CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 18 juillet 2019

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GEORGIA   (Application no. 50375/07)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   18 July 2019     FINAL   18/10/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vazagashvili and Shanava v. Georgia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Yonko Grozev,   André Potocki,   Síofra O’Leary,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 25 June 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 50375/07) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Georgian nationals, Mr Yuri Vazagashvili (“the first applicant”) and Ms   Tsiala Shanava (“the second applicant”), who were husband and wife, on 20 October 2007. 2.     The applicants were successively represented first by a group of three Georgian lawyers (Mr G. Mosiashvili, Mr M. Jangirashvili and Ms   I.   Tchkadua) and then by a group of two Georgian lawyers and one British lawyer (Ms N. Jomarjidze, Ms T. Abazadze and Mr Ph. Leach). The Georgian Government (“the Government”) were successively represented by their Agents, Mr L. Meskhoradze and M. B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicants complained, under Article 2 of the Convention, of their son’s killing by the police and the absence of an effective investigation in that regard. 4.     On 18 March 2013 notification of the application was given to the Government. On 25 March 2014 the Government informed the Court that they wished to waive their right to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, and invited the Court to decide the case on the basis of the file as it stood at hand. The applicants submitted their additional arguments on the admissibility and merits as well as their claims for just satisfaction. 5.     On 22 July 2015 the second applicant informed the Court that the first applicant had been assassinated on 20 January 2015 and that she wished to pursue the proceedings in her own name as well as on behalf of her late husband. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     Both applicants were born in 1953. On 20 January 2015 the first applicant died. The second applicant currently lives in Tbilisi. A.     The situation prior to notification of the case being given on 18   March 2013 7.     On 2 May 2006, at around 9.30 a.m., Z.V., the applicants’ son, aged   22 at that time, and his friend, A.Kh., aged 25, were shot dead by police as they were driving in Z.V.’s car in a street of Tbilisi (“the police operation of 2 May 2006”). At least fifty police officers, including senior officials from the criminal police unit of the Ministry of the Interior led by that unit’s deputy head, I.P., and masked officers of a riot-police unit, armed with machine guns, participated in that police operation. More than seventy bullets were shot by the police in the direction of Z.V.’s car, with some forty bullets hitting their target. Experts of a subsequent, post-mortem forensic examination were not able to establish, owing to the severity of the injuries, the exact number of bullets that had penetrated the body and skull of the applicants’ son and A.Kh. A third passenger of the car, Mr B.P., aged twenty-two, was seriously wounded during the shooting, but survived. 8.     On the same day, 2 May 2006, the criminal unit of the Ministry of the Interior opened a criminal case against the applicants’ late son and the other passengers of Z.V.’s car for attempted robbery and unlawful possession and transport of firearms. The investigation was led by a senior official of the Ministry who had himself participated in the police operation earlier that day. All the preliminary investigative measures, including those directly relating to the examination of the scene of the shooting, were conducted within the framework of that investigation. The results of the investigation were subsequently transmitted to the Tbilisi city public prosecutor’s office (“the city prosecutor’s office”), which relied on the thus collected evidence in its subsequent probe into the lawfulness of the police actions (see paragraph 10 below). 9.     Later the same day, I.K., the head of the criminal police unit of the Ministry, stated at a press briefing that the applicants’ son and the two other passengers of his car had robbed a pawn shop on 30 April 2006 in Tbilisi. According to “information provided by an anonymous police informant”, the group of young men had been on their way to carry out another robbery of an apartment on 2 May 2006 when the “carefully planned” police operation had intervened, preventing the group from realising their criminal goals. Commenting further on the circumstances of the police operation of 2   May 2006, the high-ranking police officer stated that the passengers of the car had opened fire on the police first and that the police had been obliged to return fire. 10.     On 5 May 2006 the Tbilisi city prosecutor’s office opened an investigation under Article 114 of the Criminal Code (killing as a result of the use of force beyond what was required for arresting a wrongdoer) for excessive use of force by the police during the operation of 2 May 2006. The relevant investigation file was mostly based on the evidence that had been collected by the Ministry of the Interior in the immediate aftermath of the police operation in question (see paragraph 8 above). 11.     From the early stages, the applicants complained regularly to the city prosecutor that the investigation was not being conducted thoroughly and impartially. They alleged that the investigators from the city prosecutor’s office who were in charge of the case were ignoring important witness statements which incriminated the police in the intentional killing of their son, and were denying the applicants the possibility to participate effectively in the proceedings, and that they had destroyed and fabricated evidence. In respect of the denial to participate properly in the proceedings, the applicants asserted that the prosecution authority had refused to grant, for several weeks, a request by the second applicant to be recognised a victim in the case. On 7 July 2006, following numerous complaints lodged by the applicants’ lawyers and the involvement of the Public Defender (Ombudsman), the second applicant was at last granted that procedural status. She was subsequently invited to get acquainted with the case file at the office of the prosecutor in charge of the case. As she was denied an opportunity to photocopy case-file material, the second applicant was obliged to rewrite by hand the content of the most significant pieces of evidence, including the forensic report containing the detailed description of the numerous lethal injuries on the body and skull of her late son. 12.     As is apparent from the case-file material, the city prosecutor’s office questioned at that time only two independent eyewitnesses to the police operation of 2 May 2006, M.Ts. and I.G. During interviews with them that took place in February 2007 the witnesses reported that it had been the police who had started firing and that there had been no retaliation from the passengers in Z.V.’s car; the police had continued shooting even after the car had hit the kerb and stopped. In a later prosecutorial resolution on the discontinuation of the investigation into the police’s actions (see paragraph 14 below), the prosecution authority stated that the statements given by the above-mentioned two independent witnesses had not been credible as they had clearly contradicted the opposite statements given by the police officers who had participated in the police operation of 2   May 2006. 13.     According to the results of a ballistics test commissioned by the city prosecutor’s office in February-March 2007, the passengers of Z.V.’s car had fired shots at the police from through a hole in the left upper corner of the car’s rear window during the police operation of 2 May 2006. 14.     On 19 April 2007 the city prosecutor’s office quashed its previous decision granting victim status to the second applicant (see paragraph   12 above). On the following day, 20 April 2007, the prosecution authority issued a resolution discontinuing the investigation into the police actions for want of a criminal offence. In reaching that decision, the authority mainly relied on the statements of the police officers who had participated in the police operation of 2 May 2006 as well as the results of the relevant ballistics test (see paragraphs 13 above) to conclude that the police had used force only in retaliation to the gunfire from Z.V.’s car and that the use of force had thus been necessary in the circumstances. 15.     Deprived of her victim status (see the preceding paragraph), the second applicant became unable to appeal against the discontinuation of the investigation to a court. 16.     Acting at the request of the first applicant, the Public Defender’s Office conducted, in 2009, its own probe into the circumstances surrounding the police operation of 2 May 2006 and assessed the adequacy of the investigation into the police actions. As part of that probe, the Public Defender commissioned an alternative forensic examination of Z.V.’s car. The results of that examination established that no shot had ever been fired from that car. 17.     On 8 September 2009 the Public Defender’s Office addressed the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office with a recommendation to reopen the investigation into the police actions during the incident of 2 May 2006. The prosecution authority’s attention was drawn to the fact that the original investigation, which had been discontinued on 20 April 2007, had failed to address such principal aspects of the case as whether or not the use of force by the police during the incident had been proportionate. The Public Defender further called into question the inconclusiveness of a number of findings previously made by the city prosecutor’s office, notably as regards the question of gunfire purportedly originating from Z.V.’s car (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above). The recommendation of the Public Defender’s Office was left unanswered. 18.     The case file contains video footage, filmed by a cameraman of the Ministry of the Interior, showing the state of Z.V.’s car at the scene of the police operation of 2 May 2006 immediately after the shooting had ended. The footage showed the glass of the car’s rear window as wholly intact, without any holes or other damage. A verbatim record of the visual examination of the car after it had been taken from the scene of the shooting to a special parking area of the Ministry of the Interior further attested, similarly to the above-mentioned video footage, that the car’s rear window had been undamaged. B.     Circumstances revealed after notification of the case being given 1.     Reopening of the investigation into the use of force by the police during the incident of 2 May 2006 19.     On 23 October 2012 the applicants obtained a statement from a former officer of the Ministry of the Interior, V.Kh. According to that witness, several police officers who participated in the police operation of 2   May 2006 were instructed by I.P., the senior officer who had set up the police operation (see paragraph 7 above), to fire guns at a police vehicle found at the scene of the police operation of 2 May 2006 in order to be able to claim later that there had been an exchange of fire with the passengers of Z.V’s car. V.Kh. also stated that he had heard how, in the immediate aftermath of the police operation of 2 May 2006, a forensic expert had clearly told I.P. that the bullet holes found on the police car had been inconsistent with the trajectory of shots that could have been fired from where Z.V.’s car had been standing after it had hit the kerb (see paragraphs   12, 13 and 16 above). 20.     On 26 October 2012 the applicants were able to approach B.P., the third passenger in the car (see paragraph 7 above), for the first time. They obtained a written statement from him, in which he described details of the police operation of 2 May 2006. He recalled that he and his two friends had been waiting in the relevant street in Tbilisi at a red traffic light in the car driven by Z.V. when suddenly a person in civilian clothes, holding a pistol in his hand, had approached the car from the right side. That person had first attempted to open the front door from the outside, but as the door was locked, the person, without giving any prior warning, had started shooting with his pistol. Z.V. had attempted to manoeuvre the car in order to escape the shooting but the car had veered out of its lane, mounted the kerb and crashed into a lamp post. The relentless shooting towards them had continued even after the crash. B.P. emphasised that not a single shot had ever been fired in the direction of the police from their side. He added that neither he nor his friends had been carrying any firearms with them on the day of the incident. 21.     On 12 November 2012 the applicants obtained written statements from two additional independent eyewitnesses to the police operation of 2   May 2006, R.P. and M.P. (see also the statements of two original independent witnesses, described in paragraph 12 above). Those witnesses confirmed that they had seen Z.V.’s car crashing into a lamp post and numerous armed men shooting in the direction of the car after that crash. The shooting had lasted about a minute or so. After it had stopped, the armed men had started collecting the used cartridge cases from the ground. 22.     On 30 October 2012 the applicants, referring to the newly obtained information (see paragraphs 19-21 above), asked the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office to reopen the investigation into the police actions during the incident of 2 May 2006. 23.     On 14 December 2012 the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office annulled the prosecutorial resolution of 20 April 2007 (see paragraph 14 above) and reopened the investigation into the police operation of 2 May 2006. 24.     In January 2013, after the first applicant had personally met with the Chief Public Prosecutor, during which the latter had allegedly conceded that the previous investigation had been defective, the applicants again transmitted to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office the witness statements that they had recently collected (see paragraphs 19-21 above). 25.     On 18 January 2013 the applicants asked the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office to conduct a number of specific investigative measures. The prosecution authority replied on 22 January 2013 that the applicants’ request could not be taken into consideration because neither of them had been granted victim status. 26.     On 2 February 2013 the applicants obtained a written statement from another independent eyewitness to the police operation of 2 May 2006, K.M. That witnesses stated that she had seen how, after the police had ended a minute-long cycle of uninterrupted shooting from multiple firearms at Z.V.’s car, a police officer, wearing a balaclava, had approached the front left door of the car and shot into the cabin of the car through the left-side front window. 27.     In July 2013 the first applicant had a meeting with the Tbilisi city prosecutor, during which the latter allegedly promised the former that all the police officers who had been implicated in his son’s murder would be brought to justice. 28.     On 21 July 2013, G.M., a former member of the special police unit, who had personally participated in the police operation of 2 May 2006, convened a press conference. During that press conference, G.M. publicly declared that the order to “liquidate” ( ლიკვიდაციის ბრძანება – in Georgian the term implies “lawful force”) the passengers of Z.V.’s car had been given by I.P., the then deputy head of the criminal police unit (see paragraphs 7 and 19 above). G.M. gave an additional explanation as regards the possible motive behind I.P’s order, suggesting that the latter had felt personal animosity towards A.Kh., one of the victims of the incident (for more details, see paragraphs 37, 39 and 44 below). 29.     On 9 August 2013 the first applicant held a press conference, speaking about the reopened investigation into the circumstances surrounding the police operation of 2 May 2006. He declared that sufficient evidence had been obtained to directly incriminate several high-ranking officers of the Ministry of the Interior in the killing of his son and in the subsequent cover-up of the original investigation. Notably, the first applicant publicly mentioned the names of I.P., G.Ts. and K.N. (see paragraph   46 below), as well as I.K., the former commanding officer of I.P. at the criminal police unit (see paragraph 9 above). The first applicant stated that he would not stop his public activities until all those implicated officers had been arrested and punished. 30.     On 18 August 2013 the applicants lodged another request with the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office aimed at obtaining information regarding the progress in the investigation, if any. Their request was left unanswered. 31.     On 18 August, 18 and 23 September and 9 and 11 October 2013 the applicants repeatedly enquired with the prosecution authority about the progress in the investigation and asked to view the available case-file material. They further requested that specific investigative measures be undertaken, such as formal questioning of the witnesses they had already approached themselves (see paragraphs 19-21 above) and a repeat forensic examination of Z.V.’s car with the aim of establishing whether any shots had been fired from inside of it. 32.     In reply, the Tbilisi city prosecutor’s office advised the applicants in letters dated 4 and 14 October 2013, that since victim status had not been granted to either of them, they were not entitled either to make any procedural requests or to view the criminal-case-file material or to receive updates concerning the progress in the investigation. The prosecution authority limited itself to advising the applicants in general terms that the criminal investigation was still ongoing, that important pieces of evidence had already been collected but that a number of additional investigative measures remained to be undertaken. 33.     According to the applicants, in December 2013 the first applicant met personally with the then Minister of the Interior. During a tense conversation, the first applicant complained that one of the high-ranking police officers, G.D., who had participated as a member of the criminal police unit in the police operation of 2 May 2006 was still holding a senior post within the Ministry. The Minister replied that he was aware that G.D. had participated in the incident. However, according to G.D.’s own statements, the latter had never fired shots at Z.V.’s car. That being so, the Minister had not seen any need to dismiss G.D. from his post. On the other hand, the Minister brought the first applicant’s attention to the fact that all the other senior officers implicated in the police operation of 2 May 2006 had already been fired from their positions in the law-enforcement system. 34.     On 14 February 2014 the applicants again requested victim status. The request was left unanswered. 2.     Delivery of the court judgment of 30 October 2015 on the basis of the reopened investigation 35.     Given that the applicants had not been involved in the reopened investigation as victims, it came as a surprise to the second applicant that, after her husband’s death (see paragraph 5 above), on 30 October 2015 the Tbilisi City Court delivered a judgment convicting five former senior officers of the Ministry of the Interior, including I.P., the ex-deputy head of the criminal police unit, of either aggravated murder (Article 109 of the Criminal Code), perverting the course of justice in a criminal case by fabrication of evidence (Article 369 of the Criminal Code), malfeasance by a public official (Article 333 of the Criminal Code) or false arrest   (Article   147 of the Criminal Code). 36.     As is apparent from the conviction of 30 October 2015, both the prosecution authority and the trial court conducted various investigative actions, including the examination of all those witnesses to whom the applicants had referred during the investigation stage (see paragraphs   19 ‑ 21 above). As a result, the conviction delivered against the five former high-ranking police officers was confirmed by copious material and documentary evidence, both direct and circumstantial, such as the relevant witnesses’ statements, results of various crime-detection examinations, forensic expert statements given to the trial court, video recordings of the shooting scene in the immediate aftermath of the police operation 2 May 2006, various official documents, inferences drawn from a confrontation during the trial between the accused people and the witnesses for the prosecution, and so on. On the basis of all that evidence examined during the trial with the participation of the parties concerned, the Tbilisi City Court established the following facts, giving them the relevant legal qualifications. (a)     Established facts 37.     The trial court established that on 7 April 2006 the special investigations unit of the Ministry of the Interior (“the SIU”) had arrested L.P., a younger brother of I.P., the senior officer who had set up the police operation (see paragraphs 7, 19 and 29 above), in relation to drug trafficking. The initiation of the criminal proceedings against L.P. and his arrest had been based on information provided to the SIU by A.Kh., one of the people killed during the police operation of 2 May 2006 (see paragraph   7 above). A.Kh. had been a regular client of L.P., frequently buying various narcotic substances from the latter. A.Kh. had decided to act as a police informer owing to the emergence of a personal conflict between him and L.P. It was also reported that A.Kh. had been spreading rumours that L.P. had been procuring drugs for sale from the store of narcotic substances seized by the Ministry of the Interior as evidence in drug ‑ trafficking cases. 38.     A number of former officers of the Ministry of the Interior testified before the trial court that, when L.P. had been arrested on 7 April 2006, a number of high-ranking officers of the SIU had been involved in a deep organisational feud with their counterparts from the criminal police unit, in particular with I.P., its deputy head. That being so, the SIU was believed to have been interested in using the initiation of the criminal proceedings against L.P. as an opportunity to undermine the authority of I.P., the accused’s brother, in the eyes of the then Minister of the Interior. 39.     Having regard to the arrest of his younger brother as well as the organisational tensions with the competing agency, I.P. had decided to take revenge against A.Kh., who had been at the origin of all his family and professional troubles. Driven by that motive, I.P. had reported on 1   May 2006 to his direct superior, the head of the criminal police unit, that he was in possession of anonymously received information that a robbery of a pawn shop had been planned by a small group of “criminals”, led by A.Kh. He had asked for and obtained approval to conduct a police operation against the group. I.P. had also received authorisation to mobilise an armed response squad of the Ministry of the Interior, which had consisted of approximately twenty heavily-armed officers. That squad had been led by K.N. In addition to that, I.P. had mobilised around thirty police officers from the criminal police unit. 40.     Having studied the files of the criminal police unit, the trial court concluded that I.P. had fabricated the so-called “anonymous information” about the planned robbery (see paragraph 9 above) in order to obtain authorisation to conduct a police operation. Furthermore, since I.P. had been tapping, in an unlawful manner, the mobile telephone conversations of A.Kh, he knew about the latter’s plan to meet up with his friends, Z.V. and B.P., on the morning of 2 May 2006. I.P. had ordered a small team of criminal police officers to monitor A.Kh.’s movements starting from the evening of 1 May 2006. With the help of that surveillance team and by tapping A.Kh.’s telephone conversations, I.P. had learnt that, having met with his two friends at 9 a.m. on 2 May 2006, the group had been travelling in a vehicle registered in the name of Z.V. in the direction of Isani-Samgori metro station. To reach the destination, the car had been supposed to pass through the right bank of the River Mtkvari, an extremely busy arterial avenue through the centre of Tbilisi. 41.     The Tbilisi City Court further established that I.P. had considered that the above-mentioned highway had been the most suitable place to conduct a police operation and so had ordered the mobilised police officers to prepare for an ambush there. At around 9.45 a.m., the moment the black car driven by Z.V. had stopped at a red traffic light, and an undercover police van had artificially created a traffic jam ahead of it, I.P. and eight officers of the special unit, led by K.N., had started approaching the car. K.N. had been the first one to reach the car, from the front passenger side, and, after having attempted to open the closed door from the outside, he had started shooting with his service pistol in the direction of the front passenger and the driver. The latter had started manoeuvring his car in order to escape the traffic jam created by the police van. In that manoeuvre, the car had crossed the lane into the traffic lane in the opposing direction; at that moment all the nine officers had opened heavy fire. Eventually, Z.V. had lost control over his vehicle which had crashed into a lamp post on the kerb, but the shooting at the car had continued after the crash. The trial court also established that, after the heavy shooting at Z.V.’s vehicle had stopped, G.Ts., a senior officer of the criminal police unit, who had been I.P.’s closest confidant at work, had approached the car from the driver’s side and fired two shots from his service pistol through the rolled-down window of the car into the heads of the driver, Z.V., and the front passenger, A.Kh. Those two shots were characterised by the trial court as “controlling” ( საკონტროლო გასროლა ) ones. Notably, as was confirmed by the results of the relevant forensic examination of the two dead bodies, both Z.V. and A.Kh. had been alive prior to those shots. The third passenger of the car, B.P., who had been seated on the rear passenger seat, had been heavily wounded, with more than fifteen bullets having penetrated various parts of his body, but had nevertheless survived. 42.     As a follow-up to its previous finding concerning the fabrication of the anonymous information received at the criminal police unit about the “planned robbery” (see paragraphs 9 and 40 above), the Tbilisi City Court further established, on the basis of the relevant legal documents, that a criminal investigation into conspiracy to commit a robbery by A.Kh., Z.V. and B.P. had been launched after the police operation of 2 May 2006. The trial court concluded that the only reason why the criminal police unit had launched that criminal investigation had been to be able to get control of the very first investigative measures conducted at the scene of the crime, as I.P. had been conspiring to cover up his and his team’s wrongdoings. In that connection, the trial court established, on the basis of the statements received from a number of former officers of the Ministry of the Interior, including those who had participated in the police operation of 2 May 2006, that, when preparing the armed ambush on Z.V.’s car, I.P. had thought of bringing along from the carpark of the Ministry of the Interior a police car that had already received bullet damage in a previous and unrelated police operation (“the damaged police car”). I.P. had ordered the driver of the damaged police car to place it right behind Z.V.’s car after the termination of the police operation of 2 May 2006. Those facts were confirmed to the trial court by the driver of the damaged police car himself. 43.     The Tbilisi City Court further found, on the basis of the statements given by numerous witnesses, including both the participants in the police operation and the independent eyewitnesses to the police operation of 2   May 2006, that no shot had ever been fired from inside of Z.V.’s car. The latter fact was further confirmed by the results of a ballistics examination conducted during the reopened investigation. The City Court further established that, in another attempt to fabricate evidence of having been under fire from Z.V.’s car, I.P. had ordered one of his subordinates, L.B., who had participated in the police operation of 2 May 2006, to inflict a light injury on himself, and the latter had duly obeyed. Furthermore, I.P. had ordered his subordinates to plant four different types of guns, balaclavas and police radio scanners in Z.V.’s car immediately after the termination of the police operation. A subsequently conducted ballistics examination confirmed that no shot had ever been fired from any of the four planted guns. The trial court also established that I.P. had made prior arrangements with an undercover police informer, who had been collaborating with the criminal police in a number of unrelated cases, to come forward in the case at hand and pretend to be a victim of the robbery attack purportedly planned by Z.V. and his two friends. Lastly, it was also established that I.P. had induced a former convicted criminal, who had been released on parole and under the criminal police’s close supervision during the probationary period, to claim falsely that he had been the three young men’s fourth accomplice in their intention to commit the robbery. (b)     Conclusions drawn from the established facts 44.     In the light of the foregoing factual findings, the Tbilisi City Court concluded that, firstly, there had been no lawful grounds for mounting a police operation against Z.V. and his two friends as the criminal police unit had not been in possession of any real information raising a reasonable suspicion that the young men had been planning to commit a criminal offence. I.P. was found to have fabricated, possibly in complicity with other unidentified senior law-enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior, the relevant documents in order to justify the mobilisation of police units. The trial court established that the mens rea behind I.P.’s criminal actions had been to take personal revenge against A.Kh. (see paragraphs   37 ‑ 39 above). The police operation of 2 May 2006 had thus been mounted with the sole aim of assassinating the passengers of Z.V.’s car. The trial court also concluded that G.Ts. had been the direct perpetrator of the killings of the two young men. 45.     Apart from the clearly murderous intent behind I.P.’s and G.Ts.’s actions, the Tbilisi City Court emphasised the shortcomings of the police operation of 2 May 2006, not least the choice to proceed with it on one of the most densely crowded avenues of the capital city during the morning rush hour, thus endangering the lives of passers-by, and the decision to open fire at Z.V.’s car unexpectedly, without giving any prior warning or order to surrender. The trial court also underscored the clearly disproportionate nature of the force used by the police – whilst no resistance whatsoever had been received from the passengers in Z.V.’s car, within the fifteen seconds that followed K.N.’s initial unwarranted gun shots, at least five police officers fired from their Kalashnikov automatic rifles, each of them fully discharging their high-capacity magazines. Overall, more than hundred shots were fired, with some of the stray bullets damaging a public-transport bus. The trial court stated that, even assuming that the passengers of Z.V.’s car had put up resistance to the police’s lawful orders, the use of such overwhelming armed force had been clearly disproportionate. 46.     The Tbilisi City Court also found that I.P. and L.B. had been directly implicated in the intentional misrepresentation of facts and fabrication of evidence with the aim of obstructing the original investigation into the police actions during the police operation of 2 May 2006. When reaching the latter conclusion, the City Court suggested that it was not unreasonable to assume that other officers of the Ministry of the Interior, who had not been identified during the reopened investigation, could have been involved in perverting the course of justice. Furthermore, given that the initiation of the criminal proceedings for attempted robbery and unlawful transport of firearms against the passengers of Z.V.’s car had been unlawful (see paragraph   40 above), the trial court concluded that the arrest of B.P., the only survivor, by G.K., the investigator in charge of the fabricated robbery case, had been unlawful. All in all: – I.P., born in 1968, was found guilty of aggravated murder (the offence prosecuted under Article 109 (a), (g) and (h) and of the Criminal Code) and sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment. Reducing the latter prison sentence by a quarter, pursuant to section 16 of the Amnesty Act of 28   December 2012 (“the Amnesty Act”), the court finally fixed his sentence at twelve years; – G.Ts., born in 1972, was likewise convicted of murder under Article   109 (a) and (h) of the Criminal Code and sentenced to sixteen years in prison. Reducing the latter prison sentence by a quarter, pursuant to section 16 of the Amnesty Act, the court finally fixed his sentence at twelve years; – K.N., born in 1976, was convicted of malfeasance (the offence prosecuted under Article 333 § 1, 2 and 3 (b) of the Criminal Code) on account of the disproportionate use of force by the special unit under his command, sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment and banned from public service jobs for a period of two years. Reducing the latter prison sentence by a quarter, pursuant to section 16 of the Amnesty Act, the court finally fixed the convict’s prison sentence at six years; – L.B., born in 1975, was convicted of fabrication of evidence with the aim of perverting the course of justice under Article 369 § 3 of the Criminal Code, sentenced to four years in prison and banned from public service jobs for a period of two years and three months. Reducing the latter prison sentence by a quarter, pursuant to section 16 of the Amnesty Act, the court finally fixed his prison sentence at three years; – G.K., born in 1978, was convicted of unlawful arrest of B.P. (the offence prosecuted Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code), sentenced to six years of imprisonment and banned from holding public service jobs for a period of two years and three months. Reducing the latter prison sentence by a quarter, pursuant to section 16 of the Amnesty Act, the court finally fixed his prison sentence at four years and six months. 47.     In the sentencing part of the judgment of 30 October 2015, the Tbilisi City Court stated that, when imposing the prison sentences, it took into consideration both the aggravating circumstances in which the offences had been committed and a number of mitigating considerations. Amongst the latter, the court referred to the fact that all five individuals to be sentenced had successfully fought criminality, owing to their former status as officers of the Ministry of the Interior, for many years, and that some of the convicted individuals were moreover war veterans who had participated in various armed conflicts and defended the territorial integrity of the country, for which service they should be given credit. (c)     Termination of the criminal proceedings 48.     The prosecution authority – who requested a more severe punishment – and the five accused – who claimed their innocence – all appealed against the Tbilisi City Court’s judgment of 30 October 2015. The prosecution authority particularly insisted in its appeal that the prison sentences imposed upon the convicted individuals had been manifestly inadequate when compared with the heinous nature of the crimes committed. The authority complained that the lower-instance court had failed to give due consideration to the fact that the offences in question had been committed by former State agents who had used State power for the commission of the crime. 49.     By a decision of 21 June 2017, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, after having conducted a fully adversarial retrial during which all of the witnesses and material pieces of evidence were examined anew, dismissed the parties’ appeals and upheld the lower-instance judgment in full. With respect to the sentencing part, the appellate court briefly stated that the prison sentences imposed by the lower court had been adequate. 50.     By a decision of 23 January 2018, the Supreme Court rejected appeals on points of law lodged by the parties, thus terminating the criminal proceedings. 3.     Investigation of the first applicant’s assassination 51.     On 20 January 2015 the first applicant was killed in a bomb blast caused by an improvised device planted at his son’s grave. The incident occurred in the village of Karaphila, Kaspi district, where Z.V., had been buried in the family cemetery plot. 52.     On 7 February 2015 G.S., a police officer, was arrested on suspicion of assassination of the first applicant. In a judgment of 6 November 2015 the Tbilisi City Court convicted G.S. as charged. As disclosed by the conviction, his guilt was confirmed by the following facts and inferences. (a)     Established facts 53.     The Tbilisi City Court established that, after the killing of his son on 2 May 2006, which became one of the most well-known and scandalous examples of police abuse, the first applicant had become actively involved in public life, incessantly demanding an effective investigation into and the bringing to justice of all those police officers who had been implicated in the crime. As part of that public struggle, the first applicant had established a non-governmental organisation, Save a Life (“the NGO”), whose mission had been to shine a light on the activities of numerous high-ranking law ‑ enforcement officers who had allegedly been involved in various crimes committed by the police. The first applicant and his NGO had been propagating the idea that there had been an administrative practice of tolerance towards and impunity in respect of police abuse in the country. 54.     The Tbilisi City Court noted that the first applicant had become particularly active in 2012, when he had started having private meetings with various decision-makers in the Government and other high-level State officials (see paragraphs 19-29 above). It had been as a result of his constant pressure that the investigation into the police operation of 2 May 2006 had been renewed and that the implicated police officers had been dismissed from the Ministry (see paragraphs 33 above). In 2012 the NGO had published an article in a national newspaper with a long list of all those police officers believed to have been implicated in various criminal offences (hereinafter “the police blacklist”). At the top of the police blacklist there had been the names of I.P. and of two other senior police officers, Z.Tch. and N.S., whilst in the end of the document the name of G.S., the accused, had also appeared. 55.     The trial further established, by reference to witness statements and various Internet news feeds found in G.S.’s electronic possession, that the accused had been closely monitoring the first applicant’s public activities and had been aware of the published police blacklist. Having regard to lawfully wiretapped conversations that G.S. had held with a number of witnesses through an Internet messaging service as well as to the statements that those witnesses had given during the trial, the court established that G.S. had experienced negative personal animosity towards the first applicant because of the threat that the latter had represented for him and his colleagues. It had been further confirmed by various pieces of evidence that G.S. had been on particularly good terms with I.P., Z.Tch. and N.S., the officers at the top of the police blacklist (see the preceding paragraph). 56.     The Tbilisi City Court also established that G.S., who had taken part in the armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation in August 2008, possessed, according to his military records, significant expertise in dealing with explosive materials. The trial court further found that on 12   January 2015 G.S. had accessed, using his personal official password, the police national database, which contained certain data of Georgian nationals, and collected all available information about the first applicant and his late son. It had been through the latter database, as well as by placing repeated telephone calls with his acquaintance, a police officer who had worked in the Kaspi police station, that G.S. had learnt that Z.V. had been buried in the village of Karaphila and that the first applicant had visited his son’s grave regularly, at least once every two weeks. 57.     On 18 January 2015 G.S. had driven in his car to the village of Karaphila. His car had been seen on that day by several villagers at the entrance to the local cemetery. As further incriminating evidence, the City Court referred to the fact that (i)   traces of G.S.’s DNA had been found on the parts of the bomb found dispersed at the scene of the crime and that (ii)   particles of soil from Z.V.’s grave had been found in G.S.’s car, under the driver’s seat, near the accelerator. The City Court also took into account the following facts – as soon as the news about the first applicant’s death had spread, G.S. had not been able to hide his satisfaction in a conversation with his friend and had immediately started promoting, within his professional, police circles, a version of the first applicant’s suicide. Shortly after the investigation into the first applicant’s assassination had been launched, G.S. had started enquiring, using his professional network, as to whether any suspects had already been identified. (b)     Conclusions drawn from the established facts 58.     In the light of the foregoing conclusions, the Tbilisi City Court found G.S. guilty of the first applicant’s murder, committed in aggravating circumstances (Article 109 of the Criminal Code). The court qualified the method of the assassination to have been particularly vile and cynical given the sanctity and significance that the son’s grave, who had in his turn been killed by police officers, had represented for the mourning father and because G.S. had eagerly assumed the risk of creating an excessive and indiscriminate danger to other peoples’ lives when planting such a large explosive device. The mens rea behind the crime had been G.S.’s wish to punish the first applicant for and/or prevent him from carrying out his public activities that had been directed against the officers appearing on the police blacklist (see paragraph 54 above). In that connection, the City Court noted, as a suspicious fact, that telephone conversations had taken place between I.P. and G.S. both a few days before and after the first applicant’s assassination. However, as they did not know the content of those conversations, the trial court refrained from making any further inferences. G.S. was sentenced to twenty years in prison. (c)     Termination of the criminal proceedings 59.     By a decision of 24 June 2016, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld G.S.’s conviction and sentence. On 23 December 2016 the Supreme Court, rejected an appeal on points lodged by G.S., finally terminating the criminal proceedings against him. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Code of Criminal Procedure 60.     Article 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was enacted on 9 October 2009 and was in force at the time of the reopened investigation (see paragraphs 23-35 above), provided for the following procedural rights of a person who had been granted victim status: Article 57 - Rights of a victim “1. A victim shall have the right to: (a) be informed about the nature of the charges brought against the accused; (b) be informed about the procedural actions provided for by Article 58 of this Code; (c) give a testimony concerning the damage he or she has incurred as a result of the offence, or submit, in writing, that information to the court during the hearing of a case on the merits ...; (d) obtain free of charge a copy of decrees/rulings, and/or of a judgment on the termination of investigation and/or criminal prosecution, or of other final court decisions; (e) be indemnified for the expenses incurred as a result of participating in the proceedings; ... (g) request the application of special protective measures if his or her own or close relative’s/ family member’s life, health and/or property is endangered; (h) be informe