CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 19 septembre 2019

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LATVIA   (Application no. 79441/17)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   19 September 2019       FINAL   24/02/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.     In the case of Andersena v. Latvia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Ganna Yudkivska,   André Potocki,   Síofra O’Leary,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 27 August 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 79441/17) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms Kerija Andersena (“the applicant”), on 20 November 2017. 2.     The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms   I. Nikuļceva, a lawyer practising in Riga. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce. 3.     The applicant alleged that a decision by the Latvian courts ordering her daughter’s return to Norway violated her right to family life and had been taken in a flawed procedure. She invoked Article 6 and Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 23 November 2017 notice of the application was given to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     Background information 5.     The applicant is a Latvian national who was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 6.     On 3 August 2013 the applicant married a Norwegian citizen, S.I.E.A. Their daughter, K.S.A. – a citizen of both Latvia and Norway – was born on 3 December 2013. At that time the family lived in Latvia. 7.     The Government submitted that in February 2014 the family had moved to Rælingen, Norway. However, the applicant maintained that both Latvia and Norway should be regarded as their countries of residence, as she and her daughter had maintained strong ties with Latvia – they had spent a lot of time there, she had continued to receive child support benefit and unemployment benefit from Latvia, and her daughter had remained registered with a family doctor in Latvia. In addition, the applicant had not been employed in Norway. 8.     Between August 2015 and June 2017 K.S.A. attended a kindergarten in Norway. 9.     In spring 2017 the relationship between the spouses deteriorated. In June 2017 S.I.E.A. moved out of the family home. 10.     In spring 2017 S.I.E.A. attended some meetings concerning issues in the family at the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs ( Bufetat ) in Romerike, Norway. In June a marriage mediation meeting – a prerequisite for divorce and child custody proceedings – was organised, but the applicant did not attend it. 11.     The applicant alleged that S.I.E.A. had become physically violent towards her. She had complained to her family doctor in Norway in that regard. The applicant claimed that she had also approached the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs, the Norwegian Child Welfare Services ( Barnevernet ), the Oslo Crisis Centre and the local crisis centre in Romerike, as well as an advice centre for women in Norway. According to the applicant, those institutions had been unable help her as she had not been a taxpayer in Norway. 12 .     The applicant further submitted that on 2 July 2017 S.I.E.A. had come to the family house without prior warning, had behaved aggressively, had attempted to steal her bag containing passports, and had struck K.S.A. After S.I.E.A. had left, the applicant had made a recording of her daughter reiterating that he had struck her on the eye with her own hand. The applicant submitted that following this incident she had left for Latvia with K.S.A. On 4 July she had sent a text message to S.I.E.A. stating that they had left Norway and were safe. 13.     Shortly afterwards the applicant found a job in Latvia and K.S.A. started attending a kindergarten there. B.     Proceedings under the Hague Convention 1.     Application for K.S.A.’s return 14.     On 5 July 2017 S.I.E.A. applied to the Norwegian Central Authority with a view to having K.S.A. returned to Norway under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). That application was received by the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court ( Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesa ) on 11   August 2017. 15.     At the first hearing of 24 August 2017 the applicant requested an adjournment so that she could obtain legal representation. The court adjourned the hearing to 7 September 2017. 16.     On 6 September 2017 the applicant issued written authorisation entitling A.R. and I.M., advocates, to represent her in relation to all issues concerning her daughter’s return to Norway. The document stated that authorisation was given to A.R. “and/or” I.M. The applicant submitted that she had only met with A.R. and had been convinced that only A.R. would represent her in the proceedings. 17 .     The applicant did not attend the hearing on 7 September 2017 owing to medical reasons. She was represented by I.M. on the basis of the above ‑ mentioned authorisation and an order ( orderis ) – a formal document certifying that an advocate acts in his or her official capacity as a member of the Latvian Council of Sworn Advocates. I.M. requested that the hearing be adjourned owing to the applicant’s absence. However, the court decided to proceed with the examination of the case on the grounds that the applicant was represented, the hearing had already been adjourned once, and the proceedings required particularly expeditious examination. 18.     With respect to the merits, I.M., relying on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, argued that returning to Norway would be harmful to K.S.A. The advocate referred to S.I.E.A.’s alleged violence towards the applicant and argued that it had amounted to emotional violence towards K.S.A. She also referred to the occasion when S.I.E.A. had allegedly struck the girl. 19.     On 8 September 2017 the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court ruled that K.S.A. should be returned to Norway. Firstly, the court established that prior to moving to Latvia K.S.A.’s habitual place of residence had been in Norway, her parents had enjoyed joint custody, and S.I.E.A. had not consented to K.S.A.’s removal. Accordingly, there had been a wrongful removal and retention of a child within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. 20 .     Secondly, the court refused to apply Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. Having outlined the evidence before it, the court concluded that it could not make a finding that K.S.A.’s return to Norway would cause her physical or psychological harm or would otherwise create an intolerable situation. In particular, the court analysed the following evidence: -               an acknowledgement of 18 August 2017 from the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs in Romerike concerning the contact which S.I.E.A. had had and the meetings and consultations which he had attended in the period between 9 February 2017 and 13 July 2017; -               a transcript of a phone conversation of 11 May 2017 in which an employee of the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs in Romerike had detailed his concerns about the applicant’s psychological well-being and its effects on K.S.A.’s well-being; -               a statement of 17 August 2017 from the child support service of the Rælingen municipality indicating that at no point during its review had it been concluded that, in this case, custody rights should be removed or the child could not live with her parents; -               a statement from the Norwegian kindergarten confirming that from August 2015 until the summer of 2017 K.S.A. had attended the kindergarten, and that during this time period there had been no reason to suspect that the child had been suffering from physical or emotional violence; -               medical documentation from the applicant’s consultations with her family doctor in Norway on 24 March 2017, 3 April 2017, 26 May 2017, and 9 June 2017 outlining her complaints concerning conflict in the family (the issue of violence on the part of her husband was also raised in the last two consultations); -               information obtained by the Latvian custodial authority on 16   August 2017 concerning K.S.A.’s conduct in the Latvian kindergarten which she had started attending on 17 July 2017, indicating that the child was active, communicative, open and friendly, showed no aggression and had adapted well to her new environment, and that no health problems had been detected and the applicant had provided no information about such problems; -               information received from K.S.A.’s family doctor in Latvia stating that the last visit had taken place in August 2015, the family lived in Norway and there was no information concerning violence in the family; -               testimony of 23 August 2017 from the applicant’s adult son attesting to S.I.E.A.’s aggressive behaviour and stating that he had struck K.S.A.; -               an excerpt of 17 August 2017 from medical documentation concerning K.S.A.’s consultations with a psychiatrist in Latvia detailing the girl’s anxious behaviour when she was questioned about her father or life in Norway; -               a report of 25 August 2017 by a clinical psychologist and family psychotherapist in Latvia concerning a psychological examination of K.S.A., which concluded that K.S.A. had been involved in psychologically traumatising events and her father had been physically violent towards her and her mother. 21 .     The court noted that there was a serious conflict between the parents, which undoubtedly had a negative effect on the child. Nonetheless, the evidence in the case file was contradictory. While some of it pointed to a possibility of emotional or maybe even physical violence on the part of S.I.E.A., it had to be assessed in conjunction with the other evidence, the majority of which showed that the child had not been subjected to any kind of violence in the family. Moreover, the case file did not contain any information that the applicant had approached the Norwegian law-enforcement authorities or child protection institutions in order to deal with the alleged violence in the family, or that she had made use of any civil-law or criminal-law remedies designed to protect people from violence. On the contrary, in the court’s view, the evidence indicated that the applicant had evaded the mechanisms created to resolve problems in the family. 2.     Ancillary-complaint proceedings 22.     On 22 September 2017 the applicant withdrew the authorisation given to A.R. and I.M. There is no indication that the domestic courts were informed of that fact. 23 .     On 25 September 2017 the applicant lodged an ancillary complaint against the decision of 8 September 2017. In accordance with the Civil Procedure Law, the accelerated ancillary-complaint procedure was the type of appeal to use to challenge the merits of a decision ordering the return of a child (see paragraphs 50-51 below). The complaint was signed by the applicant. Among other documents, the applicant submitted a transcript of the recording from 2 July 2017 (see paragraph 12 above), along with a privately-hired Latvian forensic expert’s conclusion that the file had not been tampered with or falsified. In her complaint, the applicant noted, inter alia , that she had agreed with A.R. that they would seek an adjournment of the hearing of 7 September because of her health and the fact that her daughter was in hospital. Owing to mobility difficulties, she had been unable to gather some significant pieces of evidence before the date of the court hearing; however, she had not been prescribed bedrest. Had she known what the consequences would be, she would have come to the hearing despite the difficulties. 24 .     On 6 October 2017 the Riga Regional Court ( Rīgas apgabaltiesa ) informed the applicant in writing that her ancillary complaint would be examined in written proceedings on 23 October 2017, and that she had a right to ask for judges to recuse themselves up to seven days before that date. The notification was addressed to her personally. 25.     On 13 October 2017 the applicant submitted an application, seeking that the case be examined at an oral hearing. She argued that the hearing was necessary to establish additional circumstances that were significant for deciding her ancillary complaint, particularly as she had not had an opportunity to express herself before the first-instance court. However, the applicant did not specify what those additional circumstances were. On 16   October 2017 she was personally informed that the application had been transferred to the presiding judge. 26 .     On 3 October, 12 October and 23 October 2017 the applicant lodged additional submissions further to her ancillary complaint. The latter submissions were received by the Riga Regional Court after the delivery of its decision of 23 October 2017. 27 .     On 17 October 2017 S.I.E.A. submitted written explanations with respect to the applicant’s ancillary complaint, and on 22 October 2017 he submitted written explanations in relation to her additional submissions of 12   October 2017. The latter explanations were received by the Riga Regional Court on 23   October 2017, after the delivery of the decision. 28 .     The applicant’s ancillary complaint and her additional submissions, as well as S.I.E.A.’s written explanations, were uploaded to the judicial system of electronic services. The applicant herself did not have access to the judicial system of electronic services and she also was not personally informed of S.I.E.A.’s submissions. The Government claimed that notifications about the submissions uploaded to the judicial system of electronic services had been sent to I.M. According to the Government’s information, I.M. had opened the applicant’s case in the judicial system of electronic services ten times – four times after the ancillary complaint had been lodged (on 25, 27 and 29 September and on 23 October 2017) – and had downloaded the first-instance court’s decision three times. 29 .     On 23   October 2017 the Riga Regional Court delivered its decision. It dismissed the application for the case to be examined at an oral hearing on the grounds that it lacked adequate reasoning and no new circumstances that needed to be established had been put forward. Also, the ancillary complaint had not mentioned any arguments as to why additional circumstances, if they existed, could only be established at an oral hearing. The court noted that the ancillary complaint contained a great number of arguments which it was also bound to address in written proceedings, and that the case had a sufficient amount of evidence, which allowed the case to be examined in written proceedings. 30 .     With respect to the applicant’s legal representation, the court pointed out that the first hearing had been adjourned at her request so that she could obtain legal representation. The written authorisation for the advocates A.R. “and/or” I.M. indicated that the applicant had chosen to conduct the proceedings via her authorised representatives. The court dismissed the applicant’s contention that authorisation had been given only to A.R., as that was contrary to the text of the written authorisation, which the applicant must have understood when she signed. Furthermore, the written authorisation had not been revoked, thus there were grounds to consider that the applicant was still exercising her procedural rights through her authorised representatives. 31.     Concerning the applicant’s absence from the first-instance hearing on 7 September 2017, the court considered that she had not indicated how her presence at that hearing could have affected the outcome of the case. As the applicant had not attended the hearing owing to health reasons and had been represented by her authorised representative, the first-instance court could proceed with the examination of the case. 32 .     In relation to the merits of the case, the Riga Regional Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court. It agreed that the evidence, when assessed in its entirety, was not sufficient to conclude that there was a grave risk that K.S.A.’s return to Norway would cause her physical or psychological harm or would otherwise place her in an intolerable situation. Referring to the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs where S.I.E.A. had sought help, as well as the documents produced by the municipal child support service, the court concluded that there were legal means in Norway that could protect the child from danger if necessary. The court considered that K.S.A. and the applicant would be able to receive adequate protection and support in Norway upon their return. 3.     Suspension 33.     On 15 November 2017 the applicant lodged an application with the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court, seeking that enforcement of the return order be suspended. She submitted that there had been changes in significant circumstances – K.S.A.’s state of health had deteriorated and she required inpatient medical treatment. 34.     On 21 November 2017 K.S.A. commenced inpatient treatment in a State psychiatric hospital, Ģintermuiža. She was diagnosed as having: an adjustment disorder with neurotic reactions, anxiety, fears, sleep disturbances, enuresis, a phobic childhood anxiety disorder, and a transient tic disorder. She was accompanied by her grandmother and remained in the hospital until 14   December 2017. K.S.A. had already undergone similar inpatient treatment at the same hospital from 4 to 8 September 2017, on the basis of the same diagnosis. 35 .     On 21 December 2017 the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court suspended the enforcement proceedings until 21 February 2018. However, on 13 February 2018 the Riga Regional Court revoked that decision. It considered that there had been no changes in significant circumstances, as K.S.A.’s diagnosis had already been known to the domestic courts when her return to Norway had been ordered. Also, there were no indications that K.S.A. could not continue the treatment in Norway, where a professional system of treatment and support was in place. The court considered that it would be in the best interests of the child to return to Norway and receive psychological and medical treatment there. 36.     On 15 February 2018 the applicant lodged a new application with the Riga City Vidzeme District Court ( Rīgas pilsētas Vidzemes rajona tiesa ), again requesting that enforcement of the return order be suspended. On 5 April 2018 the court denied that application. It noted that the notion of a change in significant circumstances had to be given a very narrow interpretation. That decision was upheld by the Riga Regional Court on 28   June 2018. 37.     The applicant then requested that the case be reopened on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances. That application was denied by a final decision of 24 August 2018. 4.     Enforcement 38.     On 9 March 2018 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court issued a writ of execution. On 28 March 2018 an application by the applicant to revoke the writ of execution was denied. 39.     On 12 March 2018 a bailiff sent the applicant official notification obliging her to hand K.S.A. over to S.I.E.A. or a member of the competent administrative authority ( bāriņtiesa ) by 23 March 2018. On 26   March 2018 the bailiff dismissed an application by the applicant to suspend the enforcement proceedings. On the same date he officially established that she had failed to comply with the decision ordering K.S.A.’s return. 40.     On the basis of an application by the bailiff, on 25 April 2018 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court fined the applicant 750 euros (EUR) for failing to comply with the return order. 41.     On 12 September 2018 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court granted an application by the bailiff for the police to commence a search for K.S.A., as her whereabouts could not be located and the applicant could not be contacted. C.     Other proceedings 1.     Proceedings in Norway 42.     On 7 July 2017 S.I.E.A. brought divorce and custody proceedings against the applicant before the Norwegian courts. 43.     The documents concerning those proceedings were sent to the applicant’s known residential address in Riga and to her representative, A.R. By an email of 22 September 2017 A.R. informed the applicant that she had received these documents. The applicant responded by saying that A.R. should return the documents to the sender with a note stating that she no longer represented the applicant in any proceedings. 44 .     On 24 November 2017 the Nedre Romerike Regional Court ( Nedre Romerike tingrett ) issued an interim decision concerning parental custody and K.S.A.’s place of residence. On the basis of the documents before it, the court considered that there was no indication that S.I.E.A. could not take good care of his daughter. On the contrary, the court expressed concern about K.S.A. staying with her mother, who had illegally removed her from her habitual place of residence and had deprived her of normal contact with her father, and whose parenting skills and mental health were questionable. It held that it would be in K.S.A.’s best interests to live in Norway with her father until the dispute was finally resolved. The applicant was granted three hours of supervised contact per week. 45.     That decision was amenable to appeal. There is no information that the applicant availed herself of that remedy. 2.     Proceedings in Latvia 46.     On 30 October 2017 the applicant requested that the Riga City Vidzeme District Court issue a restraining order against S.I.E.A. on account of a violent incident that had allegedly occurred on 9 October 2017. On 31   October 2017 the court issued the restraining order, prohibiting S.I.E.A. from coming within 100 metres of the applicant’s place of residence and from communicating with the applicant via any means. The applicant was given a deadline, and had until 31   January 2018 to lodge a civil claim relating to the restraining order. 47.     On 6 December 2017 the applicant lodged a claim against S.I.E.A., requesting a divorce, division of their joint property and sole custody of K.S.A. 48.     On 6 April 2018 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court concluded that these issues fell within the jurisdiction of the Norwegian courts, and did not examine the claim. It also revoked the restraining order. On 10 May 2018 that decision was upheld on appeal. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 1.     Application for return of a child 49.     Section 644 19 of the Civil Procedure Law sets out the procedure for examining applications for the return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in Latvia. It provides: “(1) The application shall be examined at a court hearing in the presence of the parties, within 15 days of the case being initiated. ... (2) If, after being summoned by the court, the defendant fails to attend [the hearing] without a justified reason, [he or she] may be brought to the court by coercive measures. (3) If one of the parties lives far away or, owing to other reasons, cannot attend [the hearing] in accordance with the court’s summons, the court may regard the written submissions of this party or the participation of [his or her] representative as sufficient for [the purposes of] examining the case. (4) In examining the application, the court shall request evidence of its own motion, using the most appropriate procedural options and the quickest way of acquiring evidence. ... (6) If the court determines that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in Latvia, it shall take a decision on returning the child to the country of [his or her] place of residence. (7) The court shall take a decision on returning or not returning the child to the country of [his or her] residence by applying the provisions of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ...” 50 .     Section 644 20 provides that a person can appeal against the court’s decision on returning or not returning the child by lodging an ancillary complaint. 51 .     Section 644 21 regulates the competence of an appeal court to examine ancillary complaints against decisions ordering or refusing to order a child’s return. This provision states: “(1) A regional court shall examine the ancillary complaint within 15 days of the ... proceedings being initiated. When examining the ancillary complaint, the regional court has the right to: 1)     leave the decision unaltered, [and] dismiss the complaint; [or] 2)     quash the decision and decide the issue on its merits. (2) The decision takes effect and becomes enforceable immediately.” 2.     Ancillary complaint 52 .     Section 441 of the Civil Procedure Law provides that parties to proceedings may appeal against the decisions of a first-instance court or an appeal court in proceedings separate from an appeal against the relevant judgment by lodging an ancillary complaint when such a possibility is provided for in this Law, or when the court’s decision hinders the proceedings. 53.     Section 446 of the Civil Procedure Law sets out the actions a court has to take following the receipt of an ancillary complaint. Section 446(1) requires a judge to send a copy of the ancillary complaint and the documents attached to the parties to the proceedings, and section 446(2) states that after the expiry of the time-limit for lodging the ancillary complaint, the judge has to send the case file and the ancillary complaint to the level of court to which the complaint is addressed. There is no regulation with respect to the exchange of observations. 54.     Section 447 states that the ancillary complaint shall be examined in written proceedings. The court shall notify the parties to the proceedings about the date of the examination of the ancillary complaint. A copy of the decision shall be sent to the parties to the proceedings within three days of the ancillary complaint being examined. Section 15(3) allows the court to also hold a court hearing in situations where this Law provides for written proceedings, if it considers such a hearing necessary to establish additional circumstances which may be significant for deciding the application, the complaint and the question put before it. 3.     Suspension of enforcement 55.     Chapter 74 3 of the Civil Procedure Law regulates the enforcement of decisions concerning the return of children to their country of habitual residence. Section 620 16 , which forms part of that chapter, sets out the grounds for suspending such a decision or refusing to enforce it. It provides: “(1) The [defendant] may submit to the district ... court ... an application to suspend enforcement of the decision or an application [for the court] to refuse to enforce the decision if there has been a change in significant circumstances. (2) The following shall be considered a change in significant circumstances within the meaning of this section: 1)     [where] the return of the child to [his or her] country of residence is not possible owing to the child’s health or psychological condition, [where this condition] is certified by the statement of a hospital or a psychiatrist; 2)     [where] the child’s objections to the return to [his or her] country of residence are confirmed by the assessment of a psychologist appointed by the [custodial authority]; or 3)     [where] the [claimant] shows no interest in renewing [his or her] connection with the child. (3) The application referred to in subsection 1 of this section may be lodged if more than a year has passed since the taking of the decision on returning the child to the country of [his or her] residence ..., except in the circumstances referred to in the first point of subsection 2 of this section. ... (6) The decision becomes enforceable immediately. An ancillary complaint may be lodged with respect to this court decision. The lodging of the ancillary complaint does not suspend the enforcement of the decision.” 4.     Representation 56 .     Section 85 of the Civil Procedure Law sets out the requirements for formalising representation in the following terms: “(1) Representation of a natural person shall be formalised with authorisation certified by a notary. ... (3) Authorisation that an advocate may provide legal assistance shall be confirmed by an order. If an advocate acts as an authorised representative of a party, this authorisation shall be confirmed by written authorisation.” 57 .     By decision no. 278 of 20 December 2010, the Latvian Council of Sworn Advocates approved instructions concerning the contents of an order confirming authorisation. Paragraph 3 of the instructions provides that an order has to state the name of the particular court before which a person is to be legally represented. It is not acceptable to include a statement that the advocate may represent the person at all levels of jurisdiction. 58 .     Further, section 86(1) of the Civil Procedure Law states that if a natural person is conducting proceedings through an authorised representative, then all notifications and documents shall be sent to the representative only. 59 .     Section 87(1) of the Civil Procedure Law provides that the person who is being represented may at any moment withdraw the authorisation given to the representative, simultaneously notifying the court in writing of the authorisation being withdrawn. 5.     The Supreme Court’s practice as regards representation 60 .     In a decision of 26 November 2015 (case no.   SKC-2391/2015), the Civil Cases Department of the Supreme Court ( Augstākās tiesas Civillietu departaments ) stated: “[7.2] ... The formalities with respect to formalising representation in cases where a person is represented by a sworn advocate are set out in section 85(3) of the Civil Procedure Law ... From the above-mentioned [provision] it can be seen that, in contrast with any other person in respect of whom notarised authorisation is required, with respect to a sworn advocate – a professional belonging to the judicial system –simple written authorisation supplemented by an order [confirming authorisation] suffices. ... [7.7] ... the court ... has rightly found that a sworn advocate has to submit both an order and authorisation in order to lodge an ancillary complaint in the name of the represented person. [7.8] From the documents submitted by the sworn advocate ... it cannot be concluded that [the appellant], in a procedure set out by law, authorised [the advocate] to represent his interests before the court, as, contrary to the requirements of section 85(3) of the Civil Procedure Law, the ancillary complaint was not accompanied by authorisation.” 61 .     By a decision of 17 June 2016 (case no.   SKC-1788/2016), the Civil Cases Department of the Supreme Court approved a decision not to accept an appeal lodged by a sworn advocate, even though in that case an order confirming authorisation had been lodged before the first-instance court and the appeal had been accompanied by written authorisation. The Supreme Court reasoned: “[5.3] ... the order [confirming authorisation] certifies not only authorisation per se , but also the special status of a sworn advocate as a person belonging to the judicial system. [5.4] With respect to authorisation of an advocate, as a person belonging to the judicial system, the Civil Procedure Law (section 85(3)) ... provides for a special (in essence, simplified) manner of formalising the authorisation – simple written authorisation, together with an order. The same finding already forms part of the case-law – the Civil Cases Department, in its decision of 26   November 2015 in case no. SKC-2391, when examining the case in an extended composition, indicated that ..., with respect to a sworn advocate, ... simple written authorisation that is supplemented by an order suffices for providing legal assistance. ... [That finding] was made in a case where ... the sworn advocate had only attached an order and had not attached an authorisation from which the court could verify the extent of the authorisation. This fact does not change the finding that both an order and authorisation are required. ... [5.5] It is uncontested that, as with any other individual, the law does not deprive a sworn advocate of the freedom to conclude an agency agreement ... and act outside the framework of his professional activity ... However, in all situations the court has to be able to verify whether, in the particular case, the representative acts as a private person or as a sworn advocate – a person belonging to the judicial system. Besides, in the Civil Cases Department’s view, a change of status within one set of civil proceedings is not justified. [5.6.] The material in the present case clearly indicates that the sworn advocate ... represented the defendant ... before the first-instance court in her professional capacity by providing legal assistance as an advocate. This is confirmed by the authorisation .... concerning representation at all levels of jurisdiction, the order ... concerning legal assistance before the [first-instance court], the procedural action of preparing and signing the appeal, and the order concerning legal assistance before the [appeal court] that is attached to the present ancillary complaint ... [5.7.] The argument ... that when lodging an appeal an advocate acts on the basis of the order issued for the representation before the first-instance court is unfounded. ... [5.8.] Accordingly, in a situation where a sworn advocate wishes to conduct proceedings by legally representing a person as part of [his or her] professional activity, the appeal has to be accompanied by an order concerning representation before the appeal court, in addition to authorisation ...” 62 .     On 27 June 2017 the Civil Cases Department of the Supreme Court delivered a decision in a case (no.   SKC-1299/2017) where an appeal lodged by a sworn advocate had not been accepted because the order attached to it had concerned representation before all levels of jurisdiction and had not specifically mentioned the appeal court. While the Supreme Court noted that the order had been drawn up “in clear contravention of the instructions approved by the Latvian Council of Sworn Advocates” (see paragraph 57 above), it took into account the inconsistent conduct of the appeal court, as several ancillary complaints previously lodged by the same advocate on the basis of the same order had been accepted and examined by that court. For that reason, the Supreme Court annulled the decision. However, it added the following passage: “[5.3.] ... It has to be reiterated here that if the Latvian Council of Sworn Advocates, acting within its competence afforded [by law], has approved instructions which regulate the manner of drawing up the order – the document that confirms the legal status of the advocate – then this internal normative act is binding on all advocates. By ignoring the requirements of the above-mentioned normative act, the sworn advocate ... has put the represented person’s right to a fair trial at risk ... [and] drawing up the order [confirming authorisation] in a manner that does not correspond to the criteria clearly defined by the above-mentioned normative act notably [hinders] the court [in its] duty to verify the advocate’s status and rights to perform procedural actions ...” III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 63.     The relevant international law is set out in X v. Latvia [GC], no.   27853/09, §§ 34-40, ECHR 2013. The most pertinent provisions of the Hague Convention read as follows: Article 3 “The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.” Article 12 “Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.” Article 13 “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.” Article 20 “The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION 64.     The applicant complained that the Latvian courts, when ordering that her daughter should return to Norway, had failed to sufficiently take into account her objections, and had not provided adequate reasoning. Furthermore, the proceedings had been flawed, for the following reasons: before the first-instance court, the applicant had not participated in the hearings and had not been represented by her authorised representative; her application to have an oral hearing during the ancillary-complaint proceedings had been dismissed; she had not been informed of the other party’s written submissions lodged in response to her ancillary complaint; and the final decision taken by the Riga Regional Court had not been sent to her. The applicant relied on Article 6 and Article 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provide: Article 6 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family life... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 65.     The Court reiterates the difference in the nature of the interests protected by Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. While Article 6 affords a procedural safeguard, namely the “right to a court” in the determination of one’s “civil rights and obligations”, Article 8 serves the wider purpose of ensuring proper respect for, inter alia , family life. The difference between the purpose pursued by the respective safeguards afforded by Articles 6 and 8 may, in the light of the particular circumstances, justify the examination of the same set of facts under both Articles (see Sylvester v. Austria , nos.   36812/97 and 40104/98, § 76, 24 April 2003). Where the complaints raised by the applicant are essentially directed against the merits of the decision, the Court may find it more appropriate to examine them under Article 8 (see, for example, R.S. v. Poland , no.   63777/09, §   40, 21 July 2015; Karrer v. Romania , no.   16965/10, §§ 25-26, 21 February 2012; and López Guió v. Slovakia , no.   10280/12, §§ 76-77, 3 June 2014); however, where the complaint more specifically concerns the procedural flaws of the decision-making process, it may proceed with a separate examination under Article 6 (see, for example, Anghel v. Italy , no. 5968/09, §§ 44 and 64, 25   June 2013; H.N. v. Poland , no.   77710/01, §§ 91-95, 13 September 2005; and Hoholm v. Slovakia , no. 35632/13, §§ 45-53, 13 January 2015). 66.     With respect to the present case, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaints of the domestic courts’ failure to have sufficient regard to her objections are directed at the merits of the dispute, and fall to be assessed under Article 8. However, her complaints that there were shortcomings in the proceedings before the domestic courts should be considered under Article 6 of the Convention. A.     Complaints under Article 6 of the Convention 1.     Admissibility 67.     The Government submitted that the proceedings concerning the applicant’s daughter’s return to Norway under the Hague Convention did not fall within the scope of Article 6 of the Convention. In particular, there had been no “dispute” (“ contestation ”) over civil rights or obligations in terms of civil law. Judicial proceedings under the Hague Convention were intended to deal expeditiously with the issue of the wrongful removal of children from the jurisdiction of their habitual residence. They were thus entirely different from any other possible subsequent domestic proceedings dealing with the custody, residence or other needs of a child. In other words, in the present case, the Hague Convention proceedings had not resolved any existing legal dispute between the applicant and S.I.E.A. 68.     The applicant submitted that the Government’s objection did not correspond to the Court’s case-law. 69.     The Court has already had an opportunity to assess Hague Convention proceedings with respect to their compliance with Article 6 of the Convention (see, for example, Anghel , cited above, §§ 44-45, 54-65; Adžić v. Croatia , no. 22643/14, §§ 42-25, 55-67, 12 March 2015; see also H.N. v. Poland , cited above, §§ 90-95; Hoholm , cited above, §§ 39, 45-53; and Deak v. Romania and the United Kingdom , no.   19055/05, §§ 72, 77-78, 3   June 2008). While it is beyond dispute that such proceedings do not determine parental custody and other issues that fall to be resolved by the courts of a person’s country of habitual residence, they do, nonetheless, determine an important dispute as to whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention of a child, and whether there are any obstacles