CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 avril 2020

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page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s1A204A7C { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#444444 } .s66E9FC38 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s69AB78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#f9f9f9 } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff } .s8EB5F569 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff } .sD30F6183 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:0.5pt }   FOURTH SECTION CASE OF ATV ZRT v. HUNGARY (Application no. 61178/14)     JUDGMENT   Article 10 • Freedom of expression • Television company prohibited from describing political party as “far-right” on the basis of unforeseeable application of statutory ban on the communication of any “opinion” by a newsreader • Domestic legislation lacking precision and absence of domestic courts’ common practice • Courts’ failure to demonstrate, in light of the aim of the ban, whether   the impugned term was capable of upsetting balanced and unbiased presentation of a matter of public interest • Courts’ failure to consider factual circumstances of the case and arguments based on the veracity and factual accuracy of the impugned term • Courts required to ensure that the statutory ban did not turn into means of suppressing free speech   STRASBOURG 28 April 2020   FINAL   28/07/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of ATV Zrt v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ganna Yudkivska, President,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Egidijus Kūris,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Georges Ravarani,   Marko Bošnjak,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian company, ATV Zrt (“the applicant company”), on 3 September 2014; the decision to give notice to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 3 July 2018, 8 January 2019, 11   February 2020 and 17 March 2020; Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last date: INTRODUCTION The applicant company in the present case, the owner of a television channel, complained that the domestic courts’ decision finding that it had infringed the Media Act, in particular its provision prohibiting the expression of opinions in news programmes, had violated its right to freedom of expression. The applicant company relied on Article 10 of the Convention. THE FACTS 1.     The applicant company is the owner of the TV channel ATV, with its registered place of business in Budapest. The applicant company was represented by Mr D. Karsai, a lawyer practicing in Budapest. 2.     The Government were represented by their Agent at the Ministry of Justice, Mr Z. Tallódi. 3.     ATV is an independent broadcaster, providing television and online services. Every evening it broadcasts televised news programmes that last for about 30 minutes. During the news programmes, a series of news items is introduced by a newsreader in a studio, and each news item is then presented by a different news reporter. 4 .     On 26 November 2012, in a speech delivered during a plenary session, a member of parliament from the political party Jobbik , Mr M.Gy., stated that “it is time ... that we made an assessment how many persons of Jewish origin, especially members of Parliament and government, there are who pose a risk to national security...”. 5 .     On 29 November 2012 the applicant television company broadcast a news item on preparations for a demonstration organised by a number of political parties with the title “Mass demonstration against Nazism” to be held as a protest against the political party Jobbik. It was explained that the background to the event was Mr M.Gy.’s speech during the plenary session and the party’s name was also mentioned. The newsreader introduced the news item by stating that “an unprecedented alliance is about to materialise on Sunday against the biased remarks of the parliamentary far right”. 6.     Following a complaint from the press officer of Jobbik , the National Media and Infocommunications Authority initiated proceedings against the applicant company, found that the latter had infringed section 12(3) and   (4) of Act no CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication (hereinafter the “Media Act”), and prohibited it from repeating the statement. It declared that the expression “parliamentary far right” went beyond a factual statement and amounted to a value judgment. The Authority noted in its reasoning that it was irrelevant whether the statement had negative connotations or was based on fact or was shared by a number of people or was the opinion of the newsreader or the broadcasting company. The communication of any opinion by a newsreader was prohibited by the Media Act, to ensure that the public received unbiased news and political information. 7.     The applicant company appealed, arguing that the term “far-right” was widely used in relation to Jobbik , that it had a scientific basis in political and social science, and that it reflected Jobbik ’s position in Parliament. 8 .     By its decision of 17 April 2013 the Media Council of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, acting as a second-instance authority, upheld the first-instance decision, endorsing its reasoning that the fact that a certain opinion was shared by the wider public did not change the nature of that opinion. 9.     The applicant company sought judicial review of this decision. It maintained that the impugned statement constituted an integral part of a news item describing a certain parliamentary group. The term was widely used and thus unlikely to influence the audience. It pointed out that the international media referred to Jobbik as a far-right party and some of the information published on the party’s own website also contained this term. 10 .     By a judgment of 30 September 2013 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court overturned the decision of 17 April 2013 (see paragraph   8 above) and remitted the case to the Media Council of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. The judgment contained the following reasoning: “It is significant that nowadays the term ‘right-wing’ is not used solely in relation to extreme, chauvinistic movements in daily political life (for instance sympathisers of fascist or national socialist ideologies) but also in relation to right-wing political parties with a milder stance. It is a sociological fact that the term has lost its meaning as referring exclusively to ‘extremists’. The same adjective could describe both truly radical, aggressive standpoints and also more moderate ideologies. It is a matter for political and sociological debate which category is to be referred to, but it is a fact that in current national and European public life [the term] is used to cover both. As a consequence, if a party whose founding document acknowledges its radical right-wing ideology is referred to in a news programme as ‘far-right’ – an adjective widely accepted in public and scientific life – this does not mean that an opinion is being expressed about the party, and especially not that it is associated with extreme chauvinistic ideas. It simply means that the political entity in question is being described, factually, using one of the various meanings of the adjective – not based on the plaintiff’s subjective assessment – corresponding to its nature as accepted by current social and political public understanding. The fact that the term ‘far-right’ is used in conjunction with the adjective ‘parliamentary’ further diminishes the impression that it refers to extreme ideology.” 11.     The respondent requested a review of the judgment before the Kúria. 12 .     By a judgment of 16 April 2014 the Kúria overturned the first ‑ instance judgment and upheld the Media Council’s decision. It also ordered the applicant company to pay 91,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 300 euros (EUR)) in court fees and HUF   80,000 (approximately EUR 260) for the respondent’s legal costs before the domestic courts. According to the Kúria: “The term ‘far-right’ in the news programme is an opinion, not a statement of fact. According to the first-instance court, the term ‘far-right’ is the subject of political and social debate and if terminology is debated, it cannot be the subject of a factual statement. The debate was not about the meaning of the term ‘far-right’, but whether the term ‘far-right’ constitutes an opinion on a news item or a statement of fact. In the Kúria ’s view the mentioning of the ‘parliamentary far right’ constitutes an expression of opinion. Jobbik does not consider itself a far-right party, and describing it using such an adjective constitutes an expression of opinion, creating an association with an extreme radical stance in the public’s mind, and thus having a negative influence.” 13 .     The applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint. It submitted, amongst other things, that political parties are regularly described using adjectives, such as the “Green” party or the “Christian” democrats, which do not reflect an opinion. Similarly, in the present case the use of the adjective reflected additional information about Jobbik that is accepted by the general public. It argued that the term should be analysed in its broader context, namely that it was expressed in connection to a demonstration triggered by an anti-Semitic comment of a Jobbik member. It also emphasised that the term was to describe the position of Jobbik in Parliament, which was factually on the far-right. 14 .     On 6 December 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. The judgment contained the following reasoning: “Section 12 of the Media Act regulates the relationship between the media and the news, opinions and evaluative explanations they broadcast as a sub-rule of the obligation to provide balanced and factual coverage. Pursuant to this provision, in news and political information programmes of the media service provider, presenters, newsreaders or reporters cannot, as a general rule, add an opinion or an evaluative explanation to the political news they are transmitting, with the exception of providing background information. Any opinion or evaluative explanation added to the news provided in a programme must be made in a form that distinguishes it from the news itself, indicates its nature as such, and identifies its author. The legislation therefore does not envisage a simple prohibition on expressing opinions, since the expression of opinions is possible, but the public needs to be informed that the expression is an opinion and about its author, and it should be distinguished from the news itself. The Media Act sets the external, legislative boundaries of a fundamental right. The provisions [of the Media Act] do not require that an opinion has a factual basis and do not pose a restriction on the publication of opinions without any factual basis but regulate the manner of publication of any such opinion. The regulation balances the right to freedom of expression against the public’s right to factual and unbiased information; it restricts the right to freedom of expression to a minimal extent by providing that media consumers should be duly informed about the fact that a particular term is an expression of opinion and about its author. ... 35.     If a qualifying adjective expressed in context in connection with a news item cannot be traced back to an organisation or person unconnected with the media, or if the origin of the opinion is not clearly stated, it can create the impression in the public that it is the opinion of the broadcaster or newsreader. ... 43.     In the Constitutional Court’s view, classifications used in political science and everyday language are not exact categories, and opinions vary as to which political ideologies might be included. The legislation does not differentiate between positive or negative opinion, but restricts every opinion or explanatory comment on news items. Section 12 (3) and (4) forbid the expression of any opinion, and rather regulate the appropriate way of publication. ... 45.     The self-definition of the political party in question is not an objective measurement, neither is the opinion of the general public. The aim of the legislation is, above all, to safeguard the public’s interest in credible information. ... 47.     In the case of news reporting, it can be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether the adjective used reflects a social consensus to such an extent that there is no doubt that the adjective represents a fact. However, if there is no such standard beyond doubt, or if there are grounds for believing that the expression is an opinion, further individual assessment is needed to decide whether the adjective is the newsreader’s opinion or whether it has other origins. ... 50.     The expression was a quotation from one of the descriptions used by the organisers [of the demonstrations] (fascist, far-right)...but it was not made clear that it reflected the opinion and value judgment of the organisers. ... 52.     Classifications in political science or in colloquial language that do not correspond to exact categories or undisputed facts are generally subjective opinions. Although the adjective was used to express the opinion of the organisers of the demonstration and therefore reflected the regularly used, well-established opinion of certain social groups, it is still necessary to distinguish it from the newsreader’s opinion. ... 56.     Even a widely used expression can influence public opinion, since public opinion changes over time and due to circumstances, so that even well-established public opinion can be reinforced or weakened by the use of an adjective. The recurring use of an adjective ... by newsreaders may fall foul of the prohibition on expressing an opinion, since such usage can infringe credibility and objectivity.” RELEVANT legal framework 15 .     The relevant provisions of the Media Act provide as follows: Information Activities Section 12 “... (2) Depending on the nature of the programmes, a balanced manner of information provision shall be ensured either within the given programme or within a series of programmes appearing regularly. (3) Save for providing background information about the news in question, employees of the media service provider appearing regularly in the programmes and providing news service and political information as presenters, newsreaders or correspondents may not add any opinion or evaluative explanation to the political news appearing in the programme aired by any media service provider. (4) Any opinion or evaluative explanation added to the news provided in a programme shall be made in a form that distinguishes it from the news itself, indicates its nature as such, and identifies its author.” Section 186 “(1) When the infringement is of minor significance and no re ‑ occurrence can be established, the Media Council or the Office – after noting and issuing a warning about the occurrence of the infringement – may, setting a deadline of thirty days at the most, request that the infringer discontinue its unlawful conduct, refrain from infringement in the future, and act in a law ‑ abiding manner, and it may also set the conditions hereof.” 16 .     At its 103rd plenary session, held on 19 and 20 June 2015, the   Venice Commission   adopted an Opinion on Media Legislation (Act CLXXXV on Media Services and on the Mass Media, Act CIV on the Freedom of the Press, and the Legislation on Taxation of Advertisement Revenues of Mass Media) of Hungary (CDL-AD(2015)015). The relevant parts of the Opinion read as follows: Provisions related to the positive obligation to give balanced press coverage “47. Section 13 of the Press Act in its current form requires that linear media service providers (i.e. essentially radio and TV broadcasters) must provide ‘balanced’ information (see also Section 12 (2) of the Media Act). In addition, Section 12 (4) of the Media Act obliges the presenters of the news programs to distinguish clearly between ‘facts’ and ‘opinions’. These requirements concern information programs. Section 181 of the Media Act establishes an administrative procedure to handle the infringements of the obligation of balanced information. This procedure will be initiated on request of ‘the party subscribing to the unrepresented view, or any viewer or listener’ and can lead to a decision of the Media Council to impose either the obligation to broadcast or publish the declaration of infringement or to provide an opportunity for the petitioner to make his viewpoint known. The Media Council’s resolution in this respect is subject to judicial review. 48.     It must be noted that Section 13 of the Press Act has already been amended, in response of the recommendations contained in the CoE expert examination of 2012. Namely, the requirement of the ‘diverse, comprehensive, factual, up-to-date, objective’ coverage was removed from the law. Furthermore, Section 13 of the Press Act is now applicable only to linear media service providers. Those amendments are welcome. The question is whether the remaining requirements (‘balanced’ news coverage and the obligation to distinguish between ‘facts’ and ‘opinions’) are justified. 49.     Balanced and neutral news reporting is, indeed, a commendable professional standard for every journalist. Furthermore, it is perfectly legitimate to require that ‘media system on the whole’ is organised in such a manner as “to provide credible information, quickly and accurately” (see Section 10 of the Press Act). After all, Article 11 of the EU Charter specifically guarantees ‘media pluralism’, which is impossible without diverse and balanced media coverage of current events. As the Venice Commission held in its opinion on laws ‘Gasparri’and ‘Frattini’ of Italy, “media pluralism is achieved when there is a multiplicity of autonomous and independent media at the national, regional and local levels, ensuring a variety of media content reflecting different political and cultural views’; further down it continued: ‘while external pluralism relates particularly to the private sector, internal pluralism has increasingly become associated with the public sector’. In the Hungarian context, measures aimed at limiting over-concentration of the media and provisions fixing minimal quotas for national and European independent content providers are supposed to ensure diversity of opinions on the media market as a whole (see, in particular, Part Two of the Media Act, Chapters I, IV, V and VI). 50.     However, it is questionable whether ‘balance’ should become an enforceable legal obligation of every particular media taken alone. The norms under consideration create a very complex obligation on the media and lack precision. How can information be ‘balanced’? One can understand balance of opinion, but information (facts) needs to be thorough and accurate, not ‘balanced’? How quickly has the ‘balance’ to be achieved when the programme is a ‘series of programmes regularly shown’? Should the ‘balance’ be assessed in quantitative or more in qualitative terms? In addition, ‘facts’ cannot always be clearly distinguished from ‘opinions’; after all, it is difficult to imagine an anchor-man not using any adjective, while every adjective gives a flavour of an ‘opinion’ to a statement of fact. In sum, the vagueness of the terms employed in two acts may turn those provisions into a tool of suppression of the free speech, even if originally it was supposed to promote non-opinionated news reporting. 51.     It was reported during the visit that the above positive obligations of the media are not strictly enforced in respect of the public service media, and, at the same time, create additional burden for the private media. The Venice Commission understands the need to distinguish between facts and opinions and provide ‘balanced’ news coverage, especially when those requirements are applied to public service media. However, given the vagueness of those concepts and the risk of abusive interpretation of Section 13 of the Press Act and Section 12 of the Media Act, the Venice Commission recommends the Media Council to issue clear policy guidelines on the application of those provisions. Such guidelines should be developed by the Media Council jointly with the self-regulatory bodies, and should be published.” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 17.     The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the domestic courts’ decisions had entailed an interference with its right to freedom of expression that could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. Article 10 reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Admissibility 18.     The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant company 19.     The applicant company claimed that the infringement of its right to freedom of expression had had no basis in clear and foreseeable practice, and that it had been punished for having employed what was a commonly used expression to describe Jobbik. It also maintained that the aim of the restriction had not been to protect the audience’s interest in receiving unbiased information, but rather to protect the reputation of the political party. This was evident from the fact that its news programmes had not been considered biased in general, but only as regards the use of the adjective describing Jobbik. 20.     It argued that the term “far-right” was not a reflection of its subjective opinion but was commonly accepted in Hungary when referring to Jobbik . It maintained that it had applied this term in good faith and disputed the criterion applied by the Constitutional Court and supported by the Government, namely that for a term to qualify as a statement of fact, there should be “no doubt” whatsoever in society about its accuracy. In its view, in these days of modern media all notions were likely to be the subject of public debate. 21.     The applicant company further contested the Government’s argument that – since there was no blanket prohibition on expressing opinions – it had not suffered significant prejudice and could have presented the alleged opinion in a different way. It argued that the newsreaders’ job would be impossible if they were obliged to declare each time a term they used might constitute a value judgment. 22.     The applicant company accepted that it was under an obligation to inform the public in an unbiased manner; however, it submitted that there could never be complete impartiality in news reporting (given that even the selection of news items represented a value judgment), which posed a natural limitation on its duties of impartial reporting. (b)    The Government 23.     The Government argued that the complaint under examination was of a fourth-instance character, that the national courts had set out the reasons for their decisions, and that the Court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it overruled them. 24 .     In addition, the Government contested that the applicant company’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. They accepted that the injunction interfered with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression and was based on sections 12 and 186 of the Media Act. However, they maintained that the injunction had been necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the right of others to receive balanced and unbiased information on matters of public life and current events and to guarantee pluralism of information and a democratic public opinion. 25 .     According to the Government, democratic public opinion could come about only through the provision of full and objective information. The measure in question served to protect freedom of the press and to prevent the emergence of monopolistic public opinion based on an “officially correct version”. Since the provision was meant to ensure that service providers did not influence their audience surreptitiously by broadcasting subjective opinions, it was irrelevant whether the opinion had negative or positive connotations or a factual basis. 26 .     In this connection the Government emphasised that television programmes had a greater influence on the public since they reached a wider audience, even in the case of programmes knowingly chosen. Also, audio-visual content, by definition, influenced its audience differently. 27.     Endorsing the findings of the Kúria and the Constitutional Court, the Government maintained that the impugned statement constituted an opinion. Since the expression “far-right” was not an exact category but a matter of political and social debate, it could not be argued that referring to a political party in those terms had been a factual statement. They pointed out that Jobbik had not identified itself as far-right party but as a conservative, value-based, national-Christian party “radical in its methods”. Furthermore, there was no social consensus on the term, which could leave the audience with the impression that it had been a subjective opinion on the part of the newsreader. This was even more likely since the newsreader had failed to clarify that the use of the impugned adjective had been a quotation of the opinion of the organisers of the demonstration. 28.     As to the proportionality of the measure, the Government explained that the Media Act did not impose a complete ban on the expression of opinion, but merely regulated the manner of publication thereof, requiring that opinions be expressed only if their origin was specified. Moreover, the sanction that had been imposed on the applicant company for its infringement of the Media Act had been the least severe one. The Court’s assessment 29.     It has not been contested by the parties that the injunction in question amounted to an interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression provided for in Article 10 of the Convention. 30.     Such an interference must be “prescribed by law”, pursue one or more legitimate aims in the light of paragraph 2 of Article 10, and be “necessary in a democratic society”. 31.     In the present case the parties’ opinions differed as to whether the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression was prescribed by law. The applicant company argued that it had not been foreseeable that the domestic courts would interpret the term “far-right” as an opinion rather than a statement of fact and would therefore penalise its usage in a news programme, relying on section 12 of the Media Act. The Government maintained that the interference had been based on the provisions of the Media Act. 32.     The Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. One of the requirements flowing from the expression “prescribed by law” is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct; he or she must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice. The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. The Court has found that persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation, can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails (see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos.   42461/13 and 44357/13, §§ 122-125, ECHR 2016 (extracts), with further references). 33.     The Court notes that section 12 of the Media Act, which served as the basis for the restriction of the applicant company’s expressive activities, states that presenters, newsreaders or correspondents must not add any opinion or evaluative explanation to political news. 34.     The Court had regard to the Opinion of the Venice Commission, which emphasises that “facts” cannot always be clearly distinguished from “opinions” and that the vagueness of the terms employed in legislation may turn the relevant provisions into a tool for the suppression of free speech, even if originally the legislation was supposed to promote non-opinionated news reporting (see paragraph 16 above). Nevertheless, in the present case the Court does not find it necessary to decide whether the above considerations alone can serve as a basis for finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Chumak v.   Ukraine , no.   44529/09, §   48, 6 March 2018, with further references). 35 .     It follows from the principles stated above that the salient issue in this case is not whether section 12 of the Media Act is in principle sufficiently foreseeable, in particular in its use of the term “opinion”, but whether when publishing the statement containing the term “far-right”, the applicant company knew or ought to have known – if need be, after taking appropriate legal advice – that that expression would represent an “opinion” in the present circumstances. 36.     It appears that the applicant company’s case was the first in which the domestic courts had been called on to examine whether an adjective describing a political ideology constituted a statement of fact or an opinion – the courts examining the case did not refer to any previous domestic case ‑ law, nor did the parties provide any examples of such case-law to the Court. Likewise, no standards as to the distinction between facts and opinions about political parties can be discerned from any other material which has been made available by the parties. The Court acknowledges that the very fact that the applicant company’s case was the first of its kind does not, as such, make the interpretation of the law unforeseeable, as there must come a day when a given legal norm is applied for the first time (see   Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania , no. 69317/14, § 67, 30 January 2018, and   the cases cited therein). 37.     For the Court the question whether the domestic courts’ approach could reasonably have been expected is closely related to the issue whether in a democratic society it was necessary to ban the term “far-right” in a news programme in the circumstances of the present case and in light of the legitimate aim pursued by the restriction. The Court therefore considers that it is not necessary to address the question whether section 12 of the Media Act could, in abstracto , constitute a foreseeable legal basis for the interference complained of (see paragraph 35 above) and will continue the examination of the case, turning to the questions whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim and whether it corresponded to any “pressing social need”. (a)    Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim 38.     The parties had somewhat divergent views with regard to the aim of the interference in issue. The applicant company agreed that the interference had pursued the aim of protecting the reputation of a political party. The Government maintained that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the right of others, which encompassed the right of the audience to receive information on matters of public life in respect of pluralism of information and a democratic public opinion. 39.     The Court is satisfied that the measure in question was intended to ensure the audience’s right to a balanced and unbiased coverage of matters of public interest in news programmes, and thus pursued the aim of the “protection of the rights of others”. 40.     The pertinent question remains whether the restriction on the applicant company’s freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society. (b)    Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society (i)   General principles 41.     The fundamental principles concerning the question whether an interference with freedom of expression is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in the Court’s case-law and were summarised in   Bédat v. Switzerland   ([GC], no. 56925/08, § 48, 29 March 2016). 42.     The Court also reiterates the principles concerning pluralism in the audio-visual media set out in   Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v.   Italy   ([GC], no.   38433/09, §§ 129-34, ECHR 2012). 43 .     As to the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State, it depends on a number of factors. It is defined by the type of expression at issue and, in this connection, there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on debates on questions of public interest. The margin is also narrowed by the strong interest of a democratic society in the press exercising its vital role as a public watchdog: freedom of the press and other news media affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. It is incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on subjects of public interest and the public also has a right to receive them (see Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 102, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The task of imparting information necessarily includes, however, “duties and responsibilities” (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, § 89, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). (ii)   Application in the present case 44.     The Court notes that in the present case many of the parties’ arguments revolve around the assessment of whether the term “far-right” was a statement of fact or an opinion. The Government submitted that the domestic courts had rightly taken the view that the newsreader’s comments amounted to an opinion, infringing section 12 of the Media Act. In the applicant company’s understanding the newsreader had used in good faith a term generally accepted to describe the political party. 45.   The Court must establish the necessity of the interference in the present case by examining whether applicant company could have foreseen that the courts would categorise the impugned term as an “opinion”, having regard to the circumstances of the present case and the aim of the restriction contained in section 12 of the Media Act. 46.     The Court first notes that even though the notion of “opinion” in section 12 of the Media Act appears to be very broad and may cover all kinds of adjectives (see the Opinion of the Venice Commission, quoted in paragraph 16 above), it is clear that the aim of the ban on expressing opinions was to protect democratic public opinion from undue influence by media service providers and was in the interests of providing objective information (see paragraph 25 above). In the Court’s view, in the absence of a definition in the legislation, the judicial review of any measure taken under section 12 had the role of developing a sufficiently specific interpretation of the provision to precisely address the risk of distortion which the State sought to avoid. It was thus for the domestic courts to interpret the term “opinion” in a manner that took into account the aim of the restriction and guaranteed the audience’s right to a balanced and impartial coverage of matters of public interest, as well as the media’s right to impart information and ideas. In other words, in view of the lack of precision in the legislation, the domestic courts were required to ensure that the contested provision concerned only expressions which were likely to upset balanced reporting on matters of public interest and which could arguably be restricted, and that it did not turn into a tool for the suppression of free speech, encompassing activities and ideas which are protected by Article 10. 47.     As to the judicial review carried out in the present case, the Court observes that throughout the proceedings the domestic courts suggested different elements of analysis to decide on the nature of the impugned term. The Budapest Administrative and Labour Court qualified the newsreader’s statement as one of fact, emphasising that the term “far-right” could describe a variety of political ideologies, but that the appropriate terminology was a matter of social and political debate. It also referred to the funding declaration of Jobbik, in which it identified itself as a radical right-wing party (see paragraph 10 above). On the contrary, the Kúria, acting as a second-instance court, found it relevant when establishing that the impugned statement had constituted an opinion, that Jobbik did not identify itself as a party with a far-right political stance (see paragraph 12 above). Lastly, to explain the difference between statements of fact and opinions, the Constitutional Court held that an adjective could be classified as a statement of fact if it was accepted beyond doubt in society. The term “far-right” was a disputed term which did not have a precise definition either in political sciences or in colloquial language; it therefore constituted a subjective opinion. According to the Constitutional Court, in the present case it represented the personal belief of the organisers of the demonstration against Jobbik , from which the newsreader had failed to distinguish himself (see paragraph 14 above). 48.     The Court notes the variety of approaches applied by the domestic courts in determining the nature of the impugned term (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 14 above). It also observes that the Government did not demonstrate the existence of a common practice, either. This state of affairs casts doubt on whether the interpretation given by the higher-level domestic courts in the present case – namely, that a statement containing the term “far-right” constituted an opinion – could reasonably have been expected. 49.     More importantly, there is no indication that the domestic courts sought to consider, when assessing the nature of the impugned notion, that the legislation was supposed to promote balanced news reporting. Although the Constitutional Court referred to the public’s right to factual and unbiased information, in reaching its decision it simply found that public opinion could be influenced by the use of an adjective, without demonstrating whether in the circumstances of the present case the specific term at issue was capable of upsetting the balanced presentation of a matter of public interest. 50.     The Court is mindful of the applicant company’s argument, also adduced before the domestic courts, that hearing Jobbik referred to as a “far-right” party was sufficiently commonplace for the audience; it was a generally accepted category in the media, scientific discourse and colloquial language in relation to Jobbik. The Court also finds force in the applicant company’s more general argument before the domestic courts that political parties were frequently defined with adjectives (green party, conservative party, and so on) that merely referred to their political objectives and programmes and did not constitute an opinion or value judgment about them, capable of creating bias in the audience (see paragraph 13 above). 51.     The applicant company also relied on the factual circumstances of the case, namely that the disputed term was expressed in connection with a demonstration triggered by an anti-Semitic comment by a Jobbik member. In those circumstances, the Court finds that such factual elements were relevant for the contention that the term “far-right” did not concern an assessment of someone’s conduct in terms of its morality, or a personal feeling of the speaker, but the position of a party within the political spectrum in general and in Parliament in particular. Nonetheless, the domestic courts did not consider the circumstances surrounding the information which formed the object of the reporting, but instead the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Media Act did not require that an opinion had a factual basis (see paragraph 14 above), thus implicitly considering irrelevant any defence by the applicant company based on the veracity and factual accuracy of the term employed. 52.     Having regard to the domestic courts’ divergent approaches to distinguishing facts from opinions, to the aim of the relevant provisions of the Media Act and to the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the applicant company could not have foreseen that the term “far-right” would qualify as an opinion. Nor could it have foreseen that the prohibition of its use in a news programme would be necessary in order to protect unbiased reporting. 53.     Therefore, the restriction placed on the applicant company in its use of the impugned term was a disproportionate interference with its right to freedom of expression, and thus not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 54.     Lastly, the Government relied on the relatively lenient nature of the sanction imposed, but in the light