CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 5 septembre 2019

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POLAND (Application no. 20147/15)             JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG 5 September 2019   FINAL   05/12/2019   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ksenija Turković, President,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Aleš Pejchal,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Tim Eicke,   Jovan Ilievski,   Raffaele Sabato, judges, and Abel Campos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 2 July 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 20147/15) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Polish nationals, Ms Danuta Olewnik-Cieplińska and Mr Włodzimierz Olewnik (“the applicants”), on 14 April 2015. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr A. Legęncki, a lawyer practising in Łódź. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska, and subsequently by Mr   J.   Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicants alleged that the State had failed to protect Mr   Krzysztof Olewnik’s life from the illegal actions of third parties and that there had been no effective investigation into his kidnapping and death. 4.     On 18 November 2015 the Government were given notice of the application. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1974 and 1949 respectively and live in Drobin. Disappearance of Krzysztof Olewnik 6.     On the night of 26 October 2001 Mr Krzysztof Olewnik, the first applicant’s brother and the second applicant’s son, disappeared from his home in Drobin. He was twenty-five years old. He and his father were businessmen, the latter owning successful butchers’ shops and meat-processing plants. On the day of his kidnapping Krzysztof Olewnik had held a garden party at his house, which was attended by four local police officers, two former police officers, his father and mother, and three of his friends. After the party, Krzysztof Olewnik drove his guests back to their homes and came back. A few hours later, he was kidnapped from his house by A, E, F and G. 7.     The second applicant noticed that his son was missing on the morning of 27 October 2001 and informed the police. 8.     At the same time he contacted a private detective, K.R., whose team arrived at the scene. K.R.’s team investigated the case independently of the police during the years that followed. 9 .     On 29 October 2001 the kidnappers contacted the applicants, asking for a ransom. The victim’s family cooperated with the kidnappers, but several attempts to hand over the ransom failed as the kidnappers did not pick up the money. On numerous occasions they contacted the family by telephone and SMS, sent voice messages, and passed on letters handwritten by the victim. Many of those letters included messages indicating that Mr   Olewnik might be harmed or killed. The applicants provided the following examples of them: “you put us at risk of being caught and Krzysiek being beaten up”, “[it] will have brutal consequences for Krzysiek”, “[this] is consent to Krzysiek’s death”. All the messages and communications received were immediately passed on to the police. On 24   July 2003 the first applicant handed over 300,000 euros (EUR) as a ransom to free her brother. However, the kidnappers did not release him. 10 .     Mr Krzysztof Olewnik was kept for almost two years by his kidnappers at three different nearby locations. He was hidden in an abandoned house, an underground garage, and an underground septic tank. According to the account given by the kidnappers at their trial, the victim was kept chained to the wall by his neck and his leg. He was drugged, beaten up on a few occasions, poorly fed and generally badly treated (see paragraph 39 below). 11.     On 5 September 2003 Mr Olewnik was murdered in a forest near Dzbądz. The circumstances of his kidnapping and murder were discovered in November 2005 and the site of his death and the burial of his body was discovered in October 2006. 12.     His funeral took place on 4 November 2006. Investigation into the kidnapping and murder Police investigation 13 .     On 24 October 2001, prior to the kidnapping, the traffic police had stopped A whilst he was driving a car belonging to B. A was a repeat offender released from prison in June 2001. 14.     After the second applicant had reported his son missing, the first police officers arrived at the latter’s house at 9 a.m. on 27 October 2001. The case was handled by the local police in Sierpiec. The house was searched and abundant blood samples belonging to the victim collected, as well as other evidence. The duty prosecutor arrived at the scene but did not enter the house to supervise the police and give them instructions. 15.     A BMW car belonging to a friend of the victim was found burned out. It had been stolen on the night of the kidnapping after being left parked by the owner in the victim’s yard. 16.     On 31 October 2001 the case was transferred to a special team led by police officer R.M. from the Radom Regional Police. The team consisted of twelve police officers, supplemented ‒ following a confidential decision by the chief of that force ‒ by K.K., a police officer who had attended the party at the victim’s house. The investigation was supervised by the Sierpiec District Prosecutor, L.W. 17.     The team led by R.M. had four main working hypotheses. The first three posited that Mr Olewnik had been kidnapped by people linked to organised crime or by husbands of women he had dated. According to the fourth theory, of so-called “self-kidnapping”, the victim had faked his own kidnapping in order to extort money from his father. This was the version favoured by the investigating police. 18.     In November 2001 the police interviewed B, a repeat offender living in the same village as the victim, and released him. In the same month the second applicant handed over to the police further evidence found in the victim’s house which had been overlooked, namely a blood-stained jacket and a mobile telephone. 19.     In January and March 2002 the traffic police on four occasions stopped A driving the same car as before, twice in the presence of B and once in the presence of D (see paragraph 13 above). 20.     The prosecutor L.W. supervised the investigation until 25 November 2002. From then until April 2004 the case was supervised by three successive prosecutors from the financial crime division of the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor’s Office (the case was transferred to the organised crime division in September 2004). 21 .     On 15 January 2003 the applicants received an anonymous letter alleging that the kidnappers were a certain D and C. The letter also indicated the geographical location where the victim was being kept and warned that his life was in danger. The applicants passed the letter on to the police, but the information contained therein was not considered meaningful and was not investigated further. 22.     Between 11 March 2002 and 11 June 2003 the kidnappers did not contact the family. On the latter date they called the applicants and reiterated their demand for a ransom in the amount of EUR 300,000. On 25   June 2003 the kidnappers sent the family a SIM card; they used the number for future communication with the applicants. 23.     On 26 June 2003 the kidnappers called the applicants and later the Słubice police station. They called from a telephone booth and used a phonecard. The police were able to trace the card to other calls made by the kidnappers to the family. On 4 July 2003 the police established that the person who had called the police station using the phonecard in question had been B. Nevertheless, B was not investigated further or placed under surveillance. 24.     On 24 July 2003 the first applicant handed over a ransom in the amount of EUR 300,000. The police failed to follow the first applicant and intercept the money or identify and arrest the individuals receiving it. The ransom was picked up by A, B, C, D and H. 25.     Between 27 and 30 July 2003 R.M. and M.L. travelled to Berlin to investigate a possible sighting of Mr Olewnik. It turned out to be false information. 26.     On 1 June 2004 the police arrested B in connection with the kidnapping of Mr Olewnik. They searched B’s flat but failed to find EUR   40,000 of the ransom hidden under a sofa. Although the police by then had various pieces of evidence linking him with the kidnapping, B was released. The investigators nevertheless ordered that he be followed. 27.     On 7 June 2004 an unmarked police car containing sixteen volumes of original documents comprising the main case file on the investigation was stolen in Warsaw. The prosecutor subsequently charged two police officers in connection with the loss of the file (see paragraph 48 below). 28.     Following the incident involving the loss of the file, the case was removed from the team led by R.M. On 18 August 2004 the Chief of Police in Warsaw created a special investigative team consisting of police officers from the Central Investigative Bureau in Warsaw ( Centralne Biuro Śledcze , CBŚ ) and from Płock. They were led by G.K. 29.     The team led by G.K. proceeded to analyse the communications made from Mr Olewnik’s mobile telephone in the period after the kidnapping (the telephone had remained active for several months after October 2001). 30.     On 15 April 2005 the police requested and received a CCTV recording from a supermarket showing that A had bought the mobile telephone used by the kidnappers for communication with the applicants on 28   October 2001. The prosecutor only decided to start monitoring the communications made from this number in May 2005, even though the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number had been known from the start of the investigation. On 5 May 2005 the cashier who had sold the telephone to A was interviewed as a witness for the first time and a facial composite image was made. On the basis of photographs shown by the police, the cashier identified A as the person who had bought the telephone. The cashier also stated that the police had already come to ask her about the telephone in 2001 and taken a CCTV tape. The original video-recording was lost from the file on an unspecified date. 31.     In June 2005 the police conducted searches of the homes of C, D and   I, and arrested A. He was released without charge after forty-eight hours. 32 .     In November 2005 a witness, P.S., made a statement and gave the names of the individuals who had allegedly kidnapped Mr Olewnik. 33.     Afterwards, B and A were arrested on charges of the kidnapping alleged by the witness. 34.     In January and February 2006 the biological (hair) and olfactory evidence collected at the house of Mr Olewnik directly after his kidnapping in October 2001 was sent for expert examination. A DNA examination of the hair was carried out in July 2006. 35.     On 4 April 2006 the first applicant requested that the investigation be transferred to another prosecution service, alleging that the proceedings up until that point had been manifestly ineffective. On 14 May 2006 another investigative team took over the case, this time composed of officers specialising in organised crime from the Police Headquarters in Warsaw. On 13   June 2006, supervision of the investigation was handed over to the Olsztyn Regional Prosecutor. 36.     On 27 October 2006, having been presented with the biological evidence found at the crime scene, B confessed to kidnapping Mr   Olewnik. He indicated where the body was buried. 37.     Afterwards, other members of the gang were arrested by the police. 38.     On 9 August 2007 the Olsztyn Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Płock Regional Court against twelve individuals for participation in the kidnapping and murder of Mr Olewnik. Judicial proceedings 39 .     On 31 March 2008 the Płock Regional Court convicted ten individuals of participation in a criminal gang set up with the intention of kidnapping Mr Olewnik, as well as other offences. Among those ten individuals, B and C were convicted of the murder of Mr   Olewnik and sentenced to life imprisonment. Others were given prison sentences ranging from one to fourteen years (II K 119/07). The conviction was based to a large extent on detailed explanations provided by B, C, D and F, who pleaded guilty. They also described the conditions in which Mr Olewnik had been held (see paragraph 10 above). The court also accepted that the leader of the gang had been A; however, he had died before the trial ended (see paragraph   74 below). In addition, the trial court ordered that the seven main members of the gang pay the second applicant 1,200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation for pecuniary damage ( odszkodowanie ) for the ransom which had been paid by him on 24 July 2003 (under Article 415 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The court allowed a request by the second applicant for interest to be paid on that sum from the date of the civil claim being lodged, that is to say 11 October 2007. The court calculated the amount of compensation on the basis of the average exchange rate between 2003 and 2008 and considered that it was equivalent to EUR 300,000. The applicants participated in the proceedings as auxiliary prosecutors. 40.     All parties appealed against the judgment. 41.     On 8 December 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal amended the judgment but upheld the convictions and sentences of the accused (II   Aka   306/08). 42.     On 8 January 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment (II   KK   153/09). 43.     The second applicant sought the enforcement of the judgment as regards payment of the compensation ordered by the court. However, the court bailiff was unsuccessful in recovering the money from the debtors as they either had no assets or income or died before the enforcement proceedings ended (see paragraphs 74, 75 and 76 below). Pending investigation 44.     On 21 December 2009 the police discovered previously overlooked forensic evidence (blood) at the house of Mr Krzysztof Olewnik. The applicants submitted that there had by then been almost ten searches of the house, each revealing previously overlooked evidence. 45 .     In 2010 the body of Mr Olewnik was exhumed from his grave but his identity was later reconfirmed. In 2011 forensic experts prepared opinions answering the prosecutor’s question regarding, in particular, errors committed during the first post-mortem examination (see also paragraph   71 below). 46 .     An investigation into the participation of other unidentified individuals in the kidnapping and murder of Mr Olewnik is pending before the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal (Ap V Ds 11/09). The investigation is being carried out by a team of police officers from the Central Investigative Bureau at the Police Headquarters in Warsaw. It appears that in the course of the investigation the police questioned and briefly detained J.K., a friend and business partner of Mr Krzysztof Olewnik. 47 .     The Government, having been asked, did not provide any significant information pertaining to the further course of the investigation. They submitted that information pertaining to the ongoing investigation was confidential. The applicants submitted that no meaningful steps had been taken by the authorities to clarify the circumstances of the kidnapping and death of Mr   Olewnik. Investigation into alleged incompetence on the part of the authorities Loss of the case file 48 .     Following the loss on 7 June 2004 of the entire sixteen-volume case file, which had been left by two police officers in a car in Warsaw, the prosecutor opened an investigation in respect of them. The investigation was discontinued on 7   September 2004. 49.     On 7 February 2005 that decision was quashed by the State Prosecutor, who ordered an investigation into possible negligence on the part of the police officers, which had resulted in the loss of the file. 50.     On 14 May 2005 the investigation was discontinued by the Warsaw District Prosecutor. The Government submitted that the issue remained under examination in the ongoing investigation (see paragraph 47 above). Proceedings against police officers (a)    M.G. 51.     On 22 March 2006 Police Officer M.G. was arrested and charged with passing on information from police databases to unauthorised persons. The Government submitted that the proceedings were still pending, but were not directly connected to the case of Mr Olewnik. (b)    Decision of 31 December 2013 52 .     On 31 December 2013 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal (Ap   V   Ds   12/09) discontinued an investigation into allegations of negligence by various police teams in dealing with the kidnapping of Mr   Olewnik, including instances of hampering the pending investigation by entering false IMEI numbers in the police database. The prosecutor discontinued as time-barred an investigation into whether the search of the victim’s house had been conducted in breach of the relevant standards. The prosecutor also investigated whether there had been appropriate supervision of the investigative team  at various levels within the police  and considered that no offence had been committed. The prosecutor discontinued an investigation concerning the period between May 2006 and May 2008 on the grounds that the investigation against A, B, C and other members of the gang had been terminated too early and in breach of the relevant provisions, and that no offence had been committed. (c)    R.M. and M.L. 53.     On 27 June 2007 the Olsztyn Regional Prosecutor opened an investigation into possible negligence on the part of the police officers and prosecutors in the years 2001 to 2005 during the handling of Mr Olewnik’s case (Ap Ds 12/09). The investigation was opened in response to a formal notification made by the second applicant that an offence had been committed. 54.     On 24 April 2008 the Olsztyn Regional Prosecutor took the decision to arrest three police officers: R.M., M.L. and S.C. They were arrested on 28   April 2008 but released following a decision of a court. On 29 April 2008 the police officers were charged with, inter alia , negligently performing their duties. 55.     The investigation was transferred to the Gdańsk State Prosecutor and later the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal. 56.     On 21 December 2012 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal (Ap   V   Ds   54/12) issued an indictment against R.M. and M.L. The police officers were charged with several counts of abuse of power (proscribed by Article 231 of the Criminal Code), allegedly committed between 31 October 2001 and 17   August 2004, when they had been in charge of the investigation into the kidnapping of Krzysztof Olewnik. The prosecutor also considered that the offences amounted to subjecting a person to a risk of danger, an offence proscribed by Article 160 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The bill of indictment itself was 333 pages long and relied on the statements of 655 witnesses who had been interviewed in the course of the investigation. The prosecutor sought the examination by the court of 909 pieces of evidence and the hearing of seventy-one witnesses. The applicants participated in the proceedings as auxiliary prosecutors. 57 .     The police officers were charged with abuse of power, in particular: failing to gather evidence that could have been provided by the sales assistant from the supermarket who had been able to identify A; failing to investigate the anonymous letter of January 2003 which had named the individuals involved in the kidnapping as B and C; delays in analysing the calls made by the kidnappers using a known telephone SIM card, which would have linked them to A and C; failing to supervise the handover of the ransom on 24 July 2003; and the destruction of two pieces of evidence resulting from the monitoring of a mobile telephone related to the kidnapping. 58.     On 10 December 2013 the Płock Regional Court acquitted both police officers. The court considered the charges under Article 160 of the Criminal Code to be ill-founded and, moreover, time-barred since September 2013. As regards the offence of abuse of power under Article   231 of the Code, the court held that the actions and omissions attributed by the prosecutor to the two accused could only be examined from the perspective of unintentional recklessness or carelessness. Such an offence would fall under Article 231 § 3 of the Criminal Code. The court was of the view that the events with which the defendants had been charged should have been taken as individual offences, which − as such − would have become time-barred on various dates in 2013. In defence of the police officers, the court noted, among other things, that the investigation should have been led by the prosecutor, who should have been instructing the police as to what action to take. In the investigation the prosecutors had mostly been passive. The court further analysed the evidence against the defendants as regards each charge brought against them and concluded that they had not caused serious damage, as required by Article 231 § 3 of the Criminal Code. 59.     On 14 October 2014 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. The offences became time-barred on 17 August 2014, which precluded the court from assessing the case on the merits. The applicant received a copy of that judgment on 1 December 2014. (d)    H.S. 60 .     On 25 January 2013 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal (Ap   V   Ds   12/09) discontinued an investigation against H.S., another police officer from Płock who had dealt with the case between 29 October 2001 and May 2006, as no offence had been committed. The police officer had been charged with abuse of power in breach of Article 231 of the Criminal Code for, in particular, failing to adduce as evidence items found by the burned-out BMW car, the video-recording from the supermarket obtained in November 2001 showing one of the kidnappers, and the video-recording from the petrol station where the kidnappers had abandoned the telephone that had been used in their communications with the family, which had delayed the discovery of the perpetrators and hindered the release of Mr   Olewnik, and had consequently resulted in his death on 5 September 2003. The officer had also been charged with failing to take any action following the anonymous letter of 15 January 2003 which had named the true perpetrators of the crime and described the circumstances thereof. 61.     In the opinion of the prosecutor, the police officer in question either had no information about the events on which the charges were based or his omissions had not been intentional. Given the circumstances of the case, the police officer could not be held criminally liable for the final outcome of the case, namely the murder of the victim by other individuals. 62.     On 22 August 2013 the Płock District Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the first applicant against the decision of 25 January 2013 and upheld it. The court agreed that there had been many mistakes and omissions in the case; however, there had not been enough evidence to consider that police officer H.S. had committed an offence. Proceedings against prosecutors (a)    Main investigation 63.     On 18 December 2012 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal decided to discontinue investigations concerning several prosecutors who had dealt with the case (ApV Ds 12/09). In that set of proceedings no charges had been brought against the prosecutors. 64 .     The following allegations of abuse of power, prohibited by Article   231 of the Criminal Code and allegedly committed by various prosecutors, to the detriment of Krzysztof Olewnik and the public interest, were not pursued owing to the statute of limitations: (i)     negligence on the part of A.N. on 27 October 2001 for failing to personally oversee the inspection of the property and supervise the collection of evidence by the police, which he was obliged to do by law; (ii)     negligence on the part of L.W. in the period from 29 October 2001 to 25   November 2002 for, in particular, incorrectly analysing the case, failing to supervise the police’s actions, and following incorrect procedures after obtaining evidence from telephone conversations, leading to substantial delays in the discovery and arrest of the perpetrators of the kidnapping; and (iii)     negligence on the part of the Płock Regional Prosecutor, who supervised the work of L.W. in the period from 31 October 2001 to 25   November 2002, for not following the rules of correct supervision, which had contributed to many of the mistakes that had been committed. Allegations of negligence on the part of other prosecutors who had been involved in the case throughout the years were also investigated and dismissed. 65.     As regards point (i) above, concerning the actions of the prosecutor A.N., who had been on duty when the kidnapping was discovered, the investigation revealed that he had committed numerous acts of negligence on 27 October 2001. The seriousness of those acts, in spite of clear legal provisions requiring prosecutors to take the initiative in such circumstances, did not allow them to be classified as unintentional. However, the proceedings to finally establish the criminal liability of A.N. had had to be discontinued owing to the statute of limitations regarding the offences in question. 66.     As regards point (ii) above, concerning the actions of the prosecutor L.W. during a period of over one year, the investigators noted, on the one hand, his low level of involvement, multiple mistakes, and omissions. On the other hand, they acknowledged that he had acted within a legal and organisational framework which had made his work more difficult. L.W. was a district prosecutor with a long list of pending cases, to which even more had been added during the time he had been working on the Olewnik case. When district prosecutors were assessed, particular attention was paid to their output and the number of cases completed. The internal organisation of the prosecution service was such that this prosecutor had received no support from his superiors, even though he had not had any experience of this type of case. 67 .     The decision of 18 December 2012 ended with the following conclusion: “Summing up the above analysis, one cannot ignore the fact that the causes behind the failures of the police and prosecution service, resulting in the dramatic consequence of the death of Mr Olewnik, lay much deeper than individual errors committed by particular prosecutors (as was also noted by the Parliamentary Commission). The whole system of operation of the prosecution service, as well as the legislative and executive powers, should be held responsible for this failure. They had failed to create a proper legal and financial structure for the prosecution service in which events as important as kidnappings would immediately be transferred to prosecutors and police officers who were prepared for dealing with them. Such a structure would concentrate all measures and attention on freeing the imprisoned victim. The law-enforcement organisation failed in the case of Mr Olewnik, and that assessment cannot be ignored, despite the ultimately successful outcome of the work of the prosecutor R.W. and the team from the Central Investigative Bureau of the Police Headquarters, who were able to initiate, and to a large extent finalise, the discovery and capture of the perpetrators of his kidnap and murder.” (b)    Other information 68.     On 30 October 2009 the Disciplinary Court within the Prosecutor General’s Office acquitted C.K., the Olsztyn Regional Prosecutor. The disciplinary proceedings had been initiated at the second applicant’s request. Investigation against central authorities 69.     On 16 April 2013 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal discontinued an investigation (Ap V Ds 12/09) into allegations of negligent performance of official duties in breach of Article 231 of the Criminal Code ( niedopełnienie obowiązków służbowych ) in the period between 27   October 2001 and 10   August 2007. The investigation had been directed against representatives of the central administrative authorities of the Republic of Poland, in particular the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration, and members of both chambers of Parliament, on account of their failure to take action aimed at attaining the effective termination of the criminal proceedings in the case of the kidnapping of Krzysztof Olewnik in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws. Their lack of action had been to the detriment of Mr Olewnik and his closest relatives and against the public interest, as it had hindered his release, delayed the discovery and arrest of the perpetrators of the kidnapping and murder, and resulted in the loss of certain pieces of evidence. 70 .     The prosecutor concluded that, in the light of the facts and the law, there were no grounds for charging the highest-ranking civil servants with any criminal offence. In particular, there were no grounds for examining whether the Minister of Justice could be held criminally liable for the flawed investigation. Forensic experts 71 .     On 28 December 2012 the Gdańsk Prosecutor of Appeal indicted a forensic expert, J.D., and the head of the forensic laboratory in Olsztyn, B.Z., before the Elbląg District Court (Ap V Ds 63/12). The charges concerned flaws discovered in 2006 concerning the examination and identification of the body of Krzysztof Olewnik. In particular, the bone and tissue samples taken for DNA testing to confirm the identity of the deceased had afterwards disappeared. All attempts to find those pieces of evidence had failed and it had been necessary to exhume the body in 2010 in order to confirm that it was that of Krzysztof Olewnik (see paragraph 38 above). 72.     The proceedings are pending, with the second applicant participating as an auxiliary prosecutor. Other matters Deaths and suicides 73 .     On 12 December 2006 P.S., the main witness who had named the kidnappers, died (see paragraph 26 above). Before his death he had complained about receiving threats which, in the way they were worded, showed that the details of his statements to the authorities could have been leaked to the perpetrators. An investigation was opened into the threatening of a witness, but no action was taken to trace any possible leak from within the investigative team. The witness apparently died of a long-term illness, so his death was not investigated. 74 .     On 18 June 2007 A, the alleged leader of the kidnapping gang and owner of the house in which Mr Olewnik had been kept, committed suicide while detained in Olsztyn Remand Centre. Earlier that day he had consulted his case file and had been searched upon returning to his cell; he had been behaving normally. A was found hanged in his single cell (in a half-sitting position resembling someone watching television, with one finger of his left hand raised  it had been taped with sellotape to the window bars). He left a will and a letter to his family. The post-mortem examination revealed traces of amphetamine and alcohol in his body. On 31 July 2008 the Olsztyn District Prosecutor decided to discontinue an investigation into the sudden death of A and possible negligence on the part of the prison guards. On 8 March 2010 the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, decided to reopen the investigation into the death. The investigation was eventually discontinued on 29 April 2011. 75 .     On 4 April 2008 B, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Mr Olewnik, committed suicide while detained in Płock Prison. The doctor performing the post mortem noted injuries on the deceased’s arms which could have been sustained if he had been held by his arms and forced into a certain position, or caused by blows inflicted just before his death. On 31   December 2010 the Ostrołęka Regional Prosecutor discontinued an investigation into the sudden death of B and possible negligence on the part of the prison guards. B’s family did not appeal and the decision became final. 76 .     On 19 January 2009 C, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Mr Olewnik, committed suicide while detained in Płock Prison. On 13   January 2011 the Ostrołęka Regional Prosecutor discontinued an investigation into the sudden death of C and possible negligence on the part of the prison guards. It was concluded, for instance, that a rib fracture sustained by C could have had happened while attempts were being made to resuscitate him. C’s family did not appeal and the decision became final. 77.     A, B, and C had been declared so-called “dangerous detainees” and had been subjected to various limitations in their contact with other detainees and many other security measures. In particular, they were detained in single cells monitored by CCTV, their contact with other detainees was severely limited, they were subjected to strip searches every time they left the cell and their cells were searched daily. 78.     While detained, B and C refused to go out for their daily walks and remained in their individual cells; it appears that B had refused to go for daily walks since September 2006. C was transferred to Płock Prison only ten days before his death. They indicated to the authorities that they were in fear of their lives. 79.     On 12 July 2009 M.K. committed suicide. He was the prison officer at Olsztyn Remand Centre on duty on the day A had committed suicide. Dismissals 80 .     On 20 January 2009 the Prime Minister accepted the resignation from the post of Minister of Justice of Mr   Z. Ćwiąkalski, who “as the head of the services responsible for investigating the case of the kidnapping and murder of Mr Olewnik, [bore] direct responsibility for the omissions and failures of those services”. 81.     At the same time the following people were dismissed: the State Prosecutor, the Deputy Minister responsible for the Prison Service, the Head of the Prison Service and the Governor of Płock Prison. Parliamentary Inquiry Commission 82.     On 13 February 2009 the Polish Sejm (lower house of Parliament) set up a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (“the Commission”) to investigate the appropriateness of the actions of the public authorities in the criminal proceedings concerning the kidnapping and death of Mr Krzysztof Olewnik ( Komisja Śledcza do zbadania prawidłowości działań organów administracji rządowej w sprawie postepowań karnych związanych z uprowadzeniem i zabójstwem Krzysztofa Olewnika ). The Commission held 136 sessions, at which it interviewed 109 individuals, some of them several times. The Commission requested information from various ministries and other State entities, as well as various intelligence agencies. It also examined 395 volumes of case files collected in the case concerning the kidnapping of Mr   Olewnik. Lastly, it examined expert opinions on the police’s work (methodology, cooperation between services, evidence) and on issues relating to the Prison Service. 83 .     At the session of 17   May 2011 the Sejm adopted an extensive final report (235 pages), which, in so far as relevant, stated: “The Sejm outlined to the Commission the following tasks, thereby setting out its remit: (1)     examination of the appropriateness of the actions of the prosecution service and the police in the criminal proceedings concerning the kidnapping and murder of Krzysztof Olewnik; (2)     examination of the appropriateness of the actions of the [Prison Service], police and prosecution service as regards the execution of the pre-trial detention and prison sentence in the criminal proceedings referred to in point 1 above; (3)     examination of the appropriateness of the actions of the public administration bodies when dealing with the criminal proceedings referred to above under point 1 and the execution of the pre-trial detention and prison sentence in the criminal proceedings in question.” 84.     As preliminary remarks the Commission stated: “The Commission is aware that procedural and operational activities that are ongoing may change some elements that had been established by the investigators or the courts. They may not challenge, however, the fact that, beyond any doubt, Krzysztof Olewnik was held hostage in order to force [his father] to pay a ransom, [that] his deprivation of liberty involved particular torment, and [that] after ransom money had been transmitted by the family, he was murdered.” 85 .     Concerning the initial reaction of the police to the disappearance of Mr   Olewnik, the Commission noted the following main shortcomings: the police officer leading the forensic team had been inexperienced, had not secured the perimeter of the crime scene, had collected blood samples carelessly, had not fully examined the property and had overlooked many pieces of evidence. As an example of this incompetence the Commission observed that, eight years after the events, a blood sample from an unidentified man had been found under the sofa in the victim’s living room. A further shortcoming was the fact that some of the officers who had attended the party at Mr Olewnik’s house on the night of his kidnapping had been part of the investigation team. 86 .     The Commission examined the work of the team led by R.M., who had been appointed to deal with the case between 31 October 2001 and 18   August 2004. The analysis, which extended to over forty pages, revealed a multitude of omissions, including basic mistakes in modern policing and the total passivity of the team led by R.M. The police had not used the technical and operational methods available to trace people (for instance, by searching police databases), communications (for instance, monitoring mobile and landlines) and items (such as marking and tracing the banknotes handed over as a ransom). Some of the shortcomings attributed to the team included: (a)     failure until May and June 2005 to make use of the witness who had sold the telephone to A and of the CCTV footage from the supermarket. Even many years later the witness had still been able to identify A, because he had reminded her of a famous singer. The original video-recording had been obtained by Police Officer M.L. in 2001 but had later been lost in unknown circumstances; (b)     no real examination of the phonecards and SIM cards used by the kidnappers; (c)     no meaningful follow-up of the anonymous letter received in January 2003; (d)     no support offered to the victim’s desperate family, who had been left to negotiate with the kidnappers on their own; (e)     “improvised and uncontrolled” supervision of the handover of the ransom money on 24 July 2003 even though the police had known about the operation since 11   June 2003 and had had time to prepare for it. Moreover, the family had made copies of the banknotes handed over as a ransom, but the police had failed to secure this evidence, so on several occasions when 500-euro notes had been presented in banks or at exchange kiosks, they could not be traced to the case; the serial numbers of the banknotes had not been transferred to the Banking Central Supervision Authority until 21   December 2004, when the case had been taken over by a different police team; (f)     failure to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the loss of the entire case file when the car in which it had been placed had been stolen on 7 June 2004; and (g)     two documented cases of destruction of important pieces of evidence. 87.     The Commission also commented that the team led by R.M. had not been supervised in any meaningful way by M.K., the Deputy Chief of the Radom Regional Police, even though this had been required by law. Other levels of supervision within the police had also been “indifferent” and tainted by personal friendships and business links. 88.     The Commission noted that the work of the police should be supervised by a prosecutor, who must direct the investigation. In the instant case, the first few years, in particular, had been characterised by the passivity of the various prosecutors. The prosecutor L.W., who had supervised the investigation while it had been handled by the team led by R.M., had been particularly at fault. The Commission concluded that the prosecutor “[had not had] a thorough knowledge of the information collected in the course of the investigation”, “[had been] unaware that the team [had] also included police officers who had attended the party at the victim’s house”, “[had] not check[ed] that his instructions were being carried out”, and had “failed to monitor the handover of the ransom”. He had never visited the victim’s house, had been unaware of the existence of the recording from the supermarket, and so forth. In general terms, he had been inexperienced in cases of this type, and had remained passive. 89.     The Commission also examined the level of supervision within the prosecution service and considered it weak. The case had overwhelmed even the superior prosecutors, who had wanted it to be removed from their sphere of responsibility. 90.     The prosecutors who had taken over the case from L.W. had committed further errors. These included failure to take any action following the anonymous letter of 14   January 2003, a lack of supervision of the actions relating to the handover of the ransom, a six-month delay before private operators had been asked for the numbers of the telephone cards used in communications by the kidnappers, and so forth. 91.     The Commission further examined the actions carried out by the second police team led by G.K., which was appointed on 18 August 2004 to investigate the case and which dealt with it until 14 May 2006. It appears that this team was influenced by the theory that Mr Olewnik had faked his own kidnapping in order to extort money from his father. In general terms the Commission noted that the investigation had clearly speeded up and that the new prosecutors who had taken over the case had been diligent. At this stage the prosecutor had examined two theories: one in which Mr Olewnik had been kidnapped by an organised criminal group or a group linked to the police, and a second which posited his “self-kidnapping”. 92.     As regards the subsequent prosecutors and supervising prosecutors, the Commission observed that they had carried out many actions aimed at correcting the errors committed earlier. However, as one of them had stated before the Commission: “in this case the majority of the errors were committed in the initial stages, which in a criminal case of this nature had a decisive impact on the outcome of the case. We will never know what would have happened if all the initial actions had been carried out correctly, starting with the examination of the place [of kidnapping] and the securing of the evidence.” 93.     The Commission also examined how the case had been supervised by the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Internal Affairs, who remained the official supervisors of the police. It noted that the family of the victim had met many ministe