CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 8 septembre 2020

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page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s2E302ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF TIMAKOV AND OOO ID RUBEZH v.   RUSSIA (Applications nos. 46232/10 and 74770/10)     JUDGMENT   Art 34 • Locus standi • Shareholders admitted to pursue proceedings instead of dissolved applicant company Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Failure to apply relevant Convention standards • Civil defamation awards largely beyond applicant’s financial resources, leading to seizure of household items • Relevant yet insufficient grounds given • Disproportionate interference Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Public hearing • Civil defamation case heard in camera without reason     STRASBOURG 8 September 2020   FINAL   08/12/2020     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Timakov and OOO ID Rubezh v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Paul Lemmens, President,   Helen Keller,   Dmitry Dedov,   Alena Poláčková,   Gilberto Felici,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges, and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: two applications (nos.   46232/10 and 74770/10) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Viktorovich Timakov (“the applicant”), and a legal entity under Russian law, OOO ID Rubezh (“the applicant company”), on 3 August and 18 September 2010 respectively; the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the right to freedom of expression and the right to a public hearing to the Russian Government (“the Government”) and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications; the parties’ observations; the decision to uphold the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee; Having deliberated in private on 30 June 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns two independent sets of civil proceedings for defamation brought by the then Governor of the Tula Region following the publication of an article in a local newspaper and of statements quoted by other news outlets expressing the view that the Governor had deserved the highest mark for corruption. The applicant, a journalist and a member of the regional legislature, was a defendant in each set of proceedings; the applicant company, the publisher of the newspaper, was involved in one of them. The first-instance court held the first set of defamation proceedings in camera, at the Governor’s request. The domestic courts made sizeable awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage, referring in their reasoning to the Governor’s social standing. In addition, criminal proceedings for libel were brought against the applicant in connection with the statements that had been found defamatory in the second set of civil proceedings. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant – a journalist and a member of the Tula Regional Duma (the regional legislature) at the material time – was born in 1965 and lives in Tula. The applicant company, an editorial and publishing house based in Tula, was a limited liability company. Its only shareholders were the applicant (with 49% of the shares) and Mr Vladimir Borisovich Leonov (with 51% of the shares). The applicant company edited and published a local newspaper, Za Sechnyy Rubezh (“the newspaper”). The applicants were represented by Ms G. Arapova, a lawyer practising in Voronezh. 3.     The Government were represented by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Application n o . 46232/10 Impugned article 5.     On 12 May 2009 the newspaper ran an editorial article entitled “What mark would the Governor deserve for corruption?” (“the article”), that had been written by the applicant. The thrust of the article was that Mr D., the then Governor of the Tula Region, had been involved in and condoned corrupt practices. The article contained several rhetorical questions and statements expressing its author’s disapproval of what he perceived as the heightened levels of corruption in the Tula Region, for example: (i)     “However, only a blind person would not notice the remarkable achievements of the acting Administration [of the Tula Region] in fostering corruption”; (ii)     “It is hardly believable that the today’s saturnalia of corruption [in the Tula Region] could have taken place if it were headed by a person as transparent as a crystal”; (iii)     “How did it happen that journalists who a few years ago followed every misstep by the authorities now only speak of the Governor as a dead man, in accordance with the ‘either good or nothing’ maxim? Why the thick veil of silence has fallen onto media outlets of Tula? What does the Governor pay them in for loyalty – in envelopes filled with foreign currency, in baked goods with cabbage, or in sunlit smiles?” Civil proceedings for defamation 6.     On 5 June 2009 Mr D. brought civil proceedings for defamation against the applicants before the Privokzalnyy District Court of Tula (“the District Court”), requesting a retraction of fourteen of the statements that had appeared in the article and claiming 10,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for non ‑ pecuniary damage. 7 .     On 13 July 2009 the District Court decided, at Mr D.’s request, to hear the case in camera in order to protect the claimant’s reputation, reasoning that the public discussion of certain secret aspects pertaining to his private life and business reputation that might be uncovered in the course of the court hearings would be detrimental to “the correct examination of the claim”. 8 .     The applicant argued before the District Court that the article had dealt with a matter of public interest and had invited readers to reflect on the situation described; it had not contained statements of fact ( сведения ). 9 .     On 25 August 2009 the District Court allowed Mr D.’s claim in part. It referred, in particular, to the Governor’s status as a high-ranking public official, ordered a retraction of the fourteen impugned statements, and held the applicant and the applicant company jointly and severally liable to pay Mr D. RUB 1,000,000 (22,150 [1] euros (EUR)) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. It also ruled that the applicants were to pay RUB   1,000 (EUR 22) in court fees. The District Court did not analyse whether any of the impugned statements, including those that had taken the form of rhetorical questions, had amounted to a value judgment. Instead it labelled them statements of fact and, to demonstrate their untruthfulness, listed (over five pages) various (i) legal measures adopted in the Tula Region aimed at combatting corruption and (ii) social programmes targeting those in need. The District Court found that the defendants had not submitted any evidence that the impugned statements were true. It summarily refused to consider the material (which included bookkeeping records, contracts, orders issued by the Governor, and newspaper articles) submitted by the defendants as evidence that there had been a sufficient factual basis to the impugned statements, for the sole reason that “the content of these documents did not allow the court to establish the facts proving the truthfulness of the tarnishing statements”. It dismissed the defendants’ argument that they had not been allowed to submit evidence because it had been seen as “an attempt to protract the examination of the case on the merits”. The District Court reasoned, in particular, as follows: “Accordingly, the court finds that the statements disseminated in the article have not been supported by objective information and are de facto untruthful, defamatory, and tarnish the honour and dignity of Mr D., discredit him as the Governor of the Tula Region in the eyes of the public and tarnish his business reputation as the highest official of the Tula Region and the head of the permanently functioning highest executive authority of the Tula Region, its Administration, which has as one of its statutory powers ... the undertaking of measures to implement, ensure, and protect the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen, protecting property and public order, counteracting terrorism and extremism, [and] combating crime. Moreover, the functioning of the [Tula] Region [and] its interactions with other constituent entities of the Russian Federation directly depends on, in particular, the business reputation and [moral] authority (авторитет) of its governor.” 10 .     The applicants appealed. Mr Timakov argued, in particular, that, as a member of the Tula Regional Duma and thus a politician, he had expressed in the article his opinion on corruption and his subjective appraisal of Mr   D.’s professional activities and performance of his official duties – that is to say he had made a value judgment. He pointed out that the District Court had refused to order a language expert to undertake an examination of the impugned article in order to distinguish value judgments from statements of fact, and had failed to apply Resolution No. 3 of the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia. He also complained of the excessive level of the award made to the claimant. The applicant company submitted that the impugned statements had merely constituted value judgments on the part of Mr Timakov. 11 .     On 4 February 2010 the Tula Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) heard the applicants’ appeal in a public hearing. It upheld the first ‑ instance judgment for the reason that the impugned statements had “been presented in an affirmative form” and that they had “overstepped the limits of permissible and acceptable criticism in respect of a political and public figure”. As regards RUB 1,000,000 awarded to Mr   D., the Regional Court noted that “the relevant findings of [the District Court] [had been] justified in detail in the [first-instance] judgment; the [Regional Court] [saw] no reasons for their reassessment, and thus the argument of [the applicants] regarding the excessive amount of the award to the claimant in respect of non-pecuniary damage [was] ill-founded”. It changed the modalities of payment of the award, ordering that the applicant and the applicant company each pay the claimant RUB   500,000 (EUR 12,000) in damages (rather than their being held “jointly and severally liable” – see paragraph 9 above). It also diminished the amount to be paid in court fees, ordering each applicant to pay RUB 100 (EUR   2.40). 12.     Two requests lodged by the applicants for supervisory review were unsuccessful. Enforcement proceedings and the applicant company’s dissolution 13.     On 4 March 2010 the bailiffs’ service of the Tula Region (“the bailiffs’ service”) commenced enforcement proceedings. 14.     According to the Government’s observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the application of 23 May 2018, the judgment of 25   August 2009 (upheld on appeal on 4   February 2010) remained unenforced in its entirety, and the enforcement proceedings were terminated on account of the impossibility of their being executed. According to their comments dated 17 September 2018 on the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction, between July and September 2010 the bailiffs’ service recovered a total of RUB 37,120 from Mr Timakov from the execution of the judgment of 25 August 2009 (which had been upheld on appeal on 4   February 2010). 15.     According to the applicant, the bailiffs’ service set up monthly withdrawals from his bank account in order for the RUB   500,100 awarded by the judgment of 25 August 2009 to be recovered. The documents contained in the case-file material available to the Court indicate that a total of RUB   37,120 (in three instalments) was withdrawn in favour of Mr   D. by way of execution of the judgment of 25   August 2009. 16 .     In view of the sizeable award to be paid by the applicant company, and given its lack of funds, its only shareholders (the applicant and Mr   Leonov) decided to dissolve the applicant company. On 24 March 2014 the applicant company was deleted from the Register of Legal Entities and ceased to exist. 17 .     By a letter of 9 July 2018 the applicant and Mr Leonov informed the Court of their intention to continue the proceedings initiated before the Court by the applicant company. Application n o . 74770/10 The applicant’s statement concerning Mr D. 18.     On 29 April 2009 the applicant received a phone call from Ms P., a journalist, who asked him for his opinion, as a member of the Tula Regional Duma, of the Governor and of corruption in the Tula Region. The applicant considered the conversation to be private, as Ms P. had not warned him that it would be recorded. During the conversation the applicant said that Mr D. deserved a “five” (the highest mark in the Russian education system) for corruption. 19.     On the same date Ms P. posted on a local news website, Tulskiye Novosti , a short item quoting the applicant as follows: “[Mr] D. is a good public official – he deserves a mark of “four” [out of five]. Yet he deserves a “five” [out of five] as a corrupt official ( коррупционер ). During his first two years in office I thought that appointing a governor was much better than electing one. But later, when [Mr] D. had gained a foothold in the office, [and] had built a network of connections ... the situation changed. And what we have today is levels of corruption ... not seen even in the era of [the previous holder of the office of governor].” 20.     According to the applicant, he remained unaware of the fact that his words had been reproduced on the website, as Ms P. had not informed him that they were about to be published and had not offered him the chance to review the text prior to its publication. 21 .     The applicant’s words concerning the highest mark in corruption were reproduced in an article, which was entitled “A layabout or a workaholic?” and published in the 6-13 May 2009 issue of the Tula regional edition of the Moskovskiy Komsomolets newspaper. Civil proceedings for defamation 22.     On 12 May 2009 Mr D. brought civil defamation proceedings against the applicant, the Tulskiye Novosti news website, and the editorial board of the regional edition of Moskovskiy Komsomolets, seeking RUB   10,000,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 23.     The applicant argued before the District Court that he had not been given an opportunity to review the interview prior to its publication. He also unsuccessfully sought the postponement of a court hearing owing to his engagements as a member of the Tula Regional Duma. 24 .     On 22 September 2009 the District Court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence. It held the impugned statement to be a statement of fact that was unsupported by evidence, granted Mr D.’s claim in part, ordered a retraction to be published in the local edition of Moskovskiy Komsomolets, and awarded Mr D. RUB   1,000,000 (EUR 25,000) in compensation for non ‑ pecuniary damage, to be paid by the applicant. The District Court reasoned, in particular, as follows: “Thus the court has reached the conclusion that the statements disseminated on the [news website] have not been supported by objective information and are de facto untruthful, defamatory, and tarnish the honour and dignity of Mr D., amount de facto to accusing Mr D. of involvement in crimes and other unlawful acts, discredit him as the Governor of the Tula Region in the public’s view and tarnish his business reputation as the highest official of the Tula Region and the head of the permanently functioning highest executive authority of the Tula Region (its Administration), which has as one of its statutory powers ... the undertaking of measures to implement, ensure, and protect the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen, to protect property and public order, to counteract terrorism and extremism, [and] to combat crime. Moreover, the functioning of the [Tula] Region [and] its interactions with other constituent entities of the Russian Federation directly depends on, in particular, the business reputation and [moral] authority (авторитет) of its Governor.” 25.     The applicant only received a copy of the judgment of 22 September 2009 on 22 December 2009. He lodged a statement of appeal, asking for it to be accepted outside the relevant statutory time-limit. 26 .     On 18 March 2010 the Regional Court upheld on appeal the District Court’s judgment in its entirety, apart from modifying the amount awarded under the head of court fees. 27.     Requests lodged by the applicant for supervisory review were unsuccessful. Enforcement proceedings 28.     On 14 December 2009 the bailiffs’ service instituted enforcement proceedings. 29 .     On 20   May 2010, owing to the applicant’s lack of sufficient funds to pay the award in full, the bailiffs’ service decided to levy execution on the applicant’s household items, including a cupboard, a sofa, a television set, a coffee machine, and a microwave oven, as well as the piano used by the applicant’s minor daughter. 30.     On 21 May 2010 the bailiffs’ service decided – on the grounds that the applicant had not paid Mr D. RUB 1,000,000 voluntarily and for no good reason – to impose on the applicant a 7% enforcement fee. The decision stipulates that the sum of RUB   70,000 was to be recovered from Mr Timakov. However, the applicants and the Government in their observations before the Court submitted that the amount recovered as an enforcement fee was RUB 7,000. 31.     The bailiffs’ service set up monthly withdrawals from the applicant’s bank account, in execution of the judgment of 22 September 2009. The documents contained in the case-file material available to the Court confirm that RUB 61,708.55 was withdrawn in favour of Mr D. and RUB   200 was withdrawn to cover the court fees. 32 .     On 8 December 2010 the bailiffs’ service seized from the applicant’s flat some of the items listed in the decision of 20   May 2010, as well as a set of brandy glasses and a decanter, a frying machine, and a stationary exercise bike. The price of the items seized was estimated at RUB 14,900. 33.     The total amount recovered from the applicant through the enforcement of the judgment of 22   September 2009 was RUB 76,808.55. Criminal proceedings for libel 34 .     In parallel with bringing his civil defamation proceedings, on 13   May 2009 Mr D. lodged a request for the institution of criminal proceedings for libel against the applicant in connection with the article entitled “A layabout or a workaholic?” (see paragraph 21 above). 35.     The local branch of the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General’s Office (“the investigative authority”) carried out a pre ‑ investigation inquiry, in the course of which the applicant explained that, as a member of the Tula Regional Duma, he had frequently denounced instances of corruption in the region and that he had criticised a corruption ‑ conducive climate for which, in his opinion, Mr D. had been responsible. 36.     On 15 June 2009 the investigative authority declined to open a criminal investigation against the applicant on account of the absence of the occurrence of a crime. That decision was later set aside by a hierarchical superior. The investigative authority subsequently refused two requests lodged by Mr D. for the opening of a criminal investigation. The hierarchical superior quashed each of them, instead demanding an additional inquiry. On 20   August 2009 following an additional inquiry the investigative authority refused for the fourth time to initiate criminal proceedings. 37.     On 22 January 2010 Mr D. reported the crime of libel to the local police. 38.     On 1 February 2010 an investigator of the Town Department of the Interior of Tula opened criminal proceedings under Article 129 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (“Libel”), as in force at the material time. Possible sanctions were as follows: a fine of up to RUB   125,000 or in the amount of a convict’s salary for the period of up to a year; 180 to 240 hours of forced labour; twelve to twenty-four months of community service; or three to six months’ detention ( ареcт ). 39.     On 21 June 2010 the applicant was indicted. 40.     On 24 June 2010 a measure of restraint in the form of an obligation not to leave his place of residence was imposed on the applicant. He challenged it, unsuccessfully. 41.     On 29 November 2010 the justice of the peace of the 57 th court circuit of the Zarechenskiy District of Tula found the applicant guilty of libel disseminated in the media (Article 129 § 2 of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time). However, the justice of the peace relieved the applicant of his punishment ( освобождение от наказания ) in view of the fact that “his deeds were no longer dangerous to society”. 42 .     On 30 June 2011 a public prosecutor decided to drop all charges against the applicant and lodged an application for the criminal proceedings against him to be terminated. On the same date the Zarechenskiy District Court of Tula quashed the conviction of 29 November 2010 and terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime. The ruling was upheld on appeal and became final on 31   August 2011. Subsequent events 43.     In February 2011 Mr D. was questioned by the investigative authority with regard to a criminal investigation into bribery. 44.     In July 2011 Mr D. was dismissed from the office of Governor of the Tula Region. In September 2011 he was officially charged with passive bribery and placed under house arrest. 45 .     On 22 July 2013 Mr D. was found guilty of accepting bribes and sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment and given a fine of RUB   900,000. The first ‑ instance conviction was upheld on appeal and became final. 46.     On 10 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for the reopening, on account of newly discovered circumstances, of the civil proceedings that had ended with the judgment of 25 August 2009, as upheld on 4   February 2010 (see paragraph 11 above). He argued that his value judgments – declared untruthful by the District Court – had in fact been confirmed by Mr D.’s conviction for bribery. On 3 February 2014 the District Court dismissed the request, which, in its view, concerned the reassessment of evidence. The ruling was upheld on appeal on 5   June 2014. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 47.     For the relevant domestic framework and practice concerning civil defamation proceedings see Cheltsova   v. Russia (no. 44294/06, §§ 32-34, 13 June 2017). 48 .     Article 10 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 2002 provides that hearings in all civil courts must be public. A civil case may be heard in camera if it concerns State secrets or the confidentiality of adoption arrangements, or belongs to another category of cases defined by federal law. A hearing could be held in camera upon a request being lodged by a party to the proceedings in question seeking to protect a secret (commercial or otherwise) or her or his privacy, or to prevent the public discussion of certain circumstances where such discussion could cause damage to her or his legitimate interests. THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 49.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. Considerations LOCUS STANDI 50.     In the absence of any objection by the Government concerning admissibility ratione personae in respect of the applicant company in application no. 46232/10, the Court notes proprio motu that the applicant company was dissolved after the application had been lodged. In view of the fact that its only shareholders (Mr Timakov and Mr Leonov) together expressed their interest in continuing the proceedings before the Court in the applicant company’s stead (see paragraph 17 above), there is virtually no risk of any differences of opinion arising among shareholders or between shareholders and the applicant company’s board of directors as to whether an infringement of Convention rights actually occurred or to the most appropriate way of reacting to such an infringement (compare S.C.   Fiercolect Impex S.R.L. v.   Romania , no. 26429/07, § 39, 13 December 2016, and Euromak Metal Doo v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 68039/14, §§ 32-33, 14 June 2018). Accordingly, the Court accepts that the applicant company’s shareholders have a legitimate interest in pursuing application no. 46232/10 in the stead of the applicant company dissolved while the application in question was pending before it , and that, accordingly, Mr Timakov and Mr   Leonov have the requisite locus standi under Article   34 of the Convention. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 51.     The applicants complained that the domestic courts’ judgments in the two sets of defamation proceedings brought by Mr D. had unduly restricted their right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Submissions by the parties The Government 52.     The Government contested the applicants’ arguments. Accepting that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, they argued that it had been prescribed by law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting Mr D.’s reputation and had been “necessary in a democratic society”. 53.     The applicants had disseminated untruthful statements concerning Mr D.’s corrupt practices, which had tarnished the reputation of the then Governor, who by virtue of his office should have been protected from offensive and abusive verbal attacks. The statements had not been based on verified facts or evidence and could have caused damage to the whole of the Tula Region as its prosperity had depended on the Governor’s public image. The defendants had not proved before the domestic courts the veracity of the statements, which had therefore lacked a sufficient factual basis. In asserting that Mr D. had abused the office of Governor they had overstepped the limits of permissible criticism, acting contrary to the ethics of journalism. 54.     When deciding on the amounts to be awarded to Mr D., the District Court had considered the nature and content of the impugned statements, the extent of their dissemination, the fact that they had depicted the Governor of the Tula Region as a person acting against the interests of society, and the negative effect they had had on the claimant’s state of health (on which his ability to exercise his powers had depended). In view of the degree of suffering sustained by Mr D., the amounts awarded had been “necessary in a democratic society”. By way of putting the amounts awarded to Mr D. into perspective, the Government referred to five domestic judgments in defamation proceedings where claimants had been awarded RUB   1,000,000. They also referred to three judgments of the Court that had found no violations of Article 10 of the Convention, despite sizeable domestic awards having been made in the relevant defamation cases. 55.     As regards the criminal proceedings against the applicant in respect of libel, the Government submitted that criminal punishment constituted a measure of State coercion and that “criminal liability does not exclude civil [liability]”, emphasising that everyone had the right to reputation. The criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated. Holding him civilly liable for defamation had been well ‑ founded. The Government concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicants 56.     The applicants argued that the judgments in the civil defamation proceedings had amounted to an interference with their respective right to freedom of expression that had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. They emphasised, in particular, that the domestic courts had accorded a heightened level of protection to the claimant’s reputation on account of his position as the Governor of the Tula Region, in breach of the firmly established Convention standard that public officials and professional politicians, who inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to the close scrutiny of their words and deeds by journalists and the public at large, had to display a greater degree of tolerance in respect of criticism. The domestic courts had not taken into account the essential role of the press in a democratic society or Mr   Timakov’s position as a member of the regional legislature who had been commenting on a matter of public interest. 57 .     The amounts awarded to Mr D. had been patently disproportionate as they had been larger than the fine imposed on Mr D. in the criminal proceedings for bribery. The applicants had experienced the chilling effect of the disproportionately large awards: the applicant company had been dissolved because it had not had sufficient funds to execute the judgment in Mr D.’s favour, and Mr Timakov, a provider for three minor children, had faced serious financial difficulties as a result of the enforcement proceedings. Referring to the case of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v.   Russia ((just satisfaction), no. 14902/04, 31 July 2014), the applicants insisted that the dissolution of a legal entity should not absolve a responding State from its responsibilities under the Convention. 58.     Mr Timakov furthermore argued that the very opening of the criminal proceedings for libel in respect of the facts that had already been considered in the civil proceedings had amounted to a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression as a journalist and as a member of the regional legislature. Moreover, in the course of the criminal proceedings he had been obliged not to leave his place of residence, which had adversely affected his professional activities. The criminal trial and his conviction had caused him profound suffering and had damaged his reputation, even though the charges against him had eventually been dropped. The Court’s assessment Admissibility 59.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits (a)    Three instances of an alleged interference with the right to freedom of expression 60.     The Court observes at the outset that the present case concerns three distinct sets of domestic proceedings initiated by Mr D. in response to news items written by a professional journalist hinting at corruption in the office of the Governor of the Tula Region: (a) the civil defamation proceedings involving both applicants that resulted in the judgment of 25   August 2009, which was upheld on 4 February 2010 (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above); (b)   the civil defamation proceedings involving Mr Timakov that resulted in the judgment of 22 September 2009, which was upheld on 18 March 2010 (see paragraphs 24 and 26 above); and (c) the criminal proceedings for libel against Mr Timakov (see paragraphs 34 ‑ 42 above). 61.     The Court notes that it dismissed on a number of occasions objections by a respondent Government as to the lack of victim status in cases where the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with an applicant’s exercising her or his right to freedom of expression had not resulted in a conviction (see, for example, Altuğ Taner Akçam v.   Turkey , no.   27520/07, §§   83, 25 October 2011; Fatih Taş v. Turkey (no. 4) , no.   51511/08, §   33, 24   April 2018; and Ali Gürbüz v. Turkey , nos. 52497/08 and 6 others, §§   57-69, 12   March 2019). However, the Russian Government have made no similar objection as regards the criminal proceedings for libel against Mr Timakov. Accordingly, in the absence of any dispute between the parties regarding the existence of an interference and/or Mr   Timakov’s victim status as regards the part of his complaint pertaining to the criminal proceedings for libel, the Court is satisfied that each of the three sets of proceedings listed in paragraph 59 above amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 §   1 of the Convention. 62.     The parties have also agreed that each instance of the interference in question was “prescribed by law” and “pursued a legitimate aim” – that is to say “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It thus remains to be examined whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”; this requires the Court to ascertain whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the grounds given by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient (see Morice v. France ([GC], no.   29369/10, § 144, ECHR 2015). The Court furthermore notes that each instance of the interference must be seen within the context of the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (see, among many other authorities, Skudayeva v. Russia , no.   24014/07, § 30, 5 March 2019). 63.     The Court will examine the issue of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” in the light of the relevant principles developed in its case-law that were summarised, in particular, in Novaya Gazeta and Milashina v. Russia (no. 45083/06, §§   55 ‑ 57, 3 October 2017). In that context it will also take into account the general principles concerning the margin of appreciation and balancing the right to freedom of expression against the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§   85 ‑ 95, 7 February 2012; Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v.   France ([GC], no.   40454/07, §§ 90-93, ECHR 2015 (extracts)); and Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], no.17224/11, § 77, 27 June 2017) as well as the long-established principle that the requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment – which is not susceptible of proof – is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself (see, among many others, Lingens v.   Austria , 8   July 1986, §   46, Series A no. 103, Morice , cited above, § 126; and Fedchenko v. Russia (no.   3) , no.   7972/09, § 41, 2 October 2018). 64.     The Court has already found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in a number of cases against Russia because the domestic courts did not apply standards that were in conformity with the standards of its case-law concerning freedom of the press (see OOO Ivpress and Others v.   Russia , nos. 33501/04 and 3 others, § 79, 22 January 2013; Kunitsyna v.   Russia , no.   9406/05, §§ 46-48, 13   December 2016; Terentyev v. Russia , no.   25147/09, §§ 22-24, 26 January 2017; OOO Izdatelskiy Tsentr Kvartirnyy Ryad v. Russia , no. 39748/05, §   46, 25 April 2017; Cheltsova v.   Russia , no.   44294/06, §   100, 13 June 2017; Skudayeva , cited above, §§   36-39; and Novaya Gazeta and Milashina , cited above). (b)    Two sets of civil defamation proceedings 65 .     The Court will begin by assessing the interference in the form of the civil defamation proceedings. The District and Regional Courts approached the two distinct sets of defamation proceedings in a nearly identical manner, limiting themselves to establishing that the statements that they regarded as tarnishing Mr D.’s honour, dignity and business reputation had actually been disseminated and to observing that the defendants had not proved the truthfulness of those statements (see paragraphs 9, 11, 24 and 26 above). The Court thus deems it appropriate to consider the two sets of civil proceedings together. 66.     The Court is not in a position to assess the level of seriousness of the alleged attack on Mr D.’s reputation, given that in each set of civil defamation proceedings, the District and Regional Courts did not assess whether the impugned statements could be regarded as constituting an actual attack capable of causing prejudice to the claimant’s honour or business reputation, let alone his dignity. They did not seek to balance the interests of Mr D. in protecting his reputation against the interests of the public in (i)   ensuring the transparency and accountability of the Governor’s office or (ii)   receiving information on matters of public concern. On the contrary, the domestic courts attached preponderant weight to Mr D.’s social status. Their reasoning appears to be based on the tacit assumption that interests relating to the protection of the honour and dignity of those vested with public powers prevail over freedom of expression in all circumstances. The District Court used a nearly identical wording in its judgments of 25   August 2009 and 22 September 2009 to emphasise the position of the claimant as “the highest official of the Tula Region” and implied that the functioning of the whole region depended on the Governor’s “moral authority” (see paragraphs 9 and 24 above). The Court considers that, by failing to weigh the competing interests against each other, the domestic courts failed to perform the requisite balancing exercise (see Skudayeva , cited above, §   38). 67.     Furthermore, in each set of civil defamation proceedings, the District and Regional Courts did not take account of: the respective roles of Mr   Timakov as a journalist and the applicant company as an editorial and publishing house; the presence or absence of good faith on the applicants’ part; the aim pursued by the applicants in publishing the article or by Mr   Timakov in alleging that the Governor had earned the highest mark for corruption; the existence or otherwise of a matter of public interest or general concern that had been touched upon by the impugned statements; or the relevance of information regarding the Governor’s allegedly corrupt practices. By omitting any analysis of such elements, the domestic courts failed to pay heed to the essential function that the press fulfils in a democratic society (see Skudayeva , cited above, § 36). 68.     Moreover, in both sets of civil proceedings the domestic courts did not discuss whether and to what extent the impugned statements were statements of fact or value judgments: the District Court posited as a starting point for the examination of the two defamation cases that they were the former; the Regional Court merely upheld the first-instance judgments without entering into this issue. Neither did the District and Regional Courts seek to establish whether the defendants in the defamation proceedings under consideration had had some factual grounds to claim that Governor D. had been involved in or condoned corrupt practices despite the latter’s requests to admit the relevant documents into evidence (see paragraphs 9 and 24 above). While the Court acknowledges that the distinction between the two concepts may not necessarily appear clear-cut and may on occasion become a point of contention, it reiterates that, in order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value judgment, it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the remarks bearing in mind that assertions about matters of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements of fact (see, with further references, Morice , cited above, §   126). Reiterating that its task is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but to review the decisions that they made under Article 10 in order to ensure that the latter applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article   10 and relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see Perinçek v.   Switzerland [GC], no.   27510/08, § 196, ECHR 2015 (extracts), the Court considers that, where a defendant in defamation proceedings alleges that an impugned statement is a value judgment rather than a statement of fact, it is incumbent on domestic courts to pay heed to her or his argument. However, the District and Regional Courts in the two sets of proceedings at hand failed to attempt to consider whether the impugned statements could be regarded as value judgment having a sufficient factual basis despite the defendants’ insistence (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above), which the Court regards as an important omission. 69.     The Court furthermore observes that the amounts awarded to Mr D. in the two above-mentioned sets of proceedings were very substantial. It is the Court’s consistent case-law regarding defamation proceedings against journalists that the nature and seve