CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 27 février 2020

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GEORGIA (Applications nos. 21447/11 and 35839/11)     JUDGMENT Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Allegedly insufficient reasoning for applicants’ conviction • Explicit reply not required for arguments insufficiently arguable or substantiated as to cast doubt on domestic courts’ findings and the body of evidence available Art 6 § 1 (criminal) and Art 6 § 3 (c) • Fair hearing • Legal assistance of own choosing • Unmotivated appointment of legal-aid lawyer, rather than the counsel chosen by applicant, without informing the latter • Absence of contact between applicant and legal-aid lawyer during proceedings before the first-instance court • Leave to appeal against in absentia conviction refused on excessively formalistic grounds without addressing applicant’s arguments   STRASBOURG 27 February 2020 FINAL   07/09/2020     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Lobzhanidze and Peradze v. Georgia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   André Potocki,   Yonko Grozev,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lәtif Hüseynov,   Lado Chanturia, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 4 February 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in two applications (nos.   21447/11 and 35839/11) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Georgian nationals, Mr Zurab Lobzhanidze (“the first applicant”) and Ms Pati Peradze (“the second applicant”), on 29   March 2011 and 6   June 2011, respectively. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr E. Lorenz, a lawyer practising in Zurich. The Georgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr B.   Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 3 .     Relying on Article   6 and Article   7 of the Convention, the applicants alleged, in particular, that the domestic judgments rendered as part of the second set of criminal proceedings had not been duly reasoned, and their convictions had not been foreseeable. The first applicant also complained that (i) the presumption of his innocence had been breached, and (ii) he had been denied the right to be defended through legal counsel of his own choosing during the third set of criminal proceedings, and that he had consequently been unable to benefit from the right to appeal against his conviction, in breach of Article   6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention and Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No.   7. 4 .     On 13 December 2017 notice of those complaints was given to the Government and the remainder of applications nos.   21447/11 and 35839/11 was declared inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54   §   3 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The first and second applicants were born in 1964 and 1950, respectively, and have lived in Horgen, Switzerland since 2003 and 2009, respectively. The first applicant is the second applicant’s son-in-law. Criminal proceedings against the applicants 6.     In 2000-2004 the first applicant served as chairman of the board of directors of two companies – JSC Madneuli and LLC Quarzite – engaged in gold and copper mining in Georgia. The first set of criminal proceedings 7 .     On 3 February 2004 the first applicant was charged in absentia with tax evasion and abuse of power in relation to his official managerial and representative authority in LLC Quartzite (a company authorised to mine gold) against the interests of the latter and for the profit of another person – causing substantial damage. 8 .     By an order of 4 February 2004 the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court authorised the detention of the first applicant. He was declared a fugitive and his name was placed on the list of wanted persons. 9 .     On 16 April 2004 the first applicant was also charged with repeated, large-scale tax evasion in connection with his activities in JSC Madneuli (a company authorised to mine copper). 10 .     On 19 February 2004 a correspondent of the Mze television channel stated that while talking to journalists the Prime Minister, Mr Z.Z., had stated that financial scheming within JSC Madneuli should be investigated and that he had warned the first applicant that the Georgian law ‑ enforcement agencies would reach him even in Switzerland (where by that time the first applicant was living). On the same day a Rustavi   2 television channel presenter quoted Mr   Z.Z. as follows: “Madneuli will not be left in dirty hands again. Under the former management the enterprise was deliberately led into bankruptcy.” 11.     In a televised speech on the Imedi television channel, Mr Z.Z stated: “Lobzhanidze is in Switzerland and thinks that Georgian justice will not reach him in Switzerland. We will not leave the activities of these scoundrels unaddressed. Not only were these people doing all this in the past but they are doing their best now to remain within Madneuli and to continue their previous activities. I said once and I am saying again that anyone who dips his hand into a state enterprise will lose his hand.” 12 .     On 20 February 2004, at a press briefing covered by the Mze television channel, the then President of Georgia, Mr M.S., stated: “What is going on in Madneuli? Madneuli is a state enterprise [that mines] gold. It belongs to every Georgian. ... Then a man like Lobzhanidze [is appointed] and 40   million dollars [of the money earned in gold exports] have been stolen ...” 13.     According to the case-file material, on 15   May 2004 a district court issued an order to freeze immovable property (including a house in the village of Kvariati – see paragraph   16 below) “registered in the name of Zurab Lobzhanidze’s mother-in-law [the second applicant] but de facto belonging [ფაქტობრივ მფლობელობაში]” to the first applicant, in order to guarantee a potential civil lawsuit and monetary sanctions as part of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. The property – while formally registered in the second applicant’s name – was treated by the court as belonging to the first applicant who may have chosen not to have had the ownership title registered in his own name in order to hide such property and, if necessary, to protect it against any possible sanctions. The property concerned was therefore sealed. On 26   September 2005 a certain Mr   M.K., acting through a representative (the same as the one of the applicants) and arguing that the house in the village of Kvariati had belonged to him since 26   April 2004, applied to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office to have the seizure order lifted in respect of that house. The prosecutor responded that the selling of the house in question had been regarded by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office as the first applicant’s attempt to evade the payment of potential damages. In February 2006 M.K., the second applicant and N.K. (M.K.’s relative) instituted judicial proceedings requesting to have the provisional seizure order lifted. M.K.’s appeal related to the house in Kvariati, while the second applicant and N.K. complained in respect of other property. On 31   January 2008 the International Investment Company substituted M.K. as the claimant based on the record of the Public Registry indicating that M.K. was no longer registered as the owner of the house in Kvariati (see paragraph   17 below). On 11   June 2008 the Chamber of Civil Cases of the Tbilisi City Court ruled that it had not been competent, ratione materiae , to decide on the matter, and indicated to the parties the proper forum for lodging their applications. The decision was subject to an appeal. It is unclear whether the parties pursued the proceedings related to the provisional seizure order. 14.     As can be seen from the case-file material, on 16   June 2017, following various procedural decisions , a first-instance court convicted the first applicant of abuse of power (see paragraph 7 above). His sentence of two years’ imprisonment was commuted under the Amnesty Act of 2012. Civil claims lodged by the State as well as his former employer were upheld in the amount of 1,700,000 United States dollars (USD) and USD   7,000,000, respectively. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2   July 2018 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and the respective civil claims. The applicant appealed against that decision. The case-file material does not contain information regarding the final outcome of this set of criminal proceedings. The second set of criminal proceedings 15.     On 22 May 2009 a preliminary investigation was opened by the Department for Constitutional Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) in respect of Article   210 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph   44 below) on account of the applicants’ alleged creation of a fictitious sale contract falsely confirming a right to property in respect of another person in order to hide its continued ownership by the first applicant. An internal MIA report of 25   May 2009 noted that operational information had been received indicating the fact that the first applicant, in order to avoid the potential confiscation of his property, had fictitiously sold it through the second applicant to a third person. 16 .     On 25 June   2009 the first applicant was charged under Article   210 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) (see paragraph   44 below) with inciting his mother-in-law (the second applicant) and M.K. to prepare and use a forged document certifying a title to property. The second applicant was charged with preparing and using the document in question. According to the document listing the charges, between 1998 and 2001 the first applicant built a two-storey house in the village of Kvariati, a resort on Georgia’s southern Black Sea coast (“the house”). In view of the absence of documents certifying that he had acquired the property (the house and the plot) through legal means, the first applicant registered the property in the second applicant’s name. In November   2003, in order to further conceal the origin of the property, the first applicant decided to arrange for the fictitious sale of the property to a third party. For this purpose the applicant incited the second applicant and M.K. to prepare and use a false document certifying M.K.’s title to the property in question. On 26 April 2004 a sale contract on the purchase of the real estate which contained false data was concluded by Mr I.P. and N.K. (relatives of the second applicant and M.K.) – acting as their representatives – and was registered with a notary public. The house and the attached land of 3,160 square meters was, according to the charges, fictitiously sold for 200,000 Georgian laris (GEL) (approximately 82,660 euros (EUR)), and the property title registered at the Public Registry. 17 .     The Public Registry record in respect of the house and the plot of land on which it was located indicated that the property in question was registered under M.K.’s ownership on 26   April 2004. The section of the registration record regarding the owner entitled “legal document confirming the right” indicated the sale contract of 26   April 2004 as the basis for the registration. According to the same record, on 10 July 2007 the property was registered under the ownership of International Investment Company LLC, a company registered in Georgia, on the basis of a sale contract dated 18   June 2007. 18 .     On 10 July 2009 the two applicants were declared wanted as part of the second set of the criminal proceedings. 19 .     In the course of the proceedings before the Khelvachauri District Court the applicants’ lawyer requested that (i) the notary public who had registered the impugned sale contract, (ii) the new owner of the property, and (iii) the latter’s representative (who had signed the contract on his behalf) be called as witnesses. The request was refused as unsubstantiated, given the fact that, according to the lawyer, those persons’ addresses were unknown, and it was also not known whether or not they were in Georgia. 20 .     On 6 July 2010 the first-instance court admitted to the case file a letter received by post from M.K. who was apparently residing in Switzerland. M.K. stated that he had purchased the house from the second applicant, but having been unable to exercise his rights as an owner owing to the house being sealed by the police, and the fact that a neighbour had not allowed him to use the shared access to the house, he had instituted judicial proceedings seeking an order for the removal of the seal. Those proceedings had been dismissed. Given that he had not been able to exercise his rights over the house, the parties had “cancelled the sale contract.” 21 .     The first-instance court had held several hearings, including on 1   and 6 July 2010, when it heard statements from various witnesses, and admitted several items as evidence. Among other things, the following evidence was made available before the court: (i)   Statements by a husband and wife – Z.P. and G.P. – who had looked after the house between 2000 and 2009. The two witnesses submitted that the house had belonged to the applicants but also noted that they had heard rumours about it being sold to M.K. Z.P. confirmed that the first applicant had been paying for their services until the time that he had left Georgia. Following that date, the second applicant had continued to pay them for their services. Z.P. stated that nobody had announced himself or herself as the new owner of the house to him. He also confirmed that M.K.’s wife and sister-in-law had attempted to enter the house on one occasion but had been refused admittance by a neighbour who had shared with him the use of the entrance to the house. He did not know in what capacity they had attempted to enter the property. Z.P. stated that the house, except for his room, had been sealed by the police since 2003 or 2004, but had been unsealed by police in 2009. G.P. stated that she had paid electricity bills on the second applicant’s behalf and had received a salary from the second applicant until the end of 2008. G.P. also stated that on an unspecified date in 2009 policemen had entered the house and had told her that it was being confiscated from the first applicant. She also noted that following that date renovation works had been carried out in the house by unknown persons, and that she had heard that the Minister of Internal Affairs had spent his summer vacation there with his family. (ii)   A statement by the owner of a neighbouring hotel who indicated that he had been on friendly terms with the first applicant. And shortly before representatives of the MIA had entered the house, he had received spare keys to that house from G.P. He noted having heard a rumour that the house had been sold to some football player, but he had never seen anyone enter the property. (iii)   Statements by several witnesses, including the applicants’ relatives, confirming that the first applicant had built the house and that it was owned by him and his family. (iv)   Statements given by the previous owners of the land confirming that the first applicant had purchased that land, registered it in the second applicant’s name, and built the house on it. One of those witnesses, Mr I.V., stated that he had sold 500 square meters of land to the first applicant, with the latter subsequently appropriating (without providing payment) an additional 400 square meters from him. The house had been sealed, and Z.P. and his family (see point (i) above) had looked after it until the above ‑ mentioned MIA officials had entered the house in 2009. I.V. had noted in his pre-trial statement that it had been the applicants who had spread rumours about the house being sold. During the trial he noted that there had been some rumours of the house being sold to some football player. Answering the lawyer’s question regarding whether he had seen the football player’s wife (T.B.) or sister-in-law (L.B.), I.V. stated that he had spotted L.B. who had visited the house to spend a holiday, without elaborating further. I.V. reiterated that he could not say whether the house had been sold. I.V. stated that the MIA or the police had entered the house the previous summer and thrown out furniture. Renovation noises had been heard. (v)   A statement by a police officer who had made a note that the first applicant had registered the property in the second applicant’s name in order to conceal its source. He noted that that information had been received as “operative information” (“ოპერატიული ინფორმაცია” – that is to say information obtained from an anonymous source) and that its source was confidential. (vi)   Statements by the first applicant’s former bodyguard and a relative of the first applicant that in 2006-2008 the second applicant had given them money on several occasions for transferral to G.P.’s (see point (i) above) bank account. (vii)   A pre-trial statement by I.P. – a relative of the second applicant – who confirmed having concluded the impugned sale agreement on the second applicant’s behalf. He stated that he had been unaware of the specific conditions of the agreement but had simply signed it. I.P. confirmed that following that date the second applicant had given him money on several occasions for transfer to the bank account of G.P., the person looking after the house (see point (i) above). (viii)   G.P.’s bank account records (which confirmed that the relevant witnesses had transferred money to her on a number of occasions on various dates following the alleged sale of the property) and payment orders made by G.P. in respect of electricity bills for the house. (ix)   A pre-trial statement by I.M., an attorney, confirming that I.M. had met the first applicant in Switzerland in 2007. According to I.M., the first applicant had solicited his advice on how to sell “his house, registered in M.K.’s name,” to a Swiss company. I.M. told him that that a Swiss company would not have the right to make a direct purchase, but that a company registered in Georgia could buy the house and then a Swiss company could acquire that Georgian company, effectively becoming the owner of the property. According to the witness statement, the first applicant had followed that advice. In particular, I.M. had been authorised by him to act as a representative of the Swiss company on whose behalf he had purchased 100% of the shares in the International Investment Company LLC (a company registered in Georgia) “for a symbolic price”. Furthermore, I.M. noted that “in June 2007 a sale contract [had been] concluded indicating that he, acting as a representative of the International Investment Company LLC, had purchased the house from M.K.’s representative. Following this transaction, Zurab Lobzhanidze’s house, located in the village of Kvariati, [had been] registered at the Public Registry as the property of the International Investment Company LLC.” (x) The impugned sale agreement. (xi) Other evidence concerning the formalities of concluding and registering the property. 22.     On 8 July 2010 the Khelvachauri District Court convicted the applicants ( in absentia ) as charged (see paragraph 16 above). The court found that the charges against the applicants had been confirmed by the evidence presented to it, and described the witness statements and other evidence (see paragraph   21 above). The applicants were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment each. 23 .     On 6   August 2010 the applicants appealed against that judgment. According to the applicants, the act allegedly committed by them had not constituted a crime for which they could have been convicted, as the impugned sale contract did not in itself constitute a “document certifying a right to property” provided for in Article 210 of the CC. Even assuming that the sale contract did constitute such a document, it would only have been forged if any of the signatures or the notary seal affixed to it or any other essential elements of the agreement had been forged. In that connection, even in the event that the agreement had not been concluded for the purpose that it had been intended for – that is to say the sale of the property – it should have been declared null and void through civil proceedings. Furthermore, they submitted, among other things, that the initial illegality of the acquisition of the house by the first applicant had never been proved. The applicants further submitted that the conviction had been based on an anonymous source. Furthermore, neither M.K. nor his relatives had been questioned regarding the fictitious nature of the agreement. As the property had been sealed soon after its sale, the buyer had not been able to exercise his ownership right over it, as confirmed by his letter addressed to the lower court. Some of the witnesses had confirmed having seen M.K.’s family being prevented from entering the house. In such circumstances, the second applicant had been obliged to continue to maintain the house until such time as the new owner became capable of taking it over. M.K. had eventually taken his money back. Finally, according to the applicants’ submissions, the initiation of the criminal proceedings and the conviction had been due to the personal interests of the Minister of Internal Affairs – who had moved into the house while the proceedings against them had still been pending – rather than any evidence confirming their guilt. 24.     By a judgment of 30 November 2010 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal upheld, following an oral hearing with the participation of the applicants’ lawyers, the lower court’s judgment in full. Referring to the witness statements and other evidence contained in the case file (see paragraph   21 above), the appellate court held the lower court’s findings of fact and law to have been correct, and that “cumulative analysis and assessment of the evidence” had confirmed that the applicants’ actions had been given the “correct legal classification”. It particularly relied on various witness statements, including those of Z.P., G.P. and the applicants’ relatives, according to which the house had remained at all times in the de facto ownership of the first applicant, and his family had paid for the maintenance services (such as security and cleaning services) in the house following the conclusion of the sale contract between the second applicant and M.K. The appellate court also reproduced parts of the pre-trial statement given by an attorney who had confirmed having discussed with the first applicant ways in which he could sell the property “registered in M.K.’s name” to a Swiss company (see point   (ix) of paragraph   21 above). The appellate court concluded, in view of all the evidence available in the case file, that “the first-instance court [had not] considered the case [in a manner involving] such legal or procedural violations as could have had a substantial impact upon the outcome of the case”. 25 .     On 21 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants as inadmissible. It reproduced the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, holding that “the case [was] not important for the development of the law and coherent judicial practice, the [contested] decision [did] not differ from the Supreme Court’s existing practice in such matters, and the appellate court [had] not committed any major procedural flaws during its examination which could have significantly affected its outcome.” Additionally, the Supreme Court responded to the applicants’ argument in respect of the application of Article   210 of the Criminal Code that their complaint in that regard did not warrant further examination owing to the fact that a well ‑ established practice already existed on the application of the provision in question to similar matters (see paragraph   51 below), and the appellate court’s judgment had been reflective of such practice. The third set of criminal proceedings 26 .     As it appears from the case-file material, on 6   July 2010 the first applicant telephoned D.M., a judge of the Khelvachauri District Court, who at that time was hearing the case brought against the applicants as part of the second set of criminal proceedings. D.M. discontinued the conversation and informed the Kutaisi Court of Appeal of the incident. 27 .     On 8   July 2010 an acquaintance of the first applicant submitted to the Khelvachauri District Court a copy of a letter written by the two applicants and addressed to D.M. The letter was signed by the applicants and gave their address in Switzerland. Among other things, the letter set out the applicants’ argument that the criminal proceedings against them had been fabricated in order that the Minister of Internal Affairs could take over the seaside house as his own. The applicants accused the judge of being biased and obstructing the search for the truth, and told him that “there will come a time when you [D.M.] will have to serve numerous years in jail ... for your illegal actions and injustices ...” 28 .     On 8   September 2010 a criminal case was opened against the first applicant on suspicion of his having grossly interfered with judicial activities in order to influence the administration of the proceedings (სამართალწარმოების განხორციელებაზე ზეგავლენის მიზნით სასამართლოს საქმიანობაში უხეში ჩარევა) (“the third set of criminal proceedings”). 29 .     A note on procedure made by an investigator on 8   September 2010 noted the following: “... at approximately 1 p.m. today I contacted the [first applicant’s] lawyer, I.A., to ask her for the contact information of the [first applicant’s] relatives in order for them to appoint a lawyer [as part of the third set of criminal proceedings]. I.A. told me that Zurab Lobzhanidze had no relatives in Georgia. Subsequently, at approximately 1.53 p.m., Zurab Lobzhanidze contacted me and asked what was going on, to which I answered that I was about to bring charges against him. Zurab Lobzhanidze replied that I should contact his lawyer, I.A., if there were any problems, and hung up.” 30.     On 9   September 2010 the investigator appointed a legal-aid lawyer for the first applicant on the grounds that the first applicant was evading justice and had no relatives in Georgia to appoint a lawyer on his behalf. 31 .     On 9   September 2010 the document containing the charges was signed by the legal-aid lawyer. According to the charges, on 6   July 2010 the first applicant telephoned D.M., a judge of the Khelvachauri District Court, who at that time was hearing the case brought against the applicants as part of the second set of criminal proceedings. “Having put several questions to the judge,” the charges read, “the first applicant tried to grossly interfere with the judicial activities in question.” D.M. immediately discontinued the conversation and informed the Kutaisi Court of Appeal of the incident. Furthermore, on 8   July 2010 the first applicant addressed a letter to the judge (see paragraphs   26-27 above) and attempted to influence him. 32 .     On 30 September 2010 the Khelvachauri District Court, sitting in a different formation, convicted the first applicant, finding him guilty in   absentia of grossly interfering with judicial activities in order to influence the administration of the proceedings and sentencing him to one year’s imprisonment.   The interference had taken the form of the first applicant attempting, according to the court, to influence Judge D.M. to rule on the case in the applicants’ favour. The court also noted, among other things, the Swiss telephone number from which the first applicant had telephoned the judge. It does not appear that the judgment was officially served on the applicant. 33.     The time-limit for appealing against the judgment of 30   September 2010 expired on 30 October 2010. 34 .     On 4 November 2010 the first applicant gave his lawyers, P.K. and K.B., power of attorney, authorising them, either jointly or separately, to (i)   represent and protect his interests before all public institutions in Georgia, (ii) represent and protect his interests before any judicial instance of general jurisdiction in civil, administrative, and criminal cases; and (iii)   “enjoy all rights granted by the law [to] a plaintiff, defendant, third person, victim, accused, convict, and acquitted [person], including [authorisation] to participate in [the consideration of a] case [and] to appeal against any decision, verdict, [or] a resolution of [a] court.” The lawyers were to enjoy “all other rights” that were not specified but were necessary to perform their undertakings under the power of attorney. 35 .     On 26 November 2010 one of the two new lawyers appointed by the applicant, acting upon the power of attorney dated 4   November 2010, lodged an application for leave to appeal against the in absentia judgment of the Khelvachauri District Court. The lawyer submitted that as a party to the second set of criminal proceedings, the first applicant had been entitled to express his opinion on the case, including his misgivings about the impartiality of the judge in question. He requested that the court renew the expired time-limit and consider the first applicant’s appeal on the merits, as his failure to appeal within one month of the date of the lower court’s judgment should have been excused, given that the first applicant had had good reason for not appealing within the time-limit. Specifically, neither the applicant nor his lawyer nor his relatives had been informed of the criminal proceedings in question, and it had been for that reason that the appeal had been lodged out of time. Furthermore, failure to duly inform the applicant of the proceedings had not been excusable, given that the applicant’s address and telephone number in Switzerland had been known to the relevant authorities. Given that such information had been readily available, no need had existed to appoint a legal-aid lawyer. Furthermore, in addition to failing to inform the applicant of the criminal proceedings against him, the legal ‑ aid lawyer had not appealed against the judgment convicting the applicant within the prescribed time-limit. It had been only on 2   November 2010 that the legal-aid lawyer had orally informed the applicant’s lawyer of the judgment of 30   September 2010. The criminal proceedings had therefore been carried out with manifest disregard to the procedural legislation and had been in breach of Article   6 §§ 1 and 3 (a), (b), and (c) of the Convention, justifying the reinstatement of the time-limit for lodging the appeal against the first-instance court’s judgment. 36 .     On 26 November 2010 the Khelvachauri District Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal in a written procedure. It noted that the first applicant had not lodged an appeal against the judgment of 30   September 2010 within the prescribed time-limit of one month. Owing to his being a fugitive, the first applicant’s interests had been defended by a legal-aid lawyer, on whom the judgment had been served. The Khelvachauri District Court continued to note that the law placed the burden of proving the existence of an excuse (by way of arguing for the reinstatement of a time-limit) upon the party who had missed the time-limit in question. As the law did not define what such circumstances could be, it was up to the courts to decide such matters on the basis of the particular circumstances of each case. The court ruled, without elaborating, that the first applicant had failed to meet that burden by providing convincing evidence proving that he had been objectively prevented from appealing. 37.     On 3   December 2010 one of the first applicant’s lawyers (see paragraph   34 above) lodged an appeal, reiterating the previously advanced arguments (see paragraph   35 above). 38 .     On 21 December 2010 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal found that the defence counsel had not been authorised to lodge an appeal. It referred to Article   523 §   4 of the Criminal Procedure Code (“the CCP” – see paragraph   50 below). Noting that one of the conditions for the retrial of a case was the wish of a person convicted in absentia to appeal in his or her absence, the court stated that any desire on the part of the applicant to have the appeal heard in his absence had not been proved on the basis of the documents presented before it. It therefore found that the appeal had been lodged by an unauthorised person and that the Khelvachauri District Court had not had to consider it at all. The appellate court thus annulled, by a final decision, the first-instance court’s decision dated 26 November 2010 (see paragraph   36 above), and left the appeal unexamined. 39.     On 30   December 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged with the appellate court an interlocutory appeal addressed to the Supreme Court, citing Article 518 § 4 of the CCP, under which a lawyer or a representative could lodge an appeal on behalf of a convicted person with the consent of that person. The lawyer argued that the power of attorney that had been enclosed with the appeal had authorised him to represent the applicant. He added that by means of this document the applicant had given his lawyer his explicit consent for him to appeal against decisions delivered in connection with the criminal cases against him. 40 .     On 5   January 2011 a clerk of the Kutaisi Court of Appeal returned to the applicant’s lawyer the interlocutory appeal on the grounds that the appellate court’s decision of 21   December 2010 was final and could not be appealed. Subsequent developments 41 .     It transpires from the material submitted to the Court by the applicants that on 17   February 2014 the former Minister of Internal Affairs was found guilty – in relation to his occupancy and renovation of the house in   Kvariati – of infringing the inviolability of property by abusing an official position. The first-instance court found that the Minister had moved into the house while the proceedings against the two applicants had still been pending. The court noted that the ownership of that house had not been transferred to the State following the applicants’ conviction as the question of the confiscation of that property had not been a part of the criminal proceedings against the two applicants. Furthermore, given that the house had been registered as the property of the LLC International Investment Company, the Minister had had no right to make any use of the house in question. The conviction was upheld by the appellate court and by the Supreme Court on 21 October 2014 and 18 June 2015, respectively. 42.     On 26   March 2014 the Supreme Court applied the Amnesty Act of 2012 in respect of the first applicant in so far as the third set of criminal proceedings was concerned and ruled that he was to “be released from serving the sentence imposed by the Khelvachauri District Court on 30   September 2010 ...” The court also reduced by half the first applicant’s sentence received during the course of the second set of the criminal proceedings. He was therefore to serve a total of three years and six months’ imprisonment. 43.     On 12   July 2016 the Khelvachauri District Court applied the Amnesty Act of 2016 to the second applicant’s conviction. The Act provided for an amnesty for certain crimes, including the one for which the second applicant had been convicted, on the basis of the age of the convicted person in question. Noting that the second applicant had turned   65, the court released her from serving the sentence imposed on her during the second set of the criminal proceedings. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 44 .     Under Article 210 of the Criminal Code, as worded at the material time, “preparing, selling, or using a forged credit or settlement card, other payment document, or a document certifying a right to property that is not a security” was a crime punishable by a fine or correctional labour for up to two years or by the restriction of liberty for up to three years, or by a term of imprisonment of between two and four years, or up to seven years, if committed on more than one occasion, or by a group. 45 .     Under Article   81 §   2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), as worded at the material time, if a suspect or an accused avoided appearing before the investigating bodies, “he or his close relatives” were to be given forty-eight hours to appoint a defence lawyer. If they did not appoint a lawyer within that time-limit, a lawyer was to be appointed on a compulsory basis. 46 .     Article   215 § 1 of the CCP provided for the possibility of renewing a lapsed time-limit on the basis of an excusable reason. Article   215 § 2 provided that the burden of proving the existence of any good reasons rested with the party who had missed the time-limit. 47 .     Under Article 236 § 4 of the CCP, a decision by a court declining to renew a missed time-limit for lodging an appeal could – only once – be appealed against to a higher court. That court could renew the missed time ‑ limit and hear the case on the merits. 48 .     Under Article 481 §   1 of the CCP, the examination of witness evidence by courts could be dispensed with in the event that such a witness “had died or reside[d] outside Georgian territory or [his or her] whereabouts [were] unknown”. 49 .     Under Article 518 § 4 of the CCP, a defence lawyer or a representative could lodge an appeal with the consent of a convicted person. 50 .     Under Article 523 § 4 of the CCP, a person who was convicted in   absentia could lodge an appeal within one month of: his or her arrest; appearance before the relevant bodies; or the day on which the first-instance court judgment was delivered, if the convicted person requested that the appeal be examined in his or her absence. 51 .     The Supreme Court’s decisions of 25   January 2017 (No. 482 აპ- 16) and 4   October 2017 (No. 257 აპ- 17) concerned, inter alia , appeals in respect of Article   210 of the CC, and confirmed, as the latest authorities, that a fictitious sale contract regarding immovable property was considered a forged document within the meaning of the provision in question. THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 52.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 53.     Relying on Article   6   §   1 of the Convention, the applicants complained   that the domestic courts had insufficiently reasoned their convictions as part of the second set of criminal proceedings. The first applicant also complained of the allegedly prejudicial statements made in respect of him by high-level government officials in relation to the first set of criminal proceedings, in breach of Article   6   §   2 of the Convention.     Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1.     In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal... 2.     Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law...” Admissibility The parties’ submissions (a)    The Government 54 .     In so far as the first applicant’s complaint under Article   6 § 2 of the Convention was concerned, the Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that regard. They referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court in relation to Article 18 § 2 of the Civil Code of Georgia – which stipulated that “a person is entitled to demand in court the retraction of information that defames his honour, dignity, privacy, personal inviolability or business reputation”) – arguing that that civil remedy had been available and was effective with respect to alleged violations of the presumption of innocence. 55 .     The Government furthermore submitted in respect of the second applicant’s complaint regarding the second set of criminal proceedings that the second applicant’s sentence had been annulled as a result of the application of an amnesty act, and the criminal record had been expunged. The second applicant’s complaint under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention should therefore either be (i) struck out of the Court’s list of cases on account of the matter having been resolved or (ii) declared inadmissible, as she had not suffered any significant disadvantage. (b)    The applicants 56 .     The first applicant submitted that the civil remedy referred to by the Government had not been available and effective at the time, and that no effective remedy existed at domestic level for complaints related to alleged violations of the presumption of innocence. 57.     The second applicant submitted that the annulment of her sentence had not set her conviction aside. Furthermore, unlike a judgment by the Court, the findings of a domestic court under the Amnesty Act could not serve as grounds for a fresh trial of the applicant. She also noted that she had left Georgia in order to avoid detention for what she considered to have been a wrongful conviction, and during that period she had had health problems, her personal circumstances were thus greatly affected by the second set of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the matter could not be considered as resolved. Nor was the complaint inadmissible on the grounds of the applicant allegedly having suffered no disadvantage, because the guilty verdict had not been quashed and the applicant could still be perceived as guilty, even though she had not served the sentence, thereby causing her great distress. The Court’s assessment (a)    The first applicant’s complaint under Article   6 §   2 regarding the first set of criminal proceedings 58.     The Court takes note of the Government’s argument that the first applicant had failed to resort to an allegedly effective civil remedy that had been at his disposal in respect of his complaint under Article   6 § 2 of the Convention. However, the Court need not address that point. It is undisputed that the first applicant failed to raise the matter before the domestic authorities. Thus, even assuming that no relevant or effective remedy was available to him, the Court notes that the instant complaint was raised before it on 29   March 2011, while the event complained of occurred