CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 3 septembre 2019

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s6CCEAD68 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s39A7D870 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB9F7F539 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sE5273FBD { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sBAD0D18F { width:1.87pt; display:inline-block } .s165BD465 { width:190.1pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s662121A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s5243C837 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; font-size:10pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .sE24C0691 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FOURTH SECTION           CASE OF JANUŠKEVIČIENĖ v. LITHUANIA   (Application no. 69717/14)                     JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   3 September 2019     FINAL   27/01/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Januškevičienė v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ganna Yudkivska, President,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Faris Vehabović,   Egidijus Kūris,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Georges Ravarani,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 October 2018 and 18 June 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 69717/14) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Ms Vida Januškevičienė (“the applicant”), on 23 October 2014. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr S. Lileikis a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė. 3.     The applicant alleged that courts in criminal proceedings against third parties had declared that she had committed criminal offences, in violation of her right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, and that she had not had an effective remedy in respect of that complaint, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention. 4.     On 20 September 2017 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Vilnius. A.     Start of the pre-trial investigation 6 .     On 23 October 2007 the Vilnius office of the Financial Crime Investigation Service opened a pre-trial investigation into allegations of fraudulent appropriation of property of high value committed in an organised group in 2005 to 2007 (hereafter “the main investigation”). More than thirty individuals and companies were suspected of having participated in the criminal activity. 7 .     On 25 October 2007 the applicant was served with the official notice that she was suspected of fraud committed in an organised group, in the capacity of an organiser, as set forth in Articles 24 § 4 and 182 § 2 of the Criminal Code. It was suspected that the applicant, as the leader of the organised group consisting of her, Č.M., I.R., D.L., T.F., S.P., O.J., A.J. and other individuals, and as the individual in charge of several companies designed to cover up criminal activity, had falsified invoices and other accounting documents issued under the name of those companies and thereby helped multiple other companies, including company D., company   A. and company S., appropriate large amounts of money in unpaid value-added tax. 8 .     The applicant was questioned on the same day in the presence of her lawyer but refused to answer any questions. She was questioned again on 27   April 2011 and again refused to answer questions. B.     Proceedings against V.D. and company D. 9 .     On 25 May 2009 the prosecutor in charge of the pre-trial investigation decided to separate the investigation against company D. and its director V.D. from the main investigation. The prosecutor stated that the investigation was of a large scope and concerned the activities of more than ten companies, and thus it might take a long time to be completed. However, the evidence against V.D. and company D. had been collected and the case against them was ready for examination; it was also necessary to ensure their right to a trial within a reasonable time. The prosecutor stated that separating the pre-trial investigations would not impair their thoroughness or objectivity. 10 .     On 18 December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court convicted V.D. and company D. of several counts of fraud, appropriation of property of high value, fraudulent accounting and falsification of documents, as set forth in Articles 182 §§ 1 and 2, 183 § 2, 222 § 1 and 300 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. They had not been charged with committing the criminal offences in an organised group. The court found that V.D. had used falsified documents to show that company D. had acquired services from other companies, thereby reducing the company’s official profits and the amount of value ‑ added tax due from the company to the State budget. The both accused had pleaded guilty to all the charges. 11 .     The beginning of the descriptive part of the judgment reproduced the charges against the accused as presented in the indictment. It stated that in respect of each charge V.D. and company D. had acted with common intent with a group of accomplices ( veikė vieninga tyčia bendrininkų grupe ), consisting of Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., T.F., S.P., O.J., A.J. and others. 12 .     Subsequently in the descriptive part of the judgment the court assessed the evidence submitted to it. It stated: “When assessing the evidence of the case, the court makes the following conclusions ( vertindamas byloje esančius įrodymus, teismas daro šias išvadas ): ... [V.D.] acquired from [D.L., I.R., the applicant, and Č.M.] falsified ... invoices and other accounting documents which included knowingly untrue information that [company D.] had bought advertising services from the aforementioned company. The falsified documents were included in the accounting balance of [company D.], the money was taken from [company D.’s] account in cash, part of which was paid to [D.L., I.R., the applicant, and Č.M.] for providing the falsified documents and the remainder was used for the various needs of [company D.].” 13.     When determining the sentence to be given to the accused, the court took into account, among other circumstances, that they had committed the criminal offences in an organised group. They received monetary fines. 14 .     Company D. appealed against that judgment, arguing that the fine given to it was too high. On 20 March 2010 the Court of Appeal partly allowed its appeal and reduced the fine. 15 .     The beginning of the descriptive part of the Court of Appeal’s judgment reproduced the charges against the accused as presented in the indictment (see paragraph 11 above). The remainder of the judgment did not include any statements mentioning the applicant. 16 .     The applicant did not have any procedural status in the proceedings against V.D. and company D. She claims that she did not know about them until she was presented with an indictment against her in April 2014 (see paragraph 31 below). C.     Proceedings against V.S., R.N., V.B., company A. and company S. 17 .     On 11 November 2010 the prosecutor decided to separate the investigation against V.S., R.N., V.B. and companies A. and S. from the main investigation. The prosecutor stated that the investigation was of a large scope and might take a long time to be completed, whereas the evidence against the aforementioned suspects had been collected and the case against them was ready for examination. The prosecutor reiterated the importance of ensuring their right to a trial within a reasonable time, and stated that the separation of the investigations would not impair their thoroughness or objectivity. 18 .     On 4 June 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court convicted V.S. and R.N. of several counts of fraud, appropriation of property of high value, fraudulent accounting and falsification of documents, as set forth in Articles   182 §§   1 and 2, 183 § 2, 222 § 1 and 300 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code. They had not been charged with committing the criminal offences in an organised group. The court found that V.S. and R.N., who were directors of company A. and company S., respectively, had used falsified documents to show that their companies had acquired services from other companies, thereby reducing the companies’ official profits and the amount of value-added tax due from them to the State. V.S. and R.N. partly confessed to the charges against them. 19.     In the same judgment the court also acquitted V.B. (director of another company), company A. and company S. of similar charges for lack of evidence. 20 .     The beginning of the descriptive part of the judgment reproduced the charges against the accused as presented in the indictment. It stated that in respect of each charge each of the accused had acted with common intent with a group of accomplices, consisting of Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., T.F., S.P., O.J., A.J. and others. 21 .     The remainder of the judgment did not include any statements mentioning the applicant. 22.     The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 26   June   2012. 23 .     The applicant did not have any procedural status in these proceedings. She claims that she did not know about them until she was presented with an indictment against her in April 2014 (see paragraph 31 below). D.     Proceedings against E.T., E.A., R.N., company P. and company S.S. 24.     On 12 July 2011 the prosecutor decided to separate the investigation against E.T., E.A., R.N. and companies P. and S.S. from the main investigation, giving essentially the same reasons as for separating other investigations (see paragraphs 9 and 17 above). 25.     On 15 January 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court found all the accused guilty of several counts of fraud, appropriation of property of high value, fraudulent accounting and falsification of documents, as set forth in Articles 182 §§ 1 and 2, 183 § 2, 222 § 1 and 300 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. They had not been charged with committing the criminal offences in an organised group. 26.     A copy of the Kaunas Regional Court’s judgment has not been provided to the Court. However, from its description in the subsequent Court of Appeal’s judgment (see paragraph 28 below), it appears that the beginning of the descriptive part of the judgment, which reproduced the charges against the accused as presented in the indictment, stated that in respect of each charge each of the accused had acted with a group of accomplices, consisting of Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., T.F., S.P., O.J., A.J. and others. It also appears that that statement was subsequently repeated in the descriptive part of the judgment as part of the court’s findings. 27.     The applicant was called as a witness before the first-instance court but she refused to testify on the grounds that that case was related to the case in which she was a suspect (see paragraph 7 above). 28 .     On 8 May 2017 the Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and acquitted all the accused on the grounds of insufficient evidence that any criminal offences had been committed. In so far as relevant to the present case, the court held: “In the descriptive part of the [judgment of the Kaunas Regional Court] it is stated that the first-instance court has established that [E.T., E.A., R.N. and companies P. and S.S.] committed the criminal offences with which they have been charged while acting in an organised group consisting of [Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., T.F., S.P., O.J., A.J. and others]. However, that conclusion of the first-instance court is not based on evidence ... As it was already mentioned, the pre-trial investigation in the present case was separated from another pre-trial investigation concerning allegations of falsification of documents and fraud when calculating and paying the value-added tax, in which official notices that they were suspects had been presented to [Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., O.J. and A.J.] ... [T]he criminal case against [Č.M., the applicant, I.R., D.L., O.J. and A.J.] concerning allegations of falsification of documents and appropriation of value-added tax is still pending before the first-instance court (the Vilnius Regional Court). The evidence in that case is still being examined and a judgment on the charges against the aforementioned individuals has not been adopted. Accordingly, since pre-trial investigations have been separated on the basis of individuals and not on the basis of criminal offences, and since the criminal case from which the present case has been separated has not been examined by a court to date, the possibility to establish all the circumstances of the criminal offences allegedly committed by the accomplices in the present case is significantly restricted. Having in mind that the proceedings before the appellate-instance court are limited not only by Article 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also by Article   320 of that Code (a case is examined only in respect of those accused (suspects) and those criminal acts which have been referred to the court for examination), the appellate-instance court ... cannot examine all the circumstances of the alleged criminal offences and cannot establish the acts and roles of [Č.M., the applicant, I.R. and D.L.] in the commission of the alleged criminal offences. As a result, the present case cannot determine the criminal liability, the form of complicity and other questions related to the aforementioned individuals who allegedly took part in criminal activity.” E.     Proceedings against other individuals 29.     On unspecified dates five other investigations against ten individuals and companies were separated from the main investigation. No information concerning the proceedings against them has been provided to the Court. F.     Proceedings against the applicant 30.     On 21 January 2014 the applicant was served with the finalised notice of suspicion which presented essentially the same allegations as before (see paragraph 7 above). She was questioned on the same day. She denied her guilt and refused to answer questions. 31 .     On 17 April 2014 the prosecutor drew up indictments against the applicant, Č.M., I.R., D.L., O.J. and A.J. It alleged that the applicant, as the leader of the organised group consisting of her, Č.M., I.R., D.L., O.J. and   A.J., and as the individual in charge of several companies designed to cover up criminal activity, had falsified invoices and other accounting documents issued under the name of those companies and thereby helped multiple other companies appropriate over 6,000,000   Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 1,700,000 euros (EUR)) in unpaid value-added tax. The indictment stated that the evidence against the applicant included, among other things, the evidence in the criminal case against V.D. and company D. and the criminal case against V.S. and R.N. (see paragraphs 9-23 above), as well as criminal cases against several other individuals. The applicant was charged with fraud, appropriation of property, legalisation of property obtained through criminal activity and falsification of documents committed in an organised group, in the capacity of an organiser or abettor, as set forth in Articles 24 §§ 4 and 6, 25 § 3, 182 § 2, 183 § 2, 216 § 1 and 300 § 3 of the Criminal Code. 32 .     On 30 April 2014 the case was referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 33 .     On 5 January 2018 all the accused asked the court to discontinue the criminal proceedings as time-barred. 34 .     On 23 January 2018 the court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant, Č.M., I.R., D.L., O.J. and A.J. as time-barred. It noted that the criminal offences had allegedly been committed in 2005 to 2007, and even for the most serious of the charges against the accused the statutory limitation period was ten years. The court observed that there was no information that any of the accused had committed new criminal offences during the relevant period or that they had been hiding from the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the proceedings were discontinued in respect of all the accused. It appears that that decision was not appealed against and became final. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Constitutional and statutory provisions 1.     Constitution 35.     The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania read: Article 31 “A person shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the procedure established by law and declared guilty by an effective court judgment. A person charged with committing a crime shall have the right to a public and fair hearing of his or her case by an independent and impartial court. ... A person suspected of committing a crime, as well as the accused, shall be guaranteed, from the moment of his or her arrest or first interrogation, the right to defence, as well as the right to counsel.” Article 109 “In the Republic of Lithuania, justice shall be administered only by courts. When administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent. When considering cases, judges shall obey only the law ...” 2.     Code of Criminal Procedure 36.     Article 44 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that anyone who has been suspected of or charged with a criminal offence must be considered innocent until his or her guilt has been proved in accordance with the Code by a final court judgment. 37.     Article 170 § 4 (1) provides that the decision to join or separate pre ‑ trial investigations is within the exclusive competence of a prosecutor. 38 .     Article 255 § 1 provides that a court examines a case only in respect of those accused and those criminal acts which have been referred to it for examination. 39 .     Articles 304, 305 and 307 provide that a judgment consists of three parts: introductory ( įžanginė ), descriptive ( aprašomoji ) and operative ( rezoliucinė ). The introductory part must list, among other items, the date and place of the adoption of the judgment, the composition of the panel, the names of the people participating in the hearing, information about the accused, and the legal provisions under which the accused has been charged (Article   304). The descriptive part of a judgment of conviction must provide the following: (1)   circumstances of the criminal offence which has been declared proven ( įrodyta pripažintos nusikalstamos veikos aplinkybės ); (2)   evidence on which the court based its conclusion, and reasons for dismissing any other evidence; (3) reasons for the legal classification of the criminal offences; (4) reasons for the decision on the sentence (Article   305 §   1). The operative part of a judgment of conviction must indicate, among others, the legal provisions under which the accused has been convicted and the sentence to be given to him or her (Article 307 § 1). 40.     Article 312 § 1 provides that an appeal against a judgment can be submitted by a prosecutor, a convicted person, a person in respect of whom a case has been discontinued, his or her defence counsel or legal representative, a victim or his or her representative. 41.     Article 367 § 1 provides that an appeal on points of law can be submitted by a prosecutor, a victim or his or her representative, a convicted person, an acquitted person, a person in respect of whom a case has been discontinued, his or her defence counsel or legal representative, a civil claimant, a civil defendant, their representatives, a person who has provided security for bail, a person whose property or assets have been seized, or his or her representative. 42 .     Article 3 § 3 provides that if the statutory limitation period expires after the case has been transferred to a court for examination and the accused asks that the criminal proceedings be continued, the court proceeds with the examination of the case and adopts a decision either to discontinue the case or to acquit the accused. 3.     Civil Code 43 .     Article 7 of the 1964 Civil Code, which remained in force until 1   July 2001 with certain amendments, provided in its relevant parts: Article 7. Honour and dignity “Individuals or organisations have the right to apply to a court asking it to order retraction of information which is erroneous and damages their honour and dignity, unless the person who has disseminated that information proves that it is not erroneous. ...” 44 .     Article 2.24 of the 2000 Civil Code, in force from 1 July 2001 onwards, provides in its relevant parts: Article 2.24. Protection of honour and dignity “1. A person shall have the right to demand the retraction, in judicial proceedings, of information which has been made public and which denigrates his or her honour and dignity and is erroneous, in addition to the right to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by the placing in the public domain of the aforementioned information ... Information which has been made public shall be presumed to be erroneous, unless the publisher proves the opposite to be true. 2. Where erroneous information has been made public by the mass media (including the press, television and radio), the person who is the subject of the publication shall have the right to provide a proposed retraction, and to demand that the media source concerned publish the aforementioned retraction free of charge or make it public in some other way ... ... 9. The rules set in this Article do not apply to parties to court proceedings, which may not be held liable for statements made during a court hearing or information provided in court documents.” 45 .     Article 6.272 of the 2000 Civil Code provides: Article 6.272. Liability for damage caused by the unlawful actions of preliminary investigation officials, prosecutors, judges and the courts “1. Damage resulting either from unlawful conviction, unlawful arrest as a suppressive measure, unlawful detention, application of unlawful procedural measures in enforcement proceedings, or unlawful imposition of an administrative penalty (detention) shall give rise to full compensation by the State irrespective of the fault of the preliminary investigation officials, prosecution officials or courts. 2. The State shall be liable for full compensation in respect of the damage caused by the unlawful actions of a judge or a court trying a civil case, where the damage is caused through the fault of the judge himself or of any other court official. 3. In addition to pecuniary damage, the aggrieved person shall be entitled to non-pecuniary damage. 4. Where the damage arises from an intentional fault on the part of preliminary investigation, prosecution or court officials or judges, the State, after compensation has been provided, shall have the right to take action against the officials concerned for recovery, under the procedure established by law, of the sums in question in the amount provided for by the law.” B.     Practice of the domestic courts 46 .     In a ruling of 29 December 2004 the Constitutional Court held: “The presumption of innocence set out in Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Constitution is one of the most important guarantees of the implementation of justice in a democratic State. It is a fundamental principle of the implementation of justice in the process of criminal cases, an important guarantee of human rights and freedoms. A person is considered innocent of a crime until his or her guilt has been proved in accordance with a procedure established by law and he or she has been found guilty by a court judgment that has come into effect. The presumption of innocence is inseparably linked with respect for and the protection of other constitutional human rights and freedoms, as well as acquired rights. It is especially important that State institutions and officials respect the presumption of innocence. It should be noted that public figures should in general refrain from referring to a person as a criminal until that person’s guilt in respect of the crime has been proved in accordance with the procedure established by law and he or she has been found guilty by a court judgment that has come into effect. Otherwise, human honour and dignity may be violated and human rights and freedoms may be undermined.” 47 .     In its review of domestic case-law, issued on 25 June 2009, the Supreme Court concluded that the requirement for a court to examine a criminal case only in respect of those accused who had been referred to it for examination, set out in Article 255 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 38 above), did not prohibit the court from examining whether the acts of third parties complied with the law, to the extent necessary for determining the criminal responsibility of the accused. However, a judgment could not include any phrases ( nuosprendyje negali būti formuluočių ) which established third parties’ guilt in respect of criminal acts, except for individuals who had already been convicted or exempted from criminal responsibility. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION 48.     The applicant complained that court judgments adopted in criminal proceedings against V.D. and company D. and those against V.S., R.N., V.B. and companies A. and S. had unambiguously stated that she had committed criminal offences as part of an organised group, despite the fact that she had not been found guilty of those offences by any court. She relied on Article   6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government 49 .     The Government submitted that the applicant had had the opportunity to defend herself in the criminal proceedings against her. They stated that the applicant had been informed of the suspicions against her on 25 October 2007 (see paragraph 7 above) and thus she could have defended her rights during the pre-trial investigation. The Government emphasised that the judgments adopted against the co-suspects had not had a res judicata effect on the courts examining the case against the applicant, as demonstrated by the fact that investigative measures with regard to the applicant had been “intensively carried out” and that the applicant herself had submitted “numerous” requests to the Vilnius Regional Court regarding access to the case file and inclusion of new evidence – the Government provided the Court with a copy of one request submitted by the applicant on 17 September 2015 to include new evidence in the case file. The Government contended that in those proceedings the applicant could have challenged the facts underlying the judgments adopted against her co-suspects; however, she had not done that. Nor had she complained at any point of a violation of her right to be presumed innocent. 50 .     The Government also submitted that the applicant herself, together with her co-accused, had requested that the Vilnius Regional Court discontinue the proceedings against her as time-barred. However, domestic law allowed courts to continue examining the case after the expiry of the statute of limitations at the request of the accused, and in such situations the court could either adopt a judgment of acquittal or discontinue the proceedings if an acquittal was not possible (see paragraph 42 above). Accordingly, the applicant could have requested that the court continue the examination of her case. The Government argued that by failing to do so she had precluded the courts from “removing any doubts” with regard to the references to her guilt made in the judgments against her co-suspects. 51 .     The Government further submitted that the applicant could have lodged a civil claim for damages for the breach of her honour and dignity. They provided two examples of relevant cases before the domestic courts: -     In the first case, the claimant had complained that his honour and dignity had been breached by his employer, a regional police force, which had stated during a disciplinary inquiry that the claimant had committed certain criminal offences, despite the fact that at that time he had not been convicted of any such offences. On 14 October 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court, relying on Article 7 of the 1964 Civil Code (see paragraph 43 above), had acknowledged that there had been a breach of the claimant’s honour and dignity and awarded him approximately 2,900 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage from the police force. The Government stated that that decision had not been appealed against and had become final. -     In the second case, the claimant had complained that his right to be presumed innocent had been breached by the courts which had refused his application to reopen the criminal proceedings against him; in those criminal proceedings the claimant had been acquitted of some of the charges against him and the case in respect of other charges had been discontinued because the relevant acts had been decriminalised. When refusing to reopen the criminal proceedings, the court had held, inter alia , that those proceedings had been opened “as a result of the claimant’s unlawful activities” and that they had been terminated on non-exonerative grounds. Relying on Article 6.272 of the 2001 Civil Code (see paragraph 45 above), the claimant had asked to be awarded compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 23   December 2008 the Supreme Court had dismissed the claim, finding that the impugned court decision had merely restated the facts which had been established in the criminal proceedings against the claimant but had not declared him guilty of any criminal offences and had thus not breached his right to be presumed innocent. 52 .     The Government also provided three examples of cases in which, in the ambit of the same proceedings, higher courts had ordered the removal of wording from the judgments of lower courts which had not been in compliance with the presumption of innocence, or had remitted such cases for re-examination. 53.     Accordingly, the Government submitted that the applicant had failed to provide the Lithuanian courts with an opportunity of redressing the alleged violations of her rights and thus her complaint had to be rejected under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of effective domestic remedies. 2.     The applicant 54.     The applicant submitted that, having no procedural status in the criminal cases against her co-suspects, she had not had any opportunity to defend herself against the allegations and to contest the statements referring to her in the relevant court judgments. She submitted that the remedies suggested by the Government (see paragraphs 49-52 above) related exclusively to the proceedings against her but would not have affected the judgments taken in the proceedings against third parties in which her right to be presumed innocent had been violated. 55 .     In response to the Government’s argument that she should have applied to have the court continue examine her case despite the expiry of the statute of limitations (see paragraph 50 above), the applicant stated that the proceedings against her had lasted for more than ten years during which she had been subjected to various restrictions of personal liberty, and she had thus agreed to the discontinuation of the case as time-barred in order to end the stress and inconvenience. B.     The Court’s assessment 56 .     The Court will first of all address the Government’s objection regarding the applicant’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 57.     The Court reiterates the general principles in this regard stated, inter alia , in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ([GC] (preliminary objection), nos.   17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014), in particular, that it is intended to be subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. It is therefore appropriate that the national courts should initially have the opportunity to determine questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention and that, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought to Strasbourg, the European Court should have the benefit of the views of the national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact with the forces of their countries (see, among many other authorities, Burden v.   the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 42, ECHR   2008). 58.     In the present case, the Government submitted, inter alia , that the applicant had had the possibility to lodge a civil claim and obtain monetary compensation for the breach of her honour and dignity (see paragraph 51 above). 59.     The Court has previously accepted that a remedy under civil law can, in principle, be considered effective against alleged violations of the presumption of innocence (see Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria , no. 34529/10, § 178, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In several cases it found remedies under civil law, offering the possibility of obtaining monetary compensation together with various other procedures for acknowledgment of or putting an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, to be effective within the meaning of the Convention (see Babjak and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no.   73693/01, 30   March 2004; Marchiani v. France (dec.), no. 30392/03, 27   May 2008; and Ringwald v. Croatia (dec.) [Committee], nos.   14590/15 and 25405/15, §§ 54-56, 22 January 2019). 60.     In the present case, the Government provided some examples of domestic case-law in which individuals had claimed that statements presenting them as guilty of a criminal offence had breached their honour and dignity, and one of them had been successful in receiving monetary compensation (see paragraph 51 above). In the Court’s view, the civil-law remedy indicated by the Government does not appear to be on its face ineffective with regard to the applicant’s complaint about her right to be presumed innocent. 61.     Moreover, in the present case the Court does not discern any exceptional circumstances which could have absolved the applicant from the obligation to avail herself of the compensatory remedy indicated by the Government. The Court reiterates, in this regard, that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see Vučković and Others , cited above, § 74, and Scoppola v.   Italy   (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17   September 2009). 62.     However, the applicant neither lodged a civil claim for compensation for a breach of her honour and dignity (see paragraph 44 above), nor asked the Vilnius Regional Court to continue examining the criminal case against her after it became time-barred and acquit her, in order to dispel any doubts as to her innocence (see paragraphs 33, 34 and 42 above; see, mutatis mutandis , Adolf v. Austria , 26 March 1982, § 40, Series A no. 49). 63 .     In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies with regard to her complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. It therefore declares that complaint inadmissible under Article   35 §§   1 and   4 of the Convention. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 64.     The applicant also complained that she had not had any possibility to appeal against the court judgments in proceedings against third parties which had affected her right to presumption of innocence. She did not invoke any specific provision of the Convention. 65.     The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article   13 of the Convention, which reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A.     Admissibility 66.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 67.     The parties’ arguments have been presented in the context of the complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 49-55 above). 2.     The Court’s assessment 68.     The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy by which to complain of a breach of the Convention rights and freedoms. Therefore, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision, there must be a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention, but the remedy must in any event be “effective” in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the State. In certain circumstances, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may satisfy the requirements of Article 13 (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 179, 23   February 2017, and the cases cited therein). The Court also reiterates that it is incumbent on the respondent Government to illustrate the practical effectiveness of the remedies they suggest in the particular circumstances in issue with examples from the case-law of the relevant domestic courts or decisions of the administrative authorities (see Varga and Others v.   Hungary , nos. 14097/12 and 5 others, § 50, 10 March 2015). 69.     In the present case, the Court has already examined the domestic remedies suggested by the Government and found that the applicant had an effective remedy under the civil law (see paragraphs 56-63 above). Accordingly, it concludes that there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT 1.     Declares , by a majority, the complaint under Article   6   §   2 of the Convention inadmissible;   2.     Declares , unanimously, the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention admissible;   3.     Holds , by four votes to three, that there has been no violation of Article   13 of the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 September 2019, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.   Marialena Tsirli   Ganna Yudkivska   Registrar   President In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Pinto de Albuquerque, Kūris and Paczolay is annexed to this judgment. G.Y. M.T. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE, KŪRIS AND PACZOLAY 1.     The Chamber has declared the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 §   2 of the Convention inadmissible and has found that there has been no violation of Article   13 (points 1 and 3 of the operative part). We disagree. These findings misrepresent the Lithuanian Government’s submissions and distort the domestic law. What is more, the reasoning underlying these findings goes against the Court’s case-law. 2.     The crux of the applicant’s complaints is that she, having had not any procedural status (not even of a witness) in the criminal cases against third persons (her co-suspects before disjoining of their cases from that of the applicant), was indicated in the judgments adopted in these cases as having committed a criminal offence. Although her criminal case was discontinued on account of statutory limitation, her de facto incrimination in these cases is to stay forever, if this judgment becomes final. 3.     In this opinion, we criticise the majority’s reasoning and propose an alternative approach, leading to opposite findings: that the Article 6 § 2 complaint is admissible and that there has been a violation of Article   13. I 4.     The majority’s reasoning as regards the (in)admissibility of the Article 6 § 2 complaint (paragraphs 58-63 of the judgment) can be summarized in the following way. The Government submitted that the applicant had had the possibility to lodge a civil claim and obtain monetary compensation for the breach of her honour and dignity. A civil-law remedy can, in principle, be considered effective, within the meaning of the Convention, against alleged violations of the presumption of innocence. In some cases the Court found civil-law remedies, offering the possibility of obtaining monetary compensation together with various other procedures for acknowledgment of or putting an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, to be effective. The Government provided examples of domestic case-law in which individuals had claimed that statements presenting them as guilty of a criminal offence had breached their honour and dignity. One of them had succeeded in receiving monetary compensation. That remedy does not appear to be “on its face” ineffective with regard to the applicant’s complaint about her right to be presumed innocent. The majority has not discerned any exceptional circumstances which could have absolved the applicant from the obligation to avail herself of the said compensatory remedy, and the existence of “mere doubts” as to the prospects of success of a remedy which is not “obviously futile” is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress. In addition, the applicant did not ask the court to continue examining the criminal case against her after it became time-barred and acquit her, in order to dispel any doubts as to her innocence. She thus has failed to exhaust domestic civil-law (compensatory) and criminal-law remedies with regard to her Article 6 § 2 complaint. 5.     The majority has uttered on its behalf only one sentence on the above-mentioned criminal-law remedy. That utterance in passing is very uncritical. In paragraphs 45 and 46 below we, unlike the majority, spare more than few words to that “additional” remedy, which should have raised the eyebrows of the majority, but did not. Still, what sufficed for the Article 6 § 2 complaint to be dismissed, was that that the applicant did not use the civil-law remedy. This is the majority’s principal consideration, by which the Government’s objection as regards the admissibility of the Article 6 § 2 complaint has been upheld. 6.     That principal consideration, however, is based on a fiction. For all the arguments which the majority has attributed to the Government’s objection as regards the admissibility of the Article 6 § 2 complaint, have been raised by the Government not in support of that objection, but as their submissions concerning the Article 13 complaint. Plainly, the Government did not raise an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as regards Article 6 § 2 complaint . Contrary to the majority’s view, that objection is not there. They made it out from not even between, but beyond the lines of another objection, worded it themselves and then accepted it, as if it had been raised by the Government. 7. When communicating the Article 6 § 2 complaint to the parties, the Court asked them two questions (see the letter of communication of 20 September 2017). The first one was the following: “Was the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, respected in the present case, in view of the parts of judgments adopted in the criminal proceedings against other individuals and companies which concerned the applicant’s alleged participation in an organised group engaged in fraud, appropriation of property, falsification of documents and related criminal offences (see Karaman v. Germany , no. 17103/10, §§ 42-43 and 64-71, 27 February 2014, and Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia , nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, §§ 103-105, 23   February 2016)? 8. The Government in their submissions has mentioned that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies allegedly available to her (see paragraph 16 below). That has been done in passing and in a confusing manner . Even so, that submission pertains not to Article 6 § 2 complaint , but to that under Article 13 , and is set out under the latter heading . Moreover, having thus hinted about the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government conclude that the Article 13 complaint should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded – not on account of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 18 below). The catch is: the Government’s submissions under Article   13, in which the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is mentioned in passing, have been transformed by the majority into the full-fledged “Government’s” objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as regards the Article   6 § 2 complaint. 9. In line with the Court’s well-established case-law, an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies cannot be examined of the Court’