CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 8 octobre 2019

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RUSSIA   (Application no. 58724/14)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   8 October 2019     FINAL   08/01/2020       This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Zelikha Magomadova v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Helen Keller,   Dmitry Dedov,   María Elósegui,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 58724/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Zelikha Khalitovna Magomadova (“the applicant”), on 26 August 2014. 2.     The applicant was represented by lawyers from the Russian Justice Initiative, a non-governmental organisation based in the Netherlands with offices in Moscow and Ingushetia, and Astreya, a legal assistance organisation based in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G.   Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by Mr V. Galperin, his successor in that office. 3.     The applicant complained, in particular, that the domestic authorities had deprived her of her parental authority, with reference to her lack of contact with the children, which had breached her right to respect for her family life as provided for in Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 24 August 2015 the application was granted priority treatment under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 5 .     On 3 November 2015 the Government were given notice of the above-mentioned complaints and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in the village of Ishcherskaya in the Chechen Republic. 7.     The applicant was married to M.B., a police officer, who died on duty in June 2006. They had five daughters: E., born in 1997; I., born in 1999; T., born in 2000; El., born in 2002, and Ir., born in 2003. They also had a son, R., who was born in 2006, three months after M.B.’s death. A.     Background events 8 .     After M.B.’s death the applicant continued living with their children in his privately owned house in the village of Betty-Mokh in the Chechen Republic, in close proximity to her late husband’s relatives. According to the applicant, those relatives put pressure on her in an attempt to take possession of M.B.’s house and the regular payments from the State to which she was entitled as a result of losing the breadwinner in her family. In particular, according to the applicant, M.B.’s father forced her to give him a power of attorney to enable him to receive those payments on her behalf, with the result that the applicant had to ask him for money to support her children. 9 .     On 15 February 2010 the applicant had an altercation with E.B., M.B.’s brother, who hit her on the head several times, inflicting a craniocerebral injury. On the same day, E.B. took the applicant to her mother’s place of residence in the village of Ishcherskaya and left her there. The applicant was thus separated from her children. According to her, her late husband’s relatives took away her identity documents, including her passport, and her mobile telephone and personal belongings. They stated that she would get her passport back only if she renounced her parental authority in respect of her children, who remained living with M.B.’s relatives – each of M.B.’s brothers kept one of the applicant’s children. 10.     In the applicant’s submission, such a situation came about because she had no male relatives of her own. 11.     The applicant has had no access to her children since 15 February 2010. 12 .     On 20 March 2010 the applicant complained in writing to a district prosecutor’s office about the above-mentioned events. She also sought protection from law-enforcement agencies, stating that M.B.’s relatives had threatened her with physical violence. On 16 June 2010 she sent a similar complaint to the Representative for Human Rights in the Chechen Republic. It does not appear that any action was taken in respect of those complaints. 13.     On 20 April 2010 the applicant was issued with a medical certificate confirming that she had had a craniocerebral injury in 2010. B.     First set of proceedings for deprivation of parental authority and determination of the children’s place of residence 14 .     By an administrative decision of 14 April 2010, E.B. was appointed legal guardian of the applicant’s children. According to the applicant, she never consented to that decision and was unaware of it. 15.     On 27 April 2010 E.B. filed a court claim for the applicant to be deprived of her parental authority in respect of the children, stating that she had grossly neglected her parental duties towards them. In particular, he claimed that she had failed to bring them up properly and provide food and adequate living conditions for them, and that she had ill-treated them. He also stated that the applicant had abandoned the children in February 2010, as she had moved to the village of Ishcherskaya, where she had been living ever since. 16 .     The applicant filed a counterclaim, complaining that her late husband’s relatives had prevented contact between her and her children. She challenged the administrative decision of 14 April 2010 (see paragraph 14 above) and sought to have it established that her children should reside with her at her current address in the village of Ishcherskaya. 17 .     On 10 August 2010 the Naurskiy District Court examined the case. 18 .     At the hearing on 10 August 2010 the applicant maintained her claim, arguing that her late husband’s relatives wished for her to be deprived of her parental authority only because they wanted to appropriate the payments to which she and her children were entitled as a result of the loss of M.B., the only breadwinner in their family. She contended that they had started those proceedings after she had annulled the power of attorney enabling them to obtain money on her behalf. The applicant described the incident of 15 February 2010 (see paragraph 9 above), and pointed out that on that date M.B.’s relatives had separated her from her children and had not allowed any contact between them since. She also said that they were trying to turn the children against her, stating that she was a bad mother and that she was immoral, as she had liaisons with unknown men. The applicant mentioned that she had had to swear on the Koran before her late husband’s relatives that she was not having any such liaisons. She further insisted that she loved her children, that she wanted them to live with her, and that she would not cease in her attempts to get them back. 19.     Representatives from two district custody and guardianship agencies stated that they had no evidence that the applicant had neglected her parental duties or had been unable to bring her children up for any reason, and therefore there were no grounds to deprive her of her parental authority, and such a measure would not be in the children’s interests. 20 .     The Naurskiy District Court also ordered and examined a psychological examination and report on the applicant’s children, which stated that their continued separation from their mother was a deeply traumatising event for them, causing them anxiety and stress. The report went on to note that, instinctively, the children maintained positive emotions with regard to their mother, and needed her love and care. The examination also revealed the children’s lack of emotional attachment to their late father’s relatives; they did not perceive those people as their family members. At the hearing, the expert confirmed the findings of the report. 21 .     The Naurskiy District Court then rejected E.B.’s arguments that the applicant had failed to fulfil her parental obligations, noting the absence of any evidence proving those allegations. It also found that there were no grounds to deprive the applicant of her parental authority in respect of her six children, and dismissed E.B.’s claim. The court further granted the applicant’s counterclaim, annulled the administrative decision of 14 April 2010 by which E.B. had been appointed the children’s legal guardian, and ordered that the children should reside with the applicant at her address in Ishcherskaya. 22 .     On 14 September 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment of 10 August 2010 on appeal. C.     Enforcement proceedings 23 .     Two writs of execution were issued on 10 August 2010; it appears that the first one ordered that the applicant’s children should reside at her home address, and the second one ordered that E.B.’s legal guardianship in respect of the applicant’s children should be annulled. 24.     The applicant’s attempt to get access to her children proved futile, as M.B.’s relatives refused to comply with the above-mentioned court decisions. 25 .     On 10 March 2011 the applicant wrote to the Bailiffs Service of the Chechen Republic, complaining about her inability to get access to her children, and seeking enforcement of the judgment of 10 August 2010, as upheld on appeal on 14 September 2010. 26 .     By a decision of 22 March 2011 the Bailiffs Service of the Nozhay ‑ Yurt District of the Chechen Republic (“the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service”) refused to institute enforcement proceedings and returned the first writ of execution to the applicant. It stated that the writ of execution submitted by the applicant did not meet the relevant requirements of the domestic legislation on the enforcement of court decisions, and, more specifically, the operative part of the judgment of 10 August 2010 “[did not] contain any requirements as regards there being an obligation on the defendant to transfer to the claimant property or monetary sums, or to perform certain actions or abstain from performing them”. 27 .     On 26 May 2011 the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service took a similar decision with regard to the second writ of execution, citing the same reasons. 28 .     On 15 June 2011 the applicant sent a written application to the Naurskiy District Court. She pointed to the bailiffs’ arbitrary refusals to enforce the judgment of 10 August 2010 in so far as it concerned the order that her children were to reside at her address and the annulment of E.B.’s legal guardianship in respect of the children, and asked the court to clarify its judgment of 10 August 2010 accordingly. 29 .     On 13 July 2011 the applicant sent a similar application to the Naurskiy District Court, complaining that she had received no response to her previous application and that the judgment of 10 August 2010 remained unenforced. It does not appear that the applicant received any reply in respect of her applications. 30 .     According to the Government, the bailiff in charge had no formal grounds to refuse to enforce the judgment, and therefore he should be held liable in disciplinary proceedings; however, the time-limit for disciplining him had expired by the time the Government submitted their observations, therefore on 4 February 2016 he was dismissed from the bailiffs service. On 11 February 2016 the prosecutor’s office of the Nozhay-Yurt District of the Chechen Republic sent the material used in the check on the bailiff to a relevant investigative department, for further investigation and, if necessary, the institution of criminal proceedings against him for the unlawful refusal to enforce the judgment in the applicant’s favour. D.     Reopening of the case owing to newly discovered circumstances 31 .     On 17 June 2011, at E.B.’s request, the Naurskiy District Court quashed its judgment of 10 August 2010, with reference to “newly discovered circumstances”, stating as follows: “When the court gave its judgment [of 10 August 2010], it was unaware of the fact that [the applicant] cohabited with an unemployed man with no specific place of residence, and that she spent on him all the money given to her by the State to support her children because of the loss of the breadwinner in their family. [E.B.] was also unaware of that fact at the moment when the judgment [of 10 August 2010] was given. In order to support his application, [E.B.] has adduced statements of persons who can confirm that [the applicant] leads an incorrect (immoral) life. In such circumstances, the court considers that [E. B.’s] application is well founded and should be granted”. 32 .     The court thus ordered that the proceedings be reopened. 33.     On 30 June 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 17   June 2011 before a higher court. She stated that the information that she cohabited with a man was false, and that, in any event, such information could not be regarded as “newly discovered circumstances” within the meaning of the relevant provisions of domestic law on civil procedure. 34 .     By a decision of 26 August 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision of 17 June 2011 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Naurskiy District Court. E.     Second set of proceedings for deprivation of parental authority and determination of the children’s place of residence 1.     Psychological examination 35.     In the context of the new set of proceedings, the Naurskiy District Court ordered a psychological examination of the applicant’s three elder daughters. 36 .     In a report of 24 January 2012 the relevant experts stated that at that time the children had a clearly negative attitude towards their mother. It went on to say that the girls felt comfortable and safe living with their uncle, E.   B., and that taking them out of their habitual environment might traumatise them, as adapting to new living conditions and a different environment might be quite painful. At the same time the report stated that the examination had established that there was a lack of emotional bonds between the children and the relatives they were currently living with; the children did not identify them as family members. 37 .     The report further stated that attempts to forcibly rupture the natural links between the children and their mother might result in detrimental effects that would negatively influence the children’s future life, and that the applicant, as their mother, should have unimpeded access to them. 2.     Proceedings before the court 38.     At a hearing, E.B. stated that the applicant had not taken care of her children and had led an immoral life, and that she had been seen in cars with one man and with another man at a late hour. According to him, in February 2010 he had seen her in a car with a man, had had an altercation with her, and had taken her to her mother, in the village of Ishcherskaya. In E.B.’s submission, the applicant would spend the payments which she received for the loss of the breadwinner in her family on herself, whereas it was he who had supported her children financially. He also stated that since the judgment of 10 August 2010, as upheld on 14 September 2010, the applicant had not taken any steps to reunite with the children; she had come to the village where they lived several times, but had not made any attempts to see them, which, in E.B.’s view, revealed that she had neglected her parental obligations. 39 .     The applicant lodged a counterclaim, asking the court to determine that her children should reside with her and to annul E.B.’s guardianship in respect of them. At the hearing, she reiterated her statements made in the proceedings of 2010 (see paragraph 18 above). She also added that she had been unable to see her children after the judgment of 10 August 2010, as upheld on 14 September 2010, as all her attempts to have it enforced had proved futile – the bailiffs service had refused to take any steps with a view to enforcing it. She submitted that she had gone to the village where her late husband’s relatives and her children lived, but had been afraid of visiting her children because of her late husband’s relatives’ threats; she had already been beaten by E.B., who had prohibited her from coming to their village. As she had no male relatives of her own, she had gone there with people who had given her a lift. 40.     The court also heard a number of witnesses for the applicant and those who made statements against her, as well as representatives from district custody and guardianship agencies and a public prosecutor. It also heard the applicant’s three elder daughters, who explained that they had a highly negative attitude towards their mother because she had not taken proper care of them, had led an “incorrect” life, and had abandoned them two years earlier. They also expressed their wish to stay with their uncle, E.B. 3.     Judgment of 31 January 2012 41 .     On 31 January 2012 the Naurskiy District Court examined the case. 42 .     It found the allegation concerning the applicant’s immoral life unconvincing, stating that the fact that certain witnesses had seen her in a car with strangers who had given her a lift on several occasions could not be considered evidence of her immorality. The court further noted that, in any event, Article 69 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 73 below) contained an exhaustive list of grounds for depriving a parent of his or her parental authority, and immorality was not on that list. 43 .     The Naurskiy District Court also found that, in the absence of any reliable evidence to that effect, it had not been proved that the applicant had ever avoided her parental duties in respect of her children. It critically assessed the statements of the applicant’s three elder daughters, noting that for the last two years they had been living with E.B. and had had no contact with their mother. The court therefore rejected E.B.’s claim to have the applicant deprived of her parental authority in respect of her children. 44 .     With reference to the report of 24   January 2012 (see paragraphs 36 ‑ 37 above), the court further observed that, given the fact that by that point the children had been living with E.B. for two years and felt comfortable living with his family, it would be in their best interests to continue living with their uncle. The applicant shared that view, stating that because of her children’s extremely hostile attitude towards her, she might have difficulties in communicating with them, and therefore she would not object if they stayed with E.B. At the same time, she asked the court to determine her contact rights with her children, so that she could take them to her home address twice a month, as well as on public and school holidays. 45 .     The court therefore ordered that the applicant’s children should continue living at E.B.’s place of residence and that his legal guardianship in respect of them should be maintained. It further ordered that the applicant should have a right to take her children to her place of residence on the first and last weekend of the month, from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 4 p.m. on Sunday, and during public holidays, from 10 a.m. on that day until 10 a.m. on the next day. The court also ordered E.B. not to obstruct the applicant’s contact with her children. 46 .     The judgment of 31 January 2012 was not appealed against and became final and enforceable on 1 March 2012. F.     Enforcement proceedings 47 .     Between 2 April and 30 July 2012 the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a writ of execution from the Naurskiy District Court. 48 .     On 6 June 2012 the applicant complained in writing to the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic about the Naurskiy District Court’s failure to issue her with a writ of execution. She mentioned her numerous attempts to obtain the writ of execution, and stated that, in the absence of that document, she was unable to have the judgment of 31 January 2012 executed, as E.B. refused to comply with it. 49.     On 20 June 2012 the Naurskiy District Court issued the writ, but it was not given to the applicant until 30 July 2012. She immediately submitted it to the competent bailiffs service for enforcement. 50 .     The enforcement proceedings commenced on 6 August 2012. 51 .     According to the Government, on 27 August 2012 a bailiff from the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service obtained a written declaration from E.B. confirming that he would not prevent the applicant’s contact with her children; E.B. was informed that he could receive an administrative punishment if he failed to comply with the judgment of 31 January 2012. A   copy of the relevant document was not submitted to the Court. 52 .     On 13 September 2012 the applicant sent a complaint concerning the bailiffs’ inactivity and failure to enforce the judgment of 31 January 2012 to the Bailiffs Service of the Chechen Republic. She complained in particular that on numerous occasions, over the telephone and in person, she had asked the bailiff in charge to ensure that the judgment was executed and to accompany her to the village where the children lived and assist her in establishing contact with them. However, the bailiff had not accompanied her even once; he had merely referred to the fact that he had imposed an obligation on E.B. not to obstruct her contact with her children, and had invited her to seek the assistance of local custody and guardianship agencies in resolving the matter, stating that there was nothing else he could do. 53 .     On 8 May 2013 the applicant sent a similar complaint to the Bailiffs Service of Russia. She again described the bailiffs’ inactivity and her numerous requests to have the judgment enforced. 54 .     By a decision of 18 June 2013 the chief bailiff of the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service rejected as unfounded a complaint made by the applicant on the same day regarding the bailiffs’ inactivity. In his decision, the chief bailiff stated in particular that the applicant’s request that the bailiff provide her with assistance in securing her contact with the children on weekends and public holidays, as determined by the relevant judgment, was in conflict with the relevant legislation, which provided that at weekends and on public holidays, enforcement action could only be taken in exceptional circumstances. 55.     On 9 December 2013 the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service terminated the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 31 January 2012 on the grounds that that judgment had been annulled. 56 .     According to the Government, on 12 February 2016 the prosecutor’s office of the Nozhay-Yurt District of the Chechen Republic (“the prosecutor’s office”) lodged an objection ( протест ) against the decision of 9 December 2013 with the acting chief bailiff of the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service. The prosecutor’s office pointed out in particular that although the bailiff in charge had terminated the relevant enforcement proceedings with reference to the annulment of the judgment of 31 January 2012, there was no court decision on the annulment of that judgment in the case file, nor was there any other relevant court decision, therefore terminating the enforcement proceedings had been unlawful. Following that objection, on 18 February 2016 the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service resumed the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 31 January 2012. On the same date the Nozhay-Yurt Bailiffs Service sent an application to the Nozhay-Yurt District Court, asking it to terminate the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 31 January 2012, in view of the conflict between that judgment and the judgment of 3 October 2013 (see paragraphs 62-65 below). The outcome of that application is unknown. G.     Deprivation of parental authority 57.     On an unspecified date in July 2013 E.B. filed a new claim with the Naurskiy District Court, asking for the applicant to be deprived of her parental authority in respect of her children. He stated that she had not contacted her children in over three years, nor had she participated in their upbringing or supported them financially. 1.     Proceedings before the first-instance court 58.     At the relevant hearing, E.B., two representatives from the custody and guardianship agencies concerned and a public prosecutor insisted that the applicant should be deprived of her parental authority. They argued that since the judgment of 31 January 2012 the applicant had not made any attempts to contact her children, including her two elder daughters who no longer lived with E.B., as they had moved to Grozny for their studies. The applicant had not attempted to meet the other children at school or seek the assistance of the relevant custody and guardianship agencies in order to get access to her children. E.B. also stated that the children did not want to see their mother, as “she [had] dishonoured them” with her immoral life. 59 .     The applicant contended that since her late husband’s relatives had forced her to leave in 2010 she had not seen her children and had had no influence on them. After the judgment of 31 January 2012 had become enforceable she had repeatedly sought the bailiffs’ assistance, asking for help in organising a meeting with the children, but the bailiff in charge had refused to accompany her to the village where her children lived, and she herself had been afraid to go there on her own because of her husband’s relatives’ threats of physical violence. She further stated that since M.B.’s relatives had set her children against her, her attempts to contact her two elder daughters at a medical college in Grozny, where they were studying, had proved unsuccessful, as the girls had simply refused to talk to her. The applicant firmly insisted that she had never avoided her parental obligations, nor had she ever refused to bring her children up; she reaffirmed her intention to maintain a relationship with them. 60.     P., the bailiff in charge, stated that he had duly instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 31 January 2012, and that he had met the applicant once and had explained to her the manner in which that judgment should be executed. He had also obtained a written declaration from E.B. in which the latter had promised not to obstruct the applicant’s contact with her children. The bailiff added that the applicant should have come to Nozhay-Yurt so that he could enforce the judgment, but she had only come there once and had stayed for five minutes, thus denying him sufficient opportunity to enforce the judgment. 61 .     The court called and examined the applicant’s two elder daughters, who reiterated their statements made in the proceedings of 2012. They submitted in particular that they did not wish to see the applicant, as she “[had] brought shame on them by having relations with unknown men”. 2.     Judgment of 3 October 2013 62 .     On 3 October 2013 the Naurskiy District Court examined the case. 63 .     The court was not convinced by the applicant’s argument that the bailiff had failed to facilitate the contact with the children which had been determined by the judgment of 31 January 2012. It stated: that the applicant could have attempted to meet them at school or, as far as her two elder daughters were concerned, at medical college; that she could have sought the assistance of local custody and guardianship agencies; and that she could have supported the children financially, as she received payments from the State for that purpose. The court went on to note that since the judgment of 31 January 2012 the applicant had failed to do any of those things, which, in the court’s view, indicated that she had avoided bringing up her children. 64.     The Naurskiy District Court also referred to the opinion of the applicant’s two elder daughters (see paragraph 61 above). It noted that although it had given the applicant time to improve the situation, a year and a half later her children’s hostile attitude towards her had not evolved. 65 .     The court thus found that E.B.’s claim should be granted, as the applicant had “avoided bringing up her children”, and therefore she should be deprived of her parental authority, in accordance with Article 69 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 73 below). It also ordered that she should pay child maintenance to support her children, and that it should be paid to E.B., the children’s legal guardian. 3.     Appeal proceedings 66 .     On 25 February 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Russian Family Code 1.     Legal provisions concerning the protection of children’s rights 67.     Every child, that is a person under the age of eighteen, has a right to live and be brought up in a family, in so far as this is possible, a right to know his or her parents, a right to be cared for, and a right to live with his or her parents, except where this is contrary to his or her interests. A child has a right to be brought up by his or her parents, a right to the protection of his or her interests, a right to full development, and a right to respect for his or her human dignity (Article   54). 68.     A child has a right to maintain contact with his parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters and other relatives (Article 55   §   1). 69 .     A child is entitled to express his or her opinion on all family matters concerning him or her, including in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings. The opinion of a child over ten years old must be taken into account, except where it is contrary to his or her interests (Article 57). 2.     Legal provisions concerning parents’ rights and obligations 70.     Parents’ right to bring up their children has precedence over any other person’s right to do so (Article 63   §   1). 71.     A parent living separately from his or her child has a right to personal contact with the child, and a right to participate in the child’s upbringing and decide on questions relating to the child’s education. The parent with whom the child lives shall not obstruct the child’s contact with the other parent, unless such contact may harm the child’s physical and mental health and spiritual development (Article 66   §   1). 72.     Parents have a right to seek the return of their child from any person who retains the child, where such retention is not based on law or is not in accordance with a court decision. In the event of a dispute, parents are entitled to file a court claim for the protection of their rights. When examining that claim, the court, with due regard to the child’s opinion, is entitled to reject the claim if it finds that transferring the child to the parents would be contrary to the child’s interests (Article   68   §   1). 73 .     Parents may be deprived of their parental authority if they: avoid their parental obligations, such as an obligation to pay child maintenance; refuse to collect the child from the maternity hospital, or any other medical, educational, social or similar facility; abuse their parental authority; mistreat the child by resorting to physical or psychological violence or sexual abuse; suffer from chronic alcohol or drug abuse; or commit a premeditated criminal offence against the life or health of their child or spouse (Article   69). 74.     Parents who have been deprived of their parental authority lose all rights based on their kinship with the child in respect of whom they have been deprived of their parental authority, as well as the right to receive child welfare benefits and allowances paid by the State (Article 71   §   1). B.     Court practice 75 .     In its ruling no. 10 on courts’ application of legislation when resolving disputes concerning the upbringing of children, dated 27 May 1998, as amended on 6 February 2007, the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Russia stated, in particular: “... 11.     Only in the event of their guilty conduct may parents be deprived of their parental authority by a court on the grounds established in Article 69 of the [Russian Family Code]. ... 12.     ... Persons who do not fulfil their parental obligations as a result of a combination of adverse circumstances, or for other reasons beyond their control, cannot be deprived of their parental authority (for instance, [where a person has] a psychiatric or other chronic disease ...) ... 13.     Courts should keep in mind that deprivation of parental authority is a measure of last resort. Exceptionally, where a parent’s guilty conduct has been proved, a court, with due regard to [that parent’s] conduct, personality and other specific circumstances, may reject an action for [him or her] to be deprived of his or her parental authority and urge [him or her] to alter [his or her] attitude towards bringing up [his or her] children, entrusting [a competent] custody and guardianship agency with monitoring whether [that parent] duly performs [his or her] parental duties.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 76.     The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had deprived her of her parental authority, with reference to her lack of contact with the children, which had breached her right to respect for her family life as provided for in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A.     Admissibility 77.     The Government pointed out that the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, as in force at the relevant time, had established a two-tier cassation appeal procedure for appealing against court decisions taken at the first two levels of jurisdiction, which had been recognised by the Court as an effective remedy in the case of Abramyan and Others v. Russia ((dec.), nos.   38951/13 and 59611/13, 12 May 2015). They thus argued that, by failing to lodge cassation appeals against the lower courts’ decisions, the applicant had failed to exhaust the effective domestic remedies available to her. 78.     With reference to the case of Kocherov and Sergeyeva (no.   16899/13, 29 March 2016), the applicant argued that when she had lodged her application with the Court she had not known that it would consider the new cassation procedure an effective remedy. She pointed out that she had lodged her application in August 2014, whereas the Court’s inadmissibility decision in the case of Abramyan and Others ((dec.), cited above) had only been delivered in May 2015. 79.     The Court has rejected similar objections by the respondent Government in many cases where applicants had lodged their applications before the Court had pronounced its decision in the case of Abramyan and Others ((dec.), cited above; see, for example, Novruk and Others v. Russia , nos.   31039/11 and 4 others, §§ 70-76, 15 March 2016; Kocherov and Sergeyeva , cited above, §§ 64-69; McIlwrath v. Russia , no. 60393/13, §§   85-95, 18 July 2017; Elita Magomadova v. Russia , no. 77546/14, §§   40 ‑ 44, 10 April 2018; and Khusnutdinov and X v. Russia , no. 76598/12, §§ 65-66, 18 December 2018). 80.     The Court does not discern any reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The applicant lodged her application with the Court on 26   August 2014, that is before the Court recognised the reformed two-tier cassation appeal procedure as an effective remedy (see Abramyan and Others (dec.), cited above, §§ 76-96). She can no longer avail herself of the remedy in question, as the time-limit for using it has expired. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s objection as to non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies. 81 .     The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Scope of the case 82 .     The Court considers it necessary to clarify at the outset that its examination of the case is limited to the part which has been declared admissible (see paragraphs 5 and 81 above), more specifically, the applicant’s being deprived of her parental authority by the judgment of 3   October 2013, as upheld on appeal on 25 February 2014. However, in order to get a broader view of the developments in the applicant’s case and properly consider the above-mentioned proceedings, the Court has to put them into their context, which inevitably means to some extent having regard to the earlier events as set out in paragraphs 8-56 above (see Jovanovic v. Sweden , no. 10592/12, § 73, 22 October 2015, and Lorenz v.   Austria , no. 11537/11, § 42, 20 July 2017). 2.     Deprivation of parental authority (a)     Submissions by the parties (i)     The applicant 83.     The applicant argued that depriving her of her parental authority in respect of her children had completely severed her ties with them, and had constituted an unjustified interference with her right to respect for her private life. 84.     The applicant contended, in particular, that the measure in question had not been in accordance with the law. She pointed out that Article 69 of the Russian Family Code established an exhaustive list of grounds for depriving a parent of his or her parental authority (see paragraph 73 above). Moreover, in its ruling no. 10 of 27 May 1998, as amended on 6 February 2007, the Supreme Court of Russia had clearly stated that deprivation of parental authority might only take place in the event of a parent’s guilty conduct (see paragraph 75 above). She insisted that she had never neglected or avoided her parental obligations, and that, contrary to the findings of the domestic courts which had determined that she was responsible for not maintaining contact with her children, the lack of contact had been the result of her being continually and arbitrarily denied access to her children, rather than her avoiding her parental obligations. Moreover, the courts had failed to demonstrate that there had been any guilty conduct on her part. Thus, in the applicant’s view, there had been no basis in the national law for depriving her of her parental authority. 85.     The applicant further argued that the interference in question had not been necessary in a democratic society. In particular, it had been too drastic a measure, as it had effectively and permanently curtailed her relations with her children. The authorities had not considered any less intrusive alternative measure, and had not taken into consideration the best interests of the children. As regards their best interests, the applicant relied on the findings of psychological reports in respect of the children carried out in the context of the proceedings in 2010 and 2012 (see paragraphs 20 and 36-37 above), which clearly showed that the children needed their mother’s love and care, that the rupture of the natural ties between them and the applicant could provoke detrimental effects that would negatively influence their life, and that the applicant should have unimpeded access to them. Thus, depriving her of her parental authority had clearly not been in the children’s best interests. 86.     The applicant admitted that in view of the fact that she had been denied contact with her children for a prolonged period, she had needed time to gradually re-establish her emotional ties with them; to that end, she had needed to be able to visit her children and spend time with them. Not only had depriving her of her parental authority not served that purpose, but it had only further alienated her from the children, in fact extinguishing any remaining family relations between them. 87.     The applicant further argued that the domestic courts had failed to adduce “relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify the measure complained of. In particular, the courts had not been justified in holding her responsible for the failure to maintain contact with her children, and in relying on this fact as evidence that she had avoided her parental obligations. She stressed that ever since she had been forcibly separated from her children by her late husband’s relatives, she had consistently sought access to the children and their return. In all three sets of court proceedings, as well as in two sets of enforcement proceedings, she had consistently informed the authorities of the conflict between her and her late husband’s relatives, their hostile attitude towards her, and the fact that they had set the children against her and completely excluded her from their life by obstructing all contact, including telephone calls. Despite all her efforts, the authorities had remained totally idle and had failed to take any measures with a view to facilitating contact between her and the children. In particular, neither the judgment of 10   August 2010 nor that of 31 January 2012 had ever been enforced, despite the applicant’s numerous requests to that end. Moreover, in the third set of proceedings that had taken place in 2013, in which she had been deprived of her parental authority, the domestic courts had held her responsible for the lack of contact between her and the children. She argued that that finding had not been based on an adequate assessment of the facts, and that the domestic courts had not struck a fair balance. 88 .     Lastly, the applicant argued that the decision-making process had been severely compromised, as the domestic courts had failed to seek and obtain the opinion of all of her children. She pointed out that only her two elder daughters had been heard in the proceedings of 2013. However, her four other children – T., born in 2000; El., born 2002; Ir., born in 2003, and R., born in 2006 – had been mature enough to express their opinions in the proceedings in question, as the question of depriving their mother of her parental authority had clearly affected their right to respect for their family life. In that regard, she relied on the case of N.Ts. and Others v.   Georgia (no. 71776/12, 2 February 2016). Moreover, two of her daughters – T. and El., aged thirteen and eleven at the relevant time – had not been heard, in breach of Article 57 of the Russian Family Code, which provided that the opinion of a child over ten years old should be taken into account (see paragraph 69 above). She also submitted that relevant psychological or psychiatric examinations by independent experts should have been carried out in respect of all six children. In the absence of knowledge of the views of all the children, it had been inevitable that any consideration of their best interests would be inadequate and one-sided. (ii)     The Government 89.     The Government acknowledged that depriving the applicant of her parental authority in respect of her children had constituted an interference with her right to respect for her family life secured by Article 8   §   1 of the Convention; however, in their view, it had been justified under the second paragraph of that Article. In particular, it had had a basis in domestic law, more specifically, it had been based on Articles of the Russian Family Code which the domestic courts had relied on in their relevant decisions, Article   69 in particular. It had also pursued the aim of the protection of the children’s rights. 90.     In the Government’s view, the measure complained of had furthermore been “necessary in a democratic society”; it had been proportionate and had taken the children’s best interests into account. They argued in particular that, under the Court’s well-established case-law, the national courts were better placed to assess the relevance and substance of the evidence before them, including witnesses’ statements. In that connection, the Government pointed out that in its judgment of 3 October 2013, the first-instance court had taken into account: the witness statements of E.B., who had stated that after her husband’s death the applicant had not taken care of her children, had not supported them financially, had led an immoral life, and had not made any attempts to see her children after the judgment of 31 January 2012; the witness statements of the applicant, who had acknowledged that her children did not wish to have any contact with her; and the witness statements of the applicant’s two elder daughters, who had expressed their wish to continue living with their uncle, E.B., and not to have any contact with the applicant. The court had also taken into account the fact that for more than a year an