between biological family members. 57 .     On 8 June 2011 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 19   April 2011 on appeal. It noted, in particular: “When dismissing the [first applicant’s] claims, the [first-instance] court considered that, as set forth in Article 67 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to grandfathers, grandmothers, brothers, sisters and other relatives, while [the first applicant] is, as a matter of law, not regarded as a member of the family or a relative of a minor or any other person whose relationship with him is governed by family law (appointed guardians, custodians, de facto guardians) given that her guardianship has been terminated. The [Regional Court] upholds the above finding of the first-instance court. By virtue of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to a grandmother, a grandfather, brothers and sisters, [and] the child’s close relatives who take part in his upbringing and education. Accordingly, the legislation protects [the relevant rights] of close relatives. The right of access to a child is not guaranteed to other individuals.” 58 .     As regards the first applicant’s argument that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy and should have considered her as R.’s family member given the nature of ties between them, the appellate court noted as follows: “When resolving the dispute, the court did not apply the law by analogy. ... [T]he members of the family, as a matter of law, are understood only as the individuals directly indicated in the Family Code of the Russian Federation. The resolution of a dispute by analogy would otherwise contradict the essence of the family relationship.” 59.     The court also rejected the applicant’s argument that the first ‑ instance court had failed to determine the degree of R.’s attachment to the applicants; it stated in this connection that the argument in question “lacked a legal basis”. 60.     The Regional Court also endorsed the District Court’s findings that R.’s parents had provided the requisite care to R.; and that they had carried out necessary medical and rehabilitation measures. It “[discerned] no evidence that R.’s rights or interests [had been] infringed” and dismissed the first applicant’s argument to that end as unsubstantiated. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Russian Family Code 1.     Legal provision concerning protection of children’s rights 61 .     Article 54 provides that every child, that is to say a person under the age of 18   years, has a right to live and to be brought up in a family, in so far as possible, a right to know his or her parents, a right to their care, a right to live together with them, except where it is contrary to his or her interests. 62.     Article 55 entitles a child to maintain contact with his or her parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters and other relatives. 63.     By virtue of Article 57, a child is entitled to express his or her opinion on all family matters concerning him or her, including in the course of any judicial proceedings. The opinion of a child over ten years old must be taken into account, except where it is contrary to his or her interests. 2.     Legal provisions concerning parents’ rights and obligations 64 .     Article 63 provides that the parents’ right to bring up their children has precedence over such a right of any other person. 65 .     Article 64 establishes that children’s rights and interests must be protected by their parents. The parents are entitled to act as legal representatives of their children and to protect their rights and interests in the children’s relations with any individuals or legal entities, including before the courts. The second part of the Article provides that parents have no right to represent their children if a competent childcare authority establishes the existence of a conflict between the parents’ interests and those of their children. If this is the case, the childcare authority has an obligation to appoint a representative for the protection of the children’s rights and interests. 66 .     By virtue of Article 67, grandparents, brothers, sisters and other relatives are entitled to maintain contact with the child. If the parents, or one of them, prevent close relatives from seeing the child, a childcare authority may order that contact be maintained between the child and the relative in question. If the parents do not comply with the childcare authority’s order, the relative concerned or the childcare authority may apply to a court for a contact order. The court must take a decision in the child’s interests and must take the child’s opinion into account. If the parents do not comply with the contact order issued by a court, they may be held liable in accordance with the law. 67 .     Article 68 vests in the parents a right to seek the return of their child from any person who retains the child not on the basis of law or not in accordance with a court decision. In the event of a dispute, the parents are entitled to lodge a court claim for protection of their rights. When examining that claim, the court, with due regard to the child’s opinion, is entitled to reject the claim if it finds that the child’s transfer to the parents is contrary to the child’s interests. 68 .     Article 69 establishes that a parent may be deprived of parental authority if he or she avoids parental obligations, such as the obligation to pay child maintenance; refuses to collect the child from the maternity hospital, any other medical, educational, social or similar institution; abuses parental authority; mistreats the child by resorting to physical or psychological violence or sexual abuse; suffers from chronic alcohol or drug abuse; or has committed a premeditated criminal offence against the life or health of his or her children or spouse. 3.     Legal provisions governing guardianship 69.     Article 148.1 provides, in particular, that the rights and obligations of a legal guardian are set in place by the Federal Law “On Guardianship” (see paragraph 70 below). It further provides that, unless it is provided otherwise in a federal law, the parents or persons replacing them forfeit their rights and obligations to represent and protect the child’s rights and lawful interests from the moment when a guardian receives such rights and obligations. It also establishes that a legal guardian is not entitled to obstruct a child’s contact with his or her parents and other relatives, except where it is contrary to the child’s interests. B.     Federal Law “On Guardianship” 70 .     Federal Law no.   48-FZ “On Guardianship” of 24 April 2008 ( Федеральный закон от 24 апреля 2008 №   48-ФЗ «Об опеке и попечительстве» ) provides in it section 15(2) that guardians are legal representatives of the children placed in their care and are entitled to act on their behalf for the protection of their rights and lawful interests without any formal authorisation. C.     Ruling of the Supreme Court of Russia 71.     In its ruling no. 10 on the application by the courts of legislation when resolving disputes concerning upbringing of children, dated 27 May 1998, as amended on 6 February 2007, the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Russia stated, in particular: “... 6.     In accordance with the law, the parents’ right to bring up their children has precedence over such a right of any other person (Article 63   §   1 of the Russian Family Code), and they are entitled to seek the return of their child from any person who retains the child not on the basis of law nor pursuant to a court decision (Article   68   §   1   (1) of the Russian Family Code). At the same time, a court is entitled, with due regard to the child’s opinion, to reject a parent’s claim if it finds that the child’s transfer to the parent is contrary to the child’s interests ... When examining such cases, the court takes into account whether there is a realistic possibility for a parent duly to bring the child up; the nature of the relations between the parent and the child, the child’s attachment to the individuals with whom he or she is living at that time, and other particular circumstances relevant for securing adequate conditions of the child’s living and upbringing by his or her parents as well as by the individuals with whom the minor is actually living and being brought up by ... 7.     When examining parents’ claims for the return of their children from individuals with whom [the children] remain on the basis of the law or in accordance with a court decision (guardians, foster parents ...), it is necessary to find out whether the circumstances, which were the grounds for the transfer of a child to those individuals ..., have changed by the time the case is being examined, and whether the children’s return to their parents would be in their interests”. THE LAW I.     PRELIMINARY ISSUE 72.     The first applicant lodged the present application on behalf of R., alleging a violation of his rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. She argued that the conditions governing the individual applications under the Convention were not necessarily the same as the national criteria relating to locus standi (referring to A.K. and L. v. Croatia , no. 37956/11, §   46, 8 January 2013), and that a restrictive or purely technical approach to the issue of locus standi must be avoided ( S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom , no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996, unreported). In that connection, the first applicant insisted that she and R. had developed emotional ties that were equivalent to those between a mother and her child. The first applicant stressed that, unlike in the case cited by the Government, she had been taking care of R. for a very prolonged period, and more specifically during the first nine years of his life; during that period she had remained the only significant adult in his life. Moreover, during that period, she had had a formal legal link to R., having been his guardian. The first applicant further insisted that there was no conflict of interest between her and R., and that R.’s biological parents were not in a position to protect effectively his interests in the present case, given the issues it raised. The first applicant compared the situation in the present case with cases brought on children’s behalf by their natural parents deprived of the parental authority over those children, and argued that there was a danger that otherwise R.’s interests would never be brought to the Court’s attention. 73.     The Government contested the first applicant’s standing to represent R. before the Court, with reference to the cases of Moretti and Benedetti v.   Italy (no. 16318/07, 27 April 2010) and Giusto and Others v. Italy ((dec.), no. 38972/06, ECHR 2007-V). They pointed out that, once her guardianship over the child had been terminated, the first applicant had lost any entitlement under domestic law to act as his legal representative. R.’s biological parents had full parental authority over him and were his legal representatives. They had never authorised the first applicant to represent R. before the Court. Therefore the part of the application lodged by the first applicant on R.’s behalf was incompatible ratione personae with the relevant provisions of the Convention. 74.     The Court reiterates that the position of children under Article 34 of the Convention calls for careful consideration, as children must generally rely on other individuals to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (see A.K. and L. v. Croatia , cited above, § 47, and P.C. and S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). It is necessary to avoid a restrictive and purely technical approach in this area; in particular, consideration must be given to the links between the child in question and his or her “representatives”, to the subject-matter and the purpose of the application and to the possibility of a conflict of interests (see S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), cited above; Giusto and Others (dec.) , cited above; and Moretti and Benedetti , cited above, §   32). 75.     In the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the first applicant is not biologically related to R. Her situation is therefore different from the cases where the Court acknowledged natural parents’ standing to act on behalf of their children in whose respect they had been deprived of their parental authority; in the latter connection, the Court has held that it was in principle in the interest of children to preserve ties with their biological parents (see A.K. and L . v. Croatia , cited above, §§   48-49, with further references). The Court further observes that the first applicant is no longer R.’s guardian, as her guardianship was definitively withdrawn by the court decision of 4 May 2010, as upheld on appeal on 23 June 2010 (see paragraphs 46 and 49 above), with the result that she no longer has legal status to act on his behalf in the context of judicial or other proceedings at the domestic level. Furthermore, R. has been transferred to, and is now living with, his parents, who have full parental authority over him, which includes, among other things, the representation of the minor’s interests. They have never authorised the first applicant to represent R. before the Court. Lastly, in view of R.’s serious medical conditions, he is clearly not in a position to express himself on the issue. 76.     In such circumstances, the Court is bound to conclude that the first applicant does not have standing to act before the Court on R.’s behalf. This part of the application must therefore be dismissed as incompatible ratione personae with the Convention provisions, in accordance with Article 35 §§   3 and 4 thereof. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 77.     The applicants complained that the decisions of the national authorities to return R. to his biological parents, terminate her guardianship and to refuse them contact with him had amounted to a breach of Article   8 of the Convention, which, in its relevant part, reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A.     Admissibility 1.     The first applicant’s standing to lodge the present application on behalf of the second, third and eighth applicants (a)     Submissions by the parties 78.     In the initial set of their observations of 22 January 2013, the Government disputed the first applicant’s standing to lodge the present application on the second applicant’s behalf. They pointed out that the second applicant, who, according to the Government, had been born on 15   April 1994 (as indicated in the Government’s initial observations), or on 15   April 1995 (as indicated in the Government’s additional observations of 29   April 2013) had reached the age of majority, when, by virtue of the relevant domestic law, the first applicant had ceased to be her guardian, had lost any legal link with her and had thus no authority to act on her behalf either at the domestic or international level. In their additional observations of 29 April 2013, the Government raised the same objection in respect of the third and eighth applicants. They argued, in particular, that the first applicant was no longer authorised to act on behalf of the eighth applicant, who, in the Government’s submission, had been born on 29 April 1993; and as of 4 May 2013 had no longer been authorised to act on behalf of the third applicant, who had been born on 4 May 1995. 79.     The applicants submitted that the second applicant (born on 1 April 1994) had turned 18 years old on 1 April 2012, and had thus gained full legal capacity to participate in the proceedings before the Court. The second applicant had submitted a power of attorney authorising the first applicant to represent her interests before the Court. (b)     The Court’s assessment 80.     The Court observes that the question of the first applicant’s standing to lodge the present application on behalf of the second, third and eight applicants is directly linked to its competence ratione personae to examine that part of the application. It has to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it, and it is therefore obliged to examine the question of its jurisdiction at each stage of the proceedings (see Blečić v.   Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 67, ECHR   2006-III; Uslu v. Turkey (no.   2) , no.   23815/04, § 18, 20 January 2009; Boucke v. Montenegro , no.   26945/06, § 63, 21 February 2012; and Buzadji v.   the   Republic   of   Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 70, 5 July 2016). 81.     It further notes that, on 6 December 2010, the date when the present application was lodged, the second, third and eighth applicants were minors and the first applicant was their guardian thus having full authority to represent their interests and to act on their behalf. 82.     Furthermore, in reply to the Government’s initial observations of 22   January 2013, the second applicant, who had come of age on 1   April   2012, confirmed her intention to pursue the application and signed a power of attorney authorising the first applicant to represent her in the proceedings before the Court. 83.     As regards the third and eighth applicants, on 29 April 2013 – the date of the submission by the Government of their additional observations and comments on the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction – the third applicant (born on 4 May 1995) was still a minor. Moreover, whilst the Government argued, without submitting any documentary evidence, that the eighth applicant had been born on 29 April 1993, the Court observes that, the documents enclosed by the applicants with their application form reveal that his actual date of birth is 29 April 2003. It is thus clear that, on when the parties completed the exchange of their observations in the present case, the third and eighth applicants were minors, and thus were not required to confirm their interest in pursuing the present application or to authorise formally the first applicant to represent their interests before the Court, as the first applicant, as their guardian (her legal status has not been disputed by the Government on any other grounds), had standing to act on their behalf before the Court. 84.     Against that background, the Court is satisfied that the first applicant had standing to represent the second, third and eighth applicants in the present case. It concludes that, in so far as the application was lodged by the first applicant on their behalf, it is compatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3   (a) of the Convention. 2.     Exhaustion of domestic remedies 85.     In their additional observations of 29 April 2013, the Government briefly submitted that, the court claim for access to R. had been lodged by the first applicant on her behalf only. 86.     In so far as this argument may be understood as an objection as to the admissibility for failure to exhaust available domestic remedies of this part of the application in respect of the second to eighth applicants, the Court reiterates that, pursuant to Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must, in so far as its character and the circumstances permit, be raised by the respondent Contracting Party in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application (see Buzadji , cited above, § 64). It notes that the Government did