CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 14 mai 2020

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font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sC402E089 { height:70.25pt } .s1043E884 { height:88.55pt } .s2B644500 { height:31.3pt } .s2B956407 { height:7.35pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .s2CE7C1B9 { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 }   FIRST SECTION CASE OF ROMIĆ AND OTHERS v. CROATIA (Applications nos. 22238/13 and 6 others)     JUDGMENT This version was rectified on 1 September 2020 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court   Art 37 • Striking out applications • Unilateral declaration acknowledging Art 6 violations and offering compensation • Reopening of flawed proceedings not clearly guaranteed, given domestic-law requirement for a violation to be found in a “judgment” and lack of case-law about strike-out decisions • Respect for human rights requiring examination to be continued Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Equality of arms and adversarial trial Art 6 § 1 (criminal) and Art 6 § 3 (c) • Rights of defence • Defence in person   STRASBOURG 14 May 2020   FINAL   14/08/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Romić and others v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,   Ksenija Turković,   Aleš Pejchal,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Tim Eicke,   Jovan Ilievski, judges, and Abel Campos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 25 February 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in seven applications (nos. 22238/13, 30334/13, 38246/13, 57701/13, 62634/14, 52172/15 and 17642/15) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by seven Croatian nationals and one national of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the applicants”), on the dates listed in the Appendix to this judgment. 2.     The first, second, fourth, fifth and seventh applicants were represented by Ms V. Drenški Lasan, a lawyer practising in Zagreb, the third applicant was represented by Mr A. Fišbah, a lawyer practising in Osijek, the sixth applicant was represented by Mr Č. Prodanović, a lawyer practising in Zagreb and the eighth applicant was self-represented. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms   Š.   Stažnik. 3.     The applicants alleged (as specified in the appended table), that they had not had a fair trial, in that the submissions of the competent State Attorney’s Office had never been forwarded to the defence and/or that the sessions of the appeal panel in the criminal proceedings against them had been held in their absence, contrary to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. 4.     On 29 June and 8 October 2015 notice of the above complaints was given to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not make use of their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention). THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. Romić v. Croatia , application no. 22238/13 6.     On 18 February 2004 the first and second applicants were indicted in the Zagreb County Court ( Županijski sud u Zagrebu ) on charges of economic crime. 7.     By a judgment of 30 June 2010 the Zagreb County Court found the first and second applicants guilty as charged and sentenced the first applicant to three years’ imprisonment and the second applicant to two and a half years’ imprisonment. 8.     In September 2010 the first and second applicants lodged appeals against the Zagreb County Court’s judgment with the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ), challenging the factual and legal grounds for their convictions and sentences, and complaining of numerous other substantive and procedural flaws in the trial and the judgment. 9.     During the appeal proceedings the Supreme Court forwarded the appeals and the Zagreb County Court’s case file to the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia ( Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske ) for it to examine and provide an opinion. 10.     On 2 December 2010 the Deputy State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter “the Deputy State Attorney”) submitted a reasoned opinion to the Supreme Court, calling for the dismissal of the appeals. That opinion was never forwarded to the defence. 11.     On 12 January 2011 the Supreme Court held a session in the presence of the first and second applicants’ lawyers and the Deputy State Attorney. During the session, the Deputy State Attorney confirmed his reasoned opinion. The first and second applicants’ lawyers reiterated the arguments set out in their appeals. 12.     On the same day the Supreme Court adopted a judgment by which it upheld the first and second applicants’ convictions. 13.     On 11 and 13 April 2011 the first and second applicants lodged constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ) arguing that their right to a fair trial had been violated, inter alia , because they had not been served with the submissions of the Deputy State Attorney to the Supreme Court. 14.     On 28 June 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first and second applicants’ constitutional complaints on the grounds that the relevant domestic law did not require the appeal courts to forward submissions of the competent State Attorney’s Office to the defence. 15.     The decisions of the Constitutional Court were served on the first and second applicants’ lawyer on 17 September 2012. Vlaškalić v. Croatia , application no. 30334/13 16.     On 8 May 2001 the third applicant was indicted in the Beli Manastir Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Belom Manastiru ) on charges of armed robbery. 17.     After several acquittals of the third applicant at first instance and remittals of the case for re-examination by the appeal court, on 23 April 2012 the Osijek Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Osijeku ), to which the case had been transferred in the meantime, found the third applicant guilty and sentenced him to eleven months’ imprisonment, suspended for five years. 18.     On 25 May 2012 the third applicant appealed to the Osijek County Court ( Županijski sud u Osijeku ), alleging numerous substantive and procedural flaws in the proceedings and the findings in the judgment. He also asked that he and his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 19.     On 30 May 2012 the Osijek County Court held a session in the presence of the Osijek County Deputy State Attorney ( zamjenik Županijskog državnog odvjetnika u Osijeku ) without informing the third applicant or his lawyer of it. On the same day the Osijek County Court dismissed the third applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 20.     The third applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that he and his lawyer had not been given an opportunity to be present at the session of the appeal panel. 21.     On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the third applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 22.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the third applicant’s lawyer on 13 October 2012. Radonić v. Croatia , application no. 38246/13 23.     On 5 February 2009 the fourth applicant was indicted in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court ( Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu ) on charges of damaging State-owned property. 24.     On 6 September 2010 he was found guilty as charged and reprimanded. 25.     On 22 September 2010 the fourth applicant lodged an appeal with the Zagreb County Court, complaining of a number of substantive and procedural flaws. He also asked that he and his lawyer be present at the session of the appeal panel. 26.     The Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office ( Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu ) – the competent prosecuting authority before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court – appealed against the fourth applicant’s sentence. 27.     During the appeal proceedings the case file was forwarded to the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office ( Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu ), which submitted a reasoned opinion on the appeals. The opinion was not served on the defence. 28.     The session of the appeal panel was held on 18 January 2011. The panel did not deem it expedient to invite the fourth applicant and his lawyer to the session. On the same day the Zagreb County Court dismissed both appeals as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgment. 29.     On 23 February 2011 the fourth applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, complaining, inter alia , that during the appeal proceedings the submissions of the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office had never been served on the defence and that he had not been given an opportunity to be present at the session of the appeal panel. 30.     On 28 February 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the fourth applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 31.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 13 March 2013. Dumančić v. Croatia , application no. 57701/13 32.     On 7 May 2008 the Zagreb County Court acquitted the fifth applicant of endangering public safety with a fatal outcome. 33.     On an appeal against that decision lodged by the competent State Attorney’s Office, the Supreme Court held a session and on 7 July 2011 it reversed the first-instance judgment, finding the fifth applicant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. 34.     The fifth applicant appealed against that judgment before a five ‑ judge panel of the Supreme Court, alleging numerous substantive and procedural flaws. 35.     During the appeal proceedings before the five-judge panel of the Supreme Court, the case file was forwarded to the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia, which on 7 December 2011 produced a written opinion on the merits of the case, asking that the fifth applicant’s appeal be dismissed. The opinion was not forwarded to the defence. 36.     On 21 March 2012 the five-judge panel of the Supreme Court held a session in the presence of the fifth applicant’s lawyer and the Deputy State Attorney. On the same day it dismissed the fifth applicant’s appeal as unfounded, upholding the judgment of 7 July 2011. 37.     The fifth applicant challenged the judgment before the Constitutional Court, complaining, inter alia , that the reasoned opinion of the State Attorney’s Office had not been forwarded to the defence. 38.     On 20 June 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the fifth applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It found that at the session of the appeal panel, which the fifth applicant’s lawyer had attended, the Deputy State Attorney had reiterated the arguments set out in the reasoned opinion of 7   December 2011. The fifth applicant’s lawyer had therefore had the opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on it. 39.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the fifth applicant’s lawyer on 30 August 2013. Severec v. Croatia , application no. 62634/14 40.     On 24 December 2007 the sixth applicant was indicted in the Poreč Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Poreču-Parenzo ) on charges of fraud. 41.     On 25 October 2010 the Poreč Municipal Court found the sixth applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for three years. 42.     On 12 January 2011 the sixth applicant lodged an appeal before the Pula County Court ( Županijski sud u Puli-Pola ), complaining of a number of substantive and procedural flaws in the proceedings and the first-instance judgment. He also asked that his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 43.     During the appeal proceedings the case file was forwarded to the Pula County State Attorney’s Office ( Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola ), which submitted a reasoned opinion to the Pula County Court on the sixth applicant’s appeal. The opinion was not served on the defence. 44.     The session of the appeal panel was held on 18 April 2012. The sixth applicant and his lawyer were not invited to attend it. On the same day the Pula County Court upheld the sixth applicant’s conviction. 45.     On 18 June 2012 the sixth applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, complaining, inter alia , that during the appeal proceedings the submissions of the Pula County State Attorney’s Office had not been served on the defence and that he and his lawyer had not been given an opportunity to be present at the session of the appeal panel. 46.     On 26 February 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the sixth applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 47.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the sixth applicant’s lawyer on 12 March 2014. Topalović v. Croatia , application no. 5172/15 48.     On 15 December 2008 the seventh applicant was indicted in the Zagreb County Court on charges of attempted murder and putting at risk the life and limb of others. 49.     On 4 May 2010 the Zagreb County Court found the seventh applicant guilty and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment. 50.     The seventh applicant appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court complaining of a number of substantive and procedural flaws in the proceedings and the judgment. He also asked that he and his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 51.     During the appeal proceedings the Supreme Court forwarded the appeals lodged by the defence and the Zagreb County Court’s case file to the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia for it to examine and provide an opinion. 52.     On 17 September 2010 the Deputy State Attorney submitted a reasoned opinion to the Supreme Court, asking that the defence’s appeals be dismissed. The opinion was never forwarded to the defence. 53.     On 24 November 2010 the Supreme Court held a session in the presence of the seventh applicant’s lawyer and the Deputy State Attorney, finding that the seventh applicant’s presence was not necessary. On the same day it upheld the seventh applicant’s conviction. 54.     On 24 January 2011 the seventh applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. He complained, inter alia , that during the appeal proceedings the submissions of the State Attorney’s Office had never been forwarded to the defence and that he had not been given an opportunity to be present at the session of the appeal panel. 55.     On 24 September 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the seventh applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It found that at the session of the appeal panel, which the seventh applicant’s lawyer had attended, the Deputy State Attorney had reiterated the arguments set out in the reasoned opinion of 17 September 2010. The seventh applicant’s lawyer had therefore been aware of it and had had the opportunity to comment on it. 56.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the seventh applicant’s lawyer on 7 October 2014. Domazet v. Croatia , application no. 17642/15 57.     On 24 August 2011 the eighth applicant was indicted in the Šibenik Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Šibeniku ) on charges of causing a road accident. 58.     On 28 March 2014 he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. 59.     The eighth applicant appealed to the Šibenik County Court ( Županijski sud u Šibeniku ), alleging a number of substantive and procedural flaws in the proceedings and the judgment, and he also asked to be invited to attend the session of the appeal panel. 60.     The Šibenik Municipal State Attorney’s Office ( Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Šibeniku ) submitted a reply to the eighth applicant’s appeal, proposing that it be dismissed. The reply was not served on the defence. 61.     The session of the appeal panel was held on 15 May 2014 in the eighth applicant’s absence. On the same day the Šibenik County Court dismissed the eighth applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 62.     The eighth applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, complaining, inter alia , that during the appeal proceedings the submissions of the Šibenik Municipal State Attorney’s Office had never been served on him and that he had not been given an opportunity to be present at the session of the appeal panel. 63.     On 5 November 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the eighth applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 64.     The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the eighth applicant on 14 November 2014. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 65.     The relevant domestic law in force at the material time, concerning the forwarding of a reasoned opinion by the State Attorney’s Office submitted in the course of appeal proceedings to the defence and the presence of an applicant at a session of an appeal panel, is set out in the cases of Zahirović v. Croatia (no.   58590/11, §§ 23 and 25, 25 April 2013) and Arps v. Croatia (no. 23444/12, § 15, 25 October 2016). 66.     On 18 December 2008 a new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted (Official Gazette nos. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012, 56/2013; hereinafter: the “2008 Code of Criminal Procedure”). The 2008 Code of Criminal Procedure fully entered into force on 1 September 2011, but did not apply to criminal proceedings instituted under the 1997 Code of Criminal Procedure, for which that Code remained applicable. 67.     Further amendments to the 2008 Code of Criminal Procedure were introduced on 15 December 2013 (Official Gazette no. 145/2013). In so far as relevant for the case at issue, Article 215 excluded the possibility for the State Attorney’s Office to submit an opinion after the examination of a case during the appeal proceedings. Article 216 provided that parties who requested to be present at the session of the appeal panel should be notified of the session. However, if the appellate court decided on an appeal against the first-instance judgment rendered for an offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment, the parties would be notified of the session of the appeal panel only if the trial court pronounced a prison sentence (ibid). 68.     Further amendments to the 2008 Code of Criminal Procedure were introduced on 27 July 2017 (Official Gazette no. 70/2017). In so far as relevant for the case at issue, Article 113 provided that parties who requested to be present at the session of the appeal panel should be notified of the session even if in the proceedings for an offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment the trial court did not pronounce a prison sentence. 69.     The relevant provisions of the 2008 Code of Criminal Procedure, as currently in force, concerning the reopening of proceedings, read: Article 502 “... (2) Criminal proceedings shall also be reopened if the request for reopening was submitted on the basis of a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, by which a violation of the rights and freedoms under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was found, if that violation of the Convention affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the violation or its consequences are capable of being rectified in the reopened proceedings ... (3) A request for proceedings to be reopened on the basis of a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights can be lodged within a thirty-day period starting from the date on which the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becomes final.” 70.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette nos. 148/2011, 25/2013 and 70/2019), read: Section 428a “(1) When the European Court of Human Rights finds a violation of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols [thereto], as ratified by the Republic of Croatia, a party may, within a thirty-day period starting from the date on which the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becomes final, lodge a request with the court in the Republic of Croatia which conducted the first-instance proceedings in which a decision violating a human right or freedom was delivered, to amend the decision by which that right or freedom was violated. (2) Provisions on the reopening of proceedings shall apply as appropriate to the proceedings referred to in subsection 1 of this section. (3) In proceedings which have been reopened on these grounds, the courts are obliged to respect the opinion expressed in the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of a human right or freedom.” 71.     The relevant provisions of the Administrative Disputes Act ( Zakon o upravnim sporovima , Official Gazette nos. 20/2010, 143/2012, 152/2014, 94/2016 and 29/2017), read: Section 76 “(1) A dispute which was terminated by a judgment [of the administrative court] shall be reopened at the request of the party: 1. if a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights decided on a violation of a right or freedom in a different manner than the judgment of the [administrative] court; ...” RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 72.     In Recommendation No. R (2000) 2, adopted on 19 January 2000, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated that its practice in supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments showed that in exceptional circumstances the re-examination of a case or the reopening of proceedings had proved the most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum . It therefore invited States to introduce mechanisms for re-examining cases in which the Court had found a violation of the Convention, especially where: “(i) the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative consequences because of the outcome of the domestic decision at issue, which are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and cannot be rectified except by re-examination or reopening, and (ii) the judgment of the Court leads to the conclusion that (a) the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the Convention, or (b) the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of.” 73.     The explanatory memorandum sets out more general comments on issues not explicitly addressed in the Recommendation. It notes, inter alia, the following: “1. The Contracting Parties to the Convention enjoy a discretion, subject to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, as to how they comply with the obligation in Article 46 of the Convention "to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties." ... 3. Although the Convention contains no provision imposing an obligation on Contracting Parties to provide in their national law for the re-examination or reopening of proceedings, the existence of such possibilities have, in special circumstances, proven to be important, and indeed in some cases the only, means to achieve restitutio in integrum... ... 14. The recommendation does not address the special problem of "mass cases", i.e. cases in which a certain structural deficiency leads to a great number of violations of the Convention. In such cases it is in principle best left to the State concerned to decide whether or not reopening or re-examination are realistic solutions or, whether other measures are appropriate. 15. When drafting the recommendation it was recognised that reopening or re-examination could pose problems for third parties, in particular when these have acquired rights in good faith. This problem exists, however, already in the application of the ordinary domestic rules for re-examination of cases or reopening of the proceedings. The solutions applied in these cases ought to be applicable, at least mutatis mutandis , also to cases where re-examination or reopening was ordered in order to give effect to judgments of the Court. In cases of re-examination or reopening, in which the Court has awarded some just satisfaction, the question of whether, and if so, how it should be taken into account will be within the discretion to the competent domestic courts or authorities taking into account the specific circumstances of each case.” THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 74.     Given that the applications raise almost identical issues under the Convention, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION 75.     The applicants complained that they had not had a fair trial. They alleged in particular: (i)     that the principle of equality of arms had been violated in that the submissions of the competent State Attorney’s Office had never been forwarded to the defence (in respect of the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants); and (ii)     that the respective sessions of the appeal panel had been held in their absence (in respect of the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants). 76.     The applicants relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an ... impartial tribunal established by law. ... 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; ...” The Government’s request to strike out the applications under Article 37 § 1 of the Convention The parties’ submissions 77.     After the failure of attempts to reach friendly settlements, the Government informed the Court, by letters submitted on various dates, that they proposed to make unilateral declarations with a view to resolving the issues raised by the applications. They further requested the Court to strike the applications out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the Convention. 78.     In their unilateral declarations the Government expressly acknowledged that there had been a violation of the applicants’ right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, and offered to pay each applicant certain amounts to cover any and all non ‑ pecuniary damage suffered as well as costs and expenses, plus any tax that might be chargeable to them. The Government committed themselves to paying these sums within three months from the date of notification of the Court’s decision, with default interest to be payable in the event of late payment. 79.     In their correspondence the applicants indicated that they were not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declarations because a striking out decision of the Court on the basis of Article 37 § 1 of the Convention would prevent them from being able to seek the reopening of the domestic proceedings against them. In particular, in accordance with the relevant domestic law, criminal proceedings could be reopened only on the basis of a final judgment of the Court finding a violation of the rights and freedoms under the Convention (see paragraph 69 above). The applicants also deemed the sums offered by the Government to be unacceptably low, considering the importance of the proceedings to them. They therefore wished the examination of the case to continue. The Court’s assessment 80.     The relevant general principles on unilateral declarations have been summarised in the cases of Jeronovičs v. Latvia ([GC], no. 44898/10, §§ 64-70, 5 July 2016) and Aviakompaniya A.T.I., ZAT v. Ukraine (no. 1006/07, §§ 27-33, 5 October 2017). 81.     The Court firstly notes that it has repeatedly found violations of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in Croatian cases on account of applicants not being forwarded submissions prepared by the competent State Attorney’s Office and not being allowed to be present at sessions of the appeal panel in the criminal proceedings against them (see Zahirović v.   Croatia , no. 58590/11, §§ 44-50 and 58-64, 25 April 2013; Lonić v.   Croatia , no. 8067/12, §§ 83-86 and 90-102, 4 December 2014; Arps v.   Croatia , no. 23444/12, §§ 24-29, 25 October 2016; Bosak and Others v.   Croatia , nos. 40429/14 and 3 others, §§ 91-101 and 105-09, 6 June 2019). The issues raised in the present case are therefore based on clear and extensive case-law of the Court. 82.     The Court notes that the amendments made to the relevant domestic law removed the origin of violations found in those cases (see paragraphs 67 and 68 above). However, in the proceedings complained of by the applicants, the previous legislation and practice was applicable. 83.     The Court reiterates that where a violation of Article 6 of the Convention has been found, a retrial or the reopening of the proceedings, if requested, is in principle an appropriate, and often the most appropriate, way of putting an end to the violation and affording redress for its effects (see Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, §§ 50 and 52, 11 July 2017, with further references). The Court finds no reason to hold otherwise in the circumstances of the present case, where violations of the Convention have been acknowledged by the Government (see paragraph 78 above), and where the aim pursued by each of the applicants in their individual applications was the reopening of the criminal proceedings against them (see paragraph 79 above and Dridi v. Germany , no. 35778/11, § 22, 26 July 2018). It is therefore necessary to address the question of whether a procedure by which such a reopening can be requested is available to the applicants. 84.     The Court notes that Article 502 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility of reopening proceedings on the basis of a final judgment of the Court finding a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 69 above). It appears that there is currently no case-law from the domestic courts on the question of whether the possibility to reopen criminal proceedings also exists in the event of a decision by the Court approving a unilateral declaration and striking the case out of its list. 85.     Therefore, the Court finds that it cannot be said with a sufficient degree of certainty that the procedure for reopening criminal proceedings would be available were the Court to accept the Government’s unilateral declaration and strike the case out of its list. The situation in the present case is thus comparable to that in Dridi (cited above, § 24) and Hakimi v.   Belgium (no. 665/08, §§ 21 and 29, 29 June 2010). The present case is distinguishable from Molashvili v. Georgia ((dec.), no. 39726/04, §§ 33 and   36, 30 September 2014), in which the Government explicitly acknowledged in its unilateral declaration that the applicant would be entitled to apply for the reopening of the criminal proceedings in accordance with the pertinent provision of domestic law, which allowed for such a reopening if the Court had established, in a judgment or decision, that there had been a breach of Convention. 86.     The Court thus accepts the applicants’ arguments and finds that, under Croatian law and practice as it currently stands, a decision of the Court striking out the application from its list does not provide the same certain access to a procedure allowing for the possibility of reopening domestic criminal proceedings as would a Court judgment finding a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 79 above). 87.     For the above reasons, the Court cannot make a finding that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the applications. Moreover, respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and its Protocols, requires it to continue the examination of the case. The Government’s request for the applications to be struck out of the list of cases under Article   37 of the Convention must therefore be rejected. Alleged violation of the principle of equality of arms as regards the submissions of the competent State Attorney’s Office Admissibility 88.     The Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. Merits (a)    The parties’ arguments 89.     The first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants contended that the submissions of the competent State Attorney’s Office in the criminal proceedings against them had never been forwarded to the defence. 90.     By letters dated 2 July 2015 and 16 October 2015 the Government were notified that they could submit their observations to the Court but they did not make use of that right. (b)    The Court’s assessment 91.     In the cases of Zahirović (cited above, §§ 44-50) and Lonić (cited above, §§ 83-86), the Court found a violation of the principle of equality of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the grounds that a submission of the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia to the Supreme Court had not been forwarded to the defence. It held that it did not need to determine whether the omission to forward the relevant document had been prejudicial to the applicant; the existence of a violation was conceivable even in the absence of prejudice (see Zahirović , cited above, §§ 48 and 49, and Lonić , cited above, § 84). 92.     In the case of Bosak and Others (cited above, §§ 94-101), the Court further found that the fact that the applicants’ lawyers had attended the session of the appeal panel in which the competent State Attorney had confirmed a reasoned opinion of the prosecution, which had not been forwarded to the defence, did not satisfy the principles of equality of arms and adversarial trial (see paragraphs 11, 36 and 53 above). It held that rendering the knowledge that observations had been filed by the prosecution entirely dependent on the presence of the defence at a session of the appeal panel amounted to imposing a disproportionate burden on the defence and did not necessarily guarantee a real opportunity to comment on the observations. In other words, it did not guarantee an unconditional right of the defence to have knowledge of, and to comment on, the prosecution’s submissions in the appeal proceedings (see Bosak and Others , cited above, § 100; and Göç v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, § 57, ECHR 2002-V). 93.     The Court notes that the fact that violations of Article 6 § 1 have repeatedly been found in cases against Croatia originated in a situation where, under the relevant domestic law, the courts were under no obligation to forward to the defence the opinion of the State Attorney’s Office at the level immediately above the office conducting the prosecution in the proceedings (see paragraph 65 above in relation to Article 373 of the 1997 Code of Criminal Procedure). 94.     The Court notes that the amendments made to the relevant domestic law in the wake of the Zahirović judgment excluded the possibility of the superior State Attorney submitting an opinion after the examination of a case during appeal proceedings. The issues of inequality between the parties and the lack of an adversarial trial in that respect were thereby removed (see   paragraph 67 above in relation to the amendments to the 2008 Code of Criminal Procedure of 15 December 2013). However, in the proceedings complained of by the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants, the previous legislation and practice were applicable. In the proceedings complained of by the eighth applicant the new legislation and practice were applicable and there was no issue of the superior State Attorney submitting a separate opinion after the examination of a case during the appeal proceedings. In those proceedings the reply of the Municipal State Attorney to the eighth applicant’s appeal was not forwarded to the defence, which appears to be an isolated issue (see paragraph 60 above). 95.     Accordingly, in view of these findings, and having regard to its case ‑ law as set out in the cases of Zahirović , Lonić and Bosak and Others (cited above), the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants. The third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants’ absence from the session of the appeal panel Admissibility 96.     The Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. Merits (a)    The parties’ arguments 97.     The third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants submitted that their presence at the session of the appeal panel had been necessary because the appellate courts in the criminal proceedings against them had been called upon to examine all the factual and legal circumstances of their cases. 98.     By letters dated 2 July 2015 and 16 October 2015 the Government were notified that they could submit their observations to the Court but they did not make use of that right. (b)    The Court’s assessment 99.     In the cases of Zahirović (cited above, §§ 58-64) and Lonić (cited above, §§ 94-102), the Court found that when an appeal court was called upon to make a full assessment of an applicant’s guilt or innocence regarding the charges against him or her, in view of not only the arguments he or she had adduced before the first-instance court, but also the arguments concerning the alleged failures of that court to establish all the relevant facts and to apply the relevant substantive and procedural rules correctly, this − as a matter of fairness − required the applicant’s presence at a session of the appeal panel. Moreover, in the case of Lonić (cited above, § 100), the Court considered it irrelevant that the appeal against the first‑instance judgment had been lodged only by the applicant, since that had not affected the principal question brought before the second-instance court, namely whether the applicant was guilty or innocent, an issue which, in order for the trial to be fair, had required the applicant’s presence at the session of the appeal panel. 100.     In the case of Bosak and Others (cited above, §§ 105-09) the Court further held that the fact that the applicant had not asked to attend the session in person, only that his lawyer be invited, could not be held against him since his attendance at the session had not been refused on the ground that he had failed to submit such a request, but because the appellate court had held that his presence would not be expedient (ibid., § 108, and see paragraphs 42 and 44 above). 101.     In the present case, the Court notes that in their appeals the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants each contested their conviction and sentence on both factual and legal grounds (see paragraphs 18, 25, 42, 50 and 59 above). The appellate courts were therefore called upon to make a full assessment of their guilt or innocence in respect of the charges against them, in the light of not only the arguments that they had raised before the first-instance court, but also those concerning the alleged failures of that court to establish all the relevant facts and to apply the relevant substantive and procedural rules correctly (see Bosak and Others , cited above, § 106; compare Abdulgadirov v. Azerbaijan , no. 24510/06, § 42, 20 June 2013, and Kozlitin v. Russia , no. 17092/04, § 63, 14 November 2013; and contrast Fejde v. Sweden , 29 October 1991, § 33, Series A no. 212-C, and Hermi v.   Italy [GC], no. 18114/02, § 85, ECHR 2006-XII). However, contrary to the requirements of the above case-law, the appellate courts held sessions without the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants being present (see paragraphs 19, 28, 44, 53 and 61 above). 102.     The Court notes that the fact that violations of Article 6 §§ 1 and   3   (c) have repeatedly been found in cases against Croatia originated in a situation where, under the relevant domestic law and practice applicable at the time, the appellate courts did not notify the accused persons of the session of the appeal panel if they were in detention and had a lawyer, or if in the