CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 juillet 2020

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text-align:justify; font-family:Arial; list-style-position:inside } .sACBB7403 { width:6.79pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s526A3E21 { margin-top:4pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:4pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sEFA4D591 { width:5.3pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sDD2975B { width:1.96pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sBA59B8E7 { width:0.12pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sF588E840 { width:0.63pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sA284A115 { width:11.79pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sFF774B43 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:25.6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify } .s9C12FBC3 { width:12pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block }   FOURTH SECTION CASE OF MONICA MACOVEI v. ROMANIA (Application no. 53028/14)     JUDGMENT   Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Statements alleging corruption directed at certain members of parliament made by politician in support of her view of incompatibility of that role with that of lawyer • Appellate courts failing to provide convincing reasons for conclusion that comments amounted to untruthful statements • Appellate courts failing to consider collective nature of statements and consequence of context in which comments had been made • Sanction capable of having dissuasive effect on exercise of freedom of expression   STRASBOURG 28 July 2020   FINAL   28/10/2020   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Monica Macovei v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Yonko Grozev, President,   Faris Vehabović,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Georges Ravarani,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Ms Monica Luisa Macovei (“the applicant”), on 11 July 2014, the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application, the parties’ observations, Noting the withdrawal from the case of Ms Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Rules 28 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court), the judge elected in respect of Romania, and the appointment by the President of Mr Krzysztof Wojtyczek to sit as ad   hoc judge (Rules 29 § 1), Having deliberated in private on 19 May and 23 June 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last ‑ mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant complained that the sentence imposed on her by a final   judgment of the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 7 November 2013 had breached her right to freedom of expression. She relied on Article   10 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bucharest. She was represented by Mr D.C. Mihai, a lawyer practising in Bucharest. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. STatements by the applicant 5 .     At the time of the events the applicant was a former minister of justice of Romania, an active politician and a member of the European Parliament. 6.     On 7 September 2009 two national newspapers published two press articles reporting comments the applicant had made the previous day at a summer school organised by the Democratic Liberal Party ( Partidul Democrat Liberal – PDL ). 7 .     Under the headline “Monica Macovei stated that the [Social Democrat Party’s ( Partidul Social Democrat – PSD )] members of parliament [V.]P. and [D.]Ş. are corrupt”, the newspaper Ziarul Financiar published the following article: “The PDL European Parliament member Monica Macovei ... stated yesterday ... that two young PSD members of parliament had [signed] contracts worth millions of euros with State companies from the constituencies they represented [in Parliament], arguing that this was a clear case of corruption. The former minister of justice stated ‘Take a look at the lawyers in Parliament, there are two youngsters from the PSD for example, who have [signed] contracts worth millions of euros with State companies from the constituencies they represent [in Parliament], money that they get for legal advice. This is a typical act of corruption by political influence. It is not at all different from other acts of corruption.’ Afterwards, she named the two PSD members of parliament, stating that she was referring to [the Chamber of Deputies member] V.P., who was also the minister for relations with Parliament, and to Senator D.Ş., and added that this information had appeared in the press. Macovei argued that the first step was to make the two   functions of lawyer and of member of parliament incompatible. ‘For as long as one is [working as] a member of parliament, one cannot exercise this profession (of lawyer).’” 8 .     Under the headline “Monica Macovei lunges at [V.]P.”, the newspaper Ziua published the following article: “The PDL European Parliament member Monica Macovei accused yesterday the Social Democrats V.P. and D.Ş. of corruption by implementing contracts [concluded] with State companies. [V.]P. argued that [her] accusations sounded like the ones of the ‘friend’ I.M. who had helped her during the electoral campaign. Naming [V.]P. and [D.]Ş., the former minister of justice stated ‘Take a look at the lawyers in Parliament, there are two youngsters from the PSD for example, who have [signed] contracts worth millions of euros with State companies from the constituencies they represent [in Parliament], money that they get for legal advice. This is a typical act of corruption by political influence.’ Contacted by Ziua , [V.]P. stated that there was no difference between the accusation made by Macovei and the one made some time ago by the controversial [I.]M. The PSD member stated that ‘she is a first-class liar. Her words are the words of I.M. Birds of a feather flock together. When [I.]M. accused me of something similar, I presented documents [which proved] that I did not have any form of contract and [I.]M. went silent. Now the idea has been taken over by [I.]M.’s friend, Macovei’. V.P. further stated that he was not considering taking legal action because he did not want to ‘waste the time of [the] justice [system] with Macovei’”. tort law proceedings against the applicant 9 .     On 16 October 2009 D.Ş. brought general tort law proceedings against the applicant, seeking 500,000 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 117,100   euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and the publication of the court’s judgment at the applicant’s expense in three national newspapers, as well as in the newspapers Ziarul Financiar and Ziua . He argued that the applicant’s statement that “the PSD members of parliament [V.]P. and [D.]Ş were corrupt” and the fact that she had named an act that in her opinion represented “a clear case of corruption” in the press articles of 7 September 2009 had discredited him in the eyes of the public and of his professional and political partners and had affected his professional and moral reputation, including his teaching career at the Bucharest Law School, as well as his dignity and honour. He relied on Articles 998-999 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 46 below), Articles   10 and 30 §§ 1 and 6 of the Constitution (see paragraph 44 below), Article   10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and Article   19 §   3 of the International Pact concerning civil and political rights. first-iNstance court’s judgment 10 .     On 18 October 2010 the Bucharest County Court (“the County Court”) dismissed D.Ş.’s action. It noted that on 6 September 2009 at a summer school organised by the PDL, the applicant had described an act which in her opinion had represented “a clear case of corruption” and that her opinion had been published in the newspaper Ziarul Financiar . It also noted that the applicant had expressed her opinion in a context in which an analysis had been made as to whether the function of lawyer and that of member of parliament were incompatible. The plaintiff’s name, together with the name of the member of parliament V.P., had been mentioned in this context. 11.     The court held that, examined in a context in which the applicant had supported the existence of an incompatibility between the functions of lawyer and member of parliament, her statements had not been defamatory. The words “a clear case of corruption” had not had an exclusive pejorative connotation as long as the person together with whom the plaintiff had been named had not been the object of a criminal investigation or of any other form of investigation which could have raised doubts about his moral integrity. The simple adjacent mentioning of the plaintiff’s name could not have led to a deterioration of his image as a politician and lawyer, and could not have affected his dignity and honour. 12 .     The court further held that in the above-mentioned context, the applicant’s statements could be regarded as insinuations. An insinuation was a form of implied sub-textual suggestion which could not carry blame. In her speech the applicant had publicly suggested a certain fact. A suggestion did not have a material support. It was used to speculate about certain meaning of words and especially the way in which the public perceived them, this perception being also directly influenced by the public’s level of education. Albeit suggestive, the applicant’s statements had not been vehement. Ironic speech and especially the suggestion of a certain circumstance were means of expressing an opinion. A person who had made a suggestion but not an offensive statement had neither accused nor exonerated. 13.     The court also held that all of the above formed the content of the right to freely express an opinion. The plaintiff had undoubtedly felt affected by the fact that his name had been used in a context casting blame on politicians and especially on those in power. 14 .     The court considered that in those circumstances the plaintiff could not ask it to punish the applicant for her attitude, given that she had remained prudent in her suggestions. Such an approach had been endorsed also by the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), which had reiterated repeatedly that criticism directed at politicians, as in the plaintiff’s case, was a matter of public interest. second-instance court’s judgment 15.     D.Ş. appealed against the first-instance judgment. 16 .     In her submissions before the second-instance court the applicant argued, amongst other things, that in several public speeches she had made in September 2009 as a Member of the European Parliament, including one she had made at the summer school organised by the PDL, she had reiterated her opinions concerning the incompatibility of the functions of lawyer and member of parliament. In support of that idea, without initially giving any names, she had provided as an example the situation in which State companies from the constituency had increased the income of two lawyers and members of parliament – members of the PSD – as a result of legal-assistance contracts. When asked by journalists, she had acknowledged that she had been referring to V.P. and D.Ş and had expressly mentioned that information about the system the two had been using to obtain income had already been reported in the press. During her public speeches on that topic she had explained that it had been a system by which the law practice “[D.]Ş and Associates” had earned substantial amounts of money from energy companies in a certain constituency at a time when V.P. had been both a senior partner of the law firm and a member of parliament representing the said constituency. The system which had led to obtaining substantial incomes by merging parliamentary influence with the position of lawyer had also been reported in press articles of 8 September 2009 (see paragraph 44 below). 17 .     On 3 October 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) allowed D.Ş.’s appeal and ordered the applicant to pay him damages of RON 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,300) and to publish the court’s judgment at her own expense in three national newspapers with the widest circulation, as well as in the newspapers Ziarul Financiar and Ziua . 18 .     The Court of Appeal held that the conditions for civil liability had been met in the applicant’s case. In particular, the applicant’s unlawful act had consisted in the statement she had made on 7 September 2009 about an untruthful fact, namely that the plaintiff had committed an act of corruption in his joint functions of lawyer and member of parliament. Her statement had gone beyond a simple value judgment and had amounted to a defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff’s activity. The domestic courts and the Court had acknowledged that freedom of expression was limited by the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In other words, freedom of expression stopped where the constitutional rights concerning the dignity of others began, and the national authorities had to make sure that a proportional balance was struck between those rights. 19.     The court considered that even though the person targeted in the statements was a public figure involved in politics, and it could therefore be argued that he had implicitly accepted exposure to criticism concerning the exercise of his public mandate, which was of public interest, the ease with which the impugned statements had been made, by a person fully aware of the legal consequences of taking a public stance without actual proof, overstepped the limits of freedom of expression. 20 .     Human dignity was a characteristic of human personality and therefore its protection had to be effective, given the fundamental nature of that right. Otherwise it would become a mere illusory right which could not be relied on by persons with an intense social activity, and exercising it would be blocked by freedom of expression. As a result, the court considered that the applicant’s allegations concerning the existence of a bill on the incompatibility of lawyers who were also members of parliament had to be discarded because, on the one hand, any statement had to have a foundation or a factual support well known by the person in question – even more so if the statement had been made by someone known by the public to be a trained professional belonging to the legal field – and, on the other hand, because the legislative process in that regard could have been conducted transparently and lawfully. 21.     The court acknowledged that the bill to which the applicant had referred in her defence had been of public interest and had concerned democratic values. However, it considered that the applicant’s statements concerning the plaintiff had overstepped the acceptable limits of exaggeration and had represented a direct affirmation of an act of corruption concerning him, even though everyone had the right to be presumed innocent. 22 .     The court reiterated the scope and limits of the rights to freedom of expression, honour, dignity, reputation and public image as prescribed by domestic, European and international provisions; the Court’s conclusions concerning the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments, and the required proof in support of such statements; the heightened level of protection enjoyed by political speech; and the higher level of acceptable criticisms to which public persons in general, and politicians in particular, may be exposed. On this basis it held that the intentional statement of the applicant, known to the public as a former minister of justice, that by exercising jointly the functions of lawyer and member of parliament during the relevant period of time, the plaintiff had used political influence in connection with the legal services provided by the law practice he had founded, had been of a nature that had affected the plaintiff’s political, professional and teaching career. None of the available evidence had proved that the plaintiff had signed any legal-assistance or other contracts with a State-owned company located in the constituency he was representing in Parliament. As a result, the plaintiff had suffered non-pecuniary damage and was entitled both to non-pecuniary damages and to the publishing of the court’s judgment in the press. 23 .     Lastly, the court held that the amount of compensation granted to the plaintiff in respect of non-pecuniary damage had been assessed symbolically because human dignity was not a value which could be quantified. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE 24.     The applicant and D.Ş. appealed on points of law against the second-instance judgment. 25 .     The applicant argued that the second-instance court had failed to examine the arguments raised by her in her defence and had assessed the facts wrongly. As regards her statements, the second-instance court had considered 7 September 2009 as the date when she had committed the unlawful act. However, two press articles of 8 September 2009 attached to the case file had noted that she had stated that the function of member of parliament should have been incompatible with the function of lawyer because politicians could use their status to obtain various benefits. She had provided as an example the law practice of “[D.]Ş. and Associates”, which had earned millions of euros from State-owned companies – located in a certain constituency – precisely at a time when V.P. had been both a senior partner at the law practice in question and a member of parliament. It had been clear, therefore that her statements had concerned mainly V.P., because he had been both a lawyer and a member of parliament. The law practice of “[D.]Ş. and Associates” had been the weak link in the D.Ş. and V.P. chain because D.Ş. had not been a member of parliament at the time when the contracts had been concluded. 26.     The applicant further argued that she had made similar statements since 2006 when she had been a minister of justice and had initiated a bill prohibiting the exercise of lawyer and member of parliament functions at the same time. Moreover, her statements had not been a gratuitous attack against the two individuals in question as she had never referred only to D.Ş. She had referred to the mutually beneficial relationship between the two men, who had been friends, which she had used as an example to justify the need for her proposed bill to be adopted. She had never stated that D.Ş. had exercised jointly the functions of lawyer and member of parliament. 27.     The applicant claimed that she had also argued before the second ‑ instance court that D.Ş. had never proved the exact content of the alleged defamatory statements that were the object of the dispute. He had relied on a press report concerning the content of her statements, which had been contradicted by other press reports. As she had already proved before the lower courts, her statements had been reported differently by the press, and D.Ş., who had been aware of those differences, had not taken any steps to clarify them. Even so, the second-instance court had accepted D.Ş.’s version of the events without providing any reasons, holding that the applicant’s unlawful act had consisted in making an untruthful public statement on 7 September 2009. She argued that it had been clear, however, that the phrase “a typical act of corruption” was missing from the press reports of 8 September 2009. Nor did it appear from those press reports that she had stated that D.Ş. had signed contracts and had earned large amounts of money from companies in his constituency, or that he had exercised jointly the function of lawyer and member of parliament. The second-instance court had avoided examining those inconsistencies in the press reports and had therefore failed to establish the facts correctly. 28 .     Furthermore, the applicant argued that her statements had been made on a clearly reasonable factual basis, namely: (i) at least four press articles concerning the mutually beneficial relationship between D.Ş. and V.P. published before her statements of September 2009; (ii) two investigations – into the contractual relationship between the “[D.]Ş. and Associates” law practice and two State-owned companies located in the constituency represented in Parliament by V.P. – which had been finalised more than a month before her statements and which had been brought to the attention of the criminal authorities; and (iii) V.P.’s public income declaration. V.P. had become a senior partner at “[D.]Ş. and Associates” in September 2007 and the above-mentioned investigations had disclosed that since then, the number of new contracts signed by the law practice had increased exponentially and that the existing ones had increased in value significantly. In addition, V.P.’s income had increased considerably. 29.     The applicant submitted that her statements had been made in good faith and had not been a gratuitous attack. Nor had they sought to discredit the plaintiff. She had sought to provide an example and an argument in support of an idea, namely the incompatibility between the functions of lawyer and member of parliament, which she had been promoting for a long time even before she had referred to the plaintiff. 30.     Lastly, the applicant argued that the second-instance court had applied wrongly the domestic general tort law provisions and Article 10 of the Convention. The protection granted to D.Ş.’s political image had been disproportionate and detrimental to a free debate on a matter of public interest. Moreover, the second-instance court had failed to examine whether in the circumstances of the case the curtailment of her right to freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Court’s case-law, the level of acceptable criticism was higher in the case of politicians, regardless of whether the statements in issue had been made by journalists or other persons. 31 .     By a final judgment of 7 November 2013 (available to the parties on 3   March 2014) the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the Court of Cassation”) dismissed both appeals on points of law. 32 .     The Court of Cassation held that the conditions for civil liability had been met in the applicant’s case. In particular, her unlawful act had consisted in the public statement she had made on 7 September 2009 containing an untruthful fact, namely that the plaintiff had committed an act of corruption in his joint functions of lawyer and member of parliament. Damage had been caused to the plaintiff as a result of the negative effect that her statements had had on his political and professional reputation and on his public image. The link between the unlawful act and the damage caused had consisted in the fact that the applicant’s statements had raised doubts about the plaintiff’s integrity in carrying out his political duties and about his reputation in the field of higher education. 33.     The applicant’s liability flowed from her attitude. Her direct statements concerning the plaintiff had overstepped the level of acceptable criticism and had amounted to a direct statement about an act of corruption committed by him in circumstances where he had enjoyed a right to be presumed innocent. 34.     It was true that the acceptable level of criticism was higher in respect of politicians. However, they also had the right to have their reputation and dignity protected. Not every statement concerning a politician had to be tolerated by default. 35 .     The court referred to the Court’s conclusions concerning the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments, and the required proof in support of such statements. On that basis it held that an accusation of acts of corruption formulated by a former minister of justice and prosecutor could have damaged the plaintiff’s political, professional and teaching career. The problem of corruption was of major interest for Romanian society. 36 .     The court could not accept the applicant’s argument that her statements concerning the incompatibility between the functions of lawyer and member of parliament had not sought to gratuitously attack the applicant or to discredit him, but had amounted to mere arguments in support of a bill. It held that the applicant was a former minister of justice, publicly perceived as a legal professional given her career as a prosecutor, and her public statement about an untrue fact, in particular an act of corruption committed by the plaintiff, had been bound to cause him non-pecuniary damage. 37.     The court held further that neither the domestic nor the international norms provided for a precise way of repairing in full the non-pecuniary damage suffered by a person. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the court concluded that the second-instance court had correctly calculated the amount of compensation granted to the plaintiff in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 38 .     Lastly, the court held that a large amount granted in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damages would not deter the applicant from committing similar acts in the future. However, an order to publish the judgments which had held that the acts in question had been unlawful would do so. Other pertinent information 39.     D.Ş. was a senator and a member of parliament from December 2008 to 2015. 40.     The applicant submitted to the Court three articles published on 7   March 2006, 24 February 2008 and 9 May 2009, respectively, in an unidentified newspaper, on the Internet page of the newspaper Ziua and on the Internet news portal HotNews. They stated that the applicant had initiated a bill proposing, amongst other things, that the function of lawyer be declared incompatible with the function of member of parliament and that the incompatibility in question remain in force for at least twenty years. They also stated that Parliament had not adopted the aforementioned proposal. 41 .     The applicant also submitted to the Court five articles published in the media between 28 September 2007 and 6 March 2009. Two of the articles stated, amongst other things, that V.P. had become a senior partner of the law practice “[D.]Ş. and Associates” in September 2007. The remaining three articles described the relationship and connections between V.P., D.Ş., the law practice “[D.]Ş. and Associates” and various major State-owned energy companies located in the constituency represented in Parliament by V.P., including the legal-assistance contracts signed by the law practice and the energy companies in question between April 2007 and December 2008 for large legal fees. 42.     On 4 August 2009 the internal audit department of one of the above ‑ mentioned State-owned companies produced an inquiry report concerning two legal-assistance contracts signed by the company with “[D.]Ş. and Associates”. The report identified several problems with regard to the way in which the contracts had been signed and implemented, and stated that the State company had suffered important financial losses. It recommended that the report be notified to the relevant authorities for further investigation. 43 .     The applicant submitted to the Court V.P.’s public income declarations from May 2007 to October 2009, indicating that from 2005 to 2008 V.P.’s income for his work as a lawyer had increased significantly. They also indicated that from September 2007 to 2008 he had been a senior partner of the law firm “[D.]Ş. and Associates”. 44 .     The applicant submitted to the Court two press articles of 8   September 2009 published by the newspaper Pandurul and the Internet news portal Presaonline . The two articles first stated that the previous day a new episode had begun in the conflict between the applicant and V.P. They then reported that the applicant had stated that the function of member of parliament should be made incompatible with the function of lawyer because politicians could use their status to obtain various benefits. She had provided as an example the law practice of “[D.]Ş. and Associates”, which had earned millions of euros from State-owned companies – located in a certain constituency – precisely at a time when V.P. had been both a senior partner at the law practice in question and a member of parliament representing the constituency in question. 45.     Lastly, the applicant submitted to the Court an article published on 20   June 2018 on the Internet news portal HotNews, which stated that the Court of Cassation had convicted D.Ş. of influence peddling and had sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. According to the article, D.Ş. had been indicted for influence peddling because from October 2011 to July 2014 he had claimed and received EUR 100,000 from a private party in order to facilitate the signing of legal-assistance contracts between a law firm and a large energy company in the country. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 46 .     The former Civil Code, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that any person who was responsible for causing damage to another would be liable to make reparation for it, regardless of whether the damage was caused through his or her own actions, through his or her failure to act or through his or her negligence (Articles 998 and 999 – see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v.   Romania [GC] , no. 41720/13, § 68, 25   June 2019). 47.     Articles 10 and 30 §§ 1 and 6 of the Constitution provide that Romania maintains and develops peaceful relations with all States and has good neighbourly relations based on the generally recognised principles and norms of international law. Freedom to express thoughts, opinions and beliefs orally, in writing, through images, or through other means of public communication is inviolable. Freedom of expression may not damage a person’s honour, dignity, private life or one’s right to one’s image. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 48.     The applicant complained that the sentence imposed on her by the final judgment of 7 November 2013 of the Court of Cassation had breached her right to freedom of expression as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Admissibility 49.     The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits Submissions by the parties (a)    The applicant 50 .     The applicant submitted that according to the Government, the defamation dispute at issue had concerned her statements of 6 September 2009 (see paragraph 59 below). However, the two appellate courts’ judgments had stated that the allegedly defamatory statements had been made on 7 September 2009. The fact that the appellate courts had retained 7   September 2009 as the date of her statements meant that the statements could not have been both made and published on the same day. They could only have been published on 8 September 2009. However, the articles published on the latter date (see paragraph 25 above) had not been taken into account by the courts in their assessment of the case. 51.     Those articles lacked the phrase “a clear case of corruption”, which according to D.Ş. had seriously affected his public image. Furthermore, in the statements quoted in those press articles, the applicant had not claimed that D.Ş. had concluded contracts and had earned substantial amounts of money from the energy companies located in the constituency he would later represent in Parliament. She had only claimed that he had earned those sums from the energy companies located in the constituency represented in Parliament by V.P. at a time when V.P. had been both a senior partner of the "[D.]Ş. and Associates" law practice, and a member of parliament. At the same time, it was not claimed in those articles of 8 September 2009 that the applicant had ever asserted that D.Ş. had cumulatively held the positions of acting lawyer and member of parliament. 52.     The factual situation presented by the applicant had shown that it had been V.P. who had cumulatively held the two positions, and not D.Ş. In her opinion, it had been inexplicable why the second-instance court had accepted D.Ş.’s argument that she had accused him of “cumulatively holding the position of lawyer and member of parliament”. 53 .     Even though she had indicated to the Court of Cassation that it had been necessary to clarify the logical inaccuracies of the second-instance court’s decision, her request had remained unanswered. Even assuming that the second-instance court had erred when it had considered 7 September 2009 as the date of the applicant’s public statements, and regardless of which press reports had been taken into account for the purposes of the present case or whether they contained the phrase “a clear case of corruption”, one factual element had been clear: the applicant had never referred to D.Ş. individually, but had presented and publicly criticised a mutually beneficial relationship between D.Ş and V.P. In her opinion, the two individuals had supported each other in a profitable manner. 54.     Even though the applicant’s public statements had concerned the relationship between two persons, only D.Ş. had taken legal action against her. It could therefore be assumed that for V. P. the same statements had been neither false nor likely to cause damage requiring a judicial response. 55.     The applicant contended that her freedom of expression had been breached, as she had acted in good faith in a matter of public interest, and her statements had had a reasonable and sufficient factual basis. Her claims of September 2009 regarding the incompatibility between the status of lawyer and that of member of parliament had not aimed to gratuitously attack or discredit D.Ş. The purpose of her comments had been to bring forward new examples and arguments in support of a bill, which she had constantly advocated over the years and even long before making any reference to the D.Ş.-V.P. relationship. It had been obvious that her statements had been of public interest since they had concerned dangers regarding public funds and questions of good governance. 56 .     The Court’s case-law relied on by the courts and by the Government in support of their arguments had concerned cases in which the impugned statements had lacked a factual basis or had been much harsher than hers. However, in her case she had had a sufficient factual basis for her statements. She had submitted her arguments and the relevant evidence to support them before all the courts. However, the appellate courts had not taken into account the evidence proving the existence of such a reasonable factual basis. Moreover, in her opinion the last two instance courts had been unjustifiably severe – almost hostile – towards her, but inexplicably lenient towards D.Ş. None of the courts had considered that the fact that both D.Ş. and V.P. had been occupying important public posts at the time when the applicant had expressed her public criticism of their conduct, had placed them under an obligation to accept close scrutiny of their every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large. 57.     The applicant submitted that the judgments of the appellate courts, in particular their assertions that freedom of expression ceased to exist where the rights concerning the dignity of others began (see paragraph 18 above), had contained arguments which had been incompatible with the Court’s case-law, especially in circumstances concerning politicians. 58.     The applicant contested the Government’s submissions that the interference with her right to freedom of expression had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. She argued that the financial penalty imposed on her and the additional financial losses suffered by her because of the public statements she had made in good faith and based on a reasonable factual basis, criticising the influence and business relationship of two politicians and lawmakers, had been not only disproportionate but also completely unjustified and in breach of the Court’s case-law. (b)    The Government 59 .     The Government submitted that the applicant was not a journalist. Moreover, her conduct after she had made the impugned statements – she had named the persons she had been referring to when she had been asked by journalists, she had never denied or retracted her statements, she had never contested the publication of her statements in the press, and she had never contested the fact that the press had been present at the summer school where she had made the statements – clearly showed that she had consented to the publication of her statements by the press. 60 .     The Government acknowledged that the judgments of 3 October 2011 by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 17-23 above) and of 7   November 2013 by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 31-38 above) could be viewed as an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. However, the interference was provided for by law, namely Articles 998-999 of the former Civil Code (see paragraph 46 above). It also pursued a legitimate aim, in particular the protection of the plaintiff’s right of reputation. 61.     The Government contended that the national authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation when they had considered that the interference with the applicant’s rights had been justified by a pressing social need. Her statements had overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism concerning a person occupying a public office. 62.     Even though political debate was characterised by certain ferocity, freedom of expression had limits which would be breached in circumstances where unnecessary defamatory statements were made. In the present case, the applicant had gone beyond mere speculation and irony and had accused D.Ş. of acts of corruption by portraying him with certain certainty as a young member of parliament who had earned a fortune from signing contracts with State-owned companies. Moreover, she had argued that her statements had been justified by past press articles which had conveyed the same information. 63.     Assuming that the applicant’s statements could be considered to fall within the context of a public debate of general interest, Article 10 did not guarantee a right to freedom of expression without any limits, even in connection with questions of public interest. In such circumstances the party imparting such information had to act in good faith in order to provide accurate and credible information. 64.     The applicant had made the statements during a presentation which she could have prepared in advance and she had answered unequivocally journalists’ questions about the identity of the two members of parliament in question. Moreover, the previous statements made by journalists in past press articles concerning the same subject matter had not been reviewed by a court. Consequently, the applicant should not have portrayed the information in question as an established fact simply by relying on the presumed good faith of the journalists and on the fact that they would not have published such information without a reasonable factual basis. 65.     Relying on the Court’s relevant case-law, the domestic courts had examined the facts of the case by taking into account also the documents submitted by the plaintiff in support of his claims. The appellate courts had concluded that the facts imputed to D.Ş. had not been true. They had considered that in the absence of a solid and real factual basis supporting the applicant’s allegations, her statements had overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism on a matter of public interest because the suggestion of acts of corruption had been made by a known public person who was respected by her peers and the public. 66.     The Government acknowledged that the amount granted to D.Ş. by the courts in respect of non-pecuniary damage (approximately EUR 2,300 – see paragraph 17 above) had not been insignificant. However, they considered that it had not been excessive either. The applicant had not challenged before the last-instance court the amount the second-instance court had granted to D.Ş. in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The courts had carried out a balancing exercise between the competing interests at stake and their conclusions had not been arbitrary, given the circumstances of the case. 67.     The reasons provided by the first-instance court in support of its judgment (see paragraphs 10-14 above) had not differed substantially from those of the appellate courts. The different outcome of the case before the first-instance court had been the exclusive result of that court’s margin of appreciation over the facts of the case. The first-instance court had also perceived the applicant’s statements as being capable of affecting D.Ş.’s reputation, even though it had eventually found in the applicant’s favour. By contrast to the first-instance court, the appellate courts had only given more weight to D.Ş.’s arguments concerning his social status and to the impact the applicant’s opinions could have had on the general public, given her position of former minister of justice. 68.     Relying on the Court’s case-law concerning statements with a potentially similar impact on the reputation of others, the Government argued that the applicant had formulated her statements with an intention to cast doubt on D.Ş.’s honesty and reputation. In circumstances where she had had the intention of alerting the public about certain possible foul play and of accusing D.Ş. directly, she had had a duty to provide a sufficient factual basis in support of her allegations. Even assuming that the applicant’s statements could be viewed as a measure promoting a bill, they had still overstepped the level of acceptable criticism, since they had amounted to an accusation of a criminal offence in respect of a person who had not been under investigation or convicted. The Court’s assessment 69.     The Court agrees with the Government that the judgments of 3   October 2011 of the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 17-23 above) and of 7   November 2013 of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 31-38 above) amounted to an “interference” with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression (see paragraph 60 above). 70.     The Court a