CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 2 juillet 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s6F88BEDC { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:3pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s3635F015 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s3136E68F { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:36.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s2E819D4D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:21.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3A692EA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s5CCD731E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s99B1BBA0 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:59.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sC33B6052 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:3pt; widows:0; orphans:0 } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s88036C24 { width:29.79pt; display:inline-block } .s67B32B97 { width:154.1pt; display:inline-block } .sAFF36EC2 { width:18.78pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 51010/10 TELECOMPANIYA IMPULS, TOV against Ukraine   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 2 July 2019 as a Committee composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 August 2010, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Telecompaniya Impuls, TOV (“the applicant company”), is a company registered in Ukraine. It is represented before the Court by V.V. Yefymenko, a lawyer practising in Vyshgorod. 2.     The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I.   Lishchyna. A.     The circumstances of the case 1.     Application for a licence 3.     Ukrainian law provides for two licensing procedures in the field of television: (i) broadcasting licence ( ліцензія на мовлення ) and (ii) programme service licence ( ліцензія провайдера програмної послуги , hereinafter “subscription service licence”). The latter involves packaging TV channels and programmes produced by broadcasters and rebroadcasting them to subscribers over “multichannel networks”, namely cable   TV networks. 4.     On 5 December 2007 the applicant company applied for the licence of the second type, subscription service licence. 5 .     On 30 January 2008 the licensing authority, the National Television and Radio Council (“the Council”), issued an invoice to the applicant company requiring it to pay a licence fee of 3,337.96 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately EUR 437 at the time) for the licence. The fee was calculated on the basis of the number of households in the neighbourhood to be covered by the applicant company’s cable network (2,750) and the number of channels (35) to be broadcast on the network. It appears that those data had been taken from the applicant company’s application. 6.     The applicant company paid the fee. 7.     On 6 March 2008 the Council issued the licence authorising the applicant company to transmit a package of TV channels to its subscribers in a neighbourhood in Dokuchayevsk, a town in the Donetsk Region. 8 .     Annex no. 7 to the licence (“the Annex”) attached to the licence stated that the applicant company would be authorised to rebroadcast to its subscribers a package of thirty-five specifically named Ukrainian, Russian and certain other TV channels. Of them, fourteen channels were designated as the “universal service package” ( пакет (перелік) програм універсальної програмної послуги ). Under the Television and Radio Act (“TV Act”), that term means the obligation of an operator of a multichannel network, such as a cable TV network, to provide its subscribers access to the channels of terrestrial broadcasters broadcasting on the same territory. 9.     The Annex also stated that the applicant company, in selecting the programmes for rebroadcast, would be guided by the following principles as to the genre of the programmes: 9 percent of news and analytics programmes, 3 percent of music, 3 percent each for children, sports and programmes dedicated to cars, 11 percent for film, 8 percent for science and education and 43 percent for entertainment programmes. 10.     It appears that the data included in the Annex had been taken from the applicant company’s application. 2.     Proceedings to declare the Council’s actions unlawful 11 .     The applicant company lodged a claim with the Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court, seeking reimbursement of the fee that it had paid and the annulment of the Annex. In particular, it argued that the requirement to pay the fee and the conditions imposed in the Annex had no basis in either the TV Act or in any other Act of Parliament governing the matter. Concerning the Annex, the applicant company pointed out that section   40   §   6 of the TV Act (see paragraph 27 below) only authorised the Council to approve the universal service package (see paragraph 8 above), but not anything beyond that, in terms of the programmes which could be transmitted by the licence holder. 12.     The Council responded that its actions concerning the issuance of the licence to the applicant company had been based on the rules it had enacted under the authority granted to it, as the body in charge of regulating television, by the National Television and Radio Council Act (“the National Council Act”, see paragraph 29 below). Those rules could be found in the Regulations Governing the Issuance of Subscription Services Licences and the rules of calculation of the fee for the issuance of such licences (“Regulations” and “Fee Calculation Rules” respectively) enacted in 2006 (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below). 13 .     On 5 November 2008 the Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court allowed the applicant company’s claim. The court: (i)     found that the conditions – to pay the fee and the limitation of the list of programmes in the Annex – were unlawful. The court ordered reimbursement of the fee to the applicant and the annulment of the Annex; (ii)     held that the TV Act (section 31, see paragraph 25 below) required the payment of the licence fee only in the case of broadcasting licences and not subscription services licences. Likewise, the Council could not define, in the Annex, the programs allowed for broadcast, beyond the universal program package. It cited in this respect section 40 § 6 of the Act (see paragraph 27 below). What programs were to be provided to the subscribers beyond the universal programme package was to be defined solely by agreement between the applicant company and its subscribers; (iii)     held that the rules contained in the Regulations and the Fee Calculation Rules could not be grounds for imposing on the applicant company the requirements not provided in the Acts of Parliament since those Acts vested in the Council no authority to set the license fees or impose the additional programming requirements on the applicants for subscription service licences; (iv)     mentioned that some provisions of the TV Act concerning broadcasting licences, namely section 23 concerning the documents to be submitted with an application for a licence (see paragraph 23 below), applied to the subscription services licences as well. It appeared to draw no conclusion from that overlap. 14.     The Council appealed, apparently repeating essentially the same arguments as those presented to the Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court. 15 .     On 27 February 2009 the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal partly amended the judgment of the first-instance court concerning the entity required to repay the fee on behalf of the State but upheld the remainder of the judgment, including the first-instance court’s reasoning. 16.     The Council appealed on points of law repeating essentially the same arguments. It also pointed out that the proceedings in the case had to be suspended because the applicant company was challenging the Regulations and the Fee Calculation Rules in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 19 below). The Council invoked its powers to regulate television under sections 7 and 23 of the TV Act and section 17 of the National Council Act (see paragraphs 22, 23 and 29 below). 17 .     The applicant company in its observations in response repeated its arguments to the effect that the conditions imposed on it were unlawful and invoked, inter alia , Article 10 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol   No. 1 to the Convention. In addition to its other arguments it also argued that: (i)     the Regulations had not been published in the publications envisaged in section 12 of the Regulatory Policy Act (see paragraphs 30 and 34 above) which fact, according to the applicant company, deprived the Regulations of legal effect; (ii)     the applicant company considered that the Annex contradicted Article   4 of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television (see paragraph 35 below). 18 .     On 14 April 2010 the High Administrative Court (“HAC”) quashed the judgments of the lower courts and rejected the applicant’s claim both as to the licence fee and as to the Annex. The court held that the Council’s actions were based on the Regulations which had been issued by the Council within its powers as the regulatory authority in the field of television. It had not been declared unlawful by the courts and was in force. The HAC stated that under sections 7 and 23 of the TV Act (see paragraphs   22 and 23 below) the Council was the authority empowered to regulate broadcasting regardless of the method of transmission and to issue broadcasting licences and that section 31 of the TV Act (see paragraph   25 below) required the payment of licence fees. Therefore, the Council had acted within its powers and lawfully in requiring the payment of the license fee and in issuing the Annex. 3.     Proceedings to declare the Regulations and the Fee Calculation Rules unlawful (“abstract review” proceedings) 19 .     The applicant company and another company, D., brought proceedings before the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court seeking to declare a number of decisions of the Council, including those by which it enacted the Regulations and the Fee Calculation Rules, unlawful and set them aside. 20.     On 28 December 2009 the court discontinued proceedings at the plaintiffs’ request. 21 .     As the relevant case-file has been destroyed (see paragraph   40 below), it is not known what arguments the applicant company raised in these proceedings. There is equally no information before the Court as to why the applicant company withdrew its claim. B.     Relevant domestic law 1.     Television and Radio Act 1993 22 .     Section 7 § 3 provided that the Council was the body in charge of regulating television and radio broadcasting, regardless of method of transmission of television and radio programmes. 23 .     Section 23 authorised the Council to issue “broadcasting licences” and defined that term in a way that covered both over-the-air broadcasting as well as broadcasting over cable (multichannel) networks. 24 .     Section 28 required broadcasters, including those broadcasting on multichannel networks, to have a programming concept, a document defining notably the breakdown of its own and rebroadcast programmes as well as a genre breakdown (§ 2). Section 28 § 1 authorised the Council to define the requirements which the programming concepts were to meet, §§   7-9 required entities broadcasting on multichannel networks to have a programming concept, specifying the list of programmes to be broadcast within the package, including own and rebroadcast programmes, and showing a breakdown by genre. 25 .     Section 31 provided that a licence fee would be payable for broadcasting licences and it would be calculated in accordance with the rules to be enacted by the Council in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. 26 .     Section 39 §   8 provided that, while the contract between the subscriber service provider and its client remained in effect, the provider could not amend the characteristics of the programme service without the subscriber’s consent. 27 .     Section 40 § 3 entitled “ Licencing of Providers of Subscriber Services ” ( Ліцензування провайдерів програмної послуги ) provided that an application for a subscriber services licence shall be lodged in accordance with the requirements of section 24 of this Act (that section governed applications for broadcasting licences). The following documents had to be submitted with the application: (a)     the general concept of packaging of programmes or a list of programmes acquired for rebroadcast; (b)     documents evidencing the fact that the applicant has acquired programmes from another broadcaster and had rebroadcasting rights. Section 40 § 4 provided that the general concept was to be a mandatory annex to the licence for cable broadcasting ( загальна концепція (принципи, підстави) добору програм для ретрансляції (пропозиції абонентам) є обов’язковим додатком до ліцензії на діяльність (мовлення) кабельного телебачення і радіомовлення ). This annex had to be re-registered annually. To obtain annual re-registration the licensee had to submit to the Council proof that it had complied with the concept in the preceding year. Section 40 § 6 provided that, based on the results of the examination of the application, the Council would make the decision: (a) to issue the licence; (b) to approve the universal programme package in the area where the subscriber services were to be provided ( про затвердження пакета (пакетів) програм універсальної програмної послуги в населеному пункті (населених пунктах) та/або на території (територіях), де передбачається надання програмної послуги ). 28 .     Section 42 § 3 provided that the right to rebroadcast programmes had to be defined in the broadcasting licence or in the subscriber services licence. Paragraph 4 provided that the maximum volume of rebroadcast and approximate selection of programmes by genre were to be specified in the programming concept. 2.     National Television and Radio Council Act 1997 29 .     Section 17 of the Act, as worded at the material time, authorised the Council to issue rules and regulations within its sector of competence and made them binding on all parties active in that sector. 3.     Regulatory Policy Act 2003 30 .     Section 12 requires “regulatory acts” of the Council to be published in two official publications, the Official Journal ( Офіційний вісник ) and the Government Gazette ( Урядовий кур’єр ). 4.     Code of Administrative Justice 2005 31 .     Article 9 § 4 of the Code of Administrative Justice, as worded at the material time, provided that in the event of a contradiction between a legislative instrument and the Constitution, an international treaty or a legislative instrument which was higher in the hierarchy of norms and one which was lower, the court was to apply the former. 5.     Rules enacted by the Council 32 .     On 19 April 2006 the Council enacted, by decision no.   357, Regulations Governing the Issuance of Subscription Services Licences ( Інструкція про видачу, продовження, переоформлення та видачу дубліката ліцензії провайдера програмної послуги ). Paragraph 10 of the Regulations provided that a fee was payable for such licences. Paragraph   7 provided that the general concept of selecting programmes was to be an annex to the licence and was to be re-registered annually. 33 .     The Council, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, by decision no. 1005 of 22 November 2006, enacted the Rules of Calculation of the Fee for the Issuance of Subscription Services Licences ( Методика розрахунку розміру ліцензійного збору за видачу, продовження, переоформлення та видачу дубліката ліцензії на мовлення та ліцензії провайдера програмної послуги ) (“Fee Calculation Rules”). 34 .     The Regulations were published in the Council’s Journal ( Вісник Національної ради України з питань телебачення і радіомовлення ), issue 11 for May 2006. The Fee Calculation Rules were published in the Journal’s issue 4-5 for February-March 2007. They are available in Liga , a major legal database (see paragraph 57 below). C.     Relevant international material 35 .     Article 4 of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television (Strasbourg, 5 May 1989, ETS no. 132) provides: “The Parties shall ensure freedom of expression and information in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and they shall guarantee freedom of reception and shall not restrict the retransmission on their territories of programme services which comply with the terms of this Convention.” COMPLAINTS 36.     The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the limitation of the list of programmes that it was permitted to provide and the requirement to pay the licence fee had amounted to a violation of its right to freedom of expression. 37.     Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention it also complained that the same limitation and requirement had also breached its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. 38.     Finally, the applicant company also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the HAC’s decision in its case had not been sufficiently reasoned. THE LAW A.     Alleged violations of Article 10 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 39.     The applicant company complained of violations of Article 10 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 which read: Article 10 “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     Domestic case files 40 .     The Government submitted that, by the time of communication, the domestic case file concerning the applicant company’s review proceedings (see paragraphs 19 to 21 above) had been destroyed as the time-limit for its storage had expired. The administrative courts’ records showed, however, that the applicant company never resubmitted the review claim it had withdrawn. The case file concerning the Council’s other claim was in the courthouse of the first-instance court in Donetsk (see paragraph 13 above), which was not accessible to the Government due to the events in that region described in Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine (nos.   73590/14 and 6 others, §§   6-11, 13 February 2018). (b)     Exhaustion of domestic remedies 41.     The Government submitted that the applicant company’s main argument was that the requirements imposed on it and which had been based on the Regulations had been unlawful. However, it had withdrawn and had failed to resubmit its claim seeking to declare the Regulations unlawful (see paragraphs 19 to 21 above). Accordingly, it had failed to exhaust an available domestic remedy. 42.     The applicant company responded that it was up to it to choose the remedy to defend its rights and it chose the one it considered to be the most appropriate, the appeal to the administrative courts seeking to declare the Council’s actions unlawful. Where a remedy has been attempted, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective was not required (citing Wójcik v. Poland (dec.), no.   26757/95, 7 July 1997). (c)     Article 10 of the Convention (i)     The Government 43 .     The Government did not contest that the conditions attached to the issuance of the licence constituted an interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression. 44.     However, they maintained that it had been prescribed by law. The procedure and conditions for the issuance of the licence were governed by the TV Act and the Regulations. The Council had the power to regulate the television market under section 7 of the TV Act and section 17 of the National Council Act (see paragraphs 22 and 29 above). The Regulations enacted by the Council had been in force at the time the company had applied for the licence and there had been no reason to find them inapplicable. The rules established by the Regulations had been clear and accessible. They had complied, in particular, with the TV Act (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). 45.     The conditions imposed pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the proper functioning of the television and radio broadcasting system, the rights of all the parties involved in it and the availability to the population of a high-quality broadcasting offer. 46.     The interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The Annex had not restricted the applicant company’s freedom to broadcast since it had simply approved the list of programmes the applicant company itself identified in its licence application. If the applicant company wished to change the programmes broadcast it was free to update the list (see paragraphs 5 and 32 above). (ii)     The applicant company 47 .     The applicant company reiterated the arguments raised by it at the domestic level and endorsed by the lower courts (see paragraphs 11, 13   (ii) and (iii) and 17 (i) and (ii) above). (d)     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 48 .     The Government submitted that the license fee was required by the domestic law for the right to conduct commercial activities which the applicant company had been granted. Therefore, the lower domestic courts had erred in ordering repayment of the fee. Accordingly, there was no “legitimate expectation” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. 49 .     The applicant company submitted that the limitation on its commercial activity imposed by the Council had been unlawful as had been the Council’s decision unlawfully to deprive it of the sum it had been forced to pay for the licence. It cited the same reasons as those in respect of its Article 10 complaint (see above). Accordingly the Council’s unlawful actions had interfered with the applicant company’s economic activity and its expected revenue. 2.     The Court’s assessment 50.     The Court notes at the outset that it sees no obstacle to examination of the case despite the destruction and inaccessibility of the domestic files (see paragraph 40 above): the material submitted by the parties is sufficient to resolve the matters raised by the application. (a)     Exhaustion of domestic remedies 51.     The Court notes that, under domestic law (see paragraph 31 above), the administrative courts, in the proceedings brought by the applicant company to challenge the Council’s actions, could disapply the rules enacted by the Council if they considered that those rules were in contradiction with the TV Act, as the applicant company argued. The domestic first-instance court and the court of appeal did just that (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). The highest domestic court disagreed with the lower courts’ assessment on the substance of the relevant rules but did not question their authority to disapply rules issued ultra vires as such. Accordingly, the remedy used by the applicant company was “effective” for Convention purposes. When a remedy has been pursued, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see, for example, Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 58, ECHR   2009). Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s objection. (b)     Substance of the complaints 52.     The parties agreed that the imposition of the conditions on the issuance of the licence to the applicant company constituted an interference with its right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.   They disagreed, however, on the question of whether there was an interference with the applicant company’s “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above). 53.     The Court, in view of its conclusions below, is prepared to proceed on the assumption that there was an interference with the applicant’s company’s rights for the purposes of both provisions. 54. As far as Article 10 is concerned, the Government’s submissions in respect of the legitimate aim of the interference and its necessity have not been specifically contested by the applicant company (see paragraph 47 above). Neither did the applicant company argue that any interference with its “possessions” was not in the “public” or “general” interest or was disproportionate for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 47 and 49 above). In the absence of any argument to the contrary the Court sees no reason to doubt that any interference met those requirements. 55.     The applicant company’s submissions focussed exclusively on the matter of lawfulness, which is common to both provisions. 56.     The Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, for example, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 142, 27 June 2017). Similar principles apply under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Lekić   v.   Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 95, 11 December 2018), as well as under other Convention provisions incorporating the requirement of lawfulness. 5 7.     The applicant company did not argue that the rules contained in the Regulations were not accessible. Indeed, the Regulations were published and are publicly available in a major legislation database (see paragraph   34 above), both sources of information easily accessible to a professional television operator. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not contain any specific requirements as to the degree of publicity to be given to a particular legal provision (see Špaček, s.r.o., v. the Czech Republic , no.   26449/95, §   57, 9 November 1999). The applicant company stressed the fact that it had not been published in certain official publications (see paragraphs 17 (i) and 47 above). However, it did not to argue that that rendered the Regulations not accessible but, rather, that failure to publish in the “right” publications rendered the Regulations invalid as contrary to a higher norm, the Regulatory Policy Act (see paragraph 30 above). 58.     The Court observes that the applicant company has failed to cite any domestic case-law in support of its opinion that the failure to publish the Regulations in the publications identified in the Regulatory Policy Act rendered them invalid by force of law, in the absence, for example, of any court decision to that effect (compare Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos.   17224/11, § 71, 27   June 2017). Even the lower domestic courts which sided with the applicant company did not take that view. These matters may have been subject to review by the courts within the framework of the review proceedings. The applicant company did not pursue them (see paragraphs 19 to 21 above). 59.     Turning to the question of “foreseeability”, the Court considers that the Regulations made it quite plain that a licence fee was payable and that the programming concept was to be inserted in an annex to the licence (see paragraph 32 above). Therefore, there is no indication that the rules the applicant company is complaining about were not “foreseeable”. 60.     Instead, the gist of the applicant company’s case, both before the domestic courts and this Court, was that the Regulations had been issued ultra vires . According to it, the requirements to pay a license fee and to have a list of programmes authorised for broadcast defined in an annex to the licence could be imposed on it only by explicit and specific provision in an Act of Parliament and the Council could not clarify such matters through the rules it enacted. While the lower courts sided with that position, the HAC disagreed, holding that the relevant requirements were based on the rules validly enacted by the Council in accordance with the authority conferred on it by the TV Act. 61.     The Court reiterates that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that law, since the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection. Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §   149, 20 March 2018). 62.     This principle is particularly relevant in a case such as the present, which involves a highly specialised and technical area of law (see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 83, ECHR 2007-I). 63.     It is true that the reasons given by the HAC for its findings were succinct (see paragraph 18 above). At the same time, neither the applicant company’s arguments nor the arguments put forward by the lower domestic courts which had sided with it are so strong as to show a fundamental flaw in the HAC’s interpretation of the domestic law. 64.     The perusal of the TV Act’s provisions shows that, at the material time, there was a certain overlap between the rules governing the two   licensing regimes with the effect that the rules primarily governing broadcasting licences were nevertheless applicable also to the subscriber services licences of the type the applicant company applied for and obtained (see, for example, sections 23 and 40 § 3 of the Act, in paragraphs 23 and 27 above). That overlap was in fact acknowledged, without comment, even by the first-instance domestic court which otherwise sided with the applicant company (see paragraph 13 (iv) above). 65.     The key provision of the TV Act in the context of the case, section 40, dedicated specifically to the procedure for the issuance of licences of the type the applicant company obtained, used the terms “subscription services licence” and “broadcasting licence” interchangeably (compare §§ 3 and 4 of the section in paragraph 27 above). 66.     There appeared, therefore, to be a basis for the HAC’s finding to the effect that section 31 of the TV Act which explicitly required the payment of fees for the broadcasting licences (see paragraph 25 above) also applied to the subscription services licences and that the Council had the authority to establish and collect fees for such licences. 67.     As to the Annex the Council added to the applicant’s licence, sections 28, 40 and 42 of the TV Act made the programming concept of the type included in the Annex an integral part of the licencing process and, in fact, appeared to require that such a document be included in a subscription services licence as an annex (see paragraphs 24, 27 and 28 above), exactly as had been done in the applicant company’s case. 68.     There was, therefore, also a basis in the domestic law for the HAC’s finding endorsing the Council’s decision to attach the Annex to the applicant company’s licence. 69.     The Court, therefore, finds that the applicant company has failed to put forward an arguable case that the HAC’s interpretation of the domestic law was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. 70.     Accordingly, it has not been shown that the conditions attached to its licence were in breach of either Article 10 of the Convention or of Article   1 of Protocol No.   1. 71.     This means that these complaints are manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. B.     Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention 72.     The applicant company complained that the HAC’s decision in its case had not been sufficiently reasoned. It invoked Article 6 of the Convention: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” 73.     In view of its findings above in respect of the complaints under Article 10 and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 the Court finds that these complaints are likewise manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 25 July 2019.   Milan Blaško   Síofra O’Leary   Deputy Registrar   President