CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 23 juillet 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s6CCEAD68 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s39A7D870 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s76CC6FD2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s294F11C8 { width:3.2pt; display:inline-block } .sAA2523D7 { width:201.43pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block }       SECOND SECTION             CASE OF ŠIRVINSKAS v. LITHUANIA   (Application no. 21243/17)                   JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   23 July 2019     FINAL   23/10/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Širvinskas v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Robert Spano, President,   Marko Bošnjak,   Valeriu Griţco,   Egidijus Kūris,   Ivana Jelić,   Arnfinn Bårdsen,   Darian Pavli, judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 2 July 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 21243/17) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Dalius Širvinskas (“the applicant”), on 8 March 2017. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A. Gruodis, a lawyer practising in Kaunas. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Acting Agent – most recently Ms L. Urbaitė. 3.     The applicant complained that the decisions of the domestic courts to make a residence order in respect of his daughter in favour of his ex-wife had violated his rights under Article 6 § 1 and Article   14 of the Convention. 4.     On 29 May 2018 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Karmėlava, in the Kaunas Region. 6.     In June 2010 the applicant married I. In September 2010 their daughter P. was born. Until 9 November 2013 they lived in the applicant’s parents’ house in Karmėlava. 7 .     On 9 November 2013, at around 3 p.m., the applicant called the police and told them that he and his wife were having a dispute and that she had decided to leave their home and take their daughter with her. According to the police report, when they arrived at the applicant’s home, there were no signs of physical violence; the applicant stated that his wife had accidentally scratched him when picking up their daughter but had not caused him any pain. He and his wife did not have any complaints against one another and asked the police not to open an investigation. 8 .     In his submissions to the Court, the applicant stated that on 9   November 2013 I. had moved out of their home, taking P. with her. The applicant and I. had disagreed on whether their daughter should go with I. or stay with the applicant, and he had called the police, who had ordered the applicant to allow his wife to take their daughter with her. The applicant had complied. He and I. had agreed that, until they reached a permanent decision, P. would live with each of them in turn. 9 .     On 20 December 2013 the applicant wrote to the Department for the Protection of Children’s Rights of Kaišiadorys Municipality (hereinafter “the Kaišiadorys childcare authority”), asking it “to influence the behaviour” of his wife. He submitted that I. had left their home (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above) and that, at her request, he had of his own free will taken their daughter to I.’s apartment in Žiežmariai, in the Kaišiadorys Municipality. On 10 December 2013 they had agreed that the applicant would collect the child ten days later. However, when he had arrived at I.’s apartment on 20 December 2013, I. had refused to allow P. to go with the applicant. He also stated that on one occasion when he had called I. by telephone, he had heard P. crying, which had made him suspect that the child might have experienced psychological and possibly physical violence. He furthermore stated that after spending time with I., P. had asked him not to leave her alone with I. any more. 10 .     On 22 December 2013 I. lodged a complaint with the police, stating that on the previous day the applicant had arrived at her workplace and had aggressively demanded that she allow him to take P. with him. I. had explained to him that the child had been ill, but the applicant had threatened to take her away while I. was at work. Later I. had received a call from her mother, who had told her that the applicant had forced his way into her house and had threatened to take P. by force. The police had been called and they had told the applicant that he could not take the child in I.’s absence. I. stated that she was experiencing constant psychological pressure and felt unsafe because of the applicant’s threats to take P. away from her. 11 .     On 23 December 2013 the applicant wrote to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that on 9 November 2013, when he had come home after work, his wife had attacked and scratched him; after seeing this, their daughter had started screaming. The applicant stated that his wife’s outbursts of anger had been frequent and that she had previously been physically violent towards P. On that day he had called the police, but had decided not to lodge a formal complaint in order not to cause problems for I. He had allowed I. to take the child with her because he had been misled by the police officers, who had told him that I. had the right to do so (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). The applicant furthermore submitted that on 20 December 2013, as previously agreed with I., he had arrived at her apartment to collect P. but that nobody had been at home. When he had called I. on her mobile telephone, she had told him to stop harassing her. The following day the applicant had gone to I.’s mother’s house, where he had found P.; P. had run to him crying and had asked him to take her home. In the applicant’s opinion, the child had appeared sad and her movements had slowed down; she had told him that she had been attacked by I.’s mother’s dog. When I.’s mother had refused to let the applicant take the child away, he had called the police, but they had told him that they would not be able to do anything in the absence of a formal complaint. Then the applicant had gone to I.’s workplace and had asked for her permission to collect the child, but I. had refused. The applicant alleged that whenever he had telephoned I., she had refused to give him information about P., and he had often heard P. crying in the background. Furthermore, whenever he had spoken to P. on the telephone, she had screamed and asked him to take her home, but on hearing P. say that, I. would start yelling at the child and tell her that the applicant did not want to live with her. The applicant asked the Kaišiadorys childcare authority to take measures to protect his daughter from I. He submitted that I. could not control her emotions, had often yelled at the child and had sometimes beaten her. Furthermore, she hindered the applicant’s contact with P. He also submitted that P. was used to the house in which she had lived since birth until her departure with I., and that I. had unilaterally changed P.’s place of residence, which was contrary to the law. In addition, the living conditions in I.’s new apartment were not suitable for the child, and because of I.’s work schedule, P. frequently stayed with I.’s mother. Moreover, I. had another daughter from a previous marriage who was being taken care of by I.’s mother, which made the applicant doubt I.’s capacity to raise their daughter. 12 .     The Kaišiadorys childcare authority notified the police of the applicant’s allegations concerning the alleged violence against P. (see paragraphs   9 and 11 above). Subsequently the police declined to open a pre-trial investigation, finding no evidence that I. had been violent towards the child. 13 .     On 23 December 2013 the Kaišiadorys childcare authority held a meeting with the applicant and I. The latter stated that she did not object to the applicant seeing their daughter, but only when I. herself was present, because the applicant had previously tried to turn P. against her. However, I. would not allow the applicant to come to her home with his parents because, in her opinion, they had been the reason for the applicant’s and I.’s separation. It was agreed that the applicant would see P. in I.’s apartment on 26   December 2013. The applicant submitted to the Court that on 26 December 2013 he had arrived at I.’s apartment but that neither I. nor P. had been there. He had telephoned I. and had sent her text messages but had not received any response. 14 .     On 27 December 2013 an official of the Kaišiadorys childcare authority visited I.’s apartment. The official found that the conditions in I.’s apartment, albeit modest and in need of some renovation, were suitable for a child. P. felt happy there and her relationship with her mother was warm and genuine. A.     Determining the child’s temporary place of residence and other related proceedings 15 .     On 30 December 2013 I. filed a petition for divorce before the Kaišiadorys District Court. She asked the court to find that the marriage had broken down through the fault of the applicant, alleging that he had started drinking, had not taken care of the family, had taken out multiple loans without consulting her, and on 9 November 2013 had thrown her and P. out of their house (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). She also asked the court to make a residence order in respect of P. in her favour, to set a schedule in respect of the applicant’s contact with the child, and to order him to pay child maintenance. Lastly, she asked the court to grant an interim measure and to rule that P. should temporarily reside with her until the final decision was adopted. 16 .     On 31 December 2013 the applicant also lodged a request with the Kaišiadorys District Court, asking it to make a residence order in his favour. He submitted that I. did not allow him to see their daughter, even though the girl had expressed the wish to see him and to live with him. He alleged that I. had often shouted at P. and had sometimes beaten her, whereas the applicant had never harmed the child in any way. He reiterated the statements that he had previously made before the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, including his statement that on 9 November 2013 he had allowed I. to take P. with her because he had been misled by the police officers, who had told him that I. had the right to do so (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). He also submitted that from her birth until her departure with I., P. had lived in the applicant’s parents’ house and was used to it, and that she was attached to her grandparents, who lived there as well. He contended that the house was better suited to the child’s needs and was closer to her kindergarten than I.’s apartment. The applicant accordingly argued that the girl should live with him. In the event that the court refused his request, the applicant asked it to set a schedule in respect of his contact with his daughter. He also asked the court to order an interim measure and to rule that P. should temporarily reside with him until the final decision was adopted. The applicant lastly asked the court not to adopt decisions in the parties’ absence (see paragraph   72 below). 17 .     On 2 January 2014 an official of Žiežmariai Eldership visited I.’s apartment and found the conditions there to be suitable for a child. The report on the visit also stated that on 2 January 2014 P. had started attending a kindergarten in Žiežmariai and that the Eldership had not received any complaints about the family. 18 .     On 6 January 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court in written proceedings adopted two separate decisions on the applicant’s and I.’s requests for interim measures (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). 19.     The court refused the applicant’s request for an interim measure. It stated that, in accordance with domestic law, an interim measure, such as determining a child’s place of residence, had to be applied when there were sufficient grounds to believe that without it the child’s rights or interests would be threatened. It also emphasised that changing a child’s habitual place of residence ( įprastinė gyvenamoji vieta ) might cause him or her social and psychological harm. The court considered the applicant’s allegation that I. had beaten their daughter to be unproven. It furthermore held that there were no grounds to find that P.’s residence with I. was in any way harmful to the girl’s rights and interests. It observed that P.’s residence with her mother did not limit the applicant’s right to see his daughter and to take part in her upbringing. The court noted that on 23 December 2013 the applicant had complained to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority that he had not been able to see his daughter (see paragraph 11 above), but that complaint had not been examined at that time, so it was not possible to conclude whether it was well-founded. 20 .     In a separate decision, the Kaišiadorys District Court allowed I.’s request for an interim measure. It observed that P. was living with I. and that P.’s official place of residence had been declared as being I.’s apartment. The court held that “changing a child’s habitual place of residence and disrupting her emotional bond with her mother, with whom she had lived since birth, in every case leads to emotional distress and is likely to cause social and psychological harm”. The court accordingly allowed the request for an interim measure and ruled that P. should temporarily reside with I. The applicant was given the right to see his daughter every other weekend, from Saturday morning until Sunday evening, and was ordered to pay maintenance of 400 Lithuanian litai ((LTL), approximately 116   euros (EUR)) per month. The wording of the decision stated that it had been adopted without the applicant being notified thereof. 21 .     The applicant lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decisions on interim measures (see paragraphs 18-20 above). He argued that the Kaišiadorys District Court had incorrectly determined that his daughter’s habitual place of residence was with I. The applicant submitted that P. had lived in his parents’ house from the time of her birth until her departure with I. and that, by taking her away, I. had changed P.’s habitual place of residence without the consent of the other parent (that is to say the applicant). He submitted that those unilateral actions had amounted to abuse of parental rights and that the Kaišiadorys District Court had legitimised that abuse. The applicant furthermore argued that his daughter, from the time of her birth until her departure with I., had lived not only with her mother but also with her father (the applicant) and that disrupting her emotional bond with either of the parents would cause her equal distress; thus, I. should not have been treated more favourably simply because she was the child’s mother. The applicant also reiterated the arguments made in his initial claim as to why P. should live with him (see paragraph 16 above). He lastly asked the court to amend the contact schedule and to allow him to see P. every weekend. 22 .     In her response to the applicant’s appeal, I. submitted that, when she had moved out of their house, the applicant had agreed that she would take their daughter with her and that there had never been any agreement that P.’s place of residence would change regularly (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), as such instability would have been detrimental to the child. I. also denied that she had prevented the applicant from seeing their daughter, and submitted that the applicant had not complied with the interim measures that had been ordered by the Kaišiadorys District Court (see paragraphs 26, 27 and 30 below). While I. acknowledged that the applicant’s parents’ house had been P.’s habitual place of residence from the time of her birth until her parents had separated, I. argued that P. was more attached to her mother than to that house and that she had quickly adapted to the new apartment; I. also pointed out that P. was attending a kindergarten nearby (see paragraph   17 above). She furthermore submitted that the living conditions in her apartment were suitable for the child, she had a regular income and her work schedule allowed her to take proper care of P. 23 .     On 17 January 2014 the applicant wrote to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that I. continued to hinder his contact with P. He stated that on 26   December 2013 he had arrived at I.’s apartment, as had been agreed (see paragraph 13 above), but that another resident of the building had told him that I. did not live there. The applicant stated that, to his knowledge, I. and P. had moved into that apartment only on 2 January 2014, which showed that she had previously lied to the authorities about her place of residence. The applicant furthermore alleged that I. was not complying with the contact schedule that had been established by the court (see paragraph   20 above). He stated that on Saturday, 11 January 2014, he had arrived at I.’s apartment, having notified her the day before, to collect the child for the weekend but that the door had been locked and I. had not responded to his telephone calls or text messages. The applicant also submitted that the building in which I.’s apartment was located was in poor condition and that he had seen drunk individuals in and around the building; it was therefore not an appropriate environment for the child. 24 .     On 20 January 2014 the Department for the Protection of Children’s Rights of the Kaunas Region Municipality (hereinafter “the Kaunas regional childcare authority”) submitted to the Kaišiadorys District Court an assessment of the conditions at the applicant’s home. It stated that the conditions there were suitable for a child and were in accordance with the child’s interests. Furthermore, the authority did not have any information that P. might have been neglected or that her parents had ever acted inappropriately. However, it also stated that the Kaunas regional childcare authority was unable to submit a final conclusion regarding which of the parents the child should live with because I. did not live in the Kaunas Region and the authority did not have the necessary information about her. 25 .     On 21 January 2014 the Kaišiadorys childcare authority submitted to the Kaišiadorys District Court an assessment of the conditions at I.’s apartment, finding them to be suitable for a child. The assessment report also included statements by I. that P. was attached to her older sister, R. (I.’s daughter from her previous marriage) and to her maternal grandparents. I. had acknowledged that P. loved her paternal grandparents as well, but that she had not been able to see them for a while because of the conflict between I. and the applicant; however, I. believed that once that conflict was resolved, she would be able to ensure more frequent contact between P. and her paternal grandparents. The assessment report concluded that, having examined all the relevant circumstances, the Kaišiadorys childcare authority was not opposed to a residence order being made in respect of P. in I.’s favour. 26 .     On 20 January 2014 the applicant wrote to the Kaunas regional childcare authority that on 18 January 2014 he had collected his daughter from I. for the weekend, in accordance with the court decision on interim measures. The following day, when he had been scheduled to return her to I., P. had begun crying and asking him not to take her back to I. because I. had hurt her ( skriaudžia ); the applicant stated that he had an audio recording of P. telling him this. He had then telephoned I. and informed her of P.’s reluctance to return to her; when I. had asked the applicant to allow her to speak to P. on the telephone, the child had refused to talk to her and had started crying again. I. had accused the applicant of turning the child against her and had threatened to call the police and a bailiff. Afterwards the applicant had asked P. why she had not wanted to go to her mother, and P. had stated that I. had hit her on the head. In the applicant’s opinion, the child was suffering from psychological distress and was being subjected to physical violence. He asked the authorities to refer P. to a psychologist in order for her psychological condition to be assessed. 27 .     On the same day I. lodged a complaint with the Kaišiadorys childcare authority and the Kaunas regional childcare authority, alleging that the applicant was not complying with the court decision on interim measures and was refusing to return P. to her. She submitted that the applicant had not answered her telephone calls and had not allowed her to speak to the child on the telephone. I. asked the authorities to promptly contact the applicant and to oblige him to return the child to her. 28 .     On the same day the Kaunas regional childcare authority issued a referral for P. to see a psychologist and forwarded the applicant’s allegations of physical violence (see paragraph 26 above) to the police. The police opened a pre-trial investigation, but it was subsequently discontinued, the police having found that no criminal acts had been committed. 29 .     On 20 January 2014 the applicant also lodged a request with the Kaišiadorys District Court, asking it to explain how its decision on interim measures (see paragraphs 18-20 above) should be enforced, given that the child refused to go back to her mother and wanted to live with him (see paragraph 26 above). On 23 January 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court explained that in order to enforce the decision on interim measures, the applicant had to notify a bailiff. 30 .     On 24 January 2014 I. asked the Kaišiadorys District Court to order the applicant to return the child to her. On 27 January 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court ordered the applicant to immediately return the child to I. 31 .     On 27 January 2014 I. wrote to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority and the Kaunas regional childcare authority, stating that the applicant had still not returned P. and had not allowed I. to talk to her. As a result, P. was not attending kindergarten and had missed a doctor’s appointment. I. furthermore stated that the applicant had been taking P. to various psychologists, without having consulted I., and was thereby causing the child emotional distress. On the same day the applicant wrote to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that he had not returned P. to I. because the child had once again refused to return to her. He stated that on 21 and 23 January 2014 he had taken his daughter to a psychologist, following a referral from the Kaunas regional childcare authority (see paragraph 28 above), and that she had told the psychologist that her mother had hurt her and had previously thrown her out of her home ( buvo išvariusi iš namų ). The applicant submitted that he was trying to convince his daughter to return to I. but that he did not wish to take her there by force. He expressed his hope that his wife would see a psychologist and change her behaviour towards their daughter. 32 .     On 29 January 2014 the applicant asked a bailiff to hand P. over to I., without harming the child, despite the fact that P. refused to go to her mother. On that day P. was handed over to I. 33 .     On 4 February 2014 the applicant lodged a request with the Kaišiadorys District Court, asking it, inter alia , to ensure that P. continued seeing psychologists in Kaunas, following the referral by the Kaunas regional childcare authority (see paragraph 28 above). He submitted that, under that referral, ten visits had been deemed necessary in order for the psychologists to make a final conclusion as to P.’s emotional bonds with her parents. To date, four such visits had taken place. The applicant expressed his fear that I. might prevent P. from seeing the psychologists any further because their preliminary conclusions had been to the effect that P.’s attachment to the applicant was strong. 34 .     On 10 February 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court allowed the applicant’s request concerning P.’s visits to psychologists in Kaunas. It ordered I. to ensure that P. visited psychologists at the Centre for Psychological Support and Counselling (a public institution) until they were able to reach a final conclusion as to the girl’s emotional state and opinion. 35 .     Subsequently I. lodged a request with the Kaišiadorys District Court, asking it to amend the aforementioned decision (see paragraph 34 above) and to allow her to take P. to psychologists in Kaišiadorys, which was closer to the child’s place of residence, and not in Kaunas. The Kaišiadorys childcare authority had recommended that P. see psychologists at the Pedagogical-Psychological Service of the Kaišiadorys Region (hereinafter “the Kaišiadorys psychological service”). It appears that the applicant did not oppose I.’s request. On 26 February 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court allowed I.’s request and ordered her to ensure that P. visited psychologists at the Kaišiadorys psychological service. 36 .     On 3 March 2014 I. asked the Kaišiadorys psychological service for recommendations regarding how she and the applicant should behave with their daughter while their dispute concerning her place of residence was pending. On an unspecified date the Kaišiadorys psychological service met with I. and P., and on 10 March 2014 it issued the following conclusions. After observing P. and I., it found that their relationship and communication corresponded to the normal level of P.’s development for her age, and there were no indications that P. might be suffering a psychological crisis or that she felt any emotional tension or aggression towards either of her parents. The report concluded: “It is insisted ( primygtinai rekomenduojama ) that the parents ... : 1. resolve their dispute concerning [P.’s] place of residence and contact rights by means of a friendly agreement, in the interests of the child’s well-being; 2. reduce to the minimum the unavoidable trauma suffered by the child as a result of her parents’ divorce by providing her with a stable living environment and contact with her father and mother, in a manner in keeping with her age; 3. take into account the fact that children of [P.’s] age (i.e. from six months to three years of age) are likely to suffer anxiety when separated from their mother ( atsižvelgti į tai, jog [P.] amžiaus vaikų raidai (t.y. nuo pusės iki trejų metų) būdingas atsiskyrimo su mama nerimas ); 4. [acknowledge that] in order to avoid a crisis reaction to the divorce, during the critical period (i.e. during the divorce proceedings and at least half a year after they end) it is unquestionably essential to fulfil [P.’s] need to live with her mother in a stable physical, emotional and social environment ( vienareikšmiškai būtina tenkinti [P.] poreikį gyventi su motina stabilioje fizinėje, emocinėje ir socialinėje aplinkoje ); 5. protect [P.] from any wish on the part of the spouses – often observed during divorce proceedings – to take revenge on the other by using the child’s helplessness and her need for emotional closeness with each of her parents.” 37 .     The applicant lodged a complaint with the Children’s Rights Ombudsperson regarding the Kaišiadorys psychological service’s conclusions. He submitted that those conclusions were biased and had been reached solely on the basis of I.’s statements – which had been inaccurate – and without assessing P.’s emotional bond with the applicant. In particular, he contested the service’s findings that P. was “likely to suffer anxiety when separated from [her] mother” and that it was “unquestionably essential to fulfil [P.’s] need to live with her mother” (see paragraph 36 above), arguing that P. would suffer no less if she were separated from her father. The applicant also complained to the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson that the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service were discriminatory against him, as P.’s father, on the grounds of gender. 38 .     On 20 March 2014 the Centre for Psychological Support and Counselling, in a letter responding to a prior request lodged by the applicant, stated that to that date it had held five meetings with P. and several meetings with the applicant and I. separately. While it was clear that P. loved both her parents, during all the meetings she had expressed the wish to live with the applicant, and the psychologists had observed her great attachment to him. In the letter it was recommended that the provision of psychological support to P. be continued. 39 .     On 1 April 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court, in written proceedings, examined the appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Kaišiadorys District Court on interim measures (see paragraphs 18-20 above). The court dismissed the part of the appeal concerning P.’s temporary residence. It stated that the applicant had not proved that P.’s residing with I. was contrary to the child’s interests; it also referred to the authorities’ findings that the conditions in I.’s apartment were suitable for the child (see paragraph 17 above). The court emphasised that at that stage of the proceedings it was determining only the child’s temporary place of residence, and that her permanent place of residence would be determined when it examined the merits of the divorce claim; only at that stage would it be decided to which parent the child was more attached or which place of residence was more suited to her needs. Referring to the reports of the psychologists who had examined P. (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above), the court considered that at that stage the psychologists had not reached a final conclusion as to which parent the child was more attached to, and that they had found that because of her young age P. was unable to express her preference regarding with which parent she wished to live and was likely to be influenced by her parents’ views. However, the court extended the applicant’s contact rights, giving him the right to see P. every other weekend, from Friday evening until Sunday evening. 40 .     Subsequently the applicant asked the Kaišiadorys District Court to further extend his contact rights, but on 9 May 2014 the court, in an oral hearing, dismissed that request. 41 .     On 15 July 2014 the applicant wrote to the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that P. had told him on the telephone that her older sister, R. (I.’s daughter from her previous marriage), had beaten her. The following day an official of the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, together with a police officer, visited I.’s parents’ house, where P. and R. were. They spoke to P. and she told them that she loved her sister and that the latter had never beaten her. Afterwards I. lodged a complaint with the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that the applicant had wrongfully accused her daughter, R., of beating P. The authority forwarded I.’s and the applicant’s allegations to the Kaišiadorys police, but on 18 August 2014 the police decided not to open a pre-trial investigation. After interviewing the applicant, I. and R., the police found no evidence that R. had used violence against P. It also considered that the applicant had not intentionally slandered R. but had merely informed the authorities of his genuine suspicions. 42 .     On 27 August 2014 the Kaišiadorys psychological service sent a written explanation to the Kaišiadorys District Court that its conclusions of 10   March 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) had been delivered following I.’s request for psychological assistance; however, its aim had not been to determine P.’s opinion concerning her place of residence. The Kaišiadorys psychological service also stated that it did not have the authority to assess P.’s attachment to her parents. 43 .     On 30 September 2014 the Children’s Rights Ombudsperson, after examining the applicant’s complaint against the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service of 10   March 2014 (see paragraphs 36 and   37 above), issued an opinion. The Ombudsperson observed that on 3   March 2014 I. had addressed the Kaišiadorys psychological service on her own initiative, and that after the Ombudsperson had begun the present inquiry, in August 2014 the service had informed the Kaišiadorys District Court that it had not assessed the degree of P.’s attachment to her parents because it did not have the authority to do so (see paragraph 42 above). The Ombudsperson found that the Kaišiadorys childcare authority had not informed the Kaišiadorys psychological service in due time of the court’s decisions ordering I. to take P. to see psychologists (see paragraphs 34 and   35 above). The Ombudsperson furthermore observed that, according to the relevant legal instruments, the Kaišiadorys psychological service did not have the authority to assess with which parent a child should live in the event of a divorce, and that the Kaišiadorys childcare authority should thus not have referred I. and P. to that service. In the Ombudsperson’s view, when adopting its decision of 26 February 2014 (see paragraph 35 above), the Kaišiadorys District Court had been misled about the scope of the authority of the Kaišiadorys psychological service. The Ombudsperson therefore considered that the service’s conclusions of 10 March 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) should not have been accepted as evidence by the court. The Ombudsperson’s opinion was forwarded to the Kaišiadorys District Court. 44 .     In October and November 2014 the applicant lodged several complaints with the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, alleging that I. was not taking proper care of P.’s health and that he was being prevented from seeing his daughter or talking to her on the telephone on the pretext that she was ill. On 3   November 2014 representatives of the Kaišiadorys childcare authority visited I.’s home; on 10 November 2014 they held a meeting with the applicant and I. in its office, during which I. denied the applicant’s allegations. P.’s doctor and the director of the kindergarten also attended the meeting and confirmed that P. was generally in good health and did not fall ill more often than most children of her age. The Kaišiadorys childcare authority expressed its regret that the applicant and I. were unable to resolve their disagreements, because such a situation was harmful to the child. It recommended to I. that if P. fell ill on a weekend that she was supposed to spend with the applicant and the illness was not serious, the applicant could still collect the child; it furthermore recommended that if the applicant had to miss a weekend with P. because of her illness, I. should allow him to spend a different weekend with the child. 45 .     On 10 November 2014 the applicant asked the Kaišiadorys District Court to amend the contact schedule and to order that, if P. was supposed to spend a weekend with the applicant but she was not handed over to him for any reason, he would have the right to collect P. on the following weekend. On 13 November 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court refused that request on the grounds that the applicant’s proposal would require changing P.’s place of residence often and that such a lack of stability might be harmful to her. The court also referred to the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service that during the divorce proceedings and at least half a year after they ended, it was essential to fulfil P.’s need to live with her mother in a stable physical, emotional and social environment and that children of P.’s age were likely to suffer anxiety if separated from their mothers (see paragraph 36 above). The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 26 January 2015 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. It emphasised that the applicant’s inability to see P. on the weekends had been due to the child’s illness and not any attempt on I.’s part to prevent him from seeing the child. 46 .     On 11 November 2014 the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson examined the applicant’s complaint against the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above). It referred to the opinion of the Children’s Rights Ombudsperson (see paragraph 43 above), which had found that the Kaišiadorys psychological service had not assessed P.’s attachment to her parents because it had not had the authority to do so and that its conclusions had been forwarded to the Kaišiadorys District Court by mistake. Accordingly, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson stated that, since the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service could not have been used as evidence in court proceedings, they could not have affected the applicant’s rights or discriminated against him on the basis of gender. 47 .     The applicant lodged a complaint against the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He argued that the courts had relied on the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service, thereby violating his rights and discriminating against him on the basis of his gender. On 3 November 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed his complaint. It held that although the Kaišiadorys District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court in their decisions had indeed relied on the conclusions of the Kaišiadorys psychological service (see paragraphs 39 and 45 above), that had not affected the lawfulness of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson’s opinion because the applicant had had the possibility to defend his rights by appealing against those court decisions. 48 .     In November 2015 the applicant lodged several complaints with the Kaišiadorys childcare authority, stating that I. was using physical and psychological violence against P. and that doctors and kindergarten personnel were providing him with untruthful information about his daughter. The authority forwarded the applicant’s complaints to the Kaišiadorys police but the police declined to open a pre-trial investigation, stating that there were no grounds to find that any criminal acts had been committed. B.     Determining the child’s permanent place of residence 49 .     On 7 March 2014 the Kaišiadorys District Court held a hearing in order to examine the merits of the applicant’s and I.’s divorce case. It held that both the applicant’s and I.’s participation in the hearing was mandatory; since neither of them had appeared, it decided to hold another hearing on 6   May 2014. 50 .     The court held further hearings on 6 May, 6 June, 17 July and 3   September 2014 during which it heard various witnesses, examined documentary evidence and considered requests lodged by the parties. 51 .     During the hearing held on 22 October 2014 the court allowed the applicant’s request for P. to be examined by a court-appointed psychologist in order for the degree of her attachment to each of her parents to be determined. It ordered the parties to submit their questions for the psychologist by 3   November 2014. 52 .     On 5 November 2014 the court forwarded the questions submitted by the applicant and I. to the psychologist. The case was adjourned until the issuance of the psychologist’s conclusion. 53 .     P. was examined by the court-appointed psychologist on 18 March 2015 and the psychologist issued her conclusion on 30   April 2015. It stated that P. was too young to have an independent opinion concerning her place of residence and that she was very easily influenced by the people closest to her. Although P. was unable to fully understand the conflict between her parents, she felt anxious about it and was unwilling to answer questions related to it. She expressed warm feelings towards both of her parents, was attached to and felt safe with both of them, and denied having experienced any physical violence from either of them. It was clear that P. was missing her father (the applicant) and the house in which she had spent the first years of her life; she wished to spend more time with her father, felt happy when she saw him and felt sad when separated from him. At the same time, having to choose between her parents was unpleasant for P. and she mostly wished that they and she could live together again. According to the psychologist, P. had already become used to her current place of residence (I.’s apartment) and the kindergarten that she was attending, and it was therefore not recommended that she change her place of residence again, as that would undermine the child’s feelings of stability and safety. The psychologist emphasised that the girl was missing her father and that it was therefore essential to ensure frequent and uninterrupted visits from him. Furthermore, in order to protect the child’s best interests, it was important to create stability in her life and, as much as possible, not to involve her in her parents’ disagreements. The psychologist’s conclusions were forwarded to the Kaišiadorys District Court on 5 May 2015. 54 .     On 26 May 2015 the court decided to resume its examination of the divorce case. It held a hearing on 25 June 2015 and decided to hold the following hearing on 10 September 2015, after the judge’s and lawyers’ holidays. On the latter date, after hearing the parties’ final arguments, the court announced that it would deliver its decision on 30   September 2015. 55 .     On 30 September 2015 the court decided to renew the examination of the merits of the case on the grounds that the parties had not submitted sufficient documents detailing their current financial state and their debts to one another. It ordered them to provide the relevant documents by 2   November 2015 and scheduled a hearing for that date. 56 .     At the hearing of 2 November 2015 the court examined the new documents, heard the parties’ final arguments and concluded its examination of the merits of the case. It announced that the decision would be delivered on 18 November 2015. 57 .     On 18 November 2015 the Kaišiadorys District Court delivered its decision in the divorce case. The court observed that the applicant and I. had both accused each other of alcohol abuse, physical violence and abandoning their family, but on the basis of the available information it considered that both of them had been equally responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. 58 .     When making its residence order, the court observed that P. had been living with I. since 9 November 2013 and was attending a kindergarten nearby; local child protection authorities had inspected I.’s apartment and had found that it was suitable for the child and that there was no indication that living with I. was harmful to P. in any way (see paragraphs   14, 17 and 25 above). The court also referred to the findings of the court-appointed psychologist, who had found that P. was equally attached to both parents but was too young to express an independent opinion as to which of them she preferred to live with; the girl had adapted to her new place of residence with her mother and to the kindergarten that she was attending, and the psychologist had recommended that it not be changed again, as stability was very important for a child of her age (see paragraph   53 above). Taking those findings into account, the court held that it was “an especially important circumstance” ( itin svarbi aplinkybė ) that for two years the child had been living with I., and emphasised that changing her place of residence might cause her social and psychological harm (see paragraphs 75 and 76 below). It stated that even though both parents were capable of ensuring proper conditions for P.’s development and upbringing and that she was attached to both of them, there were “no imperative and imminent reasons” ( nėra būtino ir neišvengiamo pagrindo ) for changing her present place of residence. The court therefore made a residence order in I.’s favour. 59.     The court furthermore emphasised that the parent with whom the child lived had no right to interfere with the other parent’s right to see the child and to participate in the child’s upbringing. It held that the applicant had the right to see his daughter every other weekend, from Saturday morning until Sunday evening. He was also ordered to pay child maintenance of EUR 200 per month. 60 .     By the same decision the court divided between the applicant and I. their marital property and liability for debts to their creditors. 61 .     The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. He argued that the court had incorrectly found that I.’s apartment had become P.’s habitual place of residence and should not be changed. He submitted that his parents’ house, in which P. had lived from the time of her birth until her departure with I., had remained her habitual place of residence and that she had been removed from that house only because of I.’s unilateral actions, which had constituted abuse of parental rights (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). He contended that the first-instance court had made a residence order in I.’s favour essentially because P. had already been living with I. as the result of an earlier decision ordering interim measures (see paragraphs 18-20 above) and that the interim measures had become de facto permanent. The applicant also submitted that the court had not addressed any of his arguments as to why the child should live with him (see paragraph 16 above). He argued that the findings of the psychologists and the testimony of the witnesses had shown that P. felt a stronger attachment to him than to I. and that she wanted to live with him. He furthermore submitted that the court had not taken into account I.’s personality and behaviour, such as her refusal to let the applicant see the child and the fact that I.’s daughter from her previous marriage did not live with her. The applicant also asked for his contact rights to be extended and the amount in maintenance that he was required to pay to be reduced. 62 .     On 10 May 2016 the Kaunas Regional Court decided to renew the examination of evidence related to the residence order. It held an oral hearing on 18 August 2016. 63 .     On 8 September 2016 the Kaunas Regional Court