CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 30 janvier 2020

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page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s87032C4E { width:174.29pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF VINKS AND RIBICKA v. LATVIA (Application no. 28926/10)           JUDGMENT Art 8 • Respect for private life • Early morning raid by anti-terrorist police unit at applicants’ home to carry out a search in the context of economic crimes • Lack of adequate and sufficient procedural safeguards against abuse   STRASBOURG 30 January 2020 FINAL   30/05/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vinks and Ribicka v. Latvia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Ganna Yudkivska,   André Potocki,   Yonko Grozev,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lәtif Hüseynov,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 7 January 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 28926/10) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Latvian nationals, Mr Vladimirs Vinks (the first applicant) and Ms Jeļena Ribicka (“the second applicant”), on 7 May 2010. 2.     The applicants were represented by Ms A. Kalēja, a lawyer practising in Riga. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that a search of their home on 16   June 2009 had been unlawful and disproportionate, and that no procedural safeguards had been available. They also alleged that there were no effective remedies available under domestic law in that regard. They relied on Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. 4.     On 7 February 2012 notice of the complaints concerning the search of 16 June 2009 and the effectiveness of domestic remedies in that regard was given to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5 .     The applicants were born in 1975 and 1972, respectively. At the material time they were living together in Ķekava parish. The first applicant, a businessman, has several previous convictions. On 18 March 1999 he was convicted of intentional destruction of property and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. On 5   March 2008 he was convicted of tax evasion and money laundering and sentenced to community service. A restriction on carrying out unspecified business activities for a period of three years was also imposed on him. Criminal proceedings against two police officers 6.     The parties disagree as to the background of criminal proceedings against A.P. and I.V., two officers of the Finance Police Department of the State Revenue Service ( Valsts ieņēmumu dienesta Finanšu policijas pārvalde – the “VID   FPP”), an authority specifically tasked with preventing and investigating criminal offences in the field of taxation. It can be seen from the material in the case file that on 10   September 2008 the first applicant, having obtained information from another individual, met those officers with a view to receiving their “help” in covering up a fictitious tax evasion and money-laundering scheme. That scheme had allegedly been intended to discover corrupt officers. On an unspecified date, the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption ( Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs – “the KNAB”) started an operational investigation and gave guidance to the first applicant in that respect. 7.     On 13 November 2008 the first applicant took part in an undercover operation ( operatīvais eksperiments ) that had been organised by the KNAB and had been approved by the prosecutor’s office. The KNAB provided the first applicant with marked banknotes in the amount of 6,800   Latvian lati (LVL – approximately 9,685 euros (EUR)) for the purpose of that operation; the first applicant handed over the marked banknotes to both officers as “payment” for their “services”. 8 .     As a result, A.P. and I.V. were arrested on the spot and criminal proceedings were opened against them for corruption and tax ‑ evasion ‑ related offences. The first applicant gave testimony to the KNAB about the fictitious tax evasion and money-laundering scheme, in the covering up of which those officers had allegedly been involved. 9.     On 6 May 2009 the criminal case was referred to the prosecution and on 18   May 2009 charges were brought against A.P. and I.V. On 8 June 2010 the criminal case was sent to the first-instance court. 10 .     On 16 June 2009 the first applicant, after the search at his home (see paragraph 23 below) and after having been taken to the premises of the VID FPP, retracted his testimony against A.P. and I.V. in a complaint addressed to the Prosecutor General, which he drafted in the presence of several VID FPP officers (see paragraph 33-35 below). That complaint was forwarded to two prosecution departments. One department was dealing with the criminal case against the two police officers (see paragraph 54 et seq. below) and the other was responsible for examining complaints about operational activities (see paragraph 42 below). 11.     On 28 June 2009 the first applicant informed the Prosecutor General that the VID FPP officers had compelled him to retract his testimony on 16   June 2009 (see paragraph 39 below). He maintained his initial testimony against A.P. and I.V. (see paragraph 8 above). It appears that at some point the criminal case against A.P. and I.V. was split into two cases. 12.     There is no information about the case against I.V., but the first applicant gave testimony before the first-instance court against A.P. The first-instance and the appellate courts examined the circumstances surrounding the retraction of his testimony on 16 June 2009, questioned witnesses and examined a certain audio recording in that regard (see paragraph 35 below). The domestic courts found that the first applicant’s initial testimony (see paragraph 8 above) was credible; it was used to convict A.P. 13.     On 20   April 2017 the Supreme Court, by a final decision, convicted A.P. of bribery and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 14.     At the same time, the Supreme Court sent the criminal case against A.P. on tax-evasion related charges back to the appellate court for fresh examination. Those proceedings are currently pending. Criminal proceedings against the first applicant 15 .     On 4 June 2009 an investigator of the VID FPP, I.S., instituted criminal proceedings concerning tax evasion and money laundering. Allegedly, an organised group of twenty-five individuals – involved in a large tax evasion and money-laundering scheme using more than two hundred fictitious companies – had been discovered. It was suspected that the first applicant was a member of that group (see, for more details, paragraphs 20-21 below). 16.     According to the Government, those criminal proceedings were instituted on the basis of information obtained during an operational investigation that had been ongoing since 1 June 2007. 17.     The applicants firmly denied those allegations and insisted that the first applicant had had no connection with the companies involved. The first applicant asserted that his name had been added without any justification to a list of suspects in an ongoing criminal investigation with which he had had no connection. 18 .     On 15 June 2009 several judges of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court ( Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesa ) examined requests for the issuance of search warrants in respect of nineteen different premises in connection with the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. A search warrant for the applicants’ home was issued. In that search warrant, a reference was made to the nature of the alleged offences (see paragraph 15 above), as described by the VID FPP investigator in her request for the warrant. More than six dozen companies were specifically listed: four companies central to the suspected tax evasion and money-laundering scheme and sixty-two other companies. An investigating judge examined the criminal case material, which had been submitted to him, and ruled that there were sufficient grounds to consider that specific documents and items, which related to the listed companies (accounting documents, powers of attorney, bank cards, digital passwords, and company stamps), as well as “other documents and items that may serve as relevant evidence in the case” might be located in the applicants’ home. He ordered the search and seizure. 19.     On 16 June 2009 the applicants’ home was searched, and the first applicant was taken into police custody and taken to the premises of the VID FPP (see paragraphs 23-32 and 33-36 below). The first applicant alleged that he had been “influenced and forced” to retract the testimony he had given in the criminal proceedings against A.P. and I.V. The Government denied that allegation. 20 .     On 18 June 2009 the first applicant was officially declared a suspect in connection with the criminal proceedings which had been instituted on 4   June 2009. It was suspected that the first applicant had organised the impugned scheme and that in 2008 and 2009 more than LVL 5,000,000 (approximately EUR 7,000,000) in proceeds had been laundered using bank accounts of four companies. The first applicant was remanded in custody. On 27 November 2009 he was released on bail. Several restrictive measures were imposed on him (a prohibition on leaving the country without prior authorisation, and a prohibition on approaching certain individuals). 21 .     On 7 July 2009 a prosecutor supervising the criminal proceedings concerning tax evasion and money laundering, on instructions issued by a superior prosecutor, reviewed the actions taken by the VID FPP. He found that the criminal proceedings had been instituted in accordance with the law. More than six dozen companies had been involved in the scheme under investigation, which had been set up for the purposes of tax evasion and money laundering on a large scale. Individuals involved in that scheme had been drawing up taxable business documents for transactions that had not actually taken place, without paying taxes, and had been receiving payments in respect of such transactions. In order to change ownership of those funds and to receive them, fictitious agreements, including loans, had been concluded. The scheme had been operated by three inter-related criminal groups comprising twenty-five individuals. On the basis of judicial warrants, nineteen searches had been carried out (two with the assistance of a special police anti-terrorism unit called Omega, owing to the potential dangerousness of those criminal groups) and, as a result, accounting documents, digital passwords and the stamps of more than two hundred fictitious companies had been seized. Eight persons had been officially declared suspects and two of them (including the first applicant) had been remanded in custody, while others had been released. The supervising prosecutor found no signs of unlawfulness in the investigative actions taken by the VID FPP officers. 22.     On 12   July 2011 all restrictive measures, which had been imposed on the first applicant in the course of the criminal proceedings against him, were revoked on the grounds that the time-limit for completing the pre-trial investigation had been exceeded. Those proceedings are currently pending before the VID at the pre-trial investigation stage. The Court has been provided with no further information in this regard. Search of 16 June 2009 Events that are not disputed between the parties 23 .     On 16 June 2009 at 7 a.m. the Omega anti-terrorism unit, which consisted of at least four armed men, without prior warning entered the applicants’ home through windows situated on the first and second floors. They located four people on the premises – both applicants and their friend, A.G., on the first floor and the second applicant’s teenage daughter on the second floor. 24 .     Subsequently, five officers of the VID FPP entered the applicants’ home, showed a search warrant to the applicants (after which they both signed it), and started a search at 7.30 a.m. The officers of the special police unit then left the applicants’ home. The search was completed four and a half hours later, at noon. Both applicants and A.G. signed the search record in the capacity of persons who had been present, and made no remarks or comments in the relevant field of that search record. The search record also bore the first applicant’s signature below a pre-typed text: “I have received a copy of this record”. The applicants’ account of events 25 .     The second applicant’s teenage daughter was pulled out of her bed by two officers of the special police unit; they immediately took her down to the first floor, without allowing her to dress. 26.     All those present in the applicants’ home, including the second applicant and her daughter, were placed on the ground with their faces against the floor. The first applicant’s hands were tied behind his back. Somebody pushed the second applicant’s head against the floor with his boot and put a firearm to it. 27.     An officer of the VID FPP, S.S., subsequently took the first applicant aside into a bedroom and told him that this was a revenge for his testimony against A.P. and I.V. The first applicant was “influenced and forced” to retract the testimony he had given in the criminal proceedings against A.P. and I.V. 28.     Nothing that related to the companies listed in the search warrant was seized during the search at the applicants’ home. The first applicant had no connection whatsoever with the companies listed in the search warrant. The Government’s account of events 29 .     On 16 June 2009 the VID FPP requested assistance by the Omega anti-terrorism unit in carrying out searches in connection with the criminal proceedings concerning tax evasion and money laundering on a large scale. It had had reason to believe that it would face armed resistance and that important evidence (documents, digital passwords, electronic evidence and data carriers) might be destroyed. The Government stated that out of nineteen searches carried out in connection with those criminal proceedings, only two – including the search of applicants’ home – had been carried out with the assistance of the special police unit. 30.     On the first floor, two officers of the special police unit located both applicants and A.G. The officers instructed all three of them to lie down on the floor in the living room and tied the hands of the first applicant and A.G. behind their backs. No physical force was used. The first applicant’s hands were untied so that he could sign the search warrant. 31 .     On the second floor, two officers of the special police unit located the second applicant’s daughter. She was allowed to dress and was taken to the living room on the second floor. She was sat down on a sofa. No physical force was used. 32 .     During the home search many items were seized, namely, several plastic folders with legal and accounting documents including correspondence with banks, digital passwords, several laptops and hard drives, CDs and USB flash drives, eighteen stamps belonging to different companies, several cell phones and SIM cards, paper notebooks, postal receipts, and several applications to the relevant domestic register concerning the registration of new companies. Those items were listed in the search record, which was signed by all those present. No complaints or remarks were made. The second applicant was issued with a copy of that record (contrast with the document mentioned in paragraph 24 above). Events in the premises of the VID FPP on 16 June 2009 33 .     After the search, the first applicant was taken to the premises of the VID FPP in Riga. The first applicant was arrested and a record of his arrest was drawn up by a VID FPP investigator, who had not participated in the search. 34.     The first applicant alleged that he had been “influenced and forced” to retract the testimony that he had given (also again in the premises of the VID FPP) in the criminal proceedings against A.P. and I.V. The Government denied that allegation. 35 .     The first applicant alleged that the VID FPP officers had told him “what to write” in his complaint to the Prosecutor General with a view to his retracting his previous testimony. The Government disagreed. They submitted an audio recording and a transcript of a conversation between the applicant and several officers of the VID FPP. The parties disagree on the significance and interpretation of that recording for the purposes of the present case. 36 .     In the record made in respect of the first applicant’s arrest, the following statement, made by the first applicant in the presence of his lawyer, was recorded: “I consider my arrest to be unjustified because items seized during the search do not belong to me. I was not given the possibility to explain the situation before I was arrested.” Review of the applicants’ complaints Regarding the search warrant for the applicants’ home 37 .     On 12   February   2010 the President of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court examined the first applicant’s complaint in respect of the search warrant of 15 June 2009. The first applicant alleged that there had been no legal grounds or justification to implicate him in those criminal proceedings and that the search had been unjustified. He had had no connection with the companies listed in the search warrant. The main suspects in those criminal proceedings had been unknown to him. He expressed doubts as to whether the investigating judge had verified all the criminal case material that had been submitted to him. The first applicant also criticised what he described as the cynical, rude and violent manner in which the VID FPP officers had carried out the search. 38 .     The President of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court upheld the lawfulness of the search warrant and dismissed all complaints as follows: “Having examined the complaint lodged by [the first applicant] and the [case] material in its entirety ... the President of [the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court] considers that the search warrant of 15 June 2009 by the investigating judge is justified and should be upheld for the following reasons. ... It appears from the request by [investigator I.S.] and the accompanying documents, that the search and seizure of the documents and items that were listed in that request will facilitate the establishment of facts that are relevant for the criminal proceedings. As can be seen from the search warrant, the investigating judge has not breached any provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law. His conclusion that there were grounds to carry out the search at [the applicants’] home was justified. Accordingly, the President of [the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court] considers that [the first applicant’s] complaint is unsubstantiated and must be dismissed. [The first applicant] in his complaint alleges that the human rights and other procedural rights of those present during the search have been disregarded. The President of [the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court] considers that that fact cannot serve as grounds to consider that the search warrant of 15 June 2009 was unjustified. Any complaints about allegedly unlawful actions taken by the [VID] FPP officers during the search must, under 337(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law, be submitted to the relevant investigating authority. ... This decision is final and no appeal lies against it.” Regarding actions taken by the officers involved in the search (a)    Complaints by the first applicant 39 .     On 28 June 2009 the first applicant, while being held in custody, lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General about allegedly unlawful actions on the part of the VID FPP officers. He alleged that all action taken by the VID FPP against him had been motivated by revenge, since he had helped to discover corrupt VID FPP officers and had cooperated with the KNAB. During the search of 16 June 2009, Officer S.S. had issued threats and passed on “greetings” from the arrested VID FPP officers. He had also received further threats in the VID FPP premises. He had been forced to retract the testimony he had given against the two officers; Officer S.S. had dictated its content and had issued threats against him and his family. In his complaint he specified that he did not wish to retract the testimony that he had given against the two officers. 40.     His complaint was forwarded to the Internal Security Bureau of the State police authorities ( Valsts policijas Iekšējās drošības birojs ), the body responsible for examining complaints against the State police authorities. However, as the first applicant’s complaint had related to Officer S.S. of the VID FPP, they could not examine that complaint and forwarded it to the VID FPP. 41.     On 21 July 2009 a director of the VID FPP issued the following reply, which was sent to the first applicant’s home address and which the first applicant received only after his release from custody: “On 15 July 2009 the Finance Police Department of the State Revenue Service received your 28 June 2009 complaint, which was addressed to the Prosecutor General. The information provided by you has been examined. The facts complained of have not been confirmed and no breaches have been found in the actions of the VID FPP officers during your arrest.” 42 .     On 7 August 2009, in response to the first applicant’s complaint of 16 June 2009 (see paragraphs 10 and 35 above), a prosecutor found no breaches of the Law on Operational Activities ( Operatīvās darbības likums ) in the actions of the KNAB officers. 43 .     On 23 November 2009 and 4 January and 9 February 2010 prosecutors at various levels examined complaints lodged by the applicants’ lawyer that raised various issues pertaining to access to the criminal case material (the search warrant and search record), and the lawfulness and legality of the first applicant’s arrest and of the reply by the VID FPP to the first applicant’s complaint of 28 June 2009. Those complaints were dismissed. It was noted that (i) the search had been authorised by an investigating judge; (ii) the involvement of the special police unit had been justified (a prosecutor referred to sections 54 and 55 of the State Administration Structure Law ( Valsts pārvaldes iekārtas likums ) and to internal police regulations); and (iii) both applicants and A.G. had been present, and they had signed the search record and had made no objections. The first applicant had been issued a copy of the search record. The actions by the VID FPP officers had been justified and lawful. The prosecutors found no breaches of the Criminal Procedure Law ( Kriminālprocesa likums ). They concluded that the search had been lawful and justified. 44.     On 5 March 2010 another prosecutor, upon a complaint by the first applicant, found no breaches of domestic law as concerns the search of 16   June 2009; a reference was also made to the replies provided to his lawyer in that regard (see paragraph 43 above). The first applicant’s allegation that the actions of the VID FPP had been motivated by revenge was dismissed as unfounded. No evidence that S.S. had physically or morally influenced the first applicant by issuing him oral threats had been discovered. (b)    Complaints by the second applicant as regards the search of 16 June 2009 45.     On 29 June 2009 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor’s office regarding allegedly unlawful actions on the part of the VID FPP and the Omega officers. She also alleged that the first applicant’s safety was under threat. The supervising prosecutor requested information from the State police authorities and the VID FPP in that regard. In particular, the State police authorities were asked to explain (i) whether the special police unit’s assistance had been organised in a manner in accordance with law, and (ii) which legislative act had authorised its assistance. The VID FPP was further asked to explain whether the involvement of the Omega anti-terrorism unit had been necessary and justified, whether the VID FPP officers had carried out the search in accordance with law and whether Officer S.S. had participated in the search. 46 .     On 10 August 2009 the State police authorities provided their reply. According to the information at their disposal, the VID FPP had had reasons to suspect that the suspects might resist and obstruct investigative activities, including authorised searches. In order to avoid that, the special police unit’s assistance had been necessary and it had authority to provide such assistance under its internal regulations. Taking into account sections 54 and   55 of the State Administration Structure Law, which set out the general principles of cooperation between State authorities, it had been decided to assist the VID FPP. 47 .     On 12   August 2009 the VID FPP provided its reply. According to the information at its disposal, the first applicant had had prior convictions dating back to 1999 and 2008. In 2007 the prosecution had placed him on a list of wanted persons. In total, the VID FPP had forwarded three criminal cases against him to the prosecution (for charges to be brought). Prior to the search, a preliminary observation of the applicants’ home had indicated that: (i) it had been located in a remote area; (ii) it had only one road approaching the property; (iii) it had been surrounded by a two-metre-high fence (thus necessitating fast action in conducting the search); (iv) it had been guarded by two dogs; (v) several men had been present and they might have been armed; (vi) it had been planned to make an arrest; and (vi) it had been possible that those present might offer armed resistance. Taking into account (i) the first applicant’s personality, (ii) the possibility that important evidence could be found, (iii) the fact that its destruction was not permissible, and (iv) the results of the preliminary observation, it was decided to seek the assistance of the Omega anti-terrorism unit in entering the applicants’ home. Officer S.S. had participated in the search. No complaints had been made by those present during the search. 48 .     On 24 August 2009 and, 22 January and 25 February 2010 prosecutors at various levels examined complaints lodged by the second applicant. She raised various issues pertaining to access to the criminal case material (the search warrant and search record) and the lawfulness and legality of the search of 16 June 2009. Those complaints were dismissed. The prosecutors noted that (i) the search had been authorised by an investigating judge; (ii) the involvement of the special police unit had been justified; (iii) both applicants and A.G. had been present and they had signed the search record and had made no objections. The first applicant had been issued a copy of the search record. The actions by the VID FPP and the Omega officers had been justified and lawful. The prosecutors found no breaches of the Criminal Procedure Law. They concluded that the search had been lawful and justified. In the last reply, dated 25 February 2010, a note was included to the effect that that reply constituted a final decision as concerns the issues determined therein. 49 .     On 19 March 2010 another prosecutor, upon a request by a superior prosecutor, examined the second applicant’s complaint about the actions of the officers of the special police unit during the search. Prior to providing his response, he received an internal report, dated 12 March 2010, which he had ordered from the relevant department of the State police authorities. That report can be summarised as follows. According to the internal regulations of the Omega anti-terrorism unit, its officers were to provide assistance to law-enforcement authorities, if those authorities faced difficulties in: (i) solving “serious” and “very serious” criminal offences, (ii)   arresting suspects and (iii) finding and seizing material evidence. The special unit had provided assistance to the VID FPP in carrying out the search in the applicants’ home in order to: (i) avoid the destruction of evidence, and (ii) arrest suspects, because an initial operational investigation had revealed that one suspect held several registered firearms at his home (see paragraph 88 below) and was armed and there was a guard dog on the premises. Moreover, the personality of one of the suspects indicated that he might offer armed resistance and destroy evidence. In his reply to the second applicant, the prosecutor found that the Omega officers had acted in accordance with internal regulations and taking into account the circumstances. They had not breached the domestic law. The reply was open to further review by a superior prosecutor; no such further review took place. (c)    Complaints by the second applicant as regards her personal belongings 50 .     On 10 December 2009 the second applicant lodged a request that several items (one item of stationary and one portable computer, three mobile phones, two hard drives, a laser printer, a black photo camera and a memory card) which belonged to her, but which had been seized during the search, be returned to her. 51.     On 3 February 2010 the VID FPP investigator refused that request because at that stage of the pre-trial investigation “it was not established that those items were unnecessary as evidence.” The second applicant was informed of that decision and of the fact that that decision was open to review by a supervising prosecutor at any stage of the pre-trial investigation. 52 .     On 3 February 2012 the second applicant lodged a complaint with a supervising prosecutor, requesting that several items (see paragraph 50 above as well as a portable computer bag and a men’s briefcase), which belonged to her, but which had been seized during the search, be returned to her and that the refusal of 3 February 2010 be quashed. 53 .     On 9 March 2012 the supervising prosecutor dismissed that complaint stating that the refusal was lawful. There were no grounds to quash that refusal and to return those items to the second applicant. The second applicant was informed that she could request once again that those items be returned to her. In view of the fact that a search had been carried out at the first applicant’s home and that the case material contained indications that those items might belong to another individual (see paragraph 36 above), she had to substantiate that those items belonged to her and it was not sufficient to merely list those items as being hers. That reply was open to further review by a higher-ranking prosecutor. No such further review was undertaken. Investigative activities related to the first applicant’s complaints 54 .     From December 2009 until April 2010 the prosecutor responsible for the criminal proceedings against the two police officers carried out numerous investigative activities related to the first applicant’s complaints about the events of 16 June 2009. She questioned the applicants, A.G. and various officers of the VID FPP (including those who had participated in the search), and requested information from the VID FPP. A cross-examination between the first applicant and Officer S.S. was carried out. Both of them agreed to undergo a polygraph test, the results of which indicated that neither of them had lied. 55.     On 7 May 2010 the prosecutor separated the material relating to the criminal case against the two police officers and opened new criminal proceedings in respect of the events of 16 June 2009 in so far as the first applicant’s allegations were concerned. 56.     On 15 February 2011 the first applicant was declared a victim in connection with those criminal proceedings. 57.     On 28 March 2011 a prosecutor examined two audio files that had been recorded by an unidentified VID FPP official on 16 June 2009 (see paragraph 35 above), and the transcripts thereof. 58.     According to the Government, the proceedings in respect of the events of 16 June 2009 are currently pending before the prosecution authorities at the pre-trial investigation stage. According to the applicants, these proceedings have been terminated owing to the expiry of statute of limitations, which was ten years. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 59 .     On 14 September 2006 the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) adopted the Third Round Detailed Assessment Report on Latvia, following a visit to Latvia from 8 until 24 March 2006 by a team of assessors from the International Monetary Fund. The report contained the following observations: “ General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 48.     Latvia is vulnerable to being used for money laundering purposes due to number of factors including its geographical location. It is a major transit point for trade between Western Europe and the CIS countries using its ports on the Baltic Sea and the land borders with other Baltic States, Russia and Belarus ... 49. Financial transactions relating to proceeds of crime have been identified passing through the Latvian financial system. The high volume of transactions creates a challenge for financial institutions in confirming the true purpose of the financial transactions. The main difficulty is that by the time the money arrives in Latvia it is difficult to identify it as the proceeds of crime ... ... 51. In general, the recorded crime rate in Latvia is relatively low ... The major criminal activities identified by the authorities as predicate offences for money laundering are drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, tax evasion and VAT fraud ... There are ongoing allegations of corruption in the public sector, including some highly-publicised cases ...” 60 .     On 5 July 2012 MONEYVAL adopted the Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report on Latvia, following a visit by experts from MONEYVAL and the Financial Action Task Force from 9 until 13 May 2011. The report contained the following observations: “ 1.2. General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 8. Latvia’s geographical location, with its ports on the Baltic Sea and the land borders with other Baltic States, makes it a major transit point. The current risks and vulnerabilities in relation to ML and FT that are faced in Latvia are considered to be connected with the “shadow economy” and phishing schemes abroad. ML in Latvia is related mainly to illegal proceeds generated by: Evasion of taxes (VAT), which has been identified as a domestic predicate crime. Illegal proceeds are laundered in Latvia or in other countries (for example in Estonia or Lithuania) mostly by creating large schemes of transactions executed by a number of legal persons.” 61 .     More recently, on 4 July 2018, MONEYVAL adopted the Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report on Latvia, following a visit by an assessment team from 30 October until 10   November 2017. They made the following observations (footnotes omitted): “ ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher-Risk Issues Overview of ML/TF Risks ML Threats 4. The national risk assessment (NRA) identifies illicit economic activities ‑ particularly corruption and bribery (including embezzlement of public funds), fraud (including through fictitious companies), and tax evasion – as Latvia’s primary money laundering (ML) threats ... 5. The NRA identifies illegal economic activities as another major ML threat. White collar crime has exceeded other more conventional proceeds-generating offences, such as drug trafficking, in terms of threat. Indeed, the top three predicate offences in the period under review were tax evasion, fraud (including fictitious companies), as well as corruption and bribery (including embezzlement of public funds). 6. Organised crime is also a factor with a substantial impact on the overall ML risk situation in Latvia. According to the NRA, ML threats that arise from international organised criminal groups (OCGs) are rated as high. The proximity and strong financial ties of Latvia with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) facilitates the access of regional OCGs to the financial system of Latvia and the international one subsequently. OCGs from CIS are known to exercise influence on the domestic ones. In fact, Latvia hosts approximately 80 OCGs ..., out of which only 10-12 groups are active in the area of severe and organised crime with an international dimension. OCG activities in Latvia are connected with publicly known criminal offences (CO) types: i.e. smuggling of narcotic/psychotropic substances; weapons/ammunition and products subject to excise duty; human trafficking, blackmail and collection of debts that is often covered behind legal commercial activity; as well as fraud and cybercrimes characteristic to Latvia. 7. The growing presence of organised crime in Latvia has also been reinforced by the high corruption levels within the state services, as well as by the shadow economy ...” RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW Criminal Procedure Law 62.     Sections 179 to 185 of the Criminal Procedure Law ( Kriminālprocesa likums ) set out the general terms governing searches. A search at premises can be carried out if there are sufficient grounds ( pietiekams pamats ) to consider that the object at issue might be located in those premises (section 179(1)). A search must be aimed at finding items and documents that are relevant to the criminal case (section 179(2)). Under the ordinary procedure for issuing a search warrant, the investigating judge or court authorises the search upon an application by the relevant investigating authority ( procesa virzītājs ), having examined the case material filed in support of that application (section 180(1)). A search warrant must indicate what items and documents must be searched and seized by which domestic authority, where, at whose home, and in connection with which proceedings (section 180(2)). A search must be carried out in the presence of a person whose home is being searched, or an adult member of his or her family (section 181(1)). 63 .     Section 182 of that law lays down the procedure for carrying out a search. A person must be made acquainted with the contents of a search warrant, and he or she must sign that search warrant to indicate that it has been done (section 182(2)). Following amendments effective as of 4   February 2010, a copy of that search warrant must also be issued to a person at whose premises the search is being carried out. The items and documents listed in a search warrant, as well as other items and documents that may be relevant to the case, must be seized (section 182(6)). The items and documents seized must be described in an official record, and, if possible, put in a bag and sealed (section 182(8)). 64 .     Section 185 of that law provides that a copy of a search record must be issued to a person at whose premises the search is being carried out or to his or her adult family member. 65 .     Section 337 of that law lays down the procedure for examining a complaint. A complaint must be addressed to and lodged with a competent authority; it may also be submitted to the official whose action or decision is being contested (paragraph 1). A complaint about an action or decision by an investigator or his or her direct manager must be examined by a supervising prosecutor, whose action or decision must be examined by a higher-ranking prosecutor. A complaint about an action undertaken or decision given by an investigating judge must be examined by the president of the court to which the investigating judge is attached (paragraph   2). When examining a complaint, the president of the court has to decide on the merits; his or her decision is final (paragraph 4). Administrative Law 66.     The relevant sections of the State Administration Structure Law ( Valsts pārvaldes iekārtas likums ) read as follows: Section 54 – Basic Provisions for Co-operation “(1) Institutions shall co-operate in order to perform their functions and tasks. (2) An institution that has received a co-operation request from another institution may refuse co-operation only if the reasons for refusal provided for in section 56 of this Law exist. (3) Institutional co-operation shall be free of charge, unless laid down otherwise in external laws and regulations. (4) Institutions may co-operate both in individual cases and continuously. When co-operating continuously, institutions may enter into interdepartmental agreements (sections 58 – 60). (5) When co-operating, public persons may enter into co-operation contracts (section 61). (6) When co-operating institutions shall provide the necessary information in electronic form unless laid down otherwise in an external regulatory enactment and the provision of information is not in contradiction with the provisions for provision of information laid down in laws and regulations. The procedures by which exchange of such information shall take place, as well as the way of ensuring and certifying the veracity of such information shall be determined by the Cabinet [of Ministers].” Section 55 – Subject-matter of Institutional Co-operation “(1) An institution may propose that another institution ensure the participation of individual administrative officials in the performance of particular administrative tasks. (2) An institution, observing the restrictions laid down in laws and regulations, may request that another institution provide the information that is at its disposal. (3) An institution may request that another institution provide it with an opinion on a matter that is in the competence of the institution that provides the opinion. (4) Upon mutual agreement and without overstepping their competence institutions may determine another subject-matter of co-operation.” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 67.     The applicants complained that the search of 16 June 2009 had been unlawful and carried out in a brutal manner and with disregard for the interests of the second applicant’s child. They argued that the search had taken place with no prior warning (to allow for voluntary compliance) and had inflicted pecuniary damage (such as broken windows). They argued that the involvement of the special police unit h