CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 30 avril 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s6CCEAD68 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s7BE5FA78 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA3260FD6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .sDE1FCA9C { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s64E792FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sA0A2D76C { width:172.92pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 }       THIRD SECTION             CASE OF KABLIS v. RUSSIA   (Applications nos. 48310/16 and 59663/17)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   30 April 2019       FINAL   09/09/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kablis v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Branko Lubarda,   Helen Keller,   Dmitry Dedov,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Georgios A. Serghides, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 2 April 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in two applications (nos.   48310/16 and 59663/17) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Grigoriy Nikolayevich Kablis (“the applicant”), on 28 July 2016 and 30 July 2017 respectively. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr V. Zubkov, a lawyer practising in Syktyvkar, Mr A. Laptev, a lawyer practising in Moscow, and Mr   E.   Mezak, a human-rights defender from Syktyvkar who was granted leave by the President of the Court to represent the applicant in application no. 48310/16. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 3.     The applicant complained of a breach of his right to freedoms of expression and assembly and the lack of an effective remedy in that respect. 4.     On 27 March and 8 September 2017 the Government were given notification of the applications. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Syktyvkar. A.     Notification of a public event and the blocking of the applicant’s social networking account and of three entries on his Internet blog 6 .     On 19 September 2015 the Federal Security Service (‘the FSB”) and the Investigations Committee of the Russian Federation announced that criminal proceedings on suspicion of membership of a criminal gang and fraud had been opened against the Governor of the Komi Republic, Mr   Gaizer, one of his deputies, several high-ranking officials in the Komi Republic government, the speaker of the Komi Republic parliament and a representative of the Komi Republic in the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. All of them were arrested on the same day. 7 .     On 21 September 2015 the applicant, together with Ms S., notified the Syktyvkar Town Administration of their intention to hold a “picket” ( пикетирование ) from 5   to 6 p.m. on 25 September 2015 at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets behind the Lenin monument, which fifty people were expected to attend. The aim of the event was to “discuss the arrest of the Komi Republic government”. 8 .     On the same day the applicant published a copy of his notification of 21 September 2015 on his Internet blog. He said that the aim of the “picket” was to let the people express their thoughts about the arrests of members of the Komi Republic government. Any opinions – from approval to criticism of the arrests – were welcome. He hoped that the “picket” would be approved. However, if the town administration proposed to hold it on the outskirts of the town, a “people’s assembly” ( народный сход ), which did not require prior notification, would be held at the same location (behind the Lenin monument). The applicant then criticised the fact that regional governors were appointed by the President and expressed the wish that governors be elected by the people. He asked why Mr Gaizer had been appointed governor of the Komi Republic in 2010 if, according to the investigators, he had been a member of a criminal gang since 2006. He then said that the accusations against Mr Gaizer and the others seemed to be based on a very slim evidentiary basis, which gave reasons to believe that the criminal proceedings against them were politically motivated. In his opinion, Mr   Putin was trying to frighten other governors into submission. In any event, appointed governors always served the interests of those who had appointed them. He therefore wanted to propose a discussion about the future of the Komi Republic and, in particular, about whether the people wanted the next governor to be appointed or elected. 9 .     Later on the same day, 21 September 2015, the Syktyvkar Town Administration refused to approve the venue chosen by the applicant, pointing out that regional law no. 91-RZ of 20 November 2012 [sic] prohibited the holding of public events in Stefanovskaya Square (see paragraph 34 below). The town administration proposed that the “picket” be held at one of the special locations for public events designated by the Komi Republic government. The applicant received that decision the following day, 22 September 2015. 10 .     On 22 September 2015 the applicant published a new entry on his Internet blog, informing his readers that the town administration had refused to approve the venue behind the Lenin monument, and enclosing a copy of its decision of 21 September 2015. He said that a “people’s assembly” would be held instead at the same location and time. He explained that a “people’s assembly” was an assembly of people who gathered to discuss without there being any organisers. Unlike a “picket”, it was not possible to use placards during a “people’s assembly”. The applicant then stated that the official who had signed the refusal to approve the “picket” was the same official who had been responsible for a 30% increase in the cost of heating in the previous two years. 11 .     On 23 September 2015 the applicant also published a post on VKontakte, [1] calling for participation in the public discussion on 25   September 2015. 12.     On 24 September 2015 the applicant’s VKontakte account was blocked by the VKontakte administrator following an order by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media and a deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The deputy Prosecutor General found that the VKontakte post described in paragraph 11 above, which was publicly accessible, contained information about a “picket” to be held on 25   September 2015 at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. The town administration had, however, refused to allow the “picket” because it was prohibited to hold public events at that location. The post therefore amounted to campaigning for participation in an unlawful public event in breach of section 10 paragraph 1 of the Public Events Act (for a summary of the domestic law provisions, see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia , nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, § 249, 7   February 2017). The applicant’s VKontakte account therefore had to be blocked pursuant to section 15.3(1) of the Information Act (see paragraph   36 below). 13 .     On 25 September 2015 the applicant published a third entry on his blog. He asked what would happen if many people came to the “people’s assembly” later that day. He did not believe that it would make the Kremlin change its politics, appoint a responsible local person as the governor of the Komi Republic or stop unsubstantiated accusations against Mr Gaiser. He claimed, however, that a high participation rate would show that there were many people who were not afraid to express their opinion. The FSB and the Prosecutor General’s office were afraid of politically active people. He called on everyone to come to the people’s assembly to prevent similar situations in future. 14.     On the same day the administrator of the Internet site that hosted the applicant’s blog informed him by email that access to the three blog entries described in paragraphs 8, 10 and 13 above had been restricted on the order of the Prosecutor General’s office because they had been found to contain calls to participate in public events held in breach of the established procedure. 15.     At about 7 p.m. on 25 September 2015 about fifty people gathered near the Lenin monument. The “people’s assembly” went peacefully and without any disturbance. B.     Judicial review of the refusal to approve the venue of the “picket” 16.     On 26 October 2015 the applicant challenged before the Syktyvkar Town Court the town administration’s decision of 21 September 2015 refusing to approve the location of the “picket”. He submitted, in particular, that the “picket” had been intended to take place fifty metres from Stefanovskaya Square. In any event, it would not have caused any disturbance or inconvenience. The special designated locations proposed by the town administration would have been unsuitable. 17 .     On 18 November 2015 the Syktyvkar Town Court rejected the applicant’s complaint. After citing Article 11 of the Convention, the applicable domestic provisions and the Constitutional Court’s decision of 2   April 2009 (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 255-59), the court held: “The complainant’s argument that the event would lose its purpose if held at the locations proposed by [the town administration] is unsubstantiated. In substance the law requires organisers to make reasonable and sufficient efforts to reach a compromise on the basis of a balance of interests in order to enjoy the right to freedom of assembly. In a situation where there is no ban on holding a public event but rather an alternative location is proposed, the organisers may not reject without valid reasons the conditions proposed by the authorities for holding the event. Decree no. 598 of 25 December 2012 by the Komi Republic Government designated [special locations for holding public events in Syktyvkar], having ensured that they were in keeping with the aims of public events and accessible by public transport, permitted the organisers of, and participants in, public events to use public utility facilities, respected sanitary norms and rules, and guaranteed the safety of the organisers of, and participants in, public events. The [town administration’s] decision of 21 September 2015 mentioned those locations, de facto proposing them as an alternative [to the location chosen by the applicant]. [The town administration’s] decree no. 9/3483 of 4   September 2013 amended [its] decree no. 10/4160 of 28 October 2008 on locations (plots of land) where public events were prohibited. In accordance with the amended decree, it is prohibited to hold public events at the location chosen by the complainant – at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. In such circumstances the municipal authority’s proposal to change the location of Mr Kablis’s public event was well reasoned and lawful ... The court considers that the refusal to approve the location for the reasons advanced in the [town administration’s] decision was lawful and acceptable ... The [town administration’s] decision of 21 September 2015 in Mr Kablis’s case was made within the time-limit established by law and contained reasons justifying the impossibility of holding the public event at the chosen location, a well-reasoned proposal to change the location and an explanation of the procedure for notifying public events. The complainant was not therefore deprived of a possibility to enjoy his constitutional right to hold [public events] in accordance with the procedure established by [the Public Events Act]. The complainant’s rights and freedoms under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention were not restricted by the contested decision; there were no obstacles preventing the complainant from enjoying his constitutional rights.” 18.     The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets was outside the area where public events were prohibited by regional law no. 91-RZ. The town administration’s decree no. 9/3483, which allegedly prohibited public events at that location, had never been published and was therefore not accessible to the public. 19.     On 28 January 2016 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 18 November 2015 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified. It held: “The [district] court rejected the complaint on the merits because the contested refusal to approve the chosen location of the picket had been made by the competent authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The municipal authority had given the complainant an objective possibility to enjoy his constitutional and Convention rights. The [district] court correctly applied [the Public Events Act] providing for the conditions for enjoying the right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution ... Having assessed the evidence in the case file, the [district] court made a correct finding that [the town administration’s] proposal to change the location of the public event chosen by the organisers had been substantiated, well reasoned and justified by the necessity to respect the balance of interests of the parties and to ensure public safety. As correctly established by the [district] court, it is prohibited to hold public events at the location chosen by the complainant – at the crossroad of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. Decree no. 598 of 25 December 2012 by the Komi Republic Government designated [special locations for holding political public events in Syktyvkar]. The choice of a location for an event and its approval by the municipal authorities does not restrict the participants’ right to freedom of opinion and expression. The argument that it was impossible to hold the event was hypothetical and did not refer to any valid reasons explaining why the locations proposed by [the town administration] were incompatible with the public event’s purposes sought by the organisers and its social and political significance. The [district] court correctly held in the judgment that in accordance with Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the enjoyment of one’s rights and freedoms must not breach the rights and freedoms of others. Therefore, the holding of a public event by some citizens must not create a situation where other citizens are arbitrarily deprived of a possibility to enjoy their rights in accordance with the established order and traditions. There were therefore objective and sufficient reasons – explaining why it was impossible to approve the location of the public event chosen by the organisers – for the proposal to change the location with the aim of ensuring a balance between the rights of the organisers and those of third persons. [The town administration] did not omit to examine the request for approval of the location of the public event and gave its reply to the complainant within the statutory time-limit. The reply contained reasons explaining why it was impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location and a well-reasoned proposal to change the location. In the court’s opinion, the complainant’s constitutional rights and interests were respected and there was no violation of Article 11 of [the Convention] guaranteeing freedom of assembly, or of [the Public Events Act]. The law does not guarantee the organiser of a public event an unconditional right to hold a public event at the location which he considers the most relevant to its political and social significance. [The town administration] fulfilled its statutory obligation to propose an alternative location for the public event that was compatible with its purposes. The locations proposed were an adequate alternative to the chosen location and were in keeping with its purposes. The [district] court therefore correctly rejected the complaint. The arguments set out in the appeal submissions are limited to a statement that the contested decision of [the town administration] refusing to approve the location chosen for the public event in Stefanovskaya Square had breached the complainant’s rights to freedom of assembly, expression, conscience and religion. These arguments are based on an incorrect assessment of the facts of the case and an incorrect interpretation of the applicable legal provisions. They do not therefore warrant the quashing of the [district] court’s judgment ... The contested decision of [the town administration] was in accordance with [the Public Events Act], was made within the municipal authorities’ powers and was in the interests of ensuring public order, with the aim of preventing disorder, protecting health and morality, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of others. It did not therefore breach the complainant’s rights.” 20.     The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He repeated his previous arguments and added that public events were regularly held at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. 21.     On 19 July 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal to the Presidium of that court for examination, having found no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. C.     Judicial review of the decisions to block the applicant’s VKontakte account and three entries on his Internet blog 22.     On 25 December 2015 the applicant challenged before the Syktyvkar Town Court the decisions of the prosecutor’s office to block his VKontakte account and three entries on his Internet blog. He argued that they had not been necessary in a democratic society and had therefore breached his right to freedom of expression. He claimed that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage. 23 .     On 5 April 2016 the Syktyvkar Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. After citing Article 10 of the Convention and section 15.3 of the Information Act (see paragraph 36 below), and noting that the town administration had refused to approve “the picket” at the location chosen by the applicant, the court held: “Despite the lack of approval for the public event, [the applicant] described the preparations for holding it on his page on a social networking site, VKontakte, and on his blog ..., calling on an unrestricted audience to participate in an unauthorised public event ... In the present case, access to the information published by the claimant was restricted because he had breached information distribution rules, in particular by distributing information containing calls for participation in a public event to be held in breach of the established procedure. In such circumstances, the restriction had a basis in law and pursued the aim of preventing breaches of law in the sphere of distribution of information. Contrary to the claimant’s allegations, his freedom of expression was not restricted, because access was blocked to information distributed in breach of the law, rather than in connection with the contents of the claimant’s statements about the aims of the notified public event (to discuss the arrest of the Komi Republic government). Restriction of access to the entire VKontakte account rather than to the specific post also had a basis in law, which in substance provides for restriction of access to an entire account, taking into consideration the nature of real-time distribution of publicly accessible content on the Internet. In view of the above, and given that it is possible for the claimant to create and distribute new Internet posts, the claimant’s personal non-property rights were not breached. The claim must therefore be dismissed.” 24.     On 7 July 2016 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. 25 .     On 14 December 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant with the Presidium of that court for examination. It held, in particular, that calls for participation in public events held in breach of the established procedure were incompatible with public order. The restriction on access to information containing such calls pursued the aim of preventing more serious violations of public order. 26.     On 31 January 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Procedure for the notification and conduct of public events 27.     For a summary of the domestic provisions on the procedure for the notification and conduct of public events, on relevant judicial review procedures   and on the liability for breaches committed in the course of public events , see Lashmankin and Others (cited above, §§ 216 - 312). 28.     The applicable domestic provisions have since been interpreted by the Supreme Court as follows. 29 .     Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 deals with the application of legislation governing public events during judicial examination of administrative complaints and administrative-offence cases. It provides that a refusal to approve a public event, its location or time or the manner in which it is to be conducted may be challenged before a court either by the event organiser or by a person appointed by the organiser to fulfil certain organisational tasks (point 2). When examining such administrative complaints, the courts have to examine whether the interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of public assembly was lawful, necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim. The courts must examine all the grounds advanced by the public authority and all the evidence submitted by it and assess whether the reasons for the interference were relevant and sufficient (point 9). Furthermore, Ruling no.   28 provides that the courts must verify whether the proposal to change the location or time of a public event or the manner of conducting it was made within the three-day statutory time-limit. Failure to comply with that time-limit means that the public event must be considered to be approved by default (point 10). 30.     Ruling no. 28 also provides that the courts must take into account that a proposal to change the location or time of a public event or the manner in which it is to be conducted must not be arbitrary or unreasoned. They must mention specific facts showing that public interest considerations make it manifestly impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. Such public interests may include: normal functioning of essential public utilities, social and transport infrastructure and communications (such as emergency maintenance work on engineering and technical networks); maintenance of public order and safety of citizens (both those participating in the public event and passers-by, including on account of a risk of building collapse or an expected number of participants in excess of the maximum capacity of the location); disruption of pedestrians or traffic or of citizens’ access to residential premises or to social or transport facilities); and other similar considerations. At the same time, inconvenience caused to citizens by a public event or an assumption by the authorities that there might be a risk of such inconvenience may not in themselves be considered valid reasons for changing the location or time of a public event. For example, a necessity to temporarily divert pedestrians or traffic may not be considered a valid reason for changing the location or time of a public event, provided that it is possible to ensure that the traffic and the conduct of everyone involved in the event will comply with the established rules and will not lead to traffic accidents. On the other hand, disruption of pedestrians or traffic or a risk of disruption of essential public utility services may be considered valid reasons for proposing to change the location or time of a public event, provided that holding the public event will breach traffic or public transport safety requirements or limit citizens’ access to residential premises or public facilities, irrespective of measures taken by the public authority to ensure compliance with such requirements. The public authority must therefore submit to the court evidence of specific facts making it impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. The courts may not take into account any circumstances which were not mentioned in the proposal to change the location or time of the public event (point 12). 31.     Ruling no. 28 further provides that the courts should take into account that the public authority must suggest a specific alternative location and time for the public event compatible with its purposes and its social and political significance. If approval was denied because it was prohibited to hold public events at the chosen location, the public authority may suggest an alternative location for that event. The organiser must reply in writing, stating whether he or she accepts the proposed alternative location and/or time, no later than three days before the planned date of the event. The organiser may also propose another location or time for approval. However, if the organiser wants to change the date of the event, he must submit a new notification (point 13). 32.     Ruling no. 28 also explains that public events held at private premises with unrestricted public access (such as shopping malls) must be notified to the public authority. The organiser must enclose with the notification the consent to the public event signed by the premises’ owner (points 8 and 14). It is not necessary to notify a public event planned at a specially designated location for public events, provided that the number of participants does not exceed the number permitted for each such location by regional law. The organiser must ensure the safety of participants and must therefore make enquiries about any other events planned at the same location at the same time to make sure that the maximum capacity of the location will not be exceeded. The fact that the organiser informed the public authority about the intended public event will be taken into account if he or she is held liable for failure to ensure public order and safety. The public authority may propose a change of location or time of a public event to be held at a specially designated location and not requiring notification only if another public event has been scheduled to take place at the same location and time and (i) the number of participants of the two simultaneous events will exceed the maximum capacity of the location; or (ii) it will not be possible to ensure the peaceful character of the simultaneous events by applying security arrangements habitually used at public events with a comparable number of participants, that is to say, it will be necessary to apply exceptional security measures (point   15). On the other hand, a cultural event, a fair or some other mass event not falling under the Public Events Act, scheduled to take place at the same specially designated location at the same time, may not in itself serve as lawful grounds for proposing to change the location or time of a public event. It may serve as lawful grounds for proposing to change the location or time of a public event only if information about that mass event was duly published and it will not be possible to ensure safety at the two events if they are held simultaneously (point 16). 33.     Lastly, Ruling no. 28 provides that if a court allowed the administrative complaint before the planned date of the public event, it may require the public authority not to impede the public event at the location and time chosen by the organisers. If the public authority has submitted evidence showing that new grounds objectively preventing holding the public event at the chosen location or time arose after the contested decision, the court may require that the public authority re-examine the issue of the event’s location, time or the manner in which it is to be conducted within a certain time-limit (point 20). B.     Komi Republic legislation on public events 34 .     Section 5 of   Komi Republic Law no. 91-RZ of 29 November 2012 on the Holding of Public Events in the Komi Republic provides: “With the aim of protecting human and citizens’ rights and freedoms, legality, public order and public safety, taking into account that the holding of public events may result in disruption to the functioning of public utilities, transport, social or communications services, obstruction of pedestrians or traffic or of citizens’ access to residential buildings or transport and social services, it is prohibited in the Komi Republic to hold public events at the following locations, in addition to the locations where the holding of public events is prohibited pursuant to section 8 paragraph 2 of the Federal [Public Events] Act: 1)     Stefanovskaya Square in the town of Syktyvkar; 2)     Railway stations, bus stations, markets, airports, educational institutions, buildings of educational institutions, religious buildings and areas within a radius of fifty metres of the entrance to those facilities; 3)     children’s playgrounds, locations designated by the municipal authorities for children’s recreation and activities, pedestrian pavements, bus stops, public parking areas; 4)     buildings in a state of disrepair and areas within a radius of fifty metres of the entrance to such buildings; 5)     buildings under construction, reconstruction or repair and areas within a radius of fifty metres of the entrance to such buildings; 6)     buildings occupied by the regional authorities of the Komi Republic, Komi Republic branches of the federal authorities, the municipal authorities of the Komi Republic, state institutions in the Komi Republic and areas within a radius of fifty metres of the entrance to those buildings.” 35 .     Syktyvkar’s town administration’s decree no. 9/3483 of 4   September 2013 described the perimeter of the zone in the immediate vicinity of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic, where the holding of public events was prohibited. The perimeter comprised the entire Stefanovskaya Square and the adjacent streets, including the area at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. C.     Information Act 36 .     Section 15.3 of Law no. 149-FZ of 27 July 2006 on Information,   Information Technologies   and Protection of Information (“the Information Act”), as in force at the material time, provided: “1.     If information disseminated through telecommunication networks, including the Internet, containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure has been discovered – including as a result of a notification by the federal State authorities, the regional State authorities, the municipal authorities, organisations or citizens – the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation or his deputies shall order the federal law ‑ enforcement authority supervising the mass media, mass communications and information technologies to take measures to restrict access to information media distributing that information. 2.     On the basis of the order mentioned in subsection 1 above, the federal law ‑ enforcement authority supervising the mass media, mass communications and information technologies shall immediately: (1)     order ... the service providers to take measures to restrict access to the information medium, such as a website, or to the information published on it containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure. The order must mention the domain name of the website, the network address and the uniform resource locator   (URL) of the webpage permitting identification of the information; (2)     identify the host service provider or person hosting the information medium on a telecommunication network such as the Internet or providing services to the owner of the website containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure; (3)     send to the host service provider or person mentioned in subparagraph 2 above an electronic notification in Russian and English about a breach of the information distribution rules, mentioning the domain name and the network address permitting identification of the website containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure, the URL of the webpage permitting identification of such information, and an order to delete the information; (4)     record in a special electronic register the date and time when the notification was sent to the host service provider or person mentioned in subparagraph   2 above. 3.     Upon receipt of the order to take measures to restrict access from the federal law ‑ enforcement authority supervising the mass media, mass communications and information technologies, the communications service provider permitting access to the Internet telecommunications network must immediately restrict access to the information medium, such as a website, or to information published thereon and containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure. 4.     Within twenty-four hours of receiving the notification mentioned in subsection 2(3) above, the host service provider or person mentioned in subsection 2(2) above must inform the owner of the information resource about the notification and that it is necessary to immediately delete the information containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure. 5.     If the owner of the information medium has deleted the information containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in breach of the established procedure, he must send a notification to the federal law-enforcement authority supervising the mass media, mass communications and information technologies. Such notification may be sent electronically. 6.     Upon receipt of the notification mentioned in subsection 5 above, and after verifying its authenticity, the federal law-enforcement authority supervising the mass media, mass communications and information technologies must immediately send a notification to the communications service provider permitting access to the Internet telecommunications network that it may reopen access to the information medium, such as a website. 7.     Upon receipt of the notification mentioned in subsection 6 above, the communications service provider shall immediately reopen access to the information medium, such as a website.” D.     Administrative proceedings 37 .     The Code of Administrative Procedure (Law no. 21-FZ of 8 March 2015), which entered into force on 15 September 2015, provides that complaints about decisions, acts or omissions of State and municipal authorities and officials are to be examined within a month of receipt, or within two months by the Supreme Court, if not otherwise provided for by this Code for certain categories of cases (Article 226 § 1). THE LAW I.     JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 38.     In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION 39.     The applicant complained about the restrictions imposed by the authorities on the location of his public event. He relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article   11, interpreted where appropriate in the light of Article 10 (see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia , cited above, §§ 363-65). Article 11 reads as follows: “ 1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.” A.     Admissibility 40.     The Court observes that the Government did not raise the issue of the applicant’s compliance with the six-month rule. It has previously found that the application of that rule should not be set aside solely because the Government have not made a preliminary objection based on it (see Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 68, ECHR 2006 ‑ III, and Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ I). The Court therefore considers it appropriate to address this issue in the present case. 41.     In its judgment in the case of Alekseyev v. Russia (nos. 4916/07 and 2 others, § 99, 21 October 2010) the Court found that Russian law, as in force at the material time, did not provide for a preventive remedy, and it found a violation of Article 13 on that ground. Subsequently, in the case of Lashmankin and Others (cited above, §§ 356-60) concerning the events between 2009 and 2012, the Court found that the judicial remedy under former Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) and the Judicial Review Act available to the applicants at the material time – in addition to its inability to allow an enforceable judicial decision to be obtained on the authorities’ refusal to approve the location, time or manner of conduct of a public event before its planned date – had insufficient scope of review. Any review was limited to examining the lawfulness of the authorities’ proposal to change the location or time of a public event or the manner in which it was to be conducted, and included no assessment of its “necessity” or “proportionality”. That finding may be interpreted as meaning that the judicial remedy under former Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act was ineffective both to prevent the alleged violation and to provide adequate redress for a violation that had already occurred. 42.     However, the present case concerns facts that occurred after 15   September 2015, the date on which the new CAP entered into force. Given that the CAP introduced substantial changes to the applicable judicial review procedures, and that it has not yet assessed the effectiveness of the judicial review procedure under the CAP, the Court considers that it was not unreasonable for the applicant to attempt to use that remedy in order to give the domestic courts an opportunity to put matters right through the national legal system, thereby respecting the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see, for similar reasoning, Zubkov and Others v. Russia , nos. 29431/05 and 2 others, § 106, 7   November 2017). 43.     The Court notes that the applicant lodged a judicial review complaint against the town administration’s refusal to approve the location of his “picket” after its planned date. He therefore chose not to avail himself of a possibility provided by the domestic law to have his complaint examined before the planned date of the event, namely to use the judicial review procedure under the CAP as a preventive remedy. He preferred to use that procedure to seek acknowledgment and/or, in combination with a subsequent civil claim, redress for the alleged violation of his right to freedom of assembly that had already occurred. 44.     The Court accordingly finds that, by lodging his application within six months of the final judgment in the judicial review proceedings, the applicant has complied with the six-month rule. 45.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Submissions by the parties 46 .     The applicant submitted that Stefanovskaya Square was the main square in the town of Syktyvkar, where historically many public events had been held. It was large and closed to traffic, and was therefore perfectly suitable for public events. In 2011 the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic had moved to the seventh floor of a building on that square; thereafter, the town administration had prohibited the holding of public events in Stefanovskaya Square altogether (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). Referring to the Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 July 2007 (for a summary of the domestic law provisions, see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, § 254), the applicant argued that the perimeter of the zone in the vicinity of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic was to be determined on the basis of the land or urban planning register and had to be objectively justified by the aim of ensuring the normal functioning of that court. The Syktyvkar Town Administration’s decree determining the perimeter of the zone in the vicinity of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic (see paragraph 35 above) did not meet those criteria, in particular because it provided for a zone covering a total area of about 51,800 sq. m comprising several plots and parts of plots of land registered separately in the urban planning register. Such a large perimeter was not necessary to ensure the normal functioning of that court, which occupied several offices on the seventh floor of an office building. Nor was it necessary to prohibit the holding of public events in the vicinity of the court during periods when it was not in session, as well as on weekends and public holidays. The applicant submitted a list of twenty festive public events held in Stefanovskaya Square in 2016, showing that the prohibition was not always complied with. 47.     The applicant further submitted that the location chosen by him had been near, rather than within, Stefanovskaya Square; the prohibition established by section 5 of   Komi Republic Law no. 91-RZ (see paragraph 34 above), on which the town administration had relied, had not therefore been applicable. Indeed, the domestic courts had relied on the town administration’s decree no. 9/3483 (see paragraph 35 above), rather than on that provision. That decree, however, was defective for the reasons described in paragraph 46 above. The location chosen by the applicant had been 160 m away from the perimeter of the zone in the vicinity of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic, as it should have been determined pursuant to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 17 July 2007. Lastly, the specially designated locations for holding public events proposed by the town administration as an alternative to the location chosen by the applicant had been remote and desolate, and therefore unsuitable. 48.     The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been proportionate to that aim. The domestic legal provisions governing the notification and conduct of public events struck a fair balance between the interests of the organisers of and participants in such events on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of all others – in particular, by providing for adequate measures to prevent and punish infringements of public order and public safety. 49.     The Government further submitted that the Public Events Act set out a list of locations where the holding of public events was prohibited (for a summary of the domestic law provisions, see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, § 223). That prohibition was justified by the special legal regime pertaining to those locations and the need to ensure their security. In particular, referring to a decision of 29 May 2007 by the Constitutional Court (for a summary of the domestic law provisions, see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §   253), the Government argued that the aim of the prohibition on holding public events in the vicinity of court buildings was to protect the independence of the judiciary and to prevent pressure being put on judges. The restriction was therefore justified, and did not breach citizens’ constitutional rights. The perimeter of the zone in the vicinity of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic had been determined by Syktyvkar town administration’s decree no. 9/3483 of 4   September 2013 (see paragraph 35 above); the location chosen by the applicant had been within that perimeter. The domestic authorities had therefore proposed that he change the location of his event to one of the specially designated locations for holding public events. The applicant had not discharged the burden of proof to show that those locations had been unsuitable for his purposes: they had been within the town of