CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 18 juin 2020

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GREECE (Application no. 20452/14)   JUDGMENT (Just satisfaction) Art 41 • Just satisfaction • Respondent State invited to guarantee applicant’s ownership of property bequeathed to her in Greece, or else to compensate her for its value in proportion to the percentage of which she was deprived • Applicant required to repay any award of compensation if outcome of proceedings currently pending in Greece is consistent with the principal judgment • No jurisdiction for the Court to determine the applicant’s claims concerning property in Turkey • No jurisdiction exercised by Greece in respect of the proceedings in Turkey • Property bequeathed in Turkey unable to form the basis of any just-satisfaction claim against Greece in the absence of a substantive position in the principal judgment on the applicant’s alleged rights in relation to that property • Possibility for the applicant to bring an application against Turkey if Turkish courts do not have regard to the findings of the principal judgment or draw from it the necessary consequences flowing from Turkey’s status as a Contracting State STRASBOURG 18 June 2020   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Molla Sali v. Greece, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Robert Spano, President,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Paul Lemmens,   Ledi Bianku,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Kristina Pardalos,   Julia Laffranque,   Aleš Pejchal,   Egidijus Kūris,   Branko Lubarda,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Mārtiņš Mits,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Alena Poláčková,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Tim Eicke,   Raffaele Sabato, judges, and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 February and 30 April 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 20452/14) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Greek national, Ms Chatitze Molla Sali (“the applicant”), on 5 March 2014. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr   Y.   Ktistakis and Mr   K.   Tsitselikis, lawyers practising in Athens and Thessaloniki respectively. The Greek Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent’s Delegates, Mr K. Georghiadis and Ms V. Pelekou, Advisers at the State Legal Council, Ms A. Magrippi, Legal Assistant at the State Legal Council, and Ms M. Telalian, Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The case concerned the application by the domestic courts of Islamic religious law (Sharia) to an inheritance dispute between Greek nationals belonging to the Muslim minority, despite the wishes of the testator (the applicant’s late husband, a Greek belonging to the Muslim minority), who had bequeathed his entire estate to his wife under a will drawn up in accordance with Greek civil law. The courts considered the will devoid of effect, finding that the law applicable to the case was Islamic inheritance law, which applied specifically to Greeks of Muslim faith in Greece. The applicant, who was deprived of three-quarters of her inheritance, submitted that she had suffered a difference in treatment on grounds of religion because had her husband not been of Muslim faith, she would have inherited the whole estate. 4.     In a judgment delivered on 19 December 2018 (“the principal judgment”), the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court held, in particular, that the difference of treatment suffered by the applicant, as a beneficiary of a will drawn up in accordance with the Civil Code by a Greek testator of Muslim faith, as compared with a beneficiary of a will drawn up in accordance with the Civil Code by a Greek non-Muslim testator, had no objective and reasonable justification. 5.     Since the Greek Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for the reopening of proceedings in the domestic courts in the event of a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention in a contentious case such as the present one, the applicant sought just satisfaction under Article   41 of the Convention in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage she considered to have resulted from the violations found in the present case, as well as the reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 6.     Since the question of the application of Article   41 of the Convention was not ready for decision, the Court reserved it and invited the Government and the applicant to submit, within twelve months, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement they might reach (see paragraph 166 and point 4 of the operative provisions of the principal judgment). 7.     As the parties had failed to reach an agreement, the applicant submitted her observations on 19 April and 28 May 2019, and the Government submitted theirs on 18 April and 28 May 2019. 8.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PRINCIPAL JUDGMENT 9.     On 13 February 2019, at the request of the State Legal Council and for the purposes of the case pending before the Court, the Komotini Tax Office drew up a document establishing the value of the property bequeathed to the applicant by her late husband as follows: (a)   50% of an apartment with a parking space and cellar (registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4 and 420170469058/2/22), valued at 34,067.08 euros (EUR); (b)   25% of a plot of land (registered under number 420170460019/0/0) with a surface area of 24.45 sq. m occupied entirely by a shop, valued at EUR   15,337.41; (c)   33.3% of a plot of farmland (registered under number 420173428146/0/0), valued at EUR   5,400; and (d)   75% of a shop occupying the entirety of a 31.30   sq.   m plot of land in Komotini (registered under number 420170494076), valued at EUR   12,777.45 (this property has since been expropriated). 10.     Following the judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation on   6   April 2017, the sisters of the applicant’s late husband applied to the Rodopi Court of First Instance on 19 April 2017. They sought rectification of the land register to recognise them as co-owners of the testator’s property registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4, 420170469058/2/22, 420170460019/0/0 and 420173428146/0/0. By judgment no. 114/2018 of 20   November 2018 the Court of First Instance recognised the two sisters as the owners of 18.75% each of the property registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4 and   420170469058/2/22; of 9.375% each of the property registered under number 420170460019/0/0; and of 12.5% each of the property registered under number 420173428146/0/0. The court also ordered the amendment of the registration of the properties in question at the Land Registry, in accordance with the terms of the judgment. Lastly, the court ruled that the applicant remained the owner of one-quarter of the property bequeathed and was required to register this portion afresh at the Land Registry. 11.     On 24 December 2018 the applicant appealed to the Thrace Court of Appeal against that judgment. First of all, relying on the Court’s principal judgment, she submitted that it was no longer possible for her late husband’s sisters to register their inheritance rights under Sharia law at the Land Registry. Secondly, she relied on Article 281 (abuse of rights) of the Civil Code, pointing out that her late husband’s sisters had previously accepted their father’s estate in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, thus creating a legitimate expectation for the applicant that they would not seek to apply Sharia law to their brother’s estate to her detriment. 12.     The Thrace Court of Appeal delivered its judgment (no. 281/2019) on 23 October 2019. Referring to its previous final judgment no. 183/2015 of 15 December 2015, the Thrace Court of Appeal noted that that judgment had ruled, with the force of res judicata , by which it was bound, that the law applicable to the deceased’s estate was Sharia law. Pursuant to that law, the shares in the estate for the heirs involved in the dispute were 6/24 for the applicant and   9/24 each in joint ownership for the two sisters. The Court of Appeal further noted that the entries in the land register to the effect that the applicant owned 100% of the property registered under numbers 420170469058/2/22, 420170469058/2/8 and 420170469058/3/4, 25% of the property registered under number 420170460019/0/0 and 33.33% of the property registered under number 420173428146/0/0 were incorrect. The Court of Appeal held that those entries infringed the two sisters’ property rights and should be rectified in the land register. It recognised the sisters as owners of 18.75% each of the property registered under numbers 420170469058/2/22, 420170469058/2/8 and 420170469058/3/4, 9.375% each of the property registered under number 420170460019/0/0, and 12.5% each of the property registered under number 420173428146/0/0. On 20 December 2019 the applicant appealed on points of law against the above-mentioned judgment. 13.     On the date of delivery of the present judgment, the proceedings were still pending. 14.     The land register at the Komotini Land Registry has not yet been rectified following the judgments delivered by the Court of First Instance on 20   November 2018 and by the Court of Appeal on 23 October 2019 so as to recognise the sisters of the applicant’s late husband as co-owners of the testator’s property. The relevant entries can only be rectified if there is an irrevocable judgment in favour of the deceased’s sisters. Only the action brought by the sisters of the applicant’s late husband has been mentioned in the land register. 15.     The plot of land registered under number 420170494076 was not referred to in the application lodged by the sisters of the applicant’s late husband. The applicant’s ownership of that land was therefore not contested. Moreover, as the applicant accepted, the property in question had been expropriated, and she was to be paid compensation on that account. 16.     As regards the proceedings in Turkey the applicant brought an action in the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance seeking to have the will applied to the property located in Turkey. At the same time, the testator’s sisters applied to have the will declared null and void on the grounds of its incompatibility with Turkish legislation. On 18 January 2018 the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance held that it was not required to consider the application by the sisters of the applicant’s late husband for the latter’s will to be declared null and void in accordance with the principles of private international law enshrined in the Turkish Civil Code (will contrary to Turkish public policy). The court held that the judgment delivered by the Greek Court of Cassation was final and that, pursuant to Turkish private international law, it was binding on the court, so that it was unnecessary to reconsider the case. Both the applicant and her husband’s sisters appealed to the Istanbul Court of Appeal against that judgment, and their appeals are currently pending. THE LAW 17.     Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” The parties’ submissions The applicant’s observations of 19 April and 28 May 2019 Pecuniary damage 18.     The applicant observed that in his will, her husband had bequeathed all his movable and real property to her. However, the will had had consequences in two States, Greece and Turkey, because at the material time the deceased’s real estate had comprised four properties in Greece (now three, namely one-third of a plot of farmland with a surface area of 2,000 sq. m, half of an apartment measuring 127 sq. m with a parking space and a cellar, and one-quarter of a shop in Komotini with a surface area of 24   sq. m – see paragraph 9 above), as well as four properties in Turkey. 19.     The applicant submitted that the Greek Civil Code did not provide for the reopening of proceedings in the domestic courts following a finding of a violation of the Convention in a judgment of the Court. Furthermore, she contended that she had no effective remedy in Turkey to contest the judgment of 18 January 2018 in which the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance had held that the judgments of the Greek Court of Cassation were final and binding on the Turkish courts, which were accordingly not required to reconsider the case. As a result, the judgments of the Greek Court of Cassation provided the sole legal basis for depriving the applicant of her property in Turkey. 20.     In those circumstances, the applicant argued that restitution of the property in issue would be the only appropriate form of redress for the violation of the Convention. Such restitution could easily be secured if the Court ordered the rectification of the registration of the inherited properties at the Land Registry in the names of her late husband’s sisters. 21.     In the absence of restitutio in integrum , the applicant invited the Court to award her compensation of EUR 44,103, corresponding to three-quarters of the value of the three properties in issue in Greece (registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4, 420170469058/2/22, 420170460019/0/0 and 420173428146/0/0), and compensation of EUR   936,912.50 in respect of the four properties in Turkey (that amount being based on the expert reports produced by the applicant in Turkey). Non-pecuniary damage 22.     The applicant claimed EUR 30,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. She submitted that she had suffered excessive stress from the publicity surrounding the proceedings in her case before the Greek courts and the Court and from her public exposure as an elderly Muslim widow following her decision to fight against the application of Sharia law in Greece. Costs and expenses 23.     The applicant claimed EUR 5,828.33 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court, broken down as follows: EUR 2,401.05 for legal fees before the domestic courts; EUR   1,364 for Mr Ktistakis’s fees before the Court; EUR   1,100 for Mr   Tsitselikis’s fees before the Court; and EUR   963.28 for the costs associated with the hearing before the Grand Chamber. The Government’s observations of 18 April and 28 May 2019 (filed prior to the Court of Appeal’s judgment no. 281/2019 of 23   October 2019) Pecuniary damage (a)    Property located in Greece 24.     At the time they submitted their observations, the Government argued first of all that the assessment of the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant was premature, uncertain and hypothetical. The registration at the Land Registry of the property bequeathed to the applicant had not yet been rectified, as requested by her late husband’s sisters, because the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court finding for the testator’s sisters was still pending before the Thrace Court of Appeal. In fact, the registration of the relevant property in the applicant’s name (in respect of the share inherited from her husband) could only be changed by an irrevocable judgment pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of Law no.   2664/1998. According to the land register, therefore, the applicant was currently the sole owner of that inherited share. 25.     Furthermore, the Government emphasised that the Court’s principal judgment had been brought to the Court of Appeal’s attention. It was clearly impossible to anticipate that court’s decision, but were the latter to allow the applicant’s appeal, the registration would not be rectified and the applicant’s legal status as the beneficiary of her husband’s will would remain unchanged. If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal were to dismiss the applicant’s appeal, she could lodge an appeal on points of law. Furthermore, the applicant could also bring an action for damages against her husband’s sisters under Article 904 (unjust enrichment) of the Civil Code or an action for damages against the State under section 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code (duty of the State to make good any damage caused by the unlawful acts or omissions of its organs in the exercise of public authority). 26.     The Government explained that in accepting her husband’s estate by notarised deed and registering the inherited property at the Komotini Land Registry, the applicant had accepted the properties bequeathed by her husband, which he had previously declared to the tax authorities. Those properties were as follows: (a)   a 50% share of a jointly owned apartment (registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4 and 420170469058/2/22), valued at EUR 34,067.08, the other 50% of which already belonged to the applicant following purchase; (b)   a 25% share of a jointly owned plot of land (registered under number 420170460019/0/0) occupied by a shop with a surface area of 24.45 sq. m, valued at EUR 15,337.41; (c)   a 33.3% share of a plot of farmland (registered under number 420173428146/0/0), valued at EUR 5,400, the remainder of which already belonged to the testator’s sisters; and (d)   a 75% share of a jointly owned plot of land (registered under number 420170494076), valued at EUR 12,777.45, the remaining 25% of which belonged to the applicant’s mother and sister. The Government pointed out that this property had not been among those whose ownership had been contested by the testator’s sisters in the application they had lodged on 19   April 2017. 27.     Lastly, the Government pointed out that the applicant had not submitted a tax declaration concerning the 25% share of the property which she had inherited, and had therefore not paid any property tax on it. (b)    Property located in Turkey 28.     The Government contended that any claim submitted by the applicant relating to the property in Turkey was inadmissible, ill-founded, vague and impossible to assess. They emphasised that that property fell outside the jurisdiction of the Greek courts. It had at no stage been the subject of proceedings in those courts and did not form part of the case before the Court; it was the subject of proceedings still pending before the Turkish courts, and consequently the question of the applicant’s inheritance rights in Turkey was premature as matters stood. Moreover, the applicant had not established the ownership of that property or its legal status with effect from her husband’s death up to the present day. 29.     The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to take the requisite steps to ensure the recognition and execution of her husband’s will in Turkey before it had been invalidated by the Greek Court of Cassation, and had not established that, even assuming that the will had been valid in Greece, it would also have been valid in Turkey for the purposes of its execution, particularly in view of the fact that the applicable law had been Turkish law. If the Greek Court of Cassation had not invalidated the will, the Turkish courts would have considered whether the will was contrary to Turkish public policy on other grounds. Non-pecuniary damage 30.     The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim under this head was vague, excessive and unfounded in view of the circumstances of the case, that is to say, its complexity, the applicant’s age and social and economic status, and the financial situation in Greece. Costs and expenses 31.     The Government submitted that the applicant had not justified her claim or provided any evidence in support of it. She had submitted four invoices for legal fees, but these had been drawn up in the name of a lawyer who had not represented her before the Court. Furthermore, two of the four invoices related to her appeal on points of law of 8 February 2016 and the hearing in the Court of Cassation, that is to say, acts and events which had taken place after the application had been lodged and which fell outside its subject matter. Lastly, the Government submitted that the sum claimed was excessive. The Court’s assessment General principles 32.     The Court reiterates its case-law to the effect that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Kurić and Others v . Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no.   26828/06, §   79, ECHR   2014). The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (Article 1). If the nature of the breach allows of restitutio in integrum , it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article   41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, § 20, ECHR 2001 ‑ I, and Guiso-Gallisay v.   Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 58858/00, §   90, 22   December 2009). The Court enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of that power, as the adjective “just” and the phrase “if necessary” attest (see Comingersoll S.A. v.   Portugal [GC], no. 35382/97, §   29, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV). To that end, it may have recourse to equitable considerations (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v.   Latvia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 71243/01 , §   36, ECHR 2014; The former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no.   25701/94, §   79, 28   November 2002; S.C. Granitul S.A. v. Romania (just satisfaction), no.   22022/03, § 15, 24 April 2012; and Kryvenkyy v.   Ukraine , no. 43768/07, §   52, 16 February 2017). 33.     The Court further reiterates that there is no express provision for non-pecuniary or moral damage. In Varnava and Others v.   Turkey ([GC], nos.   16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009) and Cyprus v. Turkey ((just satisfaction) [GC], no.   25781/94, § 56, ECHR 2014), the Court confirmed the following principles, which it has gradually developed in its case-law. Situations where the applicant has suffered evident trauma, whether physical or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration, feelings of injustice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of opportunity can be distinguished from those situations where the public vindication of the wrong suffered by the applicant, in a judgment binding on the Contracting State, is an appropriate form of redress in itself. In some situations, where a law, procedure or practice has been found to fall short of Convention standards this is enough to put matters right. In other situations, however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require something further. Such elements do not lend themselves to a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor is it the Court’s role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage (see Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 40167/06, § 39, 12 December 2017). Application of those principles in the present case Pecuniary damage 34.     The Court reiterates that in its principal judgment it found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the following grounds: whereas the applicant’s husband had decided, in a will drawn up in accordance with Greek civil law before a Greek notary, to bequeath all his property to her, the Greek Court of Cassation considered that the Islamic law of succession should be applied to her case. This had the consequence of depriving the applicant of the benefit of the will made by her husband, and specifically of three-quarters of the property bequeathed by him. 35.     The Court also notes that in her claims under Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant sought compensation for the damage sustained in respect of her husband’s property in both Greece and Turkey. (a)    Property located in Greece 36.     The Court notes that the following properties are covered by the applicant’s husband’s will, according to Land Registry documents: (a)   an apartment, a parking space and a cellar (registered under numbers 420170469058/2/8, 420170469058/3/4 and 420170469058/2/22), with a value of 34,067.08 euros (EUR), 50% belonging to the applicant’s husband and 50% belonging to the applicant; (b)   a plot of land (registered under number 420170460019/0/0) and a shop located on it, occupying a surface area of 24.45 sq. m, with a value of EUR 15,337.41, 25% belonging to the applicant’s husband, 18.75% to one of the latter’s sisters, 18.75% to the other sister and 25% to another, unidentified person; (c)   a plot of farmland (registered under number 420173428146/0/0), with a value of EUR 5,400, 33.33% belonging to the applicant’s husband, 33.33% to one of the latter’s sisters and 33.33% to the other sister; and (d)   75% of a plot of land (registered under number 420170494076), with a value of EUR 12,777.45, the remaining 25% of which belonged to the applicant’s mother and sister; the land has in the meantime been expropriated and its ownership was not contested by the testator’s sisters in the application they lodged on 19 April 2017. 37.     The Court also notes that after the Court of Cassation had delivered its judgment on 6 April 2017, the sisters of the applicant’s late husband applied to the Rodopi Court of First Instance on 19 April 2017 for rectification of the land register in order to be recognised as co-owners of the testator’s property. In a judgment of 20   November 2018, the Court of First Instance recognised the two sisters as co-owners and ordered the amendment of the registration of the property at the Land Registry, in accordance with the terms of the judgment. Lastly, the court ruled that the applicant remained the owner of one-quarter of the property bequeathed and was required to register this portion afresh at the Land Registry. On 24   December 2018 the applicant appealed to the Thrace Court of Appeal against that judgment. On 23 October 2019 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance. It referred to its previous final judgment no. 183/2015 and noted that, in it, it had ruled with the force of res judicata , by which it was bound, that the law applicable to the deceased’s estate was Sharia law. On 20 December 2019 the applicant appealed on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 38.     The Court considers that although the proceedings in the Court of Cassation are still pending, it is not required to await the outcome of those proceedings before giving its decision. In this connection, it reiterates its case-law to the effect that under Article 41, it may proceed to apply that Article if the internal law of the respondent State “allows only partial reparation to be made” for the consequences of the violation found. If the victim, after exhausting in vain the domestic remedies before complaining in Strasbourg of a violation of his or her rights, were obliged to do so a second time before being able to obtain just satisfaction from the Court, the total length of the procedure instituted by the Convention would scarcely be in keeping with the idea of the effective protection of human rights. Such a requirement would lead to a situation incompatible with the aim and object of the Convention (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (Article 50), 10   March 1972, § 16, Series A no. 14, and Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v.   Spain (Article 50), 13 June 1994, § 17, Series A no. 285-C). 39.     In the applicant’s view, the best means of redress for the violation of the Convention and of Protocol No. 1 would be for the Court to order restitutio in integrum , which in the instant case would entail rectifying in her favour the registration of the bequeathed property at the Land Registry. 40.     According to the information supplied by the parties, the land register has not yet been rectified following the Court of First Instance’s judgment of 20 November 2018 and the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 23   October 2019 so as to recognise the sisters of the applicant’s late husband as co-owners of the testator’s property. The relevant entries cannot be rectified unless an irrevocable judgment is delivered in favour of the deceased’s sisters. Only in that event could the sisters of the applicant’s late husband be recognised as co-owners of the testator’s property. 41.     Accordingly, the Court notes, firstly, that the effect of the violation of the Convention which it found in its principal judgment has not yet become tangible. Secondly, it reiterates that, in principle, it is not its task to prescribe exactly how a State should put an end to a breach of the Convention and make reparation for its consequences. 42.     Nevertheless, it is clear that restoration of “the closest possible situation to that which would have existed if the breach in question had not occurred” (see Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31   October 1995, § 38, Series A no. 330-B; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins , cited above, § 33; and Chiragov and Others v.   Armenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no.   13216/05, § 59, 12 December 2017) would consist in taking measures to ensure that the applicant retains her ownership of the property in Greece bequeathed by her husband or, in the event of an amendment to the land register, that her property rights are restored. 43.     The Court holds that unless the respondent State takes the above-mentioned measures within one year of the delivery of this judgment, it must pay an amount of compensation to the applicant that takes account of the value of the property bequeathed to her in proportion to the percentage of which she was deprived pursuant to the rules of Sharia law. 44.     The value of that property, amounting to a total of EUR   54,804.49, was supplied to the Government by the Komotini Tax Office, and the applicant indicated her agreement with that amount in her observations. 45.     Given that as a result of the Court of Cassation’s decision that the disputed estate should be governed by Sharia law, the applicant was deprived of three-quarters of the property in question (while remaining the owner of one-quarter), she is entitled, unless the respondent State takes the above-mentioned measures within the prescribed time-limit, to compensation corresponding to three-quarters of the value of that property, that is to say, a sum of EUR 41,103.36. 46.     However, the applicant cannot derive any right to double compensation or to unjust enrichment from the Court’s judgment. Consequently, if the outcome of the proceedings currently pending in Greece is consistent with the principal judgment, she should repay that sum to the respondent State in the event of its payment in the meantime. (b)    Property located in Turkey 47.     The Court notes that the application giving rise to the principal judgment was brought solely against Greece. The question of the effects of the deceased’s will, in so far as it relates to the property in Turkey, is the subject of proceedings still pending in the Turkish courts. The intervention of the Turkish courts in the inheritance dispute between the applicant and the testator’s sisters was triggered both by the action brought by the applicant in the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance seeking to have the will applied to the property located in Turkey, and also by the testator’s sisters, who for their part had applied to have the will declared null and void on the grounds of its incompatibility with Turkish legislation (see paragraphs   16 above and 88 of the principal judgment). On 18 January 2018 the Civil Court of First Instance ruled that following the judgments delivered by the Greek courts, the Turkish courts were not required to reconsider the case. The appeals lodged by both the applicant and the testator’s sisters against that judgment are currently pending before the Istanbul Court of Appeal. 48.     That being so, the Court cannot discern any particular circumstances that could be said to amount to the exercise by Greece of its jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings taking place in Turkey. 49.     It should also be noted that although the applicant’s late husband drew up his will in general terms, without specifically distinguishing between the properties located in Turkey and in Greece, the applicant’s notarised deed accepting the will refers to and describes the deceased’s property in Greece alone (see paragraph 10 of the principal judgment). 50.     At any rate, even if the applicant considers the property located in Turkey to be part of the “inheritance” of which she has been deprived, the Court, when finding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applicable, in paragraph 130 of its principal judgment, explicitly referred to the fact that “[the] applicant [had] registered the property transferred to her with the Komotini Land Registry, paying the corresponding registration fees”. This only applied to the Greek properties. It was on that basis, and that basis alone, that the Court went on to examine, in the principal judgment, whether Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated. Thus, the Court took no substantive position in the principal judgment on the applicant’s alleged rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the property located in Turkey. Consequently, this property cannot form the basis of any just satisfaction claims against the respondent State in the present reserved Article 41 proceedings. 51.     Furthermore, the Court reiterates that under Article 46 of the Convention, any judgment of the Court is binding only on the States that were parties to the proceedings giving rise to it, which was not the case for Turkey as regards the principal judgment in this instance. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the Turkish courts from taking the principal judgment into account when giving their decision. 52.     The Court would further point out that the applicant will, if appropriate, have the opportunity to bring an application against Turkey in respect of the final decision delivered by the Turkish courts on the effects of her husband’s will on the property in Turkey, should that decision not have regard to the Court’s principal judgment holding Greece liable of violating Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.   1, and should it not draw from it the necessary consequences flowing from Turkey’s status as Contracting Party to the Convention. 53.     The Court therefore considers that in these circumstances it does not have jurisdiction, in the context of the present case, to determine the applicant’s claims concerning her husband’s property in Turkey. Non-pecuniary damage 54.     The Court acknowledges that the applicant undeniably sustained damage on account of the discrimination she suffered. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it decides to award her EUR 10,000. Costs and expenses 55.     The Court reiterates that to be entitled to an award for costs and expenses under Article 41 of the Convention, the injured party must have actually and necessarily incurred them. In particular, Rule 60 § 2 states that itemised particulars of any claim made under Article 41 of the Convention must be submitted, together with the relevant supporting documents, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part. Furthermore, costs and expenses are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, among many other authorities, Vistiņš and Perepjolkins , cited above, § 50). 56.     In the present case, the Court has found a violation of Article   14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It must be acknowledged that even if there had been no violation of those provisions, the applicant would have incurred expenses for the domestic proceedings. Therefore, having regard to the documents she submitted in support of her claim, the Court considers that she should be reimbursed the sum claimed in respect of the proceedings before the domestic courts, that is, EUR 2,401.05 in legal fees. Furthermore, having regard to the documents available to it and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the full amount claimed in respect of the proceedings before it, that is, EUR 3,427.28 in respect of lawyers’ fees and the costs associated with the Grand Chamber hearing. Default interest 57.     The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, Holds , unanimously, (a)   that the taking of measures by the respondent State to ensure that the applicant retains her ownership of the property bequeathed to her in Greece, or, in the event of an amendment to the land register, that her property rights are restored, would constitute appropriate redress for the violation of her rights; (b)   that in the event that such measures are not taken within one year, the respondent State must pay the applicant the sum of EUR   41,103.36 (forty-one thousand one hundred and three euros and thirty-six cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage; (c)   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned one year until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Holds , unanimously, (a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts: (i)   EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (ii)   EUR 5,828.33 (five thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight euros and thirty-three cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b)   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses , by fourteen votes to three, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English and in French, and notified in writing on 18 June 2020, pursuant to Rules 71 § 1 and 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.   Johan Callewaert   Robert Spano Deputy to the Registrar   President   In accordance with Article   45 §   2 of the Convention and Rule   74 §   2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Lemmens, Koskelo and Eicke is annexed to this judgment. R.SO J.C.   JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES LEMMENS, KOSKELO AND EICKE Introduction 1.     We agree with the majority in relation to the statement of the general principles applicable in relation to an assessment of just satisfaction under Article 41 (as far as they go) set out in paragraphs 32 to 33 of the judgment and have voted for paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of this judgment. 2     Unfortunately, we find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in relation to its application of those principles to the applicant’s head of claim for just satisfaction in concerning the properties located in Turkey, and its conclusion in relation to that head of claim. 3.     In our respectful view, for the reasons set out in more detail below, the judgment not only reaches the wrong conclusion in relation to this head of claim but, more importantly, bases itself on an unjustifiably narrow reading of the principal judgment ( Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no.   20452/14 , 19   December 2018) and methodologically and procedurally confuses and conflates two separate and distinct stages of the assessment of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention. 4.     In doing so, the majority has avoided having to grapple with some of the more difficult issues arising in the context of an assessment of pecuniary damages under Article 41 of the Convention. Furthermore, it has failed to take this opportunity to provide some clarity in relation to the Court’s rather under-developed case-law in this area. After all, in the context of judgments of the Court in which admissibility, merits and just satisfaction are almost invariably considered together, the just satisfaction aspect of a complaint frequently receives only the most cursory attention, almost as an afterthought, without detailed exposition of or reference to applicable legal principles. Furthermore, as in the present case, this cursory approach is frequently to the detriment of the applicant for whom the just satisfaction award (and any other individual measures) under Article 41 of the Convention, arising from the judgment of this Court, may well be the only tangible (and desired) result of having initiated proceedings before this Court (in relation to the inverse risk of over-compensation: see the separate opinions of Judges Koskelo and Eicke in Čapský and Jeschkeová v. the Czech Republic , nos. 25784/09 and 36002/09, 9 February 2017). This is particularly so in cases where an applicant has had to wait a significant period of time before judgment is handed and the passage of time has made restitutio in integrum materially impossible. 5.     It is a further consequence of the Court’s current practice that opportunities such as the present, where the Court is required to engage separately (and only) with the question of just satisfaction arising from an already established brea