CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 25 juin 2019

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s1E2B8B97 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s51DFF5CF { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s17E903BE { width:3.01pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sF267204E { width:5.67pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sCED75C42 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sC7411871 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sCF155EAA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt }       GRAND CHAMBER               CASE OF NICOLAE VIRGILIU TĂNASE v. ROMANIA   (Application no. 41720/13)                 JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   25 June 2019             This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President,   Angelika Nußberger,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Robert Spano,   Işıl Karakaş,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Kristina Pardalos,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Paul Lemmens, judges,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek, ad hoc judge,   Egidijus Kūris,   Yonko Grozev,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Marko Bošnjak,   Tim Eicke, judges, and Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 15 November 2017, 12 July 2018 and 27   March 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 41720/13) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase (“the applicant”), on 21   June 2013. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr D.I. Tănase, a lawyer practising in Ploieşti. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     Relying on Articles 3, 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention the applicant alleged that the investigation carried out by the domestic authorities into the circumstances of his car accident was inadequate and excessively lengthy. He also alleged that the domestic authorities had failed to adequately safeguard his right to a court and to an effective remedy with regard to his claims. Moreover, they had failed to adequately safeguard his right to have his claims examined within a reasonable time. Finally, he alleged inhuman and degrading treatment suffered by reason of the manner in which the authorities had handled the aforementioned investigation. 4.     The application was initially allocated to the Third Section of the Court, and subsequently to its Fourth Section (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). 5.     On 17 April 2014 the application was communicated to the Government. On 2 June 2015 the Government were invited to submit further written observations. 6.     Ms Iulia Motoc, the judge elected in respect of Romania, withdrew from the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court). The President appointed Mr   Krzysztof Wojtyczek to sit as an ad   hoc judge (Rule 29 § 1). 7.     On 4 April 2017 a Chamber of the Fourth Section decided to give notice to the parties of its intention to relinquish jurisdiction of the case in favour of the Grand Chamber. On 18 May 2017 the aforementioned Chamber confirmed its intention to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, having regard to the fact that none of the parties objected to the relinquishment of the case (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule   72 §§   1 and 4). 8.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. At the final deliberations, Armen Harutyunyan, substitute judge, replaced Helena Jäderblom, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3). 9.     The applicant and the Government each filed written observations. 10.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 15 November 2017. There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   C. Brumar , of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Ms   M. Luduşan , magistrate seconded to the Government’s Agent Department,   Counsel , Mr   L. Bleoca , Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Delegation of Romania to the Council of Europe,   Adviser , (b)     for the applicant Mr   D.I. Tănase ,   Counsel .   The Court heard addresses by Ms Brumar, Ms Luduşan and Mr Tănase. Ms   Brumar and Mr Tănase subsequently replied to questions put by judges. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 11.     The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Ploieşti. The background to the case 12.     At around 8.40 p.m. on 3 December 2004 the applicant, who at the time was a judge serving with the Dâmbovița County Court, was involved in a car accident. Throughout the domestic proceedings and in his application to the Court, he alleged, inter alia , that a third party – a certain D.I. – had crashed his car into the back of the applicant’s car. As a result of this impact, the applicant’s car had been shunted into the back of a stationary military lorry, of which the driver was a certain J.C.P. 13.     Following the collision with the applicant’s car, D.I.’s car bounced off the applicant’s car and collided with another car which had been driving on the oncoming lane (hereinafter “the fourth driver”). The fourth driver was never the subject of any investigation. Criminal proceedings concerning the accident First stage of the investigation (a)    The conduct of the investigation 14.     On the same date, on 3 December 2004, the Ploieşti Police Department (hereinafter “the Police Department”) initiated, of its own motion, a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the accident. The Police Department’s investigation was supervised by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti District Court (hereinafter “the District Court Prosecutor’s Office”). 15.     The Police Department carried out an on-site investigation. According to the minutes of the report drawn up on the on-site investigation it took measurements and photographs, produced a detailed description of the site of the accident, identified the drivers involved in the incident and had medical personnel collect blood samples from all three drivers in order to establish the level of alcohol in their blood. Also, it asked the Ploieşti Forensic Service (hereinafter “the Forensic Service”) to produce toxicology reports in respect of the alcohol levels found in the drivers’ blood. In addition, it took statements from some of the passengers of the vehicles involved in the incident. 16.     Between 4 December 2004 and 6 September 2005 the Police Department took statements from the remaining passengers of the vehicles involved in the accident, as well as from the applicant, D.I., and J.C.P. and asked the Forensic Service to produce a forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident. 17.     The toxicology reports – produced on 6 December 2004 – concluded that only the applicant had alcohol in his blood that night. 18 .     The forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident – produced on 27 June 2005 – noted that the applicant had been committed to hospital three times by 6 May 2005. He was diagnosed, inter alia , with polytrauma, post-traumatic mesentery rupture, and fractured and/or displaced bones and body parts. He had undergone three surgical operations, including one involving the removal of part of his intestines, and had required a lower tracheotomy because of respiratory complications. The report further noted that the applicant’s physical examination by the forensic expert had disclosed a diminished power of compression in his right hand and reduced amplitude in the abduction movement of his right arm. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered injuries that could have been caused on 3 December 2004 by collision with or compression by hard objects or surfaces following a car accident. The injuries required between 200 and 250 days of medical care and their severity had endangered the applicant’s life. The presence of any disability was to be assessed after the end of the recovery treatment. 19.     On 22 June 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 20.     On 2 August 2005 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office declined jurisdiction in favour of the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office”) on account of the applicant’s status as a judge. The latter Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings in   rem on 6   September 2005 because the accident had caused the applicant severe injuries, giving rise to the offence of involuntary serious bodily harm. 21.     Between 7 and 24 October 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office took statements from several of the witnesses to the accident, including the fourth driver, and heard evidence from the applicant. Also, it instructed the applicant to submit, by 31 October 2005, his views on the technical expert report which he had requested, and the names of further witnesses he had asked to be heard. 22.     On 28 October 2005 the applicant’s lawyer asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office to postpone the deadline set for the applicant, inter alia , because he was unable to consult the applicant or submit evidence to the file on account of the latter’s serious medical condition. (b)    The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 23.     On 5 December 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings brought against D.I. and J.C.P. and the criminal investigation concerning the applicant. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Also, the applicant was responsible for causing the accident because he had been driving under the influence of alcohol and had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions. However, the elements of an offence had not been met in his case because the alcohol level found in his blood had been below the legal threshold of 0.8‰. 24.     The applicant challenged the decision before the Prosecutor General attached to the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the Prosecutor General”). He argued, inter alia , that the prosecutor’s office had failed to produce a technical expert report and had ignored or misinterpreted the available evidence, whether intentionally or not. 25.     On 3 January 2006 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s challenge. He reiterated the findings of the prosecutor’s office. In addition, he held that the applicant had not applied the brakes of his car before the impact with the lorry. He added that no technical expert report was necessary, considering that the evidence already obtained was conclusive. First round of court proceedings 26.     The applicant appealed against the decisions of 5 December 2005 and 3 January 2006 before the Ploieşti Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”). He reiterated the arguments which he had put forward to the Prosecutor General. In addition, he argued that the investigators had ignored his request for evidence to be included in the file which could have allowed him to prove that his blood samples had been collected unlawfully or under suspicious circumstances. 27.     On 17 April 2006 the Court of Appeal declared itself without jurisdiction and referred the case to the Ploieşti District Court (hereinafter “the District Court”) on the grounds that the applicant had retired from his post as judge. After the District Court took over the case it adjourned the proceedings five times between 13 June and 6 October 2006 on procedural grounds, and in order to have time to examine the case. 28.     On 13 October 2006 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the prosecutor’s office’s decisions. It held that the applicant had been responsible for the accident. He had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions in order to avoid potential danger. 29 .     Upon an appeal on points of fact and of law ( recurs ) by the applicant, the Prahova County Court on 18 December 2006 quashed that judgment and ordered the District Court Prosecutor’s Office to reopen the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. It also ordered the prosecutor’s office to produce a technical expert report that would clarify the circumstances of the accident. The available evidence attested that brake marks caused by the applicant’s car had been found and the witness statements on whether the lorry had been correctly parked were contradictory. Furthermore, a forensic expert report was needed with regard to the alcohol level in the applicant’s blood. Second stage of the investigation (a)    The conduct of the investigation 30.     On 3 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a psychiatric forensic expert report concerning the applicant. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder which could have been aggravated by any state of conflict. The applicant’s psychological suffering might also have been exacerbated by the repeated surgical interventions, but could not be medically quantified. Prior to the accident the applicant had not been registered as a patient with psychological problems. There was a clear connection between the chronic post-traumatic stress and all the conflict situations he was experiencing. 31 .     On 10 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a forensic expert report concerning the applicant’s blood. It concluded that there had been some irregularities in the collection of his blood samples. Among other things, it appeared that the second blood sample had been collected at a time when the applicant was in fact no longer present in the hospital’s stabilisation room. The report also noted the applicant’s argument that there had been an excessive use of disinfectants at the time when the samples were collected and that this could have altered the reading of the alcohol level found in his blood. The experts stated that, if the methodology used to collect the blood samples had not been observed, the result of the alcohol test might have been affected. 32.     On 16 May 2007 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office reopened the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. and referred the case back to the Police Department for the investigative measures ordered by the court. Subsequently, from 7 June to 22 November 2007, the applicant asked the Police Department and the prosecutor’s office for additional evidence to be included in the file, including a technical expert report concerning the circumstances of the accident and new forensic expert reports on his blood alcohol level and the dynamics of the accident. In addition, he complained repeatedly about the delays in the investigation. 33.     On 3 October 2007, following the Police Department’s request of 14   August 2007 for a forensic expert report concerning the alcohol in the applicant’s blood, the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute (hereinafter “the Forensic Institute”) informed the Police Department that the substances used when the biological samples had been collected from the applicant could not explain the presence of alcohol in his blood. 34.     On 20 December 2007 an expert assigned by the Police Department on 9 September 2007 produced a technical expert report on the causes of the accident. After having examined the available evidence, the expert concluded that J.C.P. could have prevented the accident if he had complied with the traffic regulations concerning vehicles stopping on public roads at night. Moreover, the first impact had been that between the applicant’s car and the lorry, after which D.I. had crashed into the applicant’s car. Furthermore, D.I. had complied with the traffic regulations and the speed limits, and had kept a safe distance from the car in front of him. He concluded that the applicant and D.I. could not have avoided the accident. 35.     The private experts chosen by the applicant and by D.I. to participate in the activities of the expert appointed by the Police Department, leading to the report of 20 December 2007 submitted comments on that report. The expert chosen by the applicant concluded that the applicant’s car had crashed into the lorry after having been hit by D.I.’s car, and that D.I. could have avoided the accident if he had kept a proper lookout and a sufficient distance from the car in front of him. 36.     Between 22 and 25 January 2008 the Police Department heard evidence from J.C.P. and two of the witnesses to the accident. It dismissed the applicant’s request for a re-enactment of the circumstances of the accident on the grounds that such a re-enactment could be made only on a theoretical level, by producing a technical expert report which would determine the circumstances in which the traffic accident had taken place. Also, it dismissed the applicant’s requests for a new forensic expert report on his blood alcohol level and for a new technical expert report on the grounds that the Forensic Institute and the expert had dealt with the objectives set. On 4 February 2008 it recommended discontinuing the criminal proceedings. 37 .     On 18 August 2008 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the Police Department’s recommendation. It held that the available evidence was contradictory and insufficient to clarify the circumstances of the case. It therefore ordered the Police Department to instruct the Forensic Institute to produce a forensic expert report on the applicant’s alcohol level. The prosecutor’s office also asked the Police Department to mandate the Bucharest Inter-County Laboratory for Criminological Reports (hereinafter “Laboratory for Criminological Reports”) to produce a technical expert report on the circumstances of the accident. Furthermore, depending on the outcome of the forensic expert report, the Police Department was also instructed to produce a second version of the technical expert report assessing whether the accident could have been avoided given the applicant’s alcohol level at the time of the accident. 38.     On 19 February 2009, in response to the Police Department’s 21   October 2008 request for a forensic expert report, the Forensic Institute informed the Police Department that – given the contradictory and incomplete evidence – there were serious doubts as to whether the blood collected and examined belonged to the applicant. 39.     On 30 March 2009 the Police Department dismissed the applicant’s request for a new forensic expert report to be produced with regard to his blood alcohol level on the grounds, inter alia , that a new report would not be necessary or conclusive for the case. On the same date the Police Department asked the Laboratory for Criminological Reports to produce the technical expert report ordered by the prosecutor’s office. 40.     Following a challenge by the applicant against the Police Department’s decision of 30 March 2009, the District Court Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant on 30 April 2009 that the criminal investigation file had been sent to the Laboratory for Criminological Reports and that in the absence of the file his challenge could not be examined within the legal time-limit. The applicant’s subsequent complaint of 8 May 2009 against the notification of 30 April 2009 was dismissed by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti County Court on 16   June 2009 as inadmissible. 41.     On 21 April 2009 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports informed the Police Department that, in the light of their extreme workload and the small number of experts available, the technical criminological report in respect of the applicant’s case could not be produced before 2011. 42.     Nevertheless, on 29 September 2010 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports produced the aforementioned report. It concluded, inter alia , that given the speed needed to avoid an impact with the lorry, the applicant could not have avoided it. It could not be established whether D.I. could have avoided hitting the applicant’s car, or whether J.C.P. could have prevented the accident, nor was it possible to establish the manner and the order in which the applicant’s car and D.I.’s car had collided. It estimated that the applicant’s and D.I’s cars had probably collided after the applicant’s car had hit the lorry. 43.     On 6 January 2011, having noted that the case-file had been returned by the Laboratory for Criminological Reports, the applicant reminded the District Court Prosecutor’s Office of his challenge against the Police Department’s decision of 30 March 2009. 44.     On 28 January 2011 the Police Department dismissed a request by the applicant for a new technical expert report to be produced by a court ‑ appointed expert on the grounds that the report of 29 September 2010 had clarified as far as possible the circumstances of the accident. The applicant’s challenge against the Police Department’s decision was dismissed by the District Court Prosecutor’s Office on 3 March 2011. (b)    The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 45.     On 21 February 2011 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. and J.C.P. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Neither the applicant nor D.I. had adapted their speed to the road conditions. However, the technical expert report of 29 September 2010 had been unable to establish with any certainty whether D.I. could have avoided the accident. Furthermore, according to the forensic expert report of 27 June 2005, the applicant’s injuries had been caused mainly by his car’s head-on impact with the lorry. 46.     On 23 March 2011 the higher-level prosecutor of the District Court Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s challenge against the decision of 21 February 2011. It held that according to the available evidence the said decision had been lawful. The only blame for the accident that could be established with certainty was that of the applicant. He had been driving his car too fast at night. Second round of court proceedings 47.     On 30 March 2011 the applicant appealed to the District Court against the District Court Prosecutor’s Office’s decision of 21   February 2011. He argued, inter alia , that the prosecutor’s office’s decision had relied only on part of the evidence on file. Also, he criticised the expert report of 29   September 2010. 48 .     Shortly afterwards, the applicant requested the High Court of Cassation and Justice to transfer the case to another court, on the basis of legitimate suspicion regarding the judges of the District Court. The High Court of Cassation and Justice granted the applicant’s request on 21   June 2011, noting the positions of the parties and the fact that the applicant had lodged criminal complaints against the judges and prosecutors from Ploieşti (see paragraph 62 below). It transferred the case to the Bucharest District Court. 49 .     On 30 September 2011 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the applicant’s objections against the expert report of 29 September 2010 and confirmed the prosecutor’s office’s decision in so far as it discontinued the criminal proceedings against J.C.P. According to the available evidence, the lorry had been legally parked by J.C.P., the applicant first hit the lorry and then his car was hit by D.I. 50 .     Concerning the criminal proceedings against D.I., the court considered that D.I. had not discharged his lawful duty to drive preventively. The decision to discontinue the proceedings against D.I. was contradictory, considering that the same decision acknowledged that D.I. had breached his legal duty. Also, the conclusion of the expert report of 20   December 2007 that D.I. could not have avoided the accident was at odds with the provisions of the relevant domestic legislation concerning preventive driving. 51.     However, in the absence of evidence on file clarifying the existence or non-existence of a causal link between D.I.’s action and the applicant’s injuries, the court could not retain the case for examination. Consequently, it quashed the decision in so far as it had ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings against D.I. and ordered the prosecutor’s office to produce a new forensic expert report determining the possible existence of a direct connection between D.I.’s actions and the applicant’s injuries. It took the view that this new forensic expert report should be able to establish whether the applicant’s injuries had been produced by the impact between his car and the lorry or by the impact between D.I.’s car and the applicant’s car or by a combination of the two events. 52 .     The District Court noted that the statute of limitations for criminal liability was close to becoming applicable. However, it considered that it could not retain the case for examination and indict D.I. because, in the absence of the requested evidence, the existence of all the elements of an offence could not be established beyond any doubt. 53.     D.I.’s appeal on points of fact and of law against this judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 16   January 2012. Third stage of the investigation (a)    The conduct of the investigation 54.     On 5 April 2012 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office reopened the criminal proceedings against D.I. On 6 April 2012, it asked the Forensic Service to produce the forensic expert report requested by the court. The Forensic Service produced the said report on 11 April 2012 and concluded, inter alia , that a very short period of time had elapsed between the two   impacts. It could not be established on the basis of the applicant’s injuries which of the two events had been the cause. A combination of the two impacts was possible. 55.     On 25 April 2012 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office to take over the case on the grounds that the case was complex and the proceedings had been lengthy. The Prosecutor General granted his request on 26 April 2012 on the ground that there was a risk that the statutory limitation period would expire. 56.     On 28 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s respective requests of 12 April and 18 May 2012 for a simulation of the accident to be carried out and for a new forensic expert report to be produced by the Forensic Institute. It held that – in the light of the conclusions of the available reports – the evidence requested by the applicant was neither relevant nor necessary for the case. (b)    The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 57.     On 30 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. The forensic expert report of 11 April 2012 could not establish how many of the medical-care days needed by the applicant had been the result of the self-inflicted injuries or of the injuries caused by D.I., or whether the latter’s actions had generated any need at all for medical-care days. Consequently, there was doubt regarding the causal link between D.I.’s actions and the applicant’s injuries, and this doubt worked in D.I.’s favour. 58.     On 18 June 2012 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s challenge against this decision. He held that the statute of limitations had taken effect on 3 June 2012 and that the investigation in the case therefore could not be continued. Third round of court proceedings 59.     On 18 July 2012 the applicant asked the District Court to quash the Prosecutor General’s decision of 18 June 2012 and to retain the case for examination. He argued, inter alia , that the statute of limitations had not taken effect. Also, the prosecutor’s office had breached his right to defence by dismissing his request for a review of the expert report dated 11   April 2012 by the Forensic Institute. 60.     By final judgment of 21 December 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Prosecutor General. The court held that according to the relevant criminal law provisions, including the provision concerning the more lenient criminal law, the statute of limitations in respect of D.I.’s offence had taken effect on 3 June 2012. 61.     The applicant’s appeal on points of fact and of law against the judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Court of Appeal on 7   March 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the District Court was not amenable to appeal. However, the Court of Appeal referred to the Constitutional Court a constitutional challenge by the applicant to the relevant legal provisions concerning appeals against prosecutor’s office’s decisions. The latter court dismissed the constitutional challenge as unfounded on 24 September 2013. Complaints brought by the applicant against investigators and judges dealing with his cases 62 .     Between 19 November 2008 and 30 September 2011 the applicant submitted several challenges and several criminal and disciplinary complaints to the relevant hierarchical or supervisory authorities, including the Superior Council of Magistrates, against many of the investigating and judicial authorities involved in the investigation and examination of the cases concerning him. His complaints included allegations of bias, of handling his cases in an abusive and unlawful manner and of favouring D.I. and J.C.P. 63.     With one exception (see paragraph 48 above), the applicant’s complaints either were dismissed by the competent authorities on the grounds that no unlawful acts had been committed or in some cases appear to remain pending. In some decisions relating to the applicant’s complaints, such as a decision delivered by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 10 September 2009 and a decision delivered by the Prosecutor General on 25 October 2011, the competent authorities indicated that the applicant was motivated by a subjective dissatisfaction with the outcome of the investigation, or even by a desire to take revenge on the investigators. Civil proceedings brought by the applicant 64 .     On 28 November 2006 the applicant brought proceedings before the Dâmbovița County Court against his car insurance company seeking a judgment ordering the insurance company to comply with its contractual obligation to compensate him for the total loss of the insured vehicle and to pay him non-pecuniary damages for the psychological suffering incurred following the insurance company’s allegedly unjustified refusal to comply with its contractual obligation. The applicant also brought proceedings against the company from which he was leasing his car in order to make the judgment binding on that company. On 16 September 2010 the court ordered that D.I. and J.C.P. be joined as third parties to the proceedings. 65 .     Eventually, on 27 November 2013, the Dâmbovița County Court dismissed the proceedings initiated by the applicant against the insurance and lease companies on the grounds that the applicant had failed to pay the required judicial stamp duty. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 66.     The former Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, which was in force at the material time (until 31 January 2014), provided that the object of a civil action was to hold the defendant civilly liable for damage caused by an act which was the subject matter of the criminal proceedings. A civil action could be joined to the criminal proceedings by the lodging of a civil ‑ party claim (Article 14). The injured party could lodge such a claim either during the criminal proceedings or before the trial court, up until the day the indictment was read out in court (Article 15). If an injured party had not joined criminal proceedings as a civil party, he or she could initiate separate proceedings before the civil courts for damages caused as a result of the offence. Civil proceedings had to be stayed pending the final judgment of the criminal courts. An injured party who had joined criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate separate civil proceedings if the criminal proceedings had been stayed. If the criminal proceedings were re ‑ opened, the civil proceedings opened before the civil courts had to be stayed. An injured party who had initiated civil proceedings could abandon those proceedings and lodge a request (for joining a civil claim to the criminal proceedings) with the investigating authorities or the trial court if the indictment had been made or the trial was resumed after the stay. The civil proceedings could not be abandoned once the civil court had delivered judgment, even if it was not yet a final one (Article 19). An injured party who had joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate civil proceedings, if the criminal court, by a final judgment, had left the civil action unexamined (Article 20). The final judgment of the criminal court was res judicata for the civil court which was called to examine the civil action in so far as it concerned the existence of the act, the person who had committed it and that person’s guilt. By contrast, the final judgment of the civil court was not res judicata for the investigating authorities and the criminal court in so far as it concerned the existence of a criminal act, the person who had committed it and that person’s guilt (Article 21). 67.     The former Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, in force until 14   February 2013, provided that a civil court could suspend the proceedings when criminal proceedings had been instituted for an offence which could have a decisive influence on the judgment that had to be delivered, and that the suspension had to remain in force pending a final judgment in the case which had triggered the suspension (Article 244). The court suspended the civil proceedings by an interlocutory judgment amenable to appeal, which could be lodged as long as the proceedings were suspended (Article 244 1 ). 68.     The former Romanian Civil Code, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that any person who was responsible for causing damage to another would be liable to make reparation for it regardless of whether the damage was caused through his or her own actions, through his or her failure to act or through his or her negligence (Articles 998 and 999). 69.     Legislative Decree no. 167/1958 on the statute of limitations, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that the right to lodge an action having a pecuniary scope was time-barred unless it was exercised within three years (Articles 1 and 3). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act started to run from the moment the person became, or should have become, aware of the damage and knew who had caused it (Article 8). However, the time ‑ limit was interrupted by the lodging of a court action (Article 16). A new term of the statute of limitations started to run after its interruption (Article 17). 70.     The new Romanian Civil Code, in force since 1   October 2011, provides that a person with discernment is liable for all damage caused by his actions or inactions and is bound to make full reparation (Article 1349). With regard to the existence of the damage or of the guilt of the perpetrator of the unlawful act, the civil court is not bound by the provisions of criminal law or by the final judgment of acquittal or of closing the criminal trial (Article 1365). The right to lodge an action, including one with a pecuniary scope, is time-barred if not exercised within three years, unless the law provides otherwise (Articles 2500, 2501 and 2517). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act starts to run from the moment the person becomes, or should become, aware of the damage and knows who caused it (Article 2528). The time-limit can be interrupted by the lodging of a court action or of a civil ‑ party claim during the criminal proceedings instituted, or before the court, up to the moment when the court starts the judicial examination of the case (Article 2537). If the time-bar is interrupted by the lodging of a civil ‑ party claim, the interruption remains valid until the order to close or suspend the criminal proceedings or the decision of the court to suspend the proceedings is notified, or until the criminal court has delivered a final   judgment (Article 2541). THE LAW SCOPE OF THE CASE AND CHARACTERISATION OF THE COMPLAINTS The parties’ submissions 71 .     The applicant alleged in his application to the Court that following the accident he had suffered serious bodily harm entailing danger to his life. He also alleged that the investigation into the circumstances of the accident had been unreasonably long. Also, the domestic courts had reviewed only his appeals against the prosecutor’s offices’ decisions, none of them determining the merits of his case. The authorities’ main concern had been to hide and distort the truth, rather than to clarify the circumstances of the accident. He had not been allowed to adduce relevant evidence to the file, several abuses had been committed by the authorities and the offenders had been aided by them. In his opinion all of the aforementioned elements amounted to humiliation and inhuman and degrading treatment. He had felt hurt by this treatment, considering also the fact that he was a person suffering from a serious disability following the accident. Finally, the statutory limitation of the criminal liability had come into effect during the criminal investigation proceedings, as intended by the domestic authorities. 72.     In his subsequent written observations to the Court, the applicant referred, inter alia , to the fact that J.C.P. was a State agent. He was a civil employee of a military unit and at the time of the accident he had been carrying out an official mission entrusted to him by the military unit on behalf of the Romanian State. 73 .     The Government submitted that in his initial application to the Court and in his subsequent written submissions before the Chamber, the applicant had not alleged any failure on the part of the State to adopt sufficient legal rules and measures to regulate motor vehicle traffic on public roads. Nor had he mentioned any aspect falling within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. 74.     The Government pointed out that in the aforementioned initial application the applicant had complained that the manner in which the domestic authorities had investigated the traffic accident of which he had been a victim amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. However, in circumstances such as those of the instant case, Article 3 was not applicable under its substantive limb, as the manner in which the authorities had handled the investigation had been sufficiently covered by the procedural obligations enshrined inter alia in that article. 75.     In his subsequent written submissions before the Chamber, the applicant had expressly stated that his application to the Court concerned abuses committed by State agents when investigating the circumstances of the accident and his inability to bring those agents to justice, and not the injuries he had suffered as a result of D.I.’s actions. He had also stated that he was not complaining of any breach of Article 2 of the Convention. In addition, the letters submitted by the applicant clearly showed that he had not intended to complain about an alleged breach of Article 3 under its procedural limb. 76 .     The Government considered that the Court had to take into account the applicant’s free will and limit the scope of the present case to the complaints set out in his application form and in his subsequent submissions, without changing that scope. 77.     They also argued that the applicant had never complained to the Court that the State was responsible for J.C.P.’s conduct on the basis of his status as a State agent. Also, the criminal proceedings against J.C.P. had ended on 30 September 2011 – more than six months before the applicant lodged his application before the Court – and the domestic courts had irrevocably established that J.C.P. was not responsible for the accident (see paragraph 49 above). Furthermore, there had been no evidence in the file of the State’s responsibility for the accident. The Court could not duplicate the efforts of the competent authorities and independently establish the circumstances of the accident or identify the persons responsible for it. 78 .     The Government acknowledged that J.C.P. was an employee of the military unit and that at the time of the accident he had been exercising his professional duties. However, J.C.P. was a civil employee of the said unit, and under the relevant domestic law the military unit could have been held civilly liable for the accident only if the relevant authorities had found J.C.P. responsible for the accident. Since J.C.P. had had no responsibility for the traffic accident the substantive limbs of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention were not applicable in the instant case. 79 .     Moreover, the Government considered that J.C.P.’s classification as a State agent was irrelevant to the outcome of the instant case because the applicant had not argued that J.C.P.’s status had been an element influencing the domestic investigation. Furthermore, the domestic investigation had been carried out by civilian prosecutors with no ties to J.C.P. or the military unit employing him. The Court’