CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 10 septembre 2019

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NORWAY   (Application no. 37283/13)                 JUDGMENT                 STRASBOURG   10 September 2019       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President,   Guido Raimondi,   Robert Spano,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Egidijus Kūris,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Georges Ravarani,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Péter Paczolay,   Lado Chanturia,   Gilberto Felici, judges,   Dag Bugge Nordén, ad hoc judge, and Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2018 and 27 May 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 37283/13) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Norwegian nationals, Ms Trude Strand Lobben, her children, X and Y, and her parents, Ms Sissel and Mr Leif Lobben, on 12 April 2013. 2.     The first applicant, Ms Trude Strand Lobben, and the second applicant, X (“the applicants”), who had been granted legal aid, were ultimately represented by Mr G. Thuan Dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The Norwegian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr M. Emberland and Ms H.L. Busch, of the Attorney General’s Office (Civil Matters). 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the domestic authorities’ decisions not to lift the care order for X and instead withdraw the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for him and authorise his adoption by his foster parents, violated their rights to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 1 December 2015 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the applicants’ complaint to the Government. On 30 November 2017 a Chamber of that Section, composed of Angelika Nußberger, Erik Møse, André Potocki, Yonko Grozev, Síofra   O’Leary, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Lәtif Hüseynov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, gave judgment. The Chamber unanimously declared the application by the first and second applicants admissible and the remainder inadmissible. It held, by a majority, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Grozev, O’Leary and Hüseynov was annexed to the judgment. 5.     On 30 January 2018 the applicants requested the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. On 9   April 2018 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request. 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. At the final deliberations, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, substitute judge, replaced Aleš Pejchal, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3). 7.     The applicants and the Government each filed observations (Rule   59   §   1) on the merits of the case. 8.     The President of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, and Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) International, the Associazione Italiana dei Magistrati per i Minorenni e per la Famiglia (AIMMF), the Aire Centre and X’s adoptive parents, to intervene in the written procedure, in accordance with Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules. 9.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 17 October 2018. There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the respondent Government Mr F. Sejersted , Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Mr M. Emberland , Agent, Attorney General’s Office, Ms H. Lund Busch , Agent, Attorney General’s Office   Agents , Ms A. Sydnes Egeland, Attorney, Attorney General’s Office, Mr H. Vaaler, Attorney, Attorney General’s Office, Mr D.T. Gisholt, Director, Ministry of Children and Equality, Ms C. Five Berg, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Children and Equality, Ms H. Bautz-Holter Geving, Ministry of Children and Equality, Ms L. Width, Municipal Attorney,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicants Mr G. Thuan Dit Dieudonné , Lawyer,   Counsel , Ms T. Strand Lobben ,   First applicant .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Thuan Dit Dieudonné and Mr Sejersted and their replies to questions put by the judges. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     Background 10.     In May 2008 the first applicant turned to the child welfare services because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation: she did not have a permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents. 11.     On 10 June 2008 the first applicant and the putative future father, Z, visited a gynaecological polyclinic at the regional hospital. According to the medical notes recorded that day, the doctor was informed that the first applicant had had a late abortion in October 2007 and that she also wanted to abort this time. A chlamydia test and an ultrasonography were carried out, and the first applicant and Z informed that an abortion would not be possible. 12.     On 23 June 2008 the hospital confirmed that the result of the chlamydia test taken on 10 June 2008 was positive. As one of the measures taken by the birth clinic to monitor the first applicant and her situation, the doctor noted that a social worker would make contact with the child welfare services, in agreement with the first applicant. A social worker, J.T., at the hospital noted the following day that the first applicant had expressed a strong wish for a place at a parent-child institution on the grounds that she was limited on account of a brain injury ( begrensninger på grunn av hjerneskade ) sustained following an epileptic seizure; she had no home, and a difficult relationship with the child’s putative father and other family members; and that she wanted help to become as good a mother as possible.   It was noted by the hospital that any stay at a parent-child institution would be voluntary and that the first applicant and her child could leave whenever they wished. 13.     On 1 July 2008 the hospital notified the child welfare services that the first applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and monitoring with regard to motherhood. The hospital also indicated that she needed to stay at a parent-child institution. The child welfare services took on the case, with the first applicant’s consent. She agreed to stay at a parent ‑ child institution for three months after the child was born, so that her ability to give the child adequate care could be assessed. 14.     On 16 July 2008 a meeting with the child welfare services took place. A psychologist, I.K.A., from the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs attended the meeting. According to the notes from the meeting, it was agreed that the first applicant should receive psychological counselling on a weekly basis in the social worker’s absence during the summer, and that the psychologist would give subsequent reports to the child welfare services. 15.     On 16 September 2008 a formal decision was taken to offer the first applicant and her child a place at a parent-child institution for three months. The decision stated that the child welfare services were concerned about the first applicant’s mental health and her ability to understand the seriousness of taking responsibility for a child and the consequences. 16.     Some days earlier, on 9 September 2008, the child welfare services and the first applicant had agreed on a plan for the stay. In the plan it was stated that the main purpose of the stay would be to examine, observe and guide the first applicant in order to equip her with sufficient childcare skills. A number of more specific aims were also included, involving observation of the mother and child and examination of the mother’s mental health ( psyke ) and maturity, her ability to receive, understand and avail herself of advice in relation to her role as a mother, and her developmental possibilities. Working with the first applicant’s network was also included as an aim in the plan. 17.     On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to a son, X, the second applicant. The first applicant then refused to provide the name of X’s father. Four days later, on 29 September 2008, the first applicant and X moved to the parent-child institution. For the first five days X’s maternal grandmother also stayed there with them. 18.     On 10 October 2008 the parent-child institution called the child welfare services and expressed concern on the part of their staff. According to the child welfare services’ records, the staff at the institution stated that X was not gaining sufficient weight and lacked energy. With regard to nappy changes, the staff had to repeatedly ( gang på gang ) tell the first applicant that there were still traces of excrement, while she continued to focus on herself. 19.     On 14 October 2008 the staff at the parent-child institution said that they were very concerned about X and the first applicant’s caring skills. It had turned out that the first applicant had given an incorrect weight for the baby and that X had, accordingly, lost more weight than previously assumed. Moreover, she showed no understanding of the boy’s feelings ( viser ingen forståelse av gutten sine følelser ) and seemed unable to empathise with the baby ( sette seg inn i hvordan babyen har det ). The staff had decided to move the first applicant into an apartment on the main floor in order to get a better overview and to monitor her even more closely. The next meeting between the first applicant, the staff at the parent-child institution and the child welfare services had been scheduled for 24   October   2008, but the staff at the institution wanted to bring the meeting forward as they were of the view that the matter could not wait that long. B.     Proceedings to place X in emergency foster care 20.     On 17 October 2008 a meeting between the parent-child institution, the first applicant and the child welfare services was held. The first applicant stated at the meeting that she wanted to move out of the institution together with her child, as she no longer wanted guidance. The staff at the institution stated that they were very concerned about the first applicant’s caring skills. She did not wake up at night, and the boy had lost a lot of weight, lacked energy and appeared dehydrated. The health visitor was also very concerned, whereas the first applicant was not. The institution had established close 24-hour monitoring. Staff had stayed awake at night in order to wake the first applicant up to feed the child. They had monitored the first applicant every three hours round the clock in order to ensure that the boy received nourishment. They expressed the fear that the child would not have survived had they not established that close monitoring pattern. The child welfare services considered that it would create a risk if the first applicant removed the child from the institution. X was below critical normal weight ( kritisk normalvekt ) and in need of nutrition and monitoring. 21.     In the decision taken on the same date it was also stated that the first applicant had given information about the child’s father to the child welfare services, but that she had refused him permission to take a paternity test and to sign as father at the hospital. It was stated that the father wanted to take responsibility for the child, but that he did not yet have any rights as a party to the case. 22.     It was decided to place X in an emergency foster home and that the first applicant and her mother should visit him for up to one and a half hours weekly. As to the boy’s needs, it was stated that he had lost a lot of weight and accordingly needed close and proper monitoring. It was emphasised as very important that good feeding routines be developed. Further, according to the plan, the placement was to be continuously assessed by the first applicant, the emergency foster parents, a specialist team ( fagteam ) and the child welfare services. The municipality was to stay in contact with the emergency foster parents and be responsible for being in contact with and following up on the first applicant. Preliminary approval of the decision was given by the chair of the County Social Welfare Board ( fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker ) on 21 October 2008. 23.     On 22 October 2008 the first applicant appealed to the County Social Welfare Board against the emergency decision. She claimed that she and X could live together at her parents’ house, arguing that her mother stayed at home and was willing to help care for X and that she and her mother were also willing to accept help from the child welfare services. 24.     On 23 October 2008 a family consultant and a psychologist from the parent-child institution drew up a report of the first applicant’s and her mother’s stay there. The report referred to an intelligence test that had been carried out in which the first applicant had obtained a higher score than 67% of persons of her age on perceptual organisation (meaning organisation of visual material) and below 93% of persons her age on verbal understanding. On tasks that required working memory – the ability to take into account and process complex information – the first applicant had scored below 99% of persons her age. According to the report, the tests confirmed the clinical impression of the first applicant. Furthermore, the report stated that the institution’s guidance had focused on teaching the first applicant how to meet the child’s basic needs in terms of food, hygiene ( stell ) and safety. The first applicant had received verbal and hands-on guidance and had consistently ( gjennomgående ) needed repeated instructions and demonstration. In the staff’s experience, the first applicant often did not understand what was told or explained to her, and rapidly forgot. In the conclusion the report stated, inter alia : “The mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner. During the time the mother and child have stayed [at the parent-child institution] ..., the staff here ... have been very concerned that the child’s needs are not being met. In order to ensure that the child’s primary needs for care and food are met, the staff have intervened and closely monitored the child day and night. The mother is not able to meet the boy’s practical care needs. She has not taken responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner. The mother has needed guidance at a very basic level, and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several times. Throughout the stay, the mother has made statements that we find very worrying. She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son, and has several times expressed disgust with the child. The mother has demonstrated very little understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control. The mother’s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care. Her ability to provide practical care must be seen in the light of this. The mother’s mental health is marked by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other people. The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need. Our assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child. We are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow-up. As we have verbally communicated to the child welfare services, we believe it to be important that especially close care is taken of the mother during the period following the emergency placement. The mother is vulnerable. She should be offered a psychological assessment and treatment, and probably needs help in finding motivation for this. The mother should have an individual plan to ensure follow-up in several areas. The mother has resources (see the abilities tests) that she needs help to make good use of.” 25.     On 27 October 2008 the Board heard the appeal against the emergency placement decision (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). The first applicant attended with her legal-aid counsel and gave evidence. Three witnesses were heard. 26.     In a decision of the same day, signed by the Board’s chairperson, the Board concluded that it had to rely on the descriptions given by the psychologist at the parent-child institution, who had drafted the institution’s report, and the representative from the municipal child welfare services. According to those descriptions, the first applicant had been unable to care for X properly ( betryggende ) in entirely essential and crucial respects ( helt vesentlige og sentrale områder ). Furthermore, she had said that she wanted to leave the institution. It had been obvious that she could not be given care of X without creating a risk that he would suffer material harm. Afterwards, the first applicant’s parents had said that they would be capable of ensuring that X was adequately looked after. However, the Board concluded that this would not provide X with sufficient security. The first applicant’s mother had given evidence before the Board and had stated that during her stay at the parent-child institution she had not experienced anything that gave rise to concern with respect to the first applicant’s care for X. This was in stark contrast to what had been reported by the psychologist. The Board also concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the daily care of X, not her mother. 27.     On the same day, 27 October 2008, X was sent to a child psychiatry clinic for an assessment. 28.     On 30 October 2008 the first applicant appealed against the Board’s decision of 27 October 2008 (see paragraphs 25-26 above) to the City Court (tingrett ). 29.     On 13 November 2008 the first applicant visited X in the foster home; according to the notes taken by the supervisor, Z had received the result of a paternity test the day before which had shown that he was not the father. The first applicant stated that she did not know who the father could be. She could not remember having been with anyone else. The first applicant and the adviser from the child welfare services agreed that the first applicant would contact her doctor and ask for a referral to a psychologist. 30.     On 21 November 2008 an adviser working with emergency placements ( beredskapshjemskonsulent ) at the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs produced a report on the implementation of the emergency measure. In the conclusion she stated: “The boy arrived at the emergency foster home on 17/10 with little movement in his arms and legs, and making few sounds. He could not open his eyes because they were red, swollen and had a lot of discharge. He was undernourished, pale and weak [( slapp )]. After a few days he started to move, make sounds and develop skin colour. He ate well at all meals, and enjoyed bodily contact. He opened his eyes upon receiving the correct medication and gradually started to be in contact with his surroundings. Good routines were put in place and he was closely followed up with respect to nourishment and development. The boy has developed very well in all areas in the five weeks he has been living in the emergency foster home. The doctor and health visitors were satisfied with the boy’s development and have monitored him closely. Bup [( Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk – the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic)] has also followed up on the boy and reported possible stress symptoms developed by the boy during the pregnancy or the first weeks of his life. The emergency foster parents have provided favourable conditions for the boy to work on his development, and this has worked well. The boy needs stable adults who can give him good care, appropriate to his age [( aldersadekvat omsorg )], and satisfy his needs in future.” 31.     On 28 November 2008 the municipality applied to the County Social Welfare Board for a care order, submitting that the first applicant lacked caring skills with respect to a child’s various needs. They considered that X would rapidly end up in a situation in which he would be subjected to serious neglect if he were returned to the first applicant. As to contact rights, the municipality submitted that they assumed that it would be a matter of a long-term placement and that X would probably grow up in foster care. They stated that the first applicant was young, but that it was assumed that her capacity as a mother would be limited, at least in relation to X ( [m]or er ung, men det antas at hennes kapasitet som mor vil være begrenset, i hvert fall i forhold til dette barnet ). 32.     On 5 December 2008 the team at the child psychiatry clinic, who had carried out six different observations between 3 and 24 November 2008, in accordance with the instructions of 27 October 2008 (see paragraph 27 above), set out their results in a report, which read, inter alia , as follows: “[X] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for assessment and observation. Today he is functioning as a normal two-month-old baby, and has the possibility of a good normal development. He has, from what can be observed, been a child at high risk. For vulnerable children the lack of response and confirmation, or other interferences in interaction, can lead to more or less serious psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not receive other corrective relationship experiences. The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive development. [X] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development now.” 33.     The City Court, composed of one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person, pursuant to section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below), heard the appeal against the Board’s decision in the emergency case (see paragraphs 25-26 and 28 above) on 12   January   2009. In its judgment of 26 January 2009 it stated first that an interim decision pursuant to the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) could only be made if the risk of harm was acute and the child would suffer material harm if not moved immediately. It went on to state that the case concerned a child who had been practically newborn when the interim care order had been made, and that the placement had since been reconsidered several times following appeals on the part of the mother. 34.     In its conclusion the City Court stated that it was in no doubt that X’s situation had been serious when the interim care order had been issued. He had shown clear signs of neglect, both psychologically and physically. The City Court found that the “material” harm requirement ( vesentlighetskravet ) in the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) had been met. X was at the time of its judgment in better health and showed normal development. This was due to the emergency foster parents’ efforts and follow-up. The City Court did not consider that the first applicant’s ability to provide care had changed and feared that X would suffer material harm if he were now returned to her. This was still the case even if the first applicant lived with her parents and they supported her. It was her ability to provide care that was the matter of assessment. 35.     Based on the above, the City Court did not find grounds to revoke the emergency care order pending a decision by the County Social Welfare Board on the question of permanent care. 36.     The first applicant did not appeal to the High Court ( lagmannsrett ). C.     Proceedings for a care order 1.     Proceedings before the County Social Welfare Board 37.     The Board, composed of an administrator qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a lay person, in accordance with section 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), held a hearing on the child welfare services’ request for a care order (see paragraph   31 above) on 17 and 18 February 2009. The first applicant attended and gave evidence. Seven witnesses were heard, including experts and the first applicant’s parents, their neighbour and a friend of the family. At the hearing the child welfare services requested that X be taken into local authority care, placed in a foster home and that the first applicant be granted contact rights for two hours, four times per year, under supervision. The first applicant sought to have the request for a care order rejected and X returned to her. In the alternative, she asked for contact rights of a minimum of once per month, or according to the Board’s discretion. 38.     In a decision of 2 March 2009 the Board stated at the outset that, independently of the parties’ arguments and claims, its task was to decide whether X was to be taken into care by the child welfare services. If a care order were issued, the Board would also choose a suitable placement and determine the contact arrangements. 39.     The Board concluded that the fundamental condition set out in letter (a) of the first paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act had been met (see paragraph 122 below). In its opinion, a situation involving serious deficiencies in both psychological and practical care would arise if X were returned to live with the first applicant. 40.     The Board emphasised that it had assessed the first applicant’s ability as a caregiver and changes in her approach, not her condition or personality traits. However, the Board noted that the parent-child institution had considered the first applicant’s inability to benefit from guidance to be linked to her cognitive limitations. Reference was made to conclusions drawn by the institution to the effect that the relevant test results were consistent with their daily observations (see paragraph 24 above). The tests carried out at the institution were also largely consistent with previous assessments of the first applicant, and also with the concerns reported by, inter alia , the psychologist at the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs in the summer of 2008 (see paragraph 14 above). In the Board’s view, the above factors suggested that the first applicant’s problems were of a fundamental nature and that her potential for change was limited ( sier noe om at mors problematikk er av en grunnleggende karakter og at endringspotensialet er begrenset ). 41.     The Board stated that it had to conclude that a care order was necessary and in the best interests of X. As to a suitable placement, the Board stated that, having regard to his age and care needs, a foster home placement was clearly the best solution for X at the time. It issued a care order to that effect. Based on X’s age and vulnerability, the Board also decided that he should be placed in enhanced foster care – an arrangement whereby the foster home was given extra assistance and support – at least for the first year. 42.     Turning to the question of contact rights, the Board went on to state that, under section 4-19 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), children and parents were entitled to contact with each other unless otherwise decided. When a care order was issued, the Board would determine the amount of contact and decisions regarding contact had to be in the child’s best interests, as provided for by section 4-1 of the Child Welfare Act (ibid.). The purpose and duration of the placement also had to be taken into consideration when the amount of contact was determined. 43.     On the grounds of the information available at the time of the Board’s decision, the Board envisaged that X would grow up in the foster home. This was on account of ( har sammenheng med ) the first applicant’s fundamental problems and limited potential for change ( mors grunnleggende problematikk og begrensede endringspotensial ) (see paragraph 40 above). This meant that the foster parents would become X’s psychological parents, and that the amount of contact had to be determined in such a way as to ensure that the attachment process, which was already well under way, was not disrupted. X had to be given peace and stability in his everyday life, and he was assumed ( det legges til grunn ) to have special needs in that respect. In the Board’s opinion, the purpose of contact had to be to ensure that he had knowledge of his mother. 44.     Based on an overall assessment, including of the above factors, the amount of contact was set at two hours, six times per year. The Board stated that it had some misgivings as to whether this was too frequent, particularly considering X’s reactions. However, it believed that contact could be somewhat improved by the child welfare services providing more guidance and adaptation and by a considerable reduction in the frequency of contact. 45.     In the Board’s opinion, it was necessary for the child welfare services to be authorised to supervise contact in order to ensure that X was properly cared for. 46.     The Board’s decision concluded with a statement to the effect that it would be for the child welfare services to decide on the time and place of the contact sessions. 2.     Proceedings before the City Court 47.     On 15 April 2009 the first applicant appealed to the City Court against the Board’s decision that X should be taken into public care (see paragraphs 38-46 above). She submitted, in particular, that adequate conditions in the home could be achieved through the implementation of assistance measures and that the care order had been decided without sufficient assistance measures having first been implemented. 48.     On 6 May 2009 the child welfare services sent the first applicant a letter in which she was invited to a meeting to discuss what sort of help they could offer her. The letter stated as follows: “The child welfare services are concerned that you receive help to process what you have been through in relation to the taking into care, etc. It is still an offer that the Child Welfare Service cover the costs of a psychologist, if you so wish.” 49.     On 14 May 2009 the first applicant attended a contact session together with two acquaintances. According to the report, a situation arose in which the supervisor from the child welfare services stated that the first applicant would have a calmer time with X if she were alone with him. The first applicant said that the supervisor had to understand that she wanted to bring people with her because she was being badly treated. It was ultimately agreed that one of the acquaintances would accompany the first applicant. During the session the first applicant stated that she had received an unpleasant ( ukoselig ) letter from the child welfare services offering her an appointment to discuss any help that she might need (see paragraph 48 above). The first applicant stated that she did not want any help and that she certainly did not need psychological counselling. 50.     On 19 August 2009 the City Court gave judgment on the question of the care order (see paragraph 47 above). At the outset the City Court stated that the case concerned judicial review of a care order issued pursuant to section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), which was to be considered pursuant to the rules in chapter 36 of the Dispute Act. When undertaking a judicial review of the County Social Welfare Board’s decision, the court had power to review all aspects of the decision, both legal and factual, as well as the administrative discretion. It was well established in law that its review of the Board’s decision should not be based on the circumstances at the time of the Board’s decision, but on the circumstances at the time of its judgment. The court would not therefore normally go into more detail regarding the Board’s assessment of the grounds for issuing a care order. However, the City Court went on to state that it nonetheless found that special reasons made it necessary to do so in the instant case. 51.     Based on the evidence presented to it, the City Court ultimately concluded that it had not, either at the time of its judgment or previously, been sufficiently substantiated that there existed such deficiencies in the first applicant’s ability to provide care that the conditions for the child welfare services maintaining care and control of X were met. It found , inter alia , that X’s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye infection. The Board’s decision should therefore be revoked. 52.     X was therefore to be returned to the first applicant and the City Court found that the parties understood that this had to be done in a way that would prevent X from facing further trauma. X had lived with his foster parents for ten months and had formed an attachment to them. Based on what had emerged during the proceedings, the City Court assumed that the child welfare services would give the first applicant and the foster parents the assistance they needed. The first applicant had said that she was willing to cooperate and, given that willingness, the City Court believed that it must be possible to establish the cooperative environment necessary for the child welfare services to be able to provide the help she might need. 53.     In the days following the City Court’s judgment there were a number of email exchanges between the first applicant’s counsel and the child welfare services, and a meeting was held on 26 August 2009. The following day the first applicant, through her counsel, requested an appointment so that she could immediately ( omgående ) pick X up from the foster home and bring him home with her. She also requested that this be on Saturday 29   August 2009. She stated that the foster mother could deliver X and stay as long as she wanted. The foster mother was also welcome to visit X when she wished, upon agreement with the first applicant. Representatives from the child welfare services were not welcome. 54.     The applicant’s request to have X immediately returned to her was not met by the child welfare services, but the amount of contact was increased. On 1, 3, 4 and 7 September 2009 contact sessions were held at the house of the first applicant’s parents. The supervisor took detailed notes from each session as well as from conversations with the foster mother, and made a summary report of all the sessions. She noted, inter alia , that the foster mother had stated that the session on 1 September 2009 had “gone well [( gikk greit )] in many ways”, but that X had become very tired afterwards. He had been uneasy and difficult to put to bed. At the end of the session on 3 September, the supervisor noted that X appeared completely exhausted and pale. X’s apparent tiredness was noted also in relation to the sessions on 4 and 7 September. Furthermore, it emerges from the notes that the supervisor found it strange ( underlig ) that X had not been offered food, even though the family had been informed that it was his meal time. The supervisor had noted that the first applicant had taken note of this information on the first day, but then forgotten it again by the next day. The report stated that the supervisor was uncertain as to whether this had to do with the first applicant’s insecurity and fear of asking. The report also contained details about X’s reactions to the sessions, with respect to crying, sleeping, digestion and other behaviour. 3.     Proceedings before the High Court 55.     On 4 September 2009 the municipality sought leave to appeal against the City Court’s judgment (see paragraphs 50-52 above), requested that the Board’s decision of 2 March 2009 be upheld (see paragraphs 38-46 above), and concurrently applied for implementation of the City Court’s judgment to be suspended. The municipality argued, firstly, that the City Court’s judgment was seriously flawed. They claimed that it was unlikely that the eye infection could have been the reason for X’s slow weight gain. Moreover, the first applicant had had visits with X, but they had not worked well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them. X had had strong reactions after those visits. Secondly, the municipality submitted that the case raised a question of general interest, namely relating to the first applicant’s intellectual functioning ( kognitive ferdigheter ). They stated that she had general learning difficulties and that tests had shown that she had specific difficulties, with consequences for her daily functioning. Her abilities in verbal reasoning, relating to complex information and analysing and acting in situations that arose, were matters relevant to the provision of adequate care for a child. In that context the municipality referred to a number of questions that, in their view, had to be answered, relating, inter alia , to what the first applicant was or was not capable of doing – and whether it was appropriate to leave a small child with her – and whether there were realistic assistance measures that could compensate for her shortcomings. 56.     On 8 September 2009 the City Court decided to stay enforcement of its judgment until the High Court had adjudicated the case. 57.     In her response of 11 September 2009 to the municipality’s appeal, the first applicant, through her counsel, stated that the municipality had proceeded on the grounds that she was almost retarded ( nærmest er tilbakestående ) and therefore incapable of taking care of a child, which she found to be an insulting allegation ( grov beskyldning ). Nor were there, in her view, any flaws in the City Court’s judgment. 58.     On 9 October 2009 the child welfare services decided to appoint two experts – a psychologist, B.S., and a family therapist, E.W.A. – to assess X in relation to his strong reactions after the period in which there had been frequent contact sessions at the home of the first applicant’s parents (see paragraph 54 above). In addition to examining the reasons for X’s reactions, the experts were asked to provide advice and guidance to the foster mother as to how to handle the reactions and to the first applicant, if she agreed, with respect to the contact sessions. 59.     On 12 October 2009 the High Court granted leave to appeal on the ground that the ruling of, or procedure in, the City Court had been seriously flawed (see paragraph 55 above and paragraph 133 below). It also upheld the City Court’s decision to stay enforcement of the judgment (see paragraph 56 above). 60.     On 4 November 2009 the first applicant’s counsel asked the child welfare services whether the offer of counselling to the first applicant (see paragraph 48 above) was still valid. In their response, of 12   November   2009, the child welfare services stated that they were worried about the first applicant and that it was important that she obtained help. They confirmed that they would cover the costs of a psychologist or other counsellor of the first applicant’s choice and that they would not ask the person chosen for any information or to act as a witness in the child welfare case. 61.     On 15 November 2009 the High Court appointed an expert psychologist, M.S., to assess the case. 62.     On 20 February 2010 the two experts appointed by the child welfare services to examine the contact sessions and the effects on X (see paragraph   58 above) delivered their report, which was over 18 pages long. In the report they stated that they had not observed any contact sessions, “as this [had been] done by the expert appointed by the High Court”. They further stated that the first applicant had refused guidance with respect to the contact sessions. In the chapter entitled “Is it possible to hypothesise on parents’ competence in contact situations based on their competence as caregivers?”, the following was stated: “When reviewing the various documents we find that [the parent-child institution] describes a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the mothering role, which is similar to the pattern we see during the contact sessions more than one year later. For example, the mother demonstrates a lack of ability in basic parental care during the contact sessions, as we have described above. Furthermore, her parental regulation during the contact sessions is insensitive. She seems to have significant problems with identifying X’s affects by sharing joy and making him feel secure and guiding him through confirmation and putting names on things. This is very serious. We find that the mother has significant problems in all the contact sessions and that it is difficult not to say that these problems will also extend to her general competence as a caregiver. In a report dated 19 February 2008, i.e. two years ago, Dr Philos. [H.B.], a specialist in clinical neurology, states the following: ‘There are no significant changes in the results of intelligence tests conducted before the operation and at the check-up two years after the operation. Her results in the intelligence tests have been very similar since she was 10.5 years old, i.e. her intelligence has been stable throughout all these years.’ He says that her intellectual functioning is approximately two standard deviations below her peers and that she has problems with her long-term memory and with transferring information from one thing to another. We find that it is more problematic than usual for the mother to have supervised contact sessions because of her cognitive issues, because from time to time [( fra gang til gang )] she does not know what to do in relation to the boy and because she is very driven by impulses. [H.B.]’s report also states that she has problems understanding the content of what she is reading, and we also find that she cannot read and understand the situation when she is with her child. We find this to be an important and fundamental issue in shedding light on the mother’s competence in contact situations and her competence as a caregiver. As regards the mother’s competence as a caregiver in relation to the mother’s cognitive skills, we assume that this will be further elucidated by [M.S.], the expert psychologist appointed by the Court of Appeal. This is considered to play a role in relation to the mother’s behaviour vis-à-vis X during the contact sessions and her struggle to become emotionally attuned to his needs at different ages. On page 5 of its report [(judgment)] from 2009, the City Court summarises [the situation] as follows: ‘It is generally known that many women, especially women who are giving birth for the first time, can have a psychological reaction after the birth which, in extreme situations, can take the form of serious postnatal depression. All reactions in the form of feelings of alienation and insecurity in relation to the newborn are within the normal range.’ We find that the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions cannot be regarded as serious postnatal depression since the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions have shown a similar pattern for more than 1.5 years. This is more a sign of inadequate basic parenting skills and is not related to postnatal depression alone. We consider it crucial [( avgjørende viktig )] that the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions and her competence as a caregiver in general be understood in the light of more complex psychological explanatory models relating to both cognitive issues and serious traumatic experiences both early in life and as an adult, which we know, based on researc