CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 10 novembre 2020

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display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s16DC539 { font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic }     FOURTH SECTION CASE OF THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN BULGARIA v. BULGARIA (Application no. 5301/11)     JUDGMENT   Art 9 (+ Art 11) • Manifest religion or belief • Measures by municipality and court decisions preventing construction of house of worship on its own land • Enforcement of generally applicable and neutral urban planning regulations an interference with exercise of freedom of religion • Measures either unlawful or unjustified and not necessary in a democratic society • Serious limitations on the applicant’s ability to exercise its freedom to manifest its religion   STRASBOURG 10 November 2020   FINAL   08/03/2021   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of The Religious Denomination of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Iulia Antoanella Motoc, President,   Yonko Grozev,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Georges Ravarani,   Jolien Schukking,   Péter Paczolay, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian organisation, The Religious Denomination of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Bulgaria (“the applicant”), on 11 January 2011; the decision to give notice to the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints, made under Articles 9 and 13 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, about the authorities preventing the applicant from constructing and using its house of worship on its own property and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 29 September 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns a complaint by the applicant, in particular under Article 9 of the Convention, that the authorities continually prevented it, unlawfully and without good reason, from constructing its house of worship. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant, the Religious Denomination of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Bulgaria, is a legal entity registered in Bulgaria in 2003. It is represented before the Court by Mr D. Kalaitzis, lawyer practising in Greece, and Mr   A.   Carbonneau, lawyer, authorised to practise in France. Mr   A.   Carbonneau was granted leave under Rule 36 § 4 (a) by the President of Section to represent the applicant despite not residing in any of the Contracting States to the Convention. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimitrova, from the Ministry of Justice. The circumstances of the case 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Mayoral order approving a change to the urban planning regulations regarding a plot of land and initial challenges to that order 5 .     A plot of land situated in the municipal district “Mladost” of the city of Varna, on which the applicant started to construct a house of worship in 2007, had been subject to amendments in its designation over the years. More specifically, it was returned to the pre-nationalisation owner at some point between 1990 and 1998. Pursuant to the local urban development plan of 1976, in force at the time of the restitution, the land was not designated for construction. It was land located between residential buildings and part of it was set aside for green areas. 6 .     On 5 January 1998 the owner of the land initiated proceedings for amending the local urban development plan ( застроителен и регулационен план ). He requested a change of designation of the impugned area from an “area earmarked for green spaces between residential buildings” to “two plots designated for construction” (plots nos. 168 and 169). On 12 January 2001, while the administrative proceedings for amendments in the local urban development plan were pending, three individuals, members of the applicant organisation, purchased plot no. 168. 7.     On 16 May 2001 an announcement dated 11 May 2001 was posted in the neighbourhood to the effect that a change to the planning regulations was pending as regards the area in question, which was going to be used “for public services”. Interested parties could consult the plans and object to them within a seven-day period. 8.     In a reaction to that announcement, a group of twenty-one individuals living in the immediate vicinity (“the neighbours”), including Mr B. and Mr   U., sent a letter to the mayor of Varna’s municipal district “Mladost” on 23 May 2001. The neighbours expressed their concern about the lack of clarity of the term “public services”. They also stated their worries about the possibility of buildings for public services being erected in close proximity to their homes because of the potential nuisance and air pollution which they could generate. It would appear that the mayor did not reply to that letter. 9 .     After the amendments to the local development plan were finalised by the Varna municipal council, they were approved by the mayor of Varna municipality (hereafter “the mayor”) under an order of 16 August 2001 (hereafter, the “2001 mayoral order”). The 2001 mayoral order stated that the property was to be converted into two separate lots, namely plots nos.   168 and 169, designated for the construction respectively of a one ‑ storey building and a three-storey building, the latter specifically designated as a residential property. 10.     In accordance with the relevant statutory rules for town planning, the 2001 mayoral order had to be reasoned, in particular, by pointing to the specific public interest and need for the amendment (see section 32 § 1 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act 1973 – hereinafter, “the 1973 Act” – in relation to section 84 of the regulations for its implementation, both quoted in paragraph 64 below). The reasons had to be provided in either the 2001 mayoral order or in the documents in the administrative file. As later established by the domestic courts (see paragraph 35 below), neither the order, nor the accompanying documents contained reasons for the amendments. The request for amendments lodged in 1998 was not found either. 11.     Furthermore, the mayoral order had to be served on the chairpersons of the adjacent residential properties (see section 194 of the 1973 Act, quoted in paragraph 62 below), so that interested neighbours could challenge the order in court if they so wished. 12.     Some of the neighbours were notified of the 2001 mayoral order. The applicant submitted, to that effect, a number of copies of postal delivery notices received on different dates in the second half of August 2001 by individuals living in different streets in Varna’s municipal district “Mladost” and in a number of separate buildings (blocks nos. 2, 24, 307, 212, 206, 13 and 118). It is unclear from the notices what exactly was delivered to those recipients. The Government pointed out that two domestic judicial levels had found that the municipality had failed to provide, or at least had not kept, a record of serving the statutorily required notices on the interested parties – the neighbours of the impugned plots (see paragraphs 34 and 36 below). 13 .     On 11 September 2001 some of the neighbours, including Mr B., who lived in neighbouring block no. 2, challenged the 2001 mayoral order before the Varna Regional Court, which had jurisdiction to hear the case at the time. In particular, they were concerned that the height of any future residential construction on plot no. 169 would block daylight to the lower floors of their buildings, obstruct their view and potentially cause air pollution and other types of nuisance. They also pointed out that when they had purchased their apartments the area covering plots nos. 168 and 169 had been designated as free from construction, with possible plans to convert it into a park or a children’s playground. 14 .     These proceedings were terminated on 20 October 2002, on procedural grounds and without a ruling on the merits. The court found, in a final decision, that the complainants had failed to correct irregularities in their appeal despite an earlier specific instruction by the court to that effect. It accordingly returned the complaint to them without examining it. 15.     In the meantime, on 3 October 2001 the consultative council for territorial planning attached to the Varna municipality decided that the 2001 mayoral order should be amended, and plot no. 169 be redesignated for the construction of a three-storey building “for public services” (see paragraph   9 above). The council also stated that the new order had to be notified accordingly. 16 .     On 29 November 2001 the mayor amended his 2001 order (see paragraph 9 above). There is no indication that Mr B., Mr S. or Mr U. were notified of this order. According to the applicant, the individuals who had challenged the 2001 mayoral order in court (see paragraph 13 above) were notified of this amendment. According to the Government, the order was sent to three families living in the adjacent residential building. 17 .     On 12 July 2006 a group of neighbours challenged the 2001 mayoral order in court, claiming that it was null and void. Mr B., Mr S. and Mr   U. were not among those neighbours. On 27 September 2006 the Varna Regional Court terminated the proceedings in respect of all but one of the neighbours, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to correct a number of irregularities in the complaint, in breach of the court’s instructions. On 4   December 2006 the same court also terminated the proceedings in respect of the remaining plaintiff for the same reason. The Supreme Administrative Court (hereinafter, “the SAC”) declared his appeal inadmissible in February 2007. Building permits in respect of plot no. 168 18 .     On 7 July 2005 the “Mladost district” of Varna municipality issued a building permit to the three individuals who had bought plot no. 168 on 12   January 2001 (see paragraph 6 above). The permit concerned the construction on that plot of a one-storey building “for public services”, specifically, lecture halls. 19.     On 18 January 2006 the applicant obtained title to plot no. 168. On 30 March 2006 the chief architect of the “Mladost district” of Varna municipality approved an amendment to the building permit, following a request to that effect by the applicant. 20 .     On 7 May 2007 the municipality authorised the continuation of the construction and the applicant immediately started building works. Suspension of the construction on the property and related judicial review proceedings 21.     Less than two months later, on two occasions, that is to say on 29   June and 2 July 2007 respectively, the municipal buildings-control authorities carried out an inspection of the construction site and found breaches of some of the relevant regulatory requirements, in particular section   160(2) of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001 (hereinafter, “the 2001 Act”) taken in conjunction with section 224(1)(3) and (5) of the same Act (see paragraph 65 above). More specifically, it was established that the construction was proceeding in the absence of an authorised technical supervisor, of a signed orders book and of a signed record of the starting date of the construction work. 22 .     On 4 July 2007 the mayor imposed a fine of EUR 1,500 on the applicant for the breaches of construction regulations. On the same day the applicant wrote to the mayor objecting to the building-control authorities’ findings, and asking the mayor to annul them. On an unidentified date the applicant challenged before the regional governor the mayoral order imposing the fine. Neither the mayor nor the governor reacted to these challenges. 23 .     On 9 July 2007 the mayor ordered the suspension of construction on the basis of the findings of the building-control authorities concerning the breaches of construction regulations. The mayor acted pursuant to section   224 of the 2001 Act, as relevant at the time (see paragraph   65 below). 24 .     On 19 July 2007 the applicant challenged that suspension order in court, and requested that its enforcement be stayed. The Varna Administrative Court (hereinafter, “the VAC”) rejected the applicant’s complaint on the merits on 28 November 2007. The court, having carried out a review of the lawfulness of the mayoral order of 9 July 2007, found that the supervisory authorities had found a number of breaches which had occurred during the construction works. Those breaches had impeded the lawful start and continuation of construction. The applicant had not shown, either before the administrative authorities or before the court, that those breaches had not occurred. Consequently, the mayor had been authorised in law to suspend construction, and he had acted in accordance with that prerogative. 25.     The applicant appealed to the SAC. It argued that the administrative measures applied to it had been draconian in nature and inadequate in terms of the law. The applicant claimed that the “severe and pedantic attitude” demonstrated by the authorities in its regard, “in a context of a sea of unlawful constructions happening throughout the city of Varna”, amounted to a breach of its right to manifest its religion and be free from discrimination. It pointed out that the right to manifest one’s religion comprised the possibility to use one’s own premises for religious meetings. The authorities had to refrain from imposing overly strict or prohibitive conditions for practising a religion, which included using an excessively restrictive interpretation of otherwise flexible rules as grounds for suspending the construction of a place of worship for a minority religious group. The mayoral order for suspension of the construction had been clearly discriminatory, and had been issued as a result of public pressure and an open demonstration of intolerance towards their religion. The applicant submitted that it therefore had been a victim of discrimination on the basis of its religion, in breach of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention. 26 .     The SAC upheld the lower court’s findings on 16 July 2008. In particular it found that the irregularities in the construction process which had been established by the administrative authorities had been sufficiently serious and, in view of the imperative relevant legal requirements, the suspension of construction had been justified. As to the applicant’s claim that the authorities had acted with unreasonable formalism, in a prejudiced and discriminatory manner, and had thus interfered unlawfully with the applicant’s freedom of religion, the court held that it was without merit and out of the scope of the examined case. More specifically, suspension orders of the type issued in this case were given in all cases and to all persons in respect of whom the relevant authorities had established similar breaches. Such orders were based on the applicable legal requirements and were unrelated to the religious convictions of the persons to whom they were addressed. Instances of public opposition to the applicant’s religion 27.     İn May and June 2007, once the applicant had begun constructing its house of worship, a well-known Bulgarian nationalist political party displayed posters at the building site and held a large-scale protest against the building project. Slogans such as “Orthodoxy – Yes! Sects – No!” and “No to sectarian poison” were exhibited. 28 .     On 3 July 2007 the Municipality issued a declaration which stated in part: ”We, members of the Public Council on topics regarding ethnic and religious communities in Varna, operating under the mayor of the city, declare our explicit support for the protests by the citizens of the Varna neighbourhood Mladost against the construction of the church of prayer of Jehovah’s Witnesses ...We express our serious worries about the official invasion of our town by that foreign religious community, one which is outlandish for Bulgaria. We are deeply anxious about the influence of this sect, which aggressively and arrogantly plants dubious religious values in the population of our town and especially in our children”. The Municipality’s declaration was published in the Narodno Delo newspaper on 5 July 2007. 29 .     In September 2009, a local internet television channel reported that the mayor had declared that the people of Varna had the right to protest against the construction of a house of worship by the applicant. While the protest planned for later that day would be unlawful as the mayor had not been put on notice by the organisers (a political party and the people living in Mladost neighbourhood), he was ready to authorise such a protest as in his opinion the people were right. The mayor clarified that judicial proceedings were pending in connection with the construction of a house of worship by the Jehovah’s Witnesses and that he personally was not inclined to issue an order allowing them to build. Complaints by the applicant to the Directorate for Religious Denominations 30.     On 14 March, 6 July and 24 July 2007 respectively, a representative of the applicant wrote to the General Director of the Directorate for Religious Denominations (“the Directorate”) about growing intolerance and opposition to its religion by the general population, by a certain political party and by representatives of the municipality, which included a targeted campaign aimed at obstructing its endeavours to build a place of worship. The applicant asked for assistance towards ensuring that the arbitrary obstruction of its activities by various local authorities in Varna was brought to an end. 31.     The Directorate did not react to those complaints and requests and the applicant did not pursue the matter further. New challenge to the mayoral order approving a change to the urban planning regulations regarding plot no. 168 32 .     In the meantime, on 6 November 2006, Mr B., Mr S. and Mr U., all three of them neighbours who lived in blocks nos. 1 and 2 in the vicinity of plots nos. 168 and 169, complained before the VAC about the 2001 mayoral order (see paragraph 9 above). They submitted their complaint via the mayor’s office. In particular they complained that they had not been properly informed of the purpose for which the change to the urban planning regulations had been authorised. On 19 June 2007, in the absence of a reply from the mayor, they reiterated their challenge in court. The VAC invited the complainants to provide further details on their complaint. On 23   November 2007 a lawyer acting on their behalf clarified that the complaint concerned the mayoral order of 16 August 2001, as modified by his subsequent order of 29 November 2001 (see paragraph 16 above). The lawyer specified alternative grounds for the challenge, namely the fact that the interested parties had not been properly notified and that the order had been unlawful, as well as null and void. 33 .     In the proceedings before the VAC, the representative of the municipality argued that the complaint by Mr B., Mr U. and Mr S. was unfounded and should be rejected. The representative of the applicant, which had joined the court proceedings as an interested party, argued that the plaintiffs were not “interested parties” within the meaning of section   131 of the 2001 Act, as a result of which they had no legal interest in challenging the mayoral order in court. 34 .     On 4 December 2009 the VAC found that the complaint against the 2001 mayoral order was admissible as it had not been demonstrated that the procedural requirement of notifying all interested parties had been complied with. The court acknowledged that earlier proceedings challenging the same order had been brought by interested groups of neighbours and that those proceedings had been terminated on 20 October 2002 and 27 September 2006 respectively (see paragraphs 14 and 17 above). There was, however, no evidence that the current claimants had taken part in those earlier proceedings against the mayoral order. 35 .     Thereafter, ruling on the merits, the court quashed the 2001 mayoral order, finding it unlawful as lacking reasons to justify the change to the planning regulations, in breach of the legal requirements at the time (see section 32(1) of the 1973 Act, quoted in paragraph 64 below). The order had affected the lives of a large number of individuals, namely those living in the immediate vicinity of the property in question, and specific reasons had to be given if the change to the regulations were to be lawful. 36 .     The SAC rejected the related appeal, brought by the applicant, in a final judgment of 12 July 2010. The court found, in particular, that the lower court had correctly accepted that the challenge to the 2001 mayoral order was admissible. On the other hand, no evidence had been presented demonstrating that the order in question had been properly notified to all interested parties. In particular, the individuals who had challenged the order were interested parties as they had demonstrated that they held ownership rights to property adjacent to the plots covered by the said order. 37.     The SAC also concluded that the applicant’s claim of having been subject to discrimination was not germane to the case and did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court adjudicating in those proceedings (see paragraph   68 below). The court further found that the mayoral order of 29   November 2001, “correcting a factual error” (see paragraph 16 above), had been null and void, given that it had in fact modified the grounds for the reclassification of the land and that could not be said to be a factual error. However, as that finding did not alter the court’s conclusion in respect of the validity of the lower court’s decision, the SAC upheld that decision in its entirety. Proceedings for continuing the construction on the plot First set of judicial proceedings 38 .     On 15 May 2009, the applicant asked the mayor in writing to allow the continuation of the construction which he had suspended on 9 July 2007 (see paragraph 23 above). The applicant emphasised that it had complied with all previous orders issued by the mayor and had indeed paid the EUR   1,500 fine (see paragraph 22 above). 39 .     On 20 July 2009, the applicant provided documentary evidence to that effect. 40.     As no reply by the mayor followed, the applicant challenged in court the absence of an administrative decision authorising the continuation of its construction. In a decision of 14 December 2009 the VAC found that the limitation period for such a challenge had lapsed. In particular, the mayor had been obliged to react within fourteen days counted as from 20 July 2009, and the applicant had a further fourteen days to challenge the mayor’s failure to act. The applicant appealed, pointing out that the absence of a decision authorising the continuation of the construction was in breach of its right to build a place for religious worship, protected both under the Bulgarian Constitution and under the Convention. On 23 March 2010, in a final decision, the SAC upheld the lower court’s decision. 41 .     In the meantime, on 20 November 2009, the mayor suspended the proceedings started on 15 May 2009 by the applicant (see paragraph   38 above), pending completion of the court proceedings brought by the neighbours on 6 November 2006 against the 2001 mayoral order (see paragraph 32 above). The order suspending the proceedings could have been challenged in court within fourteen days, and the applicant omitted to do so. Subsequently, on 5 January 2010 the applicant asked the mayor in writing to lift the suspension of the proceedings ordered on 20 November 2009. The mayor did not reply. Second set of judicial proceedings 42 .     In the meantime, on 7 October 2009 the applicant again asked the mayor to allow continuation of the construction. As no reply followed, on 27 October 2009 the applicant challenged in court, under Article 58 of the Code of Administrative Procedure in conjunction with section 224(5) of the 2001 Act (see paragraph 65 below), the mayor’s tacit refusal to allow the resumption of the construction. The applicant emphasised that the mayor’s silence was a serious breach of its right to freedom to manifest its religion, protected under the Convention and referred to case-law of the Court in support of its submission. It specified explicitly that the silence of the mayor had been the result of external pressure caused by public opposition to its religion (see paragraph 29 above). In particular, the applicant pointed out that in September 2009 two local newspapers had published an interview with the mayor in which he had declared that he was not inclined to authorise the resumption of the construction and that, if a political party had asked for his permission to demonstrate against continuing the construction of the applicant, he would have allowed such a demonstration. During the same month, a local internet television and the leader of a political party, also on television, had announced that following conversations with the mayor it had become clear that the resumption of the applicant’s construction would not be authorised. 43 .     In a decision of 21 January 2010 the VAC dismissed the challenge, finding it inadmissible. It held in particular that the tacit refusal of the mayor to authorise the construction following the applicant’s request of 15   May 2009 (see paragraph 38 above) had become final in the absence of a timely appeal by the applicant. The applicant could therefore not bring further proceedings concerning the same subject matter. Upon an appeal by the applicant, in which it stated that the municipality was deliberately finding different ways to prevent its construction, the SAC quashed the lower court’s decision on 7 July 2010. The SAC observed that the lower court had found that there had been no new tacit refusal by the mayor on the merits of the applicant’s request, but that the mayor’s silence concerned a question on the admissibility of such a request. Thus, the SAC found, the lower court had without justification ruled on a different issue to that at the core of the applicant’s challenge and had, as a result, delivered an unlawful decision. The mayor’s silence following the applicant’s request of 7   October 2009 (see paragraph 42 above) had undoubtedly represented a tacit refusal and, not only were the courts not prevented from pronouncing on the challenge to it, but were indeed called upon to exercise judicial control over its lawfulness. The SAC accordingly returned the case to the VAC for examination. 44 .     On 7   December 2010, in a final judgment, the VAC found that the mayor’s tacit refusal to issue an order in reply to the request to allow the resumption of the construction had been unlawful and repealed it. The court observed in the first place that the applicant had specifically complained that the mayor had acted with ulterior motives and that his inaction had breached the applicant’s human rights. The court went on to establish that, as stated in an expert report commissioned in the course of the judicial proceedings and confirmed by the legal representative of the respondent, the applicant had rectified all the irregularities which had led to the construction’s suspension in the first place. Consequently, under section   224(5) of the 2001 Act, the mayor had been required to issue an order allowing the requested continuation of the construction. The mayor’s failure to reply at all had represented an abuse of authority. In the same judgment, the court returned the case to the mayor, instructing him to issue a decision on the applicant’s request in line with the court’s reasoning. The court did not deal with the applicant’s explicit arguments about the religious prejudice demonstrated by the mayor and about it having breached the applicant’s right to manifest its religion. 45.     The mayor initially failed to act upon this court’s judgment. Third set of judicial proceedings 46 .     On 19 January 2011 the applicant wrote to the municipality requesting permission to resume its construction works. As no reply ensued, the applicant brought proceedings before the VAC on 28 June 2011, seeking a court order for the mayor to implement the judgment of 7 December 2010 (see paragraph 44 above) and asking the court to fine the mayor, under the Code of Administrative Procedure, if no implementation followed. The applicant did not allege, either explicitly or implicitly, that the mayor’s failure to act upon the judgment negatively affected its freedom to manifest its religion. 47 .     The VAC rejected the claim in a final decision of 27 September 2011. The reason for it was that the mayor had in the meantime issued a decision on 20   September 2011 in which he had explicitly refused to allow resumption of the construction (see paragraph 46 above). The court held that the mayor had therefore implemented the final judgment of 7   December 2010 which had obliged him to act. It had been immaterial, for the purposes of implementing final court decisions, what the result of the mayor’s decision was. The court held that the mayor’s decision of 20   September 2011 could be challenged on the merits in separate judicial proceedings. Fourth set of judicial proceedings 48 .     On 10 October 2011 the applicant challenged the mayor’s explicit refusal of 20 September 2011 to allow the resumption of the construction (see the preceding paragraph). It claimed that the refusal was unlawful, that it had been given because of political motives and that it was in breach of the applicant’s freedom to manifest its religion. 49 .     In a final judgment of 19 March 2012, the VAC rejected the challenge to the mayor’s explicit refusal to allow resumption of the construction. The court ordered an expert report which established, following an inspection and some excavation on the suspended construction site, that the foundations of the construction had been laid. The court examined the applicant’s arguments relating to the continuation of the construction works. The court rejected those arguments, giving detailed reasons. The court observed more specifically that the mayor had established that the applicant had indeed rectified all the irregularities which had originated the 9 July 2007 suspension order (see paragraph 23 above). In the meantime, however, as stated in the expert report as accepted in the court proceedings, the earlier mayoral order of 2001 designating the plot of land as an area where building was permitted had been quashed as unlawful (see paragraphs 35-36 above). Consequently, the building permit of 2005 (see paragraph 18 above) had been invalidated as no longer corresponding to the urban planning order of 1976 (see paragraph 5 above), which had remained in force after the 2001 mayoral order had been quashed. 50 .     The court further observed that, pursuant to domestic law, in particular paragraph 22 of the Transitional Provisions taken in conjunction with section 159 of the 2001 Act (see paragraph 67 below), the construction works could have continued despite the quashing of the 2001 mayoral order. The relevant legal provisions required, in particular, that the physical laying of the foundations had been completed and that this had been duly recorded in the requisite construction documentation which had to be filled in and recorded. An expert report commissioned in the context of the proceedings established that foundation work had been realised on the applicant’s construction site. However, in the absence of a proper record concerning the laying of the foundations, which also served to ascertain the compliance of the foundations with the relevant building regulations, the legal requirement for considering the construction “tolerable” had not been met. The court concluded that, in the circumstances, it would have been unlawful for the mayor to order the continuation of the construction. 51 .     Finally, the court held that, as the SAC had found on 16 July 2008 (see paragraph 26 above), the applicant’s allegations of demonstrated formalism, discrimination and ulterior motives behind the refusal to allow resumption of the construction, were unrelated to the concrete dispute in the case and could not be considered to have been the reason for the impugned mayoral order. The applicant appealed against this decision, but the courts confirmed that no appeal lay against it. Proceedings for damages brought by the applicant in connection with the suspension of the construction 52.     In the meantime, on 27 October 2009, the applicant brought a claim for damages against the municipality, under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (“the SMRDA” – see paragraph 66 below). It specified that it sought compensation for the municipality’s tacit refusal to allow the resumption of the construction, and from public statements by representatives of the municipal authorities concerning the applicant’s case. The VAC dismissed the claim as inadmissible on 1 February 2010. 53.     The applicant appealed against that decision, stating also, without elaborating further, that the municipal authorities’ actions had breached its fundamental rights, in particular those protected under Articles 6, 9, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as under Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention. On 18 June 2010, the SAC quashed the lower court’s decision and returned the case to it for a fresh examination. 54.     On 18 January 2011 the VAC asked the applicant to specify its claim. The applicant clarified that it was claiming compensation for pecuniary damage in respect of the tacit refusal of the mayor, which had been quashed as unlawful, to allow the resumption of the construction of its planned house of worship. The applicant had incurred pecuniary damage from having had to pay rent for alternative premises in order to hold its religious meetings. It also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the mayor’s negative statements in the media, which had included insults, defamatory claims and discriminatory threats against the applicant. It reiterated its statement (see the paragraph immediately above) about this having breached its Convention rights. 55.     On 5 May 2011 the VAC rejected the claim. The court observed in particular that the applicant had concluded two contracts for rental of premises: one on 1 July 2007 and the second one in July 2009. Those contracts concerned a period of time when the mayoral order of 9 July 2007 for the suspension of the construction (see paragraph 23 above) had been lawfully in force. Similarly, the applicant had not demonstrated that it would have accrued material gains from the potential future completion of the construction and its exploitation for profit. No causal link had been established therefore between the unlawful act of the administration and the pecuniary loss incurred by the applicant. As to non-pecuniary damages, such compensation could only be awarded to physical persons. 56.     The SAC confirmed the lower court’s judgment in a final judgment of 2 November 2011. It found that the applicant’s request for permission to continue its construction work had been made after it had signed the contracts for rent of alternative premises. Consequently, the applicant had knowingly concluded those contracts for a specific period of time which had been unrelated to and not conditional on its ability to complete the construction. The court also concluded that no unlawful action or inaction had been established on the part of an administrative authority which had been in a direct causal link to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which the applicant claimed it had incurred. Further developments 57 .     In the absence of any ability to continue the construction of its worship house, the applicant’s members have been meeting at rented hotel facilities which are neither designed nor suitable for that purpose. 58.     In 2017 the applicant brought tort proceedings, under sections   45 and 49 of the Obligations and Contracts Act, which were unrelated to any of the proceedings described above. The applicant sought compensation from a television company and the leading presenter on one of its programmes for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of denigrating statements made by the presenter on television in 2014. In a final judgment of 18 March 2019 the Supreme Court of Cassation (“the SCC”) granted the applicant’s claim in its entirety. The court observed that the possibility, as a matter of principle, for legal persons to be awarded non-pecuniary damages was introduced in the Bulgarian legislation in the mid-2000s, following and in line with the case-law of the Court. 59.     In 2013, the applicant had brought another set of tort proceedings against a media company for the publication of denigrating statements. In a final judgment of 26 March 2019 the SCC granted the claim for part of the amount sought by the applicant. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 60.     Article 13 § 1 of the Constitution provides that religions shall be free. Article 37 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, thought and choice of religion or of religious or atheistic views. Freedom of conscience and religion cannot be exercised to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. 61 .     In Bulgarian administrative law, administrative acts that affect the rights of individuals or organisations must be notified to them in accordance with the statutory provisions. Proper notification is an obligation incumbent on the administrative body and it marks the beginning of the running of the time-limit for challenging the act. The lack of proper notification does not allow for this time-limit to start running. It is irrelevant whether the individuals or organisations concerned learned about the act in another manner (see реш. № 1310 от 14.02.2003 г. на ВАС по адм.д. №   9787/2002 г., II о.; опр. № 4797 от 27.05.2004 г. на ВАС по адм.д. №   3941/2004 г., II о.; опр. № 2060 от 9.03.2005 г. на ВАС по адм.д. №   416/2004 г., II o.; реш. № 3908 от 25.03.2009 г. на ВАС по адм.д. №   11159/2008 г., II о.). 62 .     Pursuant to section 194 of the 1973 Act, notifications to owners of flats in multi-storey shared buildings had to be served on the chairpersons of the residential property ( председатели на етажна собственост ) in which the interested persons resided. According to paragraph 6 § 3 of the transitional provisions of the 2001 Act, the rules under the 1973 Act applied in respect of the procedures for approving, notifying and challenging urban development plans submitted for approval before 31 May 2001. 63 .     Administrative proceedings start on the date when a request is made before an administrative body (Article 25 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the Code”)). Administrative acts are to be issued within a fourteen-day period from the request being made (Article 57 § 1 of the Code). As a general rule, an administrative body has to issue the requested act, or refuse to do so, in an explicit motivated decision, which has to contain a number of mandatory elements, such as factual and legal grounds, as well as an operative part (Article 59 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code). The failure of an administrative body to pronounce on a request, when required by law to decide on it, represents a tacit refusal (Article 58 § 1 of the Code). A tacit refusal can be challenged in court within one month counted from the end of the period within which the administrative body had been obliged to reply (Article 149 § 2 of the Code). The domestic courts have consistently applied these provisions by quashing tacit refusals of administrative bodies when the latter were required in law to explicitly issue a motivated decision on a request addressed to them, but had failed to do so (реш. № 41 от 8.04.2008 г. на адм. съд - Добрич по адм. д. № 396/2007 г.; реш. № 1 от 18.05.2007 г. на адм. съд - Враца по адм. д. № 20/2007 г.; реш. № 17 от 1.08.2008 г. на адм. съд - Враца по адм. д. № 193/2008 г.; реш. № 44 от 24.06.2009 г. на адм. съд - София по адм. д. № 737/2009 г. ; реш. №   7492 от 8.06.2009 г. на ВАС по адм. д. № 2835/2009 г; реш. № 13576 от 12.11.2009 г. на ВАС по адм. д. № 5748/2009 г). 64 .     According to section 32(1) of the 1973 Act, changes to the local development plan can be made in the public interest for the purposes and needs of urban planning. In particular, such amendments were allowed when there were significant changes to socio-economic or town planning instruments, or to the technical conditions under which the plan had been put together, and when new public needs emerged for which it was necessary to provide plots of land (section 84 of the regulations for the implementation of the 1973 Act). 65 .     Under section 160(2) of the 2001 Act, the working relations among different construction actors are defined in written contracts. Under section   224(1)(5) of the 2001 Act, as worded at the time of the relevant facts, the mayor must suspend work on a construction and prohibit access to the site if the work is being carried out, among other things, without an entry in the signed records book and a signed record of the starting date of construction. Under section 224(5) of the 2001 Act, as worded at the time, construction works which had been previously suspended may resume after an order to that effect has been issued by the body having suspended it. 66 .     Section 1(1) of the SMRDA provides that the State and, since 2006, municipalities are liable for damage suffered by private persons as a result of unlawful acts or omissions by State or municipal bodies or civil servants, committed in the exercise of administrative duties. Section 4 provides that compensation is due for all damage which is the direct and proximate result of the unlawful act or omission. 67 .     Paragraph 22 of the Transitional Provisions of the 2001 Act, in conjun