CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 2 juillet 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s7E985A65 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:1pt } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s8B7697D0 { width:20.77pt; display:inline-block } .s283A1600 { width:122.4pt; display:inline-block } .sF7DC134C { width:39.46pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }     THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 4014/12 Peter JARKOVSKÝ against Slovakia   The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 2   July   2019 as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Alena Poláčková,   María Elósegui,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 January 2012, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Mr Peter Jarkovský, is a Slovak national who was born in 1963 and lives in Prešov. He is represented before the Court by Mr   M.   Feciľak, a lawyer practising in Prešov. 2.     The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 1.     Background 4.     The applicant has brought twenty-one applications under the Convention. Their content indicates that he systematically acquired title to numerous plots of land in and around the city of Prešov on which buildings, roads and other constructions and facilities had been built prior to the   changes of 1989. 5.     According to the applicant, the constructions were built without regularisation of the legal relationships concerned and their owners did not have good title to have them on the land that has since become his. On that basis, he has claimed financial compensation in numerous sets of domestic proceedings. 6.     The present application specifically concerns four plots of land containing roads and footpaths built in the 1970s, which now belong to the city of Prešov. 7.     The applicant bought the plots in 2007 from an individual who, as acknowledged by the courts in 2006, had inherited them in 1986. 8.     At or around the time of sale, the seller declared in writing to the city of Prešov that, as regards the constructions situated on the land that she was selling to the applicant, neither she nor her legal predecessors had ever consented to them and that, accordingly, she considered the land free from any encumbrances. 2.     Compensation claim 9.     On 3 December 2008 the applicant brought a claim in the Prešov District Court against the city of Prešov. Relying on Article 451 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 25 in “Relevant domestic law and practice” below), he sought the equivalent of some 35,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for what he considered to be unjust enrichment by the defendant at his expense in relation to the four plots in the period from 24 January to 19   November   2007. 10.     At a hearing held on 9 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer also relied, without providing any further explanation, on the provisions of Article 135c of the Civil Code, which dealt with what was known as “unlawful construction” in so far as the roads and footpaths had been built on his land without good title. Under those provisions, a situation of unlawful construction could be resolved by, for example, removing the construction; giving the owner of the land title to the construction, with compensation being paid to the original owner of the construction; or, ultimately, creating an easement for the benefit of the owner of the construction, with compensation being paid to the owner of the land. 11.     On 28 June 2010 the District Court dismissed the claim. It found that one of the four plots identified by the applicant, no. 1518/39, was not encumbered by any constructions situated directly on it or legally considered to be touched by the adjacent road. The applicant had accordingly failed to show any cause of action against the defendant in that respect. As for the remaining three plots, in so far as the applicant had relied on the concept of unlawful construction under Article 135c of the Civil Code, the District Court held that this lacked any substantiation in terms of evidence, arguments or otherwise and that it accordingly did not amount to a claim under that provision. The claim was thus understood to be a claim for unjust enrichment. The court observed that, by using the land, the city was satisfying general needs and providing services to the public for which it received no payment. It was doing so at its own expense, without making any profit. The exercise of the applicant’s rights was therefore contra bonos mores within the meaning of Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 in section “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) and, as a consequence, his claim had to   be dismissed. 12.     On 14 July 2010 the applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment in the Prešov Regional Court, contesting the District Court’s factual and legal conclusions. In addition, he relied on judicial decisions in unrelated but similar cases brought by him and by others (see paragraphs   21, 26 and 27 below) which, in his view, supported his claim in the present case. 13 .     On 13 April 2011 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the challenged judgment. It examined the matter in detail, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning and adding further reasons of its own. In   particular, it held that the original interference with the property in question and any claims potentially stemming from it concerned the original owner of the property and not the applicant. He had only acquired title to the property by way of purchase in 2007. It was true that in the relevant period (24 January to 19 November 2007) there continued to be restrictions on the use of the property for which the defendant was liable. In the absence of any good title on its part, it was enriching itself without any justification and would normally have to return the gain thus obtained to the applicant. However, on the particular facts of the case, consideration had to be given to the fact that the applicant had acquired the property of his own free will, being fully aware of its condition. Although the seller had made a   declaration to the effect that the property was free from any encumbrances, it was obvious, and was clearly reflected in the purchase price, that the parties were fully aware of the restrictions attached to the property. The court knew from other files that, as in the case at hand, the applicant was pursuing similar claims in numerous other cases without actually seeking to regularise the relationship between ownership and use. The exercise of his property rights in such circumstances was therefore contra bonos mores within the meaning of Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code and his claim had to be dismissed. 3.     Final domestic decision 14.     On 16 June and 23 August 2011 the applicant lodged and amended a   complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, alleging that by its judgment of 13 April 2011 the Regional Court had, inter alia , violated his property rights and his right to a fair hearing. In substance, he contested the findings of law and fact by the ordinary courts and pursued a similar line of argument as above. He pointed out that the unfavourable outcome of his claim had resulted in him being totally deprived of any compensation and the defendant’s unlawful use of his land being completely protected. As to the alleged inconsistency of the decision-making of the District Court and the Regional Court, in addition to the case-law already relied on, he also relied on a judgment of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 30 below) which he believed supported his case. 15.     On 28 September 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. It referred to the contested judgment, concluding that it was free from any constitutionally relevant arbitrariness and irregularities. In addition, it took the view that it was not its task to deal with a possible divergence of practice by the ordinary courts and thereby to substitute the responsibility of the Supreme Court in a matter of that nature. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court observed that its own judgments in cases nos.   IV.   US   70/11 and IV. US 94/11 (see paragraph 21 below) concerned a   lack of reasoning in judgments of the ordinary courts in cases similar to the present one, contained no position on their substance, and were accordingly of no relevance to the case at hand. 16.     The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 25 October 2011 and was not amenable to appeal. 4.     Subsequent harmonisation of the courts’ practice 17.     Between 31 August and 4 October 2012 the applicant wrote to the President of the Regional Court several times, arguing that the court had an   inconsistent approach as regards claims for compensation for unjust enrichment by owners of roads situated on someone else’s land constructed without good title. In that connection, he relied on judgments and decisions of the District Court, the Regional Court and the Constitutional Court (such as those summarised in paragraphs 21 and 26 below), and asked that measures be taken with a view to harmonising the divergent views. 18.     In a letter of 4 September 2012 the President of the Regional Court informed the applicant that she saw no reason to take any particular measures. 19 .     Nevertheless, on 10 January 2013 an opinion was adopted by the Civil Division of the Regional Court with a view to harmonising the existing practice on the matter. According to the opinion adopted, unjust enrichment consisted not only of a   gain in terms of property by its beneficiary but also a lack of loss of property. There was no reason not to apply that principle to public entities which enriched themselves by using someone else’s land without good title for the purposes of a road. The owners of such constructions were under a   duty to compensate the owners of the land containing those constructions, irrespective of how the owners of the constructions exercised their ownership rights and whether they were making any profit. The amount of compensation was to be determined on a case-by-case basis. If a municipality owned a road situated on someone else’s land and no other arrangements had been made, under legislation which entered into force on 1 March 2009 (Law no. 66/2009 Coll.), an ex lege easement was established for the benefit of the municipality. While the legislation did not address the issue of compensation, there was no legal obstacle to it being awarded to the owners of the land concerned under the general rules on easements. 20 .     The applicant learned of the opinion of 10 January 2013 from the written transcript of a judgment adopted by the Regional Court on 11   December 2012 in an unrelated but similar case brought by him, which was served on him on 15 February 2013. It was subsequently specifically referred to in other decisions and judgments, including a decision of the Regional Court of 19   November 2015 on an appeal (no. 19Co 198/14) in   an   unrelated but similar case. 5.     Other similar cases involving the applicant 21 .     In cases that resulted in the Constitutional Court’s judgments of 16   December 2009 (no. III. ÚS 237/09), 23 June 2011 (no. IV. ÚS 70/11) and 7   July 2011 (no. IV. ÚS 94/11), the applicant and a company associated with him pursued claims against a city and a self-governing region for compensation in respect of unjust enrichment in circumstances similar to those in the present case. The claims were dismissed by the District Court and, on appeal, by the Regional Court on various grounds, including for being contra bonos mores . In the above-mentioned judgments, the Constitutional Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgments on the grounds that its reasoning was insufficient in that it had failed to respond adequately to the applicant’s arguments. While the cases were remitted to the Regional Court for re-examination of the arguments in question, the Constitutional Court specifically indicated that it in no way prejudiced the outcome of the dispute. 22.     The position that a municipality owning a road situated on another person’s land was to compensate the owner of the land under the rules of unjust enrichment was also endorsed by the Regional Court in its judgment of 25 September 2013 on an appeal (1Co 21/13) by the applicant in an   unrelated but similar case brought by him. The judgment however gave no consideration to the notion of bonos mores . B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     Civil Code 23 .     Article 3 § 1 provides that: “The exercise of rights and [performance of] duties arising from a civil relationship shall not, without legal grounds, interfere with the rights and legitimate interests of others and shall not be contra bonos mores .” 24 .     Article 123 stipulates: “Within the boundaries of the law, an owner shall have the right to hold, use, collect civil fruits and proceeds from and make dispositions in respect of the object of ownership.” 25 .     Article 451 reads: “1.     Whoever unjustly enriches himself at the expense of another shall restore the enrichment.” 2.   Unjust enrichment is any property gain obtained by receiving consideration without legal grounds, under an invalid legal act, or for legal grounds that have ceased to exist, as well as any property gain obtained from improper sources.” 2.     Judicial practice 26 .     In judgments of 25 November 1999 (case no. 12C 201/95), 20   March 2003 (case no. 17C 166/99), 23 May 2005 (case no. 17C 269/02), 27 October 2006 (case no. 11C 107/06) and 16 September 2014 (case   no.   20C 132/08) the Prešov District Court ruled on claims by a group of individuals (who appear to be members of the same family) against the city of Prešov for compensation in respect of real property belonging to them but being used by the defendant. These claims were examined and allowed under the rules pertaining to unjust enrichment, with no consideration to bonos mores being given. A similar stance was upheld by the Supreme Court in its judgment of 31   January 2011 in an appeal on points of law (file no. 4Cdo 52/09) in an   unrelated but similar case. The District Court’s judgment of 20 March 2003 mentioned above followed an earlier judgment of the Prešov Regional Court of 20   September   2002 (file no. 2Co 579/01) in the same case, but this concerned matters unrelated to the subject of the present application. 27 .     In a judgment of 13 November 2009 in an appeal on points of law in an unrelated case (no. 5Cdo 8/09) the Supreme Court elaborated on the method for determining the amount of compensation to be paid for unjust enrichment in a context similar to that obtaining in the present case. The   judgment gave no consideration to the notion of bonos mores . 28 .     In a case that ultimately resulted in a decision by the Constitutional Court on 26 November 2009 (file no. II. ÚS 389/09), an individual owning land unlawfully encumbered by a road belonging to a public entity claimed compensation in respect of unjust enrichment. After the ordinary courts at two levels (the first-instance court on 5 November 2008 and the appellate court on 15 June 2009) had dismissed the claim by reference to the notion of contra bonos mores , the claimant sought protection of his property rights before the Constitutional Court. In the above-mentioned decision, the court dismissed his complaint as unfounded, specifically taking into account that the claimant had acquired the land in question by way of purchase and of his own free will, being well aware of its condition. The Constitutional Court also noted that the claimant had failed to attempt to regularise his property relationship with the defendant and concluded that he therefore could not have had any legitimate expectation that his claim in respect of unjust enrichment would succeed. 29 .     In a judgment of 11 December 2012 in an appeal (no. 6Co 75/12) the Regional Court considered a situation in which the city of Prešov as defendant was the owner of a road situated on land belonging to the claimant without any legal arrangement having been made between the parties. Given the circumstances, the defendant was liable to pay the claimant compensation in respect of unjust enrichment equivalent to the habitual rent. At the same time, the Regional Court specifically rejected the defendant’s objection that, as the claimant had acquired the property in question of his own free will knowing that it was encumbered, his claim was contra bonos mores . In that regard, it acknowledged that the problem had its origins in the State’s past lack of diligence when building roads and that this problem and its consequences had been shifted onto the defendant. Nevertheless, this was no reason to depart from the principles of equality, legal certainty and proportionality, taking into account the claimant’s property rights, including the right to compensation in respect of unjust enrichment gained from the unlawful use of his property. The fact that the claimant had acquired that and other properties by way of purchase was of no consequence in that regard. 30 .     In a judgment of 26 January 2011 (case no. PL. ÚS 19/2009), the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional certain statutory provisions authorising de facto restrictions on property rights of private individuals for the purposes of constructing motorways prior to the de iure settlement of the legal relationship involved. COMPLAINTS 31.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings in his case had been unfair in that his claim had been dismissed arbitrarily and in violation of the principle of legal certainty. 32.     He also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that he could not use his land and had been arbitrarily denied any compensation in that respect. 33.     Lastly, he complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal in relation to the violations alleged above. THE LAW A.     Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 34.     The applicant complained that the proceedings in his case had been unfair, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a   fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” 35.     In particular, the applicant contended that, without any explanation, the same courts had decided his claim differently to similar previously and subsequently decided cases. 36.     The Government contested that argument, pointing out that while the principal reason why the applicant’s compensation claim had been dismissed was because it had been contra bonos mores within the meaning of Article 3 §   1 of the Civil Code, none of the earlier decisions and judgments relied on by him had made any pronouncements in that particular regard. In so far as the position taken by the domestic courts in the case at hand contradicted that reached by the Regional Court in its judgment no.   6Co 75/12 (see paragraph 29 above), the Government pointed out that that judgment had been given after the final domestic decision in the present case. At the same time, they submitted that the position taken in the present case had been in full compliance with the Constitutional Court’s earlier decision in case no. II. ÚS 389/09 (see paragraph 28 above). 37.     In response, the applicant reiterated his complaints and emphasised that the Regional Court’s harmonising opinion of 10 January 2013 (see   paragraph 19 above) had been directly prompted by his requests specifically complaining about the application of the contra bonos mores rule under Article 3 §   1 of the Civil Code in his cases. 38.     The Court notes that the applicant’s compensation claim was made under the rules on unjust enrichment, that there does not appear to be any doubt that such claims were to be examined under those rules, that these rules provided for compensation equivalent to the average rent, and that in the applicant’s case the courts actually acknowledged that his claim fell within the purview of those rules (see paragraphs 13, 26 and 28 above). The sole reason why his claim was dismissed was however its incompatibility with the contra bonos mores rule under Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code. 39.     The applicant’s claim was dismissed with reference to Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code in June 2010 by the District Court and in April 2011 by the Regional Court, with the final decision in his case being given in September 2011 by the Constitutional Court. By that time, the contra bonos mores rule had been applied in a similar fashion on one occasion (see paragraph 28 above). The decisions and judgments relied on by the applicant, which preceded the judgments on his case in the present case, contained no analysis in respect of the contra bonos mores rule, in no way precluded it, and in some instances specifically pointed out that no particular position on the merits of the case was being taken (see paragraphs 21, 26 and 27 above). To the extent that the applicant’s complaint has been substantiated, there is accordingly no indication that the application of Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code in the present case was vitiated by any profound and long-standing differences within the meaning of the Court’s case-law (see, for example, Albu and Others v. Romania , nos. 34796/09 and sixty-three other cases, §   34, 10 May 2012, with further references). This conclusion is unaffected by the harmonising opinion and the decision ‑ making subsequent to the determination of the applicant’s claim in the present case (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 29 above). 40.     In sum, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of have been substantiated and are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a   violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Accordingly, the complaint under that provision is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35   §§   3   (a)   and   4 of the Convention. B.     Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 41.     The applicant complained that, by using his land, the city of Prešov had prevented him from enjoying his possessions and that he had been arbitrarily denied any compensation in that respect. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 1.     Parties’ arguments 42.     The Government argued firstly that any roads encumbering the applicant’s property had been established in the 1970s, which had been prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Slovakia. Moreover, they pointed out that the Convention did not guarantee any right to compensation in respect of wrongs suffered prior to its entry into force. In addition, noting that the applicant had only acquired the property in question in 2007, they pointed out that any interference with it prior to the date of purchase had not concerned the applicant himself. Thus, relying on the Court’s decision in Petrová and Valo v. Slovakia (no. 49103/09, § 44, 5   November 2013), they raised objections of incompatibility ratione temporis , materiae and personae with the provisions of the Convention. The Government further objected that, in so far as the applicant complained that he could not use his land, he could and should have asserted his rights under Article 135c of the Civil Code in accordance with the prescribed requirements. As he had not, he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Government also contended that as the applicant had failed to   attempt to regularise his property relationship under Article 135c of the Civil Code, he could not have had any legitimate expectation that his claim in respect of unjust enrichment would succeed. Accordingly, his complaint about the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. Lastly, the Government relied on the domestic courts’ finding that plot no. 1518/39 was not affected by the constructions in question, which meant that the complaint in that respect was manifestly ill-founded. 43.     In reply, the applicant considered his case different from Petrová and Valo (cited above) in that, unlike in that case, the encumbrance on his property had no legal basis and had completely prevented him from using it. Moreover, he considered that he had made a valid claim under Article   135c of the Civil Code. In relation to the Government’s argument about the legitimacy of his expectation to have his compensation claim succeed, the applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court’s decision of 26 November 2009 on which they had relied was a single occurrence and, as such, unconvincing. In conclusion, he considered the dismissal of his claim for compensation arbitrary and the domestic courts’ conclusions in relation to plot no. 1518/39 unlawful. 2.     The Court’s assessment 44.     The Court first notes that the Convention entered into force in respect of Slovakia on 18 March 1992, and that the applicant acquired the plots in question in 2007. Any complaint in respect of events, or compensation for events, which occurred prior to 18 March 1992, and any loss suffered by the applicant’s legal predecessors, is incompatible ratione personae , temporis and materiae with the provisions of the Convention. 45.     The Court next notes that the domestic courts found that plot no.   1518/39 was not affected by road constructions. The applicant does not agree with that finding, but has not shown that it is wrong or arbitrary. To the extent that the applicant complained about plot no. 1518/39, the Court finds that the complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 46.     The applicant relied on Article 135c of the Civil Code in the first ‑ instance proceedings. A claim under that provision would have enabled him to remedy the underlying problem affecting his land, namely the existence of a road for which there was no legal title. However, the domestic courts found that the applicant had not produced any evidence or arguments in respect of that claim, and did not deal with it. It follows in this connection that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV). 47.     As to the applicant’s remaining claim that he was arbitrarily denied compensation in respect of the municipality’s use of his land, other than plot no.   1518/39, it must first be determined whether his claim to such compensation amounted to “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to attract the protection of that provision. 48.     The Court reiterates that an applicant may allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to his or her “possessions” within the meaning of that provision (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004-IX). “Possessions” can be “existing possessions” or claims that are sufficiently established to be regarded as “assets” (ibid.). Where a proprietary interest is in the nature of a   claim, it may be regarded as an “asset” only if there is a sufficient basis for that interest in national law (for example, where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it) and the claim is sufficiently established to be enforceable (see Kopecký , cited above, §§ 49 and 52, and Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece , 9 December 1994, § 59, Series A no. 301-B). 49.     The Court has also accepted as “possessions” claims in respect of which an applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” that they will be realised, that is, that he or she will obtain effective enjoyment of a property right (see, inter alia , Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002-VII, and Kopecký , cited above, § 35). However, a legitimate expectation has no independent existence; it must be attached to a   proprietary interest for which there is a sufficient legal basis in national law (see Kopecký , cited above, §§ 45-53). 50.     As to the applicant’s compensation claim in the present case, the Court notes that it was based on the fact (i) that he was the owner of the property in question; (ii) that as such he was normally entitled to   collect civil fruits and proceeds from the object of his ownership under Article   123 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 24 above); and (iii) that an accepted way of asserting this entitlement was under the rules of unjust enrichment under Article 451 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 25 above). 51.     The applicant’s claim was thus attached to his ownership of the property in question, which he acquired in 2007 in a private transaction, and his compensation claim was an ordinary private civil claim between the parties to a private civil relationship. 52.     It is true that, at the time of acquisition, there existed some judgments of the ordinary courts allowing similar claims (see paragraph 26 above). However, these judgments contained no analysis of the contra bonos mores rule under Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 above). 53.     It is of a particular importance in the present case that the applicant’s compensation claim was dismissed specifically under the contra bonos mores rule and that this rule was applicable to his claim in view of the very specific circumstances in which the claim had been brought and was being asserted. In particular, as the Regional Court observed, the applicant acquired the property of his own free will, being fully aware of its condition, and was pursuing similar claims in numerous other cases without actually seeking to   regularise the relationship between ownership and use. It was on account of these circumstances that the contra bonos mores rule applied to the applicant’s claim and it had to be dismissed Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 13 above). 54.     At the time when the applicant acquired the property in question, in   2007, the application of the contra bonos mores rule in similar situations does not seem to have been established so as to give rise to a legitimate expectation that his compensation claim would succeed. This state of affairs persisted at the time of the determination of the applicant’s claim by the ordinary courts in 2010 and 2011 and of his constitutional complaint in 2011. Rather to the contrary, at that time, there had already been at least one similar case in which the courts at all levels had applied the contra bonos mores rule in a fashion similar to that in the applicant’s case (see paragraph   28 above). 55.     Subsequent developments in the case-law appear to have gone in the opposite direction (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 29 above).This however has no impact on the conclusion that when, by acquiring the property in question, the applicant acquired the accessory right to claim compensation in respect of its use, and throughout the duration of the proceedings, the success of his claim was openly conditional on the absence of circumstances covered by the contra bonos mores rule under Article 3 § 1 of the Civil Code and there were no elements showing that it was “sufficiently established to be enforceable” in terms of the above-cited case ‑ law. 56.     In these circumstances, the applicant cannot be said to have been asserting anything more than a speculative private civil claim without any legitimate expectation in terms of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of success. He   therefore had no “possessions” protected by that provision. 57.     Accordingly, the remainder of the applicant’s property complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35   §   4. C.     Remaining alleged violation 58.     The applicant complained that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal in relation to the other violations alleged, in breach of his rights protected under Article 13 of the Convention. 59.     As has been found above, the applicant’s other complaints are inadmissible as being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and as being manifestly ill ‑ founded. On similar grounds, they cannot be considered “arguable” for the purposes of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom , 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131). That complaint is accordingly manifestly ill–founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 25 July 2019.   Stephen Phillips   Vincent A. De Gaetano   Registrar   President