CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 11 juin 2020

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text-align:justify; font-size:10pt }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF BALDASSI AND OTHERS v. FRANCE (Applications no. 15271/16 and 6 others)     JUDGMENT   Art. 10 • Freedom of expression • Action in favour of boycott of Israeli products entailing criminal sanction for discrimination, without relevant and sufficient reasons • Call to boycott protected by Article   10 as means of expression of opinion by way of protest • Differences from Willem v.   France • Influence of applicants, ordinary citizens, incomparable to that of a mayor • Action triggering or stimulating debate on subject of general interest • Lack of racist or antisemitic language or speech inciting hatred, violence or intolerance • Lack of violence or material damage Art. 7 • Nullum crimen sine lege • Existence of precedent making criminal conviction foreseeable   STRASBOURG 11 June 2020   FINAL   11/09/2020     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Baldassi and Others v. France, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Ganna Yudkivska,   André Potocki,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Lado Chanturia,   Anja Seibert-Fohr, judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to: the seven applications against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the following eleven individuals (“the applicants”): Mr   Jean-Michel Baldassi (application no.   15271/16), Mr   Henri Eichholtzer (application no.   15280/16), Ms   Aline Parmentier (application no.   15282/16) and Ms   Sylviane Mure (application no.   15286/16), who lodged their applications on 16   March 2016; Mr   Nohammad Akbar (application no.   15842/16) and Mr   Maxime Roll (application no.   16207/16), who lodged their applications on 21   March 2016; and Ms   Laila Assakali, Mr   Yahya Assakali, Mr   Jacques Ballouey, Ms   Habiba El Jarroudi and Ms   Farida Sarr-Trichine (application no.   15724/16), who lodged their application on 18   March 2016; the applicants all being French nationals except for Mr   Nohammad Akbar and Ms Habiba El Jarroudi, who are respectively of Afghan and Moroccan nationality; the decision of 7 April 2017 to give notice of the applications to the French Government (“the Government”); the observations submitted by the Government and those submitted by the applicants in reply; the observations of the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH)) and the Ligue des droits de l’homme, which had been given leave to submit written comments (Article   36 §   2 of the Convention and Rule   44 §   3 of the Rules of Court); Having deliberated in private on 28 April 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The cases concern the criminal conviction of activists for the Palestinian cause, for inciting economic discrimination on the basis of section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29   July 1881 on freedom of the press, on account of their participation in actions calling for the boycott of products imported from Israel. The applicants complained of a violation of Articles   7 and 10 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     Mr   Henri Eichholtzer and Ms   Aline Parmentier live in Habsheim and Zillisheim, respectively. Mr   Jacques Ballouey lived in Mulhouse, as did the other applicants. 3.     Ms   Laila Assakali, Mr   Yahya Assakali, Mr   Jacques Ballouey, Ms   Habiba El Jarroudi and Ms   Farida Sarr-Trichine are represented by Mr   Grégory Thuan dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The other applicants are represented by Mr   Antoine Comte, a lawyer practising in Paris. 4.     The Government are represented by their agent, Mr   F.   Alabrune, Directeur of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5.     The applicants belong to “Collectif Palestine 68”, which acts as a local relay for the international campaign “Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions” (BDS). This campaign was launched on 9   July 2005 by an appeal from Palestinian non-governmental organisations, one year after the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which found that “[t]he construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, [were] contrary to international law”. The “Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel Until it Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights” reads as follows (original English): “...   Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression; We, representatives of Palestinian civil society , call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace. These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination and fully complies with the precepts of international law by: 1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; 2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.” EVENTS OF 26   septembER 2009 AND 22   maY 2010 6.     On 26   September 2009, the applicants Henri Eichholtzer, Aline Parmentier, Jacques Ballouey, Farida Sarr-Trichine and Mohamed Akbar took part in an action organised by “Collectif Palestine 68” inside the C. hypermarket in Illzach, calling for the boycott of Israeli products. They exhibited products that they claimed to be of Israeli origin in three trolleys placed so that customers could see them and handed out leaflets with the following wording (translation): “You can force Israel to respect human rights. Boycott products imported from Israel. ‘If apartheid (in South Africa) ended, so can the occupation, but the moral force and international pressure will have to be just as determined. The current divestment effort is the first move in that direction’, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize winner, October 2002. To buy products imported from Israel is to legitimise the crimes in Gaza, to endorse the policies of Israeli governments. Some products imported from Israel sold in supermarkets in the Mulhouse area: [list of brands or product names]. Campaign supported by: association France-Palestine Solidarité Haut-Rhin (AFPS 68), association REDA (from the Muslim dynamic presence), Justice for Palestine (JPLP), French Communist Party (PCF-68), Les Verts ... For more information on the boycott... : [indication of Internet links].” 7.     A similar event was organised by “Collectif Palestine 68” on 22   May 2010 in the same hypermarket. The applicants Jean-Michel Baldassi, Sylviane Mure, Laila Assakali, Yahya Assakali, Habiba El Jarroubi, Farida Sarr-Trichine, Mohamed Akbar and Maxime Roll took part. The participants also presented a petition to be signed by the customers calling for the hypermarket to stop selling products imported from Israel. 8.     No violence or damage was caused. SUMMONS FOR THE APPLICANTS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE Mulhouse CRIMINAL COURT 9.     The public prosecutor of Colmar summoned the applicants (and one other person, in relation to the events of 22   May 2010) to appear before the Mulhouse Criminal Court on the following charges: “... [for having] by means of a written or printed text, drawing, engraving, painting, emblem, image, exhibited in a public place or assembly, namely the premises of the shopping centre [C.], incited discrimination, hatred, or violence, directed against a group of people on account of their origin or the fact of belonging to a given ethnicity, race, religion, or nation; namely by distributing tracts with the following wording: ‘Boycott products imported from Israel, if you buy Israeli products you legitimise crimes in Gaza, you approve of the Israeli government’s policies; a few products imported from Israel on sale in supermarkets in the Mulhouse region [list], and by using the following language: ‘Israel murderers, [C.] accomplice’; offences provided for by section   24, eighth paragraph, section   23, first paragraph [and] section   42 of the Law of 29   July 1881, section   93-3 of Law no.   82-652 of 29   July 1982, sanctions for which are prescribed by section   24, eighth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth paragraphs, of the Law of 29   July 1881, [and] Article   131-26 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code.” 10.     With the exception of Ms Sylviane Mure, Ms Habiba El Jarroudi and Ms Farida Sarr-Trichine, the applicants were also summoned to appear for wearing clothing bearing the inscription “Long live Palestine” and “Boycott Israel”. 11.     The hypermarket in question did not apply to join the proceedings as a civil party. JUDGMENTS OF Mulhouse CRIMINAL COURT DATED 15   DECEMBER 2011 12.     In two judgments of 15   December 2011, containing essentially the same reasoning, the Mulhouse Criminal Court acquitted the applicants. It found in particular as follows (extract from the judgment on the events of 22   May 2010): “ ... The present case has been brought under section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law, which authoritatively circumscribes the subject matter pursuant to section 53 of that Law. According to settled case-law, the court must assess the offence in relation to the said characterisation, as stated in the summons, and in accordance with the section of the 1881 Law which is cited therein ... ... The conduct referred to in the summons stems from the expressions ‘Long Live Palestine’, ‘Boycott products imported from Israel’, ‘if you buy Israeli products you legitimise crimes in Gaza, you approve of the Israeli government’s policies’. The language thus used seeks only to incite consumers, in support of the defendants’ action, not to buy Israeli products. Section 24, eighth paragraph, as referred to in the indictment, is not directed against incitement to economic discrimination, which is defined by Article 225-2 of the Criminal Code as the obstruction of the normal exercise of an economic activity. The basis for the prosecution is all the more inappropriate since the conduct in question is likely to fall under a specific text, namely sub-section 9 of the same text introduced by the 2004 Act and which refers to acts of economic discrimination provided for and defined by Article 225-2 of the Criminal Code. There is no ambiguity as to the choice of section 24, eighth paragraph, since no reference to Article 225-2 of the Criminal Code, mentioned expressly in section 24, ninth paragraph, is made in the summons served on the defendants. Some of the civil parties argued that the use of the slogan ‘Israel murderers [C.] accomplice!’ in fact demonstrated the character of incitement to racial hatred of this action in accordance with the provisions of section 24, eighth paragraph. This slogan, attributed to only some of the defendants, who acknowledged having used it, was also contested by quite a number of other participants, who denied that it had been used, as far as they were concerned, finding the language excessive and not in keeping with the meaning of their action. Most of the defendants, without denying their participation, emphasised, on the contrary, that their demonstration had no religious or antisemitic aims. The said slogan, which was not expressed in a concerted manner, could not in itself give the impugned statements and acts the character of incitement to racial hatred as provided for by section 124 [ sic ], eighth paragraph. The character of economic discrimination with regard to certain products can clearly be seen from the established acts and statements that have been admitted in evidence. Moreover, the court below was persuaded that there had been no incitement to racial, or even antisemitic hatred, in view of the nature of the members of ‘Collectif 68’, who were members of associations or political movements not known for racist or antisemitic stances, and also having heard the supportive testimony of Mr [M.], a senator and mayor, and that of Mgr [G.], a bishop, who was known for speaking out in favour of minorities. Having regard to the legislation referred to in the indictment, namely section 24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29 July 1881, the defendants must be acquitted.” JUDGMENTS OF THE Court of Appeal OF Colmar DATED 27   novembER 2013 13.     In two judgments of 27   November 2013, the Court of Appeal of Colmar overturned the first-instance judgments in so far as they had acquitted the applicants. It found as follows: “ ... It is of scant relevance that incitement to economic discrimination, as defined in Article 225-2 of the Criminal Code, is characterised as a criminal offence under section 24, ninth paragraph, of the Law of 29 July 1881, in so far as the Criminal Court, when determining the charge as stated, must examine whether the facts referred to it can be attributed the classification provided for in the summons, namely that of section 24, eighth paragraph, without the possibility, in the context of this type of offence, of reclassifying the charge. It can be seen from the content of the leaflet distributed and from the statements made by the defendants that they, through their action, were causing discrimination against products imported from Israel, inciting the customers of the shop in question not to buy such goods on account of the origin of the producers or suppliers who, constituting a group of persons, belong to a specific nation, in this case Israel, thus constituting a nation within the meaning of the provision characterising the criminal offence and of international law. Incitement to discrimination cannot be encompassed within the right to freedom of opinion and expression since it constitutes a positive act of rejection, manifested by incitement to bring about a difference in treatment, with regard to a category of persons, in this case the producers of goods based in Israel. The mere fact that the defendants incited others to discriminate between producers and/or suppliers, in order to reject those from Israel, is sufficient to characterise the material element of the offence in question without it being necessary to show that the products referred to in the distributed leaflet were genuinely of Israeli origin. Under the head of necessity, it is alleged that there is a disproportion between [ sic ] the fact that consumers were misled about the origin of goods labelled as coming from Israel whereas they could in fact have been produced in the territories occupied by the State of Israel. Even if it were to transpire that the products at issue were the subject of a false declaration of origin, which has not been proven but is a mere allegation, this fact clearly does not constitute any imminent danger for the defendants or third parties; consequently the provisions of Article 122-7 of the Criminal Code cannot be applied in this case. The same applies to the provisions of Article 122-4 of the said Code, since although freedom of expression is guaranteed both by the fundamental laws of the Republic and by the conventions recognised by the latter, it must once again be recalled that respect for this right does not authorise its holder, under the guise of this freedom, to commit an offence punishable by law, such as, in the present case, incitement to discrimination. Consequently, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendants are found guilty of the offence as charged; they are each sentenced to a suspended fine of one thousand euros ...” 14.     As to the events of 26   September 2009, the Court of Appeal sentenced each of the five defendants to pay a suspended fine of 1,000 euros (EUR). It also ordered them to pay jointly, to each of the four admissible civil parties (the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, the association Avocats sans frontières, the association Alliance France-Israël and the Bureau national de vigilance contre l’antisémitisme), EUR 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 3,000 under Article   475-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (expenses incurred by the civil parties and not paid by the State). 15.     As to the events of 22   May 2010, the Court of Appeal sentenced each of the nine defendants to a suspended fine of EUR 1,000. In addition it ordered them to pay jointly to three of the civil parties (the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, the association Avocats sans frontières and the association Alliance France-Israël) EUR 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,000 under Article   475-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (expenses incurred by the civil parties and not paid by the State). JUDGMENTS OF THE Court of Cassation DATED 20   octobER 2015 16.     In two judgments of 20   October 2015 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeals on points of law lodged by the applicants, who claimed in particular that there had been a violation of Articles   7 and 10 of the Convention. 17.     It found inter alia that the Court of Appeal had given justification for its judgment since it had rightly noted that the elements of the offence provided for in section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29   July 1881 were made out, and that the exercise of freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article   10 of the Convention, could be, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, subjected to restrictions or sanctions constituting, as in the present cases, measures that were necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder and the protection of the rights of others. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE ExtraCts from the FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ACT 1881 and the criminal CODE 18.     At the relevant time, sections   23 and 24 of the Freedom of the Press Act (Law of 29 July 1881) read as follows (as amended by Law no. 2004-1486 of 30   December 2004): Section 23 “Anyone who, by uttering speeches, cries or threats in a public place or assembly, or by means of a written or printed text, drawing, engraving, painting, emblem, image, or any other written, spoken or pictorial item sold or distributed, offered for sale or exhibited in a public place or assembly, or by means of a placard or notice exhibited in a place where it can be seen by the public, or by any electronic means of communication to the public, has directly incited the perpetrator or perpetrators to commit a serious crime ( crime ) or other major offence ( délit ), and if the incitement has been acted upon, shall be punished as an accomplice in the said offence. ...” Section 24 “... [eighth paragraph] Anyone who, by one of the means referred to in section   23, has incited discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group on account of their origin or the fact of belonging, or not belonging, to a given ethnicity, nation, race or religion, shall be liable to a one-year prison term and a fine of 45,000 euros, or only one of those two sanctions. [ninth paragraph] Anyone who, by the above means, has incited hatred or violence against a person or group on account of their gender, sexual orientation or disability, or incites against those same persons any of the forms of discrimination provided for in Articles   225-2 and 432-7 of the Criminal Code, shall be liable to the sanctions prescribed by the previous paragraph. ...” 19.     At the material time, Articles   122-4, 225-1 and 225-2 of the Criminal Code read as follows: Article 122-4 “Anyone who performs an act that is prescribed or authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions shall not be criminally liable. Anyone who performs an act that is ordered by a lawful authority, unless the act is manifestly unlawful, shall not be criminally liable.” Article 225-1 “Discrimination shall be constituted by any distinction made between individuals on account of their origin, sex, family situation, physical appearance, surname, place of abode, state of health, handicap, genetic traits, morality, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, political opinions, union activities, or the fact of belonging or not belonging, whether this is established or presumed, to a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion. Discrimination shall also be constituted by any distinction made between legal persons on account of the origin, gender, family situation, physical appearance, surname, place of abode, state of health, handicap, genetic characteristics, morality, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, political opinions, union activities, or the fact of belonging or not belonging, whether this is established or presumed, to a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion, of one or more members of such legal entities.” Article 225-2 “Discrimination as defined by Article 225-1, when committed against an individual or legal entity, shall be punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 45,000 where it consists: 1 o in refusing to supply goods or services; 2 o in obstructing the normal exercise of any given economic activity; 3 o in refusing to recruit, sanction or dismiss a person; 4 o in subjecting the supply of goods or services to a condition based on one of the factors referred to in Article 225-1; 5 o in subjecting an offer of employment, an application for a course or a training period to a condition based on one of the factors referred to in Article 225-1; 6 o in refusing to accept a person onto one of the courses referred to in 2 o of Article L.412-8 of the Social Security Code. Where the discriminatory refusal referred to under point 1 o is committed in a public place or in order to bar access to such place, the maximum sanctions shall be increased to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 75,000.” circulaR CRIM-AP n o   09-900-A4, 12   FEBRUARY 2010 20.     On 12   February 2010 the head of the Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons sent the following Circular to the Principal Public Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal: “Since March 2009 the Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons has been informed of a number of prosecutions concerning calls for a boycott of Israeli products on the basis of public incitement to discrimination as provided for and punished by section 24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29 July 1881. These actions usually take the form of gatherings in shopping centres where calls for a boycott are made. Some of these demonstrations are then broadcast on websites. In a judgment of 10 February 2010, the Bordeaux Criminal Court convicted an individual on the above-mentioned charge for acts of this kind. It would seem imperative to ensure that the public prosecutor’s office provides a coherent and firm response to these acts. To this end, and with a view to possibly grouping the prosecutions together for the proper administration of justice, I should like to ask you to inform the Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons of all the acts of this kind that have been referred to the public prosecutors within the jurisdictions of your courts. If certain proceedings have already been discontinued, I would be grateful if you could describe the facts in detail and indicate the reasoning which led to the relevant decisions. ...” EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF TO THE UN General Assembly, 20   SEPTEMBER 2019 21.     In an activity report addressed to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UN, official documents, 20   September 2019, A/74/358), the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief observed as follows: “18.     ... He recalls that international law recognizes boycotts as legitimate forms of political expression and that non-violent expressions of support for boycotts are, as a general matter, legitimate speech that should be protected. However, he also stresses that expression that draws on antisemitic tropes or stereotypes, rejects the right of Israel to exist or advocates discrimination against Jewish individuals because of their religion, should be condemned.” THE LAW whether Ms MARINE ROBERT AND MR.   BRUNO BALLOUEY HAVE LOCUS STANDI 22.     On 15   May 2018 the representative of Mr   Jacques Ballouey informed the Court that his client had died. The wife of Mr   Jacques Ballouey, Ms   Marine Robert, and their son, Mr   Bruno Ballouey, indicated that they wished to pursue the proceedings in his stead. 23.     The Court observes that it normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has a legitimate interest, where the original applicant has died after lodging the application (see, among many other authorities, Malhous v.   the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.   33071/96, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII, and Murray v.   the Netherlands [GC], no.   10511/10, §   79, 26   April 2016). Having regard to the subject matter of the application and the material before it, the Court takes the view that in the present case Ms Marine Robert and Mr   Bruno Ballouey have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the name of their deceased husband and father and, as a result, have locus standi under Article   34 of the Convention. For practical reasons the Court will continue to refer to the late Mr   Jacques Ballouey as one of the “applicants”. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 24.     In view of the similarity between the applications as regards the facts and the substantive questions that they all raise, the Court considers it appropriate to join them in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION 25.     The applicants, relying on Article   7 of the Convention, complained about their conviction under section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Freedom of the Press Act (Law of 29   July 1881) for the offence of incitement to economic discrimination, whereas the said provision did not refer to economic discrimination. They relied on Article   7 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2.     This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” Admissibility 26.     The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicants 27.     The applicants pointed out that they had been convicted for incitement to “economic discrimination” under section 24, eighth paragraph, of the Freedom of the Press Act, which made it an offence to incite discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group on account of their origin or their belonging or not belonging to a particular ethnicity, nation, race or religion, and therefore did not cover economic discrimination, which fell under a different provision (the ninth paragraph of that section), enacted in 2004. They observed that, in the drafting of that legislation, Mr Pascal Clément, then Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Laws, Legislation and the General Administration of the Republic and later Minister of Justice, stated before the National Assembly that the 2004 Law was intended to punish the forms of incitement provided for in the eighth paragraph of section 24 of the Freedom of the Press Act with regard to new categories of people who were victims of economic discrimination, adding that this precision did not exist in the case of incitement to racial, religious or ethnic discrimination. 28.     They further argued that their conviction had stemmed from a distortion of the facts, since they had merely expressed criticism of the State – the call for a boycott merely being a means to that end – and such expression was not punishable under French law since the Freedom of the Press Act protected individuals alone. 29.     They also stressed that the general nature of the words “incitement to discrimination” contained in the legislative provision was incompatible with Article 7 since it was a broad term applied to a concept, discrimination, which was ambivalent. They further criticised the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation for finding that by inciting discrimination against products from Israel, they had encouraged the customers of the shop in question not to buy these goods on account of the origin of the producers or suppliers, who constituted a “group of persons belonging to a particular nation”. In so doing, the courts had established the “Israeli producers” as the group discriminated against on the basis that they belonged to the nation of Israel, but this was at odds with the case-law of the Court of Cassation (they referred to the judgments of the Criminal Division of 3 February 2009 and 1 March 2011). 30.     The applicants submitted that many domestic courts had refused to apply section 24, eighth paragraph, of the Freedom of the Press Act to circumstances such as those in their case and that legal commentators had been highly critical of the decisions handed down against them. They further noted that under French criminal law there were no sanctions in respect of calls to boycott certain goods and explained this by two factors. First, such boycotts were part of a long history of non-violent civil protest or opposition, with the aim of informing consumers about the political, economic and ethical significance of their purchases. Secondly, the emergence of consumer rights, including the freedom to choose which goods to buy, for reasons relating to many different considerations, including very personal ones, came into play. The applicants noted that, in examining the impact of oil companies on the environment, parliamentarians had observed that “a call for a boycott as the ultimate weapon of responsible consumption [had to] be regarded as lawful where it [had] been established by credible reports from international organisations and trustworthy non-governmental organisations that a multinational company [was] deliberately and seriously violating international law” (information report on the role of oil companies, National Assembly no. 1859, p. 134). In the present case, therefore, the deliberate and serious violation of international law was attested, in their view, not only by credible reports from international organisations and trustworthy NGOs, but also by the opinion of the International Court of Justice as to the illegality of the Israeli wall of separation, thus unquestionably rendering the call for a boycott lawful. (b)    The Government 31.     The Government stated that they did not dispute that the sanction imposed on the applicants had constituted a penalty within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention. They took the view, however, that the sentence handed down against them had met the requirements of that provision and that it had not therefore been breached. 32.     They observed in that connection that the “law” on which the conviction had been based was accessible, since it consisted of sections 23 and 24 of the Freedom of the Press Act (Law of 29 July 1881) together with reported case-law. They submitted that it was also foreseeable. The text of section 24 was clear and precise, and the generic nature of its wording “incitement to discrimination” reflected the legislature’s intention to encompass all forms of discrimination, including economic discrimination. Referring to the judgments of the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation of 28 September 2004 (no. 03-87.450; concerning the case of Willem v. France , no. 10883/05, 16 July 2009) and 16 April 2013 (no. 13-90.008), the Government added that the Court of Cassation’s position that economic discrimination, particularly in the form of calls for boycotts, fell within the scope of the eighth paragraph of section 24 was long-standing and consistent. 33.     This interpretation, in their view, was moreover in line with the text of the law. They observed that the eighth paragraph of section 24 concerned incitement to discriminate against a person or group on account of their origin or their belonging or not belonging to a particular ethnicity, nation, race or religion, whereas the ninth paragraph, inserted by the Law of 30 December 2004, concerned incitement to one of the forms of discrimination defined in Articles 225-2 and 432-7 of the Criminal Code, with regard to a person or group on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or disability, and that the features of such discrimination were more restricted and were listed exhaustively by means of a reference to the said Articles of the Criminal Code. The eighth paragraph, on account of its generic wording, using as it did the term “discrimination”, covered all forms of discrimination, including those falling within the economic field. This was also apparent from the parliamentary debates. As to the ninth paragraph, it had not been intended to introduce economic discrimination into the law, but to punish incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination, not only on account of a person’s origin, but also on the basis of his or her gender, sexual orientation or disability; it therefore sought to restrict the new offence of incitement to discrimination on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or disability to certain forms of discrimination. The Government concluded from this that the Court of Cassation had not reasoned by analogy in holding that the eighth paragraph applied to incitement to economic discrimination, but had confined itself to defining the scope of its application by applying the principle that there was no need to distinguish where the text itself made no distinction. 34.     As to the applicants’ contention that the courts had broadened the scope of the offence by extending it from “persons” to “goods”, the Government pointed out that “persons” included legal persons and that, as the advocate-general of the Court of Cassation had stated in the present case, goods could not be artificially dissociated entirely from those who produced, manufactured and supplied them. They pointed out that Article 7 of the Convention did not prohibit judicial interpretations, even extensive ones, provided that they were consistent with the substance of the offence and reasonably foreseeable. The Court’s assessment 35.     The Court would refer to the general principles on Article   7 as set out in particular in its judgment in Vasiliauskas v.   Lithuania [GC] (no.   35343/05, §§   153-157 and 160, ECHR 2015). The main points are as follows. Article 7 is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused’s disadvantage: it also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty ( nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ) and the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy. It follows from these principles that an offence must be clearly defined in the law, be it national or international. This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision – and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’   interpretation of it and with informed legal advice – what acts and omissions will make him or her criminally liable. The Court has thus indicated that when speaking of “law” Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability. 36.     In the present case the applicants were convicted on the basis of the eighth paragraph of section   24 of the Law of 29 July 1881, under which: “Anyone who, by one of the means referred to in section   23, has incited discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group on account of their origin or the fact of belonging, or not belonging, to a given ethnicity, nation, race or religion, shall be liable to a one-year prison term and a fine of 45,000 euros, or only one of those two sanctions.” 37.     The applicants had been acquitted at first instance, in particular on the grounds that the conduct with which they were charged had sought only to incite consumers not to buy Israeli products, whilst section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29 July 1881 did not concern “economic” discrimination, this only being contemplated specifically by the ninth paragraph of that Article, which referred to economic discrimination as provided for and defined by Article   225-2 of the Criminal Code. The Colmar Court of Appeal, however, set aside that judgment, finding that the applicants had “incited discrimination against goods from Israel”, by encouraging customers not to buy such goods on account of the origin of the producers, who constituted a “group’” belonging to a given “nation”, namely Israel. 38.     The Court observes that, admittedly, the text of section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29 July 1881 does not expressly refer to incitement to economic discrimination. As to the ninth paragraph, it does expressly concern this form of incitement to discrimination but only on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or disability, and not on account of origin or the fact of belonging to a nation. 39.     The Court, however, agrees with the Government that prior to the events in the present case, the Court of Cassation had ruled in favour of applying section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29   July 1881 in the case of a call to boycott imports from Israel. In the context of the Willem case, cited above, in responding to an argument alleging a failure to adhere to the principle of strict interpretation of the criminal law, the Court of Cassation thus endorsed, by a judgment of 28   September 2004, a judgment of the Douai Court of Appeal of 11   September 2003, which had found as follows: “[S]ections   23 and 24 of the Law of 29   July 1881 make it a criminal offence to incite ... discrimination by obstructing the normal exercise of any economic activity ... these provisions refer[ring] to Articles   225 ‑ 1 and 225 ‑ 2 of the Criminal Code ...” The Court of Cassation noted that the judgment appealed against had stated in particular that the defendant in that case, by announcing his intention as mayor to ask the municipality’s catering services to stop buying goods imported from the State of Israel, had incited those services to take account of the origin of the goods and, consequently, to obstruct the economic activity of Israeli producers, the boycott thus being connected with the fact that they belonged to the Israeli “nation”. It found that, in view of the foregoing, and since the dissemination on the municipality’s website of the mayor’s decision to boycott Israeli goods, accompanied by partisan remarks, was capable of inciting discriminatory conduct, as a result of the wide audience of that message, the Court of Appeal had given due justification for its decision. 40.     Therefore, as the case-law stood at the time of the relevant events in the present case, the applicants could have known that they were likely to be convicted on the basis of section   24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 29   July 1881 on account of their call to boycott goods