CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 23 janvier 2020

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UKRAINE (Application no. 2053/09)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 23 January 2020   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Golovko v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 17 December 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 2053/09) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Oleg Ivanovych Golovko (“the applicant”), on 26   December 2008. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr O.M. Pokhyl, a lawyer practising in Kobelyaky. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been ill-treated by the police in violation of Article 3 of the Convention and that there had been no effective domestic investigation into the matter. He also complained that he had not had a fair trial contrary to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). 4.     On 19 April 2018 notice of the above complaints was given to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Gorishni Plavni (named Komsomolsk at the material time). Background 6.     At the time of the events the applicant owned a small scrap metal company. 7 .     On 16 September 2000 Ko., a private entrepreneur who, like the applicant, was involved in a local scrap metal business, was shot several times near his home in Komsomolsk. His wounds were assessed as being of moderate gravity. The applicant’s arrest, and administrative-offence proceedings against him 8 .     On 4 February 2003, at about 7 p.m., the applicant was arrested. According to the police report (see paragraph 9 below), he was arrested for swearing while drunk in public, which was classified as an administrative (minor) offence of petty hooliganism. As indicated by officials from the Kremenchuk Unit of the Poltava Regional Department for Combatting Organised Crime (“the UBOZ”) when they were subsequently questioned by the prosecution authorities, on 4   February   2003 they had received “operational information” that the applicant and one of his acquaintances, Pi., might have been involved in the assault on Ko. (see paragraph 7 above). The UBOZ officers stated that they had had a conversation with the applicant and Pi. on that day, and that those men had immediately confessed (see paragraphs 53 and 54 below). 9 .     The police drew up a report on the applicant’s commission of an administrative offence. Although it was formally dated 4 February 2003, the applicant alleged that it had been issued on 5 February 2003. The report contained a handwritten note (written by the applicant) stating that he admitted swearing in public and regretted his actions. According to the applicant, he was forced to write that and sign the report as a result of his ill-treatment (see paragraph 14 below). 10 .     On 5 February 2003 a judge of the Kremenchuk Kryukivskyy District Court found the applicant guilty of petty hooliganism on account of his actions as reported by the police, and sentenced him to ten days’ administrative detention. 11.     On 21 March 2003 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (“the Regional Court”) quashed the above judgment on the grounds that it was poorly reasoned and the overall examination of the case had been formalistic and incomplete. The appellate court also noted that, although administrative detention was an exceptional penalty, its application in the applicant’s case had not been explained. The case was remitted to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 12.     On 20   May 2003 the Kremenchuk Kryukivskyy District Court discontinued the administrative-offence proceedings against the applicant as time-barred. In its reasoning, it mentioned that the applicant’s guilt had been fully established. 13.     On 24 July 2003 the Regional Court upheld that decision, but deleted the part concerning the applicant’s guilt. Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant, domestic investigation into the matter, and developments concerning the applicant’s health 14 .     According to the applicant, he was subjected to serious ill-treatment by the police after his arrest (see paragraph 8 above). He provided the following account of the events. At about 7.40 p.m. on 4 February 2003 he was taken to the UBOZ, where police officers suggested that he confess to having ordered Ko.’s murder. They stated that the applicant’s acquaintance Pi. had been arrested earlier on that day and had confessed to having shot Ko. upon the applicant’s instructions. The applicant refused to admit his involvement. The police officers handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back, and put a gas mask on him, covering the eye area. Thereafter, the applicant was thrown to the floor face down. One of the officers pressed down on his back and another did the same to his feet. The applicant tried to get up and was kicked several times. Ringlike conductors were placed on his fingertips and he was subjected to electric shocks. The pain increased and decreased periodically. The applicant stated that, having succumbed to the torture, which had lasted until the morning of 5 February 2003, he had agreed to write a   “statement of surrender to the police”, which had been dictated by the investigator. He had had light red linear marks around one finger on both hands, which had disappeared several days later. 15 .     According to the applicant, on 5 February 2003, once he was represented by D., the lawyer suggested to him by the investigator (see paragraph 56 below), he informed that lawyer about his ill-treatment. However, D. persuaded the applicant not to complain. 16 .     On 6 February 2003 the applicant asked to talk to the Komsomolsk town prosecutor in private. When provided with that opportunity, he complained that the police had given him electric shocks, and showed his fingers to the prosecutor. When the prosecutor was subsequently questioned about that event in the context of the investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 41 and 50 below in particular), on one occasion he stated that he had seen ringlike marks on the applicant’s fingers. On another occasion he stated that he had not seen anything. On yet another occasion the prosecutor stated that he had seen some linear marks around the applicant’s fingers which had looked like they had been caused by pressure from a fingernail. The prosecutor also stated that during their conversation on 6 February 2003 he had asked the applicant whether being subjected to electric shocks had influenced his statements, and the applicant had replied in the negative. The prosecutor undertook to arrange for a forensic medical examination of the applicant. 17 .     According to the applicant, his conversation with the prosecutor was interrupted by D., the lawyer, who tried to dissuade the applicant from raising any complaints. 18.     On the same day the applicant’s wife complained to the Kremenchuk city prosecutor’s office and numerous other authorities that the administrative-offence charge against her husband had been fabricated and that he was being arbitrarily detained. She stated that neither she nor the lawyer whom she had hired on the day after the applicant’s arrest (see paragraph 55 below) had been allowed to see the applicant. However, her husband had been able to inform her, through some unidentified persons, that the police had forced him to confess to an attempted murder by giving him electric shocks. 19 .     Later, on 6 February 2003 an expert from the Kremenchuk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations examined the applicant and issued the following report (no. 182): “To establish the severity of injuries. Circumstances of the case: according to the subject, he was arrested by the police on 4 February 2003 on suspicion of an administrative offence. No police officers inflicted any injuries on him during the arrest. Likewise, thereafter nobody inflicted any injuries on him. Complaints: none. Objectively: no objective signs of injuries at the moment of the examination, the subject being fully undressed. Conclusion: No objective signs of injuries at the moment of the forensic medical examination.” 20 .     One of the police officers who had allegedly been involved in the applicant’s ill-treatment was present during the examination. 21 .     On 13   February 2003 the applicant was transferred to the Komsomolsk Temporary Detention Facility (the “ITT”), where he was examined by doctors as part of the standard admission procedure, and no bodily injuries were reported. 22.     On 19   February 2003 the applicant complained to the Poltava regional prosecutor’s office that he had been ill-treated, providing the account of events summarised in paragraph 14 above. He reiterated that complaint to the investigator during the reconstruction of the events on 5   March 2003 (see paragraph 65 below). 23 .     On 5 March 2003 the Poltava regional prosecutor’s office issued a ruling in respect of the applicant’s complaint, refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. In particular, the prosecutor relied on the report on the applicant’s forensic medical examination of 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 19 above). 24.     On 20 March 2003 the investigator ordered another forensic medical examination of the applicant at the Kremenchuk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations, with a view to answering the following questions: (1) whether the applicant had any injuries and, if so, what was the nature, location, origin and severity of those injuries; and (2) whether there were any objective signs indicating that he might have been subjected to electric shocks. 25.     The applicant requested that the investigator entrust the examination to a bureau in a different region, but to no avail. The applicant’s arguments were as follows: he did not trust the Kremenchuk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations, because during the examination on 6 February 2003 an expert from that bureau had disregarded the marks from electric wires which had been on his fingers (see paragraph 19 above). 26 .     On 15 April 2003 the same expert who had examined the applicant on 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 19 above) issued expert opinion no. 453, this time without examining the applicant. The text of the report contained a brief overview of the charges against the applicant. It mentioned the fact that he had been examined at the Kremenchuk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations on 6 February 2003 and noted: “[The applicant’s] forensic medical examination did not discover ... any objective signs of injuries or any objective signs that he had been subjected to electric shocks.” 27 .     As indicated in the applicant’s medical file, on 27 April 2003 an ambulance was called for him on account of his experiencing pain in his heart. He was diagnosed with cardiac vegetative-vascular dystonia and was given medication. 28.     On 2 June 2003 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the prosecutor for a forensic medical examination of the applicant by a panel of experts. He submitted that, while small linear red marks on the applicant’s fingers had been the only marks of the alleged ill-treatment which the applicant had shown to the prosecutor, the expert had ignored them. The lawyer noted that the applicant was constantly complaining of headaches, pain in his heart and other health-related concerns, symptoms which had started manifesting themselves since the applicant had been subjected to electric shocks. Given that the applicant did not trust the Kremenchuk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations, his lawyer requested that the examination be carried out by the Kharkiv Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. 29 .     It appears that on 8 June 2003 the prosecution authorities issued another decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. There is no copy of that ruling in the case file before the Court. 30 .     At a certain point during his trial for aggravated murder and handling illegal firearms (which started on 20   August 2003 – see paragraph   69 below), the applicant raised his complaint of ill-treatment before the trial court. 31 .     On 10 February 2004, in a ruling remitting the case for additional pre-trial investigation (see paragraph 70 below), the Regional Court noted that the applicant’s allegations warranted thorough verification, particularly by way of a forensic medical examination. The Regional Court also released the applicant. However, on 15 April 2004 the Supreme Court quashed the part of the above-mentioned ruling concerning the remittal of the case for additional investigation. It upheld the part pertaining to the applicant’s release. 32 .     From 13   February to 1   March   2004 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment in the neurological department of Novi Sanzhary Hospital, where he was taken by ambulance following a preliminary diagnosis of an attack relating to vegetative-vascular dystonia. The applicant complained of a headache, darkened vision and vertigo. His final diagnoses as established in the hospital were as follows: residual effects of an organic lesion of the central nervous system, asthenic-vegetative syndrome and paroxysmal syncope. As the doctor who treated the applicant explained when she was questioned in October 2006 in the context of the investigation into the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment (see, in particular, paragraph   42 below), while those diagnoses could have resulted from an electric shock, they could not be interpreted as direct evidence proving that the applicant had been subjected to electric shocks. The doctor stated that such diagnoses might result from any organic disease: a head injury, an infection, intoxication and so on. She also stated that, in her opinion, the fact that there was no mention of the issue of electric shocks in the applicant’s medical file meant that he had not spoken of it to the doctors. 33 .     On 15 April 2004 the applicant sought treatment from the Kyiv Neurosurgery Institute. He submitted that he had sustained an electric shock about a year earlier, and complained of memory deterioration, insomnia and irritation. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia of hypertonic type and paroxysmal syncope. However, his condition did not warrant neurosurgical treatment. 34 .     In May 2004 the applicant solicited a licensed private forensic medical centre for an expert conclusion. Having referred to his alleged ill-treatment as summarised in paragraph 14 above, the applicant stated that he was suffering from headaches and heart palpitations, which he considered to be the consequences of being subjected to electric shocks. Having examined the applicant and studied his medical file, on 29 May 2004 the relevant expert issued his report (no. 719). It stated that electric shocks did not always leave marks. If the applicant had been subjected to such shocks as he had described, that might indeed have left temporary marks on his fingers. The expert further noted that the problems with the applicant’s health (see paragraphs 27, 32 and 33 above) might have resulted from his being subjected to electric shocks, particularly given the absence of any medical precedents that would explain the origin of those problems. The expert also documented an area of pigmentation measuring 5 cm by 8 cm on the applicant’s thigh. In the expert’s opinion, that could be a haematoma sustained from a blow from a blunt object. The expert stated that the healing time for such a haematoma was one to three weeks. 35 .     On 24 October 2004 the Poltava regional prosecutor’s office issued a ruling in respect of the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment, refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The prosecutor observed that neither the applicant’s medical examination upon his arrival at the ITT on 13 February 2003 (see paragraph 21 above) nor his forensic medical examination of 15   April   2003 (see paragraph 26 above) had revealed any injuries. It was also noted that no complaints from the applicant had been reported during those examinations. 36.     On 3 November 2004 the Regional Court, which was in charge of the applicant’s trial (see paragraph 69 below), ordered a forensic medical assessment of the applicant by a panel of experts from the Poltava Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations, with a view to answering the following questions: (1) whether there was any indication in the applicant’s medical documents that he might have sustained electric shocks on 4 or 5   February 2003; and (2) whether expert conclusion no.   719 (see paragraph   34 above) could be regarded as confirmed. 37 .     On 28 January 2005 the panel of experts issued their report (no. 18), which was based on their assessment of the applicant’s medical file. The experts gave an overview of the pertinent scientific literature as regards the possible impact of electric shocks on a person, without answering the first question. They also noted that, while there was information that the applicant had had an area of pigmentation on his thigh which had looked like a haematoma in May 2004 (see paragraph 34 above), it was impossible to establish when and how it had been sustained. As regards the second question, the experts stated that they were not competent to answer it. 38.     In its judgment of 22 March 2005 delivered in the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 72 below), the Regional Court dismissed his allegation of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. In particular, the trial court relied on the prosecutor’s refusals to institute criminal proceedings against the police of 5 March 2003, 8 June 2003 and 24   October 2004 (see paragraphs 23, 29 and 35 above). It also referred to the expert reports of 6 February and 15 April 2003 (see paragraphs 19 and   26 above), as well as that of 28 January 2005 (see paragraph 37 above). 39 .     On 7 July 2005 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment (see paragraph 73 below). It held, in particular, that the investigation into the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment had been incomplete and superficial. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant himself had never been questioned in that regard, and that the statements of the police had been taken at face value. It also observed that the applicant’s examination on 6   February 2003, which had not documented any visible bodily injuries, had been carried out in the presence of one of the police officers concerned. The other forensic medical examination reports relied upon could not be considered entirely credible, given that they were either based on an analysis of the medical file only, or involved incomplete or incorrectly posed questions to the experts. 40 .     On 1 November 2005, in the proceedings following the remittal of the applicant’s case, the Regional Court instructed the prosecution authorities to further investigate his complaints of ill-treatment. In the course of that additional investigation, the prosecution authorities questioned six persons who had been detained in the same detention facility as the applicant at the time of the events. None of them had seen any injuries on him. Four detainees submitted that the applicant had not complained, one detainee stated that he had complained of police ill ‑ treatment in broad terms, and another detainee noted that the applicant had complained that the police had given him electric shocks. When subsequently questioned in that regard by the Regional Court during the applicant’s trial, that last-mentioned detainee noted that he himself was also intending to raise complaints of police ill-treatment, and that he was counting on the applicant to testify in his favour. 41 .     The Poltava regional prosecutor’s office also questioned the lawyer   D. (see paragraph 56 below), who stated that the applicant had not complained of ill-treatment to him, and the forensic medical expert who had examined the applicant on 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 19 above). That expert submitted that a police officer was usually present during an examination as a security measure, without there being any impact on the examination. The Komsomolsk town prosecutor was also questioned and stated that he had not seen any injuries or marks on the applicant’s fingers on 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 16 above). 42 .     On 23 November 2005, 9 June, 21 October and 15 November 2006 the Poltava regional prosecutor’s office issued further rulings in respect of the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment, refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. However, all those rulings were quashed for being based on an incomplete and superficial investigation. 43.     On 12 May 2006 the applicant was questioned for the first time in respect of his ill-treatment allegations. 44 .     Furthermore, on 30 June 2006 a forensic psychological assessment report was issued (no.   342) in respect of a video-recording of the reconstruction carried out on 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 58 below). The relevant experts did not discern any indication that the applicant had been put under psychological pressure by those participating in the investigative measure. He appeared to have made his statements freely. 45 .     On 3 April 2007 the Main Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations of the Ministry of Public Health issued an expert opinion (no. 682/3) at the request of the applicant’s lawyer. Having studied the applicant’s medical file, the experts concluded that the deterioration of the applicant’s health (in particular, the asthenic-vegetative syndrome and paroxysmal syncope) might have been a remote result of his alleged ill-treatment – his being subjected to electric shocks – on 4-5 February 2003. They observed, in particular, that prior to his arrest in February 2003 the applicant had not had any medical history of neurological or cardiovascular disorders. The experts also concluded that, if indeed the applicant had had red linear marks around his fingers as he alleged, such marks could have been caused by his being subjected to electric shocks. 46 .     According to the applicant, the trial court refused to include the above-mentioned expert opinion in the case file. The reasons for that are unknown. 47 .     On 8 August 2007 a panel of experts from the Poltava Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations issued a report (no.   90) following an additional evaluation of the applicant’s medical file (including his examinations and treatment in hospitals – see paragraphs 27, 32 and 33 above). The evaluation had been carried out upon the instructions of the trial court. The experts concluded that there were “no objective forensic medical data” suggesting that the applicant had been subjected to electric shocks. In reply to a question put to them regarding any chronic diseases which might explain the symptoms manifested by the applicant, the experts noted that prior to 2004 he had not had any chronic diseases with neurological symptoms. They also observed that the applicant had not sought any medical assistance since 30 July 2004. The last question put to the experts was about what could have caused the area of pigmentation on the applicant’s thigh (mentioned in report no. 18 of 28 January 2005 – see paragraph 37 above) and when it had appeared. The experts noted that the applicant had sought assistance from a doctor in respect of that issue for the first time on 18 May 2004, more than a year after his arrest and his alleged ill-treatment. There was therefore no link between those events. They also found that it was impossible to establish when the area of pigmentation in question had appeared. 48.     The applicant complained to the Regional Court that the above ‑ mentioned experts could not be regarded as objective, particularly because they had already been involved in a similar examination on 28   January 2005 and had not been able to give clear answers to the relevant question (see paragraph 37 above). 49 .     On 16 October 2007, in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, the Poltava regional prosecutor’s office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 50 .     On 14 December 2007 the Regional Court delivered a new judgment on the applicant’s criminal case (see paragraph 75 below). It dismissed his complaint of ill-treatment as unfounded. The trial court relied on forensic medical expert reports nos. 90 and 18, according to which there was no indication that the applicant had been subjected to electric shocks (see paragraphs 37 and 47 above). The court also questioned the experts who had issued those reports. As regards the expert conclusion which the applicant had commissioned (no. 719 – see paragraph 34 above), according to which there had been an indication that he had been subjected to electric shocks, it was concluded that it had been based on incomplete medical documentation. Namely, the court noted that the applicant had provided the expert with only the medical records containing his complaints that he had been subjected to electric shocks, and that no forensic medical examination reports of 2003 had been given to the expert. The expert in question was not summoned to the hearing, in spite of the applicant’s requests to that effect. The trial court questioned the prosecutor to whom the applicant had complained of ill-treatment on 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 16 above). He stated that he had seen some linear marks around the applicant’s fingers which had looked like they had been caused by pressure from a fingernail. The prosecutor also submitted that he had drawn the forensic medical expert’s attention to the applicant’s allegation that he had sustained electric shocks. Furthermore, the court questioned the doctors from Novi Sanzhary Hospital who had treated the applicant in February-March 2004 (see paragraph 32 above). One of them said that the applicant had stated that he had sustained an electric shock as a result of an accident at his house in the country. Lastly, the Regional Court questioned a number of former detainees with whom the applicant had been detained in the same detention facility in February 2003. One of them stated for the first time that he had seen linear marks on the applicant’s fingers in June 2003. The court did not find that statement credible, given that it contradicted statements given by the same witness at an earlier stage, and having regard to the timing of the statement. No other former detainees confirmed the veracity of the applicant’s allegation. 51 .     Overall, the trial court considered that there had been a thorough investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment allegation, and that the prosecutor’s ruling of 16 October 2007 refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers concerned (see paragraph 49 above) was duly reasoned. 52 .     On 10 July 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the first-instance court’s findings (see also paragraph 85 below). Criminal proceedings against the applicant 53 .     On 5 February 2003 the applicant’s acquaintance Pi. wrote a “statement of surrender to the police” in which he stated that he had shot Ko. several times (see paragraph 7 above) upon the instructions of the applicant, who had promised him 3,000 United States   dollars (USD) for Ko.’s murder. Subsequently Pi. retracted that statement on the basis that it had been obtained under duress. 54 .     On the same day the applicant also wrote a statement of surrender, allegedly as a result of his ill-treatment (see paragraph 14 above). The contents of the statement were as follows. On an unspecified date in summer 2000 the applicant had discovered that a number of specific metal pieces were missing from his warehouse. He had decided to inspect all the scrap metal collection points in the vicinity. The applicant submitted that he had eventually found the metal pieces at Ko.’s collection point, and that Ko. could not convincingly explain where they had come from. The applicant had therefore decided to teach him a lesson. He had given a gun to Pi. and had asked him to intimidate Ko. by shooting in the latter’s direction, in exchange for money. After Pi. had informed the applicant that he had done as asked, the applicant had paid him USD 3,000. 55 .     At some point on 5 February 2003 the applicant’s wife signed a legal assistance contract for the applicant’s defence with U., a lawyer. However, U. was not allowed to see the applicant either on that date or for another week, even though he persistently asked for such a meeting (see paragraph   60 below). It appears that officials from Kremenchuk police station refused U.’s requests to that effect on the grounds that additional permits were required, it was a weekend, or schedules were too busy. 56 .     On the evening of 5 February 2003, at 8.15 p.m., the investigator instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of attempted murder. He issued a report explaining to the applicant what his procedural rights were as a suspect in criminal proceedings. The applicant signed it with a note stating that he wished to be legally represented. The investigator proposed that the applicant be represented by D., a lawyer who happened to be in the police station for unrelated proceedings. Both the applicant and D. agreed to this, and at 9 p.m. D. was formally admitted to the proceedings as the applicant’s legal counsel. At that point the applicant was not aware of the legal assistance contract regarding his representation by U. 57.     Late in the evening on 5 February 2003 the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of the lawyer D., and he reiterated his initial statement of confession (see paragraph 54 above). 58 .     On 6 February 2003 the reconstruction of the events was carried out at a place where the applicant had allegedly thrown the gun and its magazine into a river. Two divers who were deployed did not recover anything of interest for the investigation. The applicant and the lawyer D. were present. 59 .     On 11 February 2003 the reconstruction of the events was resumed. This time the applicant did not have a lawyer present. The divers retrieved a recoil spring and a gun magazine with two bullets from the river. According to the applicant, those items had been planted by the police. He referred to the video-recording of that investigative measure, from which it allegedly appeared that the investigator had announced the discovery of those items before the divers had appeared on the surface with them. The applicant stated in front of the camera that he had been tortured by electric shocks. 60 .     On 12 February 2003 the applicant’s wife hired another lawyer, Ch., in addition to the lawyer U. (see paragraph 55 above). On the same day the applicant declined the services of D. and said that he wished to be represented by the lawyers U. and Ch., who were immediately admitted to the proceedings. There is no information on any investigative measures carried out in the presence of those lawyers. 61.     On 13 February 2003, once the applicant’s administrative detention had expired (see paragraph 10 above), the investigator of the Komsomolsk town prosecutor’s office arrested him on suspicion of the attempted murder of Ko. 62.     On 16 February 2003 the Komsomolsk Town Court remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. On 28 February 2003 the Regional Court upheld that decision. 63.     On 22 February 2003 the applicant refused the services of the lawyers U. and Ch. and said that he wished to be represented by the lawyers R. and Po. 64 .     On the same day the formal charge of attempted murder was laid against the applicant and he was questioned as an accused in the presence of his new lawyers, R. and Po. Relying on Article 63 of the Constitution (see paragraph 86 below), he refused to make any statements. He also stated that he wished to retract all his earlier statements, including those made in the presence of the lawyer D. 65 .     On 5 March 2003 another reconstruction of the events was carried out at the place where the applicant had allegedly thrown the gun and its magazine into the river (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above), this time in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer Po. The divers continued looking for the gun, but did not find anything. The applicant denied his involvement in the incident with Ko. He stated that he had not had a gun, let alone thrown one into the river. He also noted in the reconstruction report that the lawyer D. had been imposed on him by the investigator, and that his initial confession had been made as a result of his torture by electric shocks. 66.     On 21 March 2003 the applicant refused the services of the lawyer   R., and said that he wished to retain Po. as his only legal counsel. 67.     On 10 June 2003 formal charges of attempted aggravated murder and illegal firearms handling were brought against the applicant. 68.     On the same day the applicant was questioned in the presence of the lawyer Po., and denied any involvement in the incident concerning Ko. 69 .     On 20 August 2003 the Regional Court started the trial as a court of first instance. 70 .     On 10 February 2004 the Regional Court remitted the case for additional pre-trial investigation, mainly with a view to verifying the applicant’s ill-treatment allegation (see paragraph 31 above). The applicant was released subject to his giving an undertaking not to abscond. 71.     On 15 April 2004 the Supreme Court quashed the part of the ruling of the appellate court concerning the remittal of the case for additional investigation. However, it upheld the part pertaining to the applicable preventive measure. 72 .     On 22 March 2005 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of inflicting grievous bodily injuries on Ko., and sentenced him to four years’ deprivation of liberty. However, he was amnestied and absolved from serving the sentence. As a preventive measure before the judgment became final, the applicant maintained his undertaking not to abscond. 73 .     On 7 July 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. It observed that the only evidence against the applicant and Pi. had been their own self-incriminating statements and the gun magazine with two bullets, and that the trial court had not verified whether that evidence had been collected lawfully. The Supreme Court criticised the investigation into the accused’s complaints of ill-treatment (see paragraph 39 above) and observed that their allegations that the administrative-offence charges against them had been fabricated had not been verified. The Supreme Court further observed that the motives for the criminal offence had not been duly established: there had been no assessment of the applicant’s statements that he had in fact found the missing metal pieces (see paragraph 54 above) at the scrap metal collection point owned by a certain Zh. and that Zh. had given them back to him. In confirmation of that, the applicant had presented a notarised statement from Zh., who had meanwhile moved to Portugal. The trial court had neither commented on that statement nor sought to have Zh. questioned through an international legal assistance mechanism. Furthermore, the Supreme Court criticised the Regional Court for not having duly responded to the applicant’s complaint that his right to defence had been violated on account of his lack of access to the lawyer whom his wife had hired (U.) from 6 to 12 February 2003 (see paragraphs 55 and 60 above). 74.     On 7 August 2007 the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was changed from an undertaking not to leave town to pre-trial detention. No further information in that regard is available. 75 .     On 14 December 2007 the Regional Court delivered a new judgment by which it found the applicant guilty of attempted aggravated murder and illegal arms handling and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, with confiscation of half of his personal property. 76.     The Regional Court found that the applicant’s motives had been as follows. In an effort to put an end to their commercial competition, and wishing to increase the proceeds from his scrap metal business, on many occasions he had proposed to Ko. that they unite their businesses, but Ko. had refused. The fact that Ko. had not allowed the applicant to enter his warehouse “had definitely convinced [the applicant] of [Ko.’s] unwillingness to unite their businesses, and had made the applicant want to get rid of his competitor and capture [Ko.’s] scrap metal market”. It was established that the applicant had bought a gun from an unidentified person and had hired Pi. to carry out Ko.’s murder. 77.     The applicant argued that he had had no reasons to wish Ko. any harm, let alone order his murder. He observed that since the incident in September 2000 (see paragraph 7 above) he had been maintaining friendly personal and commercial relations with Ko. However, the trial court was not convinced by those arguments. Nor did it find credible the applicant’s submission that his transfer of USD 3,000 to Pi. in September 2000 had in fact been a loan which Pi. had repaid to him in December 2000. 78.     The Regional Court relied on the applicant’s and Pi.’s initial statements of surrender (see paragraphs 53 and 54 above). However, it considered that the applicant’s real intention had not been to intimidate Ko. as noted in the statement of surrender, but to have him murdered. 79.     Pi. refused to make any statements before the trial court, and maintained his not guilty plea. He alleged that his statement of surrender had been extracted from him by ill-treatment. While noting that Pi. had given several versions of the events, the court considered the initial one – according to which he had shot Ko. upon the applicant’s instructions – the most convincing. At some point during the pre-trial investigation Pi. had stated that he had received the gun from a certain Ka. (a local criminal gang leader who had died by the time the investigation in this case had been completed). Eventually Pi. had stated that it had been Ka. who had shot Ko. and told Pi. about that incident. 80 .     As regards the testimonies by the victim, Ko., the trial court observed that the case file contained an “explanation” ( пояснення ) from him dated 16   September 2000, a report on his questioning dated 30   September 2000 and some further explanations which were undated, according to which he could not remember any features of the perpetrator’s appearance. However, in March 2007 Ko. had stated that the signature on those documents did not belong to him. As a result, a criminal investigation had been launched in respect of the forgery of those documents. A forensic handwriting examination of 19   September   2007 had established that, indeed, the signature on the documents in question was not that of Ko. The Regional Court therefore declared those documents inadmissible evidence and excluded them from the file. It noted that at some point during the pre ‑ trial investigation the investigator had shown Ko. the video-recording of the reconstruction of the crime, and Ko. had recognised Pi. as the perpetrator. From that moment on, Ko. had had no doubts that it was Pi. who had shot him. The Regional Court relied on his statements in that regard. 81 .     In giving reasons for the applicant’s conviction, the trial court also relied on the material evidence: three bullet casings and a bullet found at the incident site, and the gun magazine with two bullets retrieved by the divers from the river at the place which the applicant had indicated (see paragraph   59 above). They were found to have similar characteristics as regards their classification. 82.     As regards the applicant’s complaint that a lawyer had been imposed on him by the investigator during the initial stage of the investigation, the court noted that as of 6 February 2003 the applicant had been represented by U., a lawyer of his choice, and that subsequently he had been able to instruct other lawyers. 83 .     Lastly, the Regional Court held that the applicant’s complaint that the administrative-offence charge against him had been fabricated was not supported by the case-file material. 84 .     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He complained in particular that his conviction had been mainly secured by the initial self ‑ incriminating statements which he had made under duress and in the absence of legal assistance. The applicant also contended that his complaints about further restrictions on his right to defence (namely, the continued denial of his access to the lawyer U., and the absence of legal assistance for him during the reconstruction on 11 February 2003) had not been duly addressed. He complained that the Regional Court had not adequately examined his pertinent and arguable claim that the administrative-offence charge against him had been fabricated in order to secure his availability for questioning as a criminal suspect without respecting his procedural rights. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the trial court had disregarded the evidence which indicated firstly that he had had no motives for wishing harm on Ko., and secondly that the facts outlined in his statement of surrender were inaccurate (see paragraph 73 above). Lastly, the applicant observed that the victim’s statements had been accepted without any assessment, particularly as regards why he had not challenged the authenticity of his signature on the initial investigation documents for about four years, even though he had studied the case file on many occasions (see paragraph 80 above). 85 .     On 10 July 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment overall. It held that the convicted persons’ guilt had been established by the totality of the evidence which had been duly assessed by the first-instance court. The Supreme Court summarised the contents of the convicted persons’ statements of surrender and the reports on the reconstruction of the events. It also reiterated the trial court’s reference to the material evidence (see paragraph 81 above). As regards the applicant’s allegation of coercion, the Supreme Court considered that it had been rightly dismissed as unfounded (see paragraphs 50-52 above). The ruling of the Supreme Court did not mention the issue of the alleged fabrication of the administrative-offence charge. It was also silent as to the applicant’s arguments about the alleged restrictions of his right to defence, and did not contain any reference to his complaints regarding the alleged flaws in the assessment of Ko.’s statements and the failure to examine Zh.’s testimonies. DOMESTIC LAW 86 .     The relevant provisions of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine are quoted in the Court’s judgment in the case of Ogorodnik v. Ukraine (no.   29644/10, § 65, 5 February 2015). 87 .     The relevant provisions of the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure (in force at the material time and repealed with effect from 19   November 2012) can be found in the judgments in the cases of Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine (no. 22313/04, §§ 30-33 and 35, 28 October 2010) and Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893/03, § 45, 15 May 2012). THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 88.     The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that there had been no effective domestic investigation into the matter. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or