CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECGRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 18 novembre 2020

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De Gaetano,   Helen Keller,   Branko Lubarda,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Alena Poláčková,   Marko Bošnjak,   Lәtif Hüseynov,   Jovan Ilievski,   Lado Chanturia,   Arnfinn Bårdsen, judges ,   and Johan Callewaert, Deputy to the Registrar , Having deliberated on 12 June 2019 and 18 November 2020, decides as follows: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an inter-State application (no. 54155/16) lodged with the Court by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia against the Government of the Republic of Croatia under Article 33 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 15   September 2016. 2.     The Slovenian Government (“the applicant Government”) are represented by their Agent, N. Pintar Gosenca. The Croatian Government (“the respondent Government”) are represented by their Agent, Ms   Š.   Stažnik. 3.     The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule   51 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Having regard to the observations submitted by both Governments, on 18 December 2018 the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention). 4.     A hearing on the admissibility of the application took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 12 June 2019 (Rules 51 § 5 and 71 § 1). There appeared before the Court:   (a) for the respondent Government   Ms Š. Stažnik,   Agent , Mr J. McBride, Ms N. Katić,   Counsel , Ms L. Barberić, Ms A. Krmek,   Advisers ;   (b) for the applicant Government   Ms N. Pintar Gosenca,   Agent , Ms A. Polak Petrič, Mr B. Juratowitch QC, Ms M. Menard, Mr D. Müller   Counsel , Mr M. Dragonja, Ms M. Prevc, Ms E. Lap, Mr B. Pucelj, Ms K. Rejec Longar,   Advisers .   5.     The Court heard addresses by Mr McBride, Ms Polak Petrič and Mr   Juratowitch QC. Ms Stažnik, Mr McBride and Mr Juratowitch QC subsequently replied to questions put by the judges. THE FACTS General background to the case 6.     The general factual and legal background to the case, as established by the Court in Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia ([GC], nos.   44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, §§ 27-31, 3 October 2008), Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 60642/08, ECHR 2014) and Ljubljanska banka d.d. v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 29003/07, 12 May 2015 ), may be summarised as follows. 7.     Before the economic reforms that were carried out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter “the SFRY”) in 1989-90, its commercial banking system consisted of “basic” and “associated” banks. Basic banks had separate legal personality but were integrated into the organisational structure of one of the nine associated banks. As a rule, basic banks were founded and controlled by socially-owned companies based in the same territorial unit (that is, in one of the Republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia – or Autonomous Provinces – Kosovo and Vojvodina). Socially-owned companies were the flagship of the Yugoslav model of self-management: neither private nor State-owned, they were collective property controlled by their employees, based on a Communist vision of industrial relations. At least two basic banks could form an associated bank. 8.     The Ljubljana Bank (in Slovenian and Croatian: Ljubljanska banka ) was founded in 1955 under the laws of the then People’s Republic of Slovenia. In 1969 it opened an office in Zagreb in the then Socialist Republic of Croatia. From 1978 until 1   January 1990 the Ljubljana Bank Ljubljana (hereafter “the Ljubljana Bank Head Office”) operated as an “associated bank” (in Slovenian: Ljubljanska banka – združena banka ) and was composed of Ljubljana Basic Bank Sarajevo, Ljubljana Basic Bank Zagreb, Ljubljana Basic Bank Skopje and a number of other basic banks. In the same period the Ljubljana Bank’s Zagreb office operated as a “basic bank”, that is, as the Ljubljana Basic Bank Zagreb (in Croatian: Ljubljanska banka – Osnovna banka Zagreb ) and had separate legal personality under the law of the then Socialist Republic of Croatia. It was, however, integrated into the organisational structure of the Ljubljana Bank. 9.     Within the framework of the 1989-90 reforms, the SFRY abolished the system of basic and associated banks described above. This shift in the banking regulations allowed some basic banks to opt for an independent status, while others became branches (without legal personality) of the former associated banks to which they had belonged. 10.     On 19 December 1989 the Ljubljana Bank Head Office was re-registered as a joint-stock company (in Slovenian: delniška družba, “d.d.” ) in the then Socialist Republic of Slovenia. The change was entered in the register of commercial companies the same day and became effective on 1   January 1990. 11.     On 29   December 1989 the Ljubljana Basic Bank Zagreb was re-registered with effect from 1 January 1990 as the Zagreb Main Branch (in Slovenian Ljubljanska banka d.d. Ljubljana – Glavna podružnica Zagreb ; in Croatian: Ljubljanska banka d.d. Ljubljana – Glavna filijala Zagreb ) in the registers of commercial companies in both the then Socialist Republic of Slovenia and the Socialist Republic of Croatia, that is, as a business unit of the Ljubljana Bank (in Slovenian: del podjetja , in Croatian: dio poduzeća ) without legal personality. 12.     Shortly after its declaration of independence on 25 June 1991, Slovenia nationalised the Ljubljana Bank. In 1994, it restructured the bank by virtue of the 1994 Amendments to the 1991 Constitutional Act Implementing the Fundamental Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia. Most – but not all – of the bank’s assets and a part of its liabilities were transferred to a new bank – the New Ljubljana Bank ( Nova Ljubljanska banka ). The old Ljubljana Bank was initially administered by the Bank Rehabilitation Agency of Slovenia. It is now controlled by a Slovenian Government agency – the Succession Fund. Cases covered by the present application 13.     The initial application submitted by Slovenia before the Court concerned 26 particular civil cases brought before the Croatian courts by the Ljubljana Bank and/or the Ljubljana Bank Zagreb Main Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Ljubljana Bank”). On 2 February 2017, the applicant Government added 17 additional similar cases. In their further observations of 12 July 2017, submitted in reply to those of the respondent Government, they added five more particular cases to the list of domestic proceedings covered by the present application, thus bringing the total number of these cases to 48. 14.     According to the applicant Government, as its Croatian debtors failed to repay their liabilities, the Ljubljana Bank lodged civil claims with Croatian courts, starting from 1991. As of 1994, over 80 such cases were pending before Croatian courts. These cases concerned unpaid and overdue receivables from credit loans and guarantees, mainly given to companies operating in the agricultural and food sectors of Croatia. These legal proceedings lasted on average 18 years or more. In more than a half of all these 80 cases, the debtors were subject to bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings, thus making the enforcement of the claims of the Ljubljana Bank impossible. 15.     Moreover, since 2004, the Croatian courts, including the Constitutional Court, denied the locus standi of the Ljubljana Bank. According to the interpretation adopted by Croatian courts, claims which the Ljubljana Bank had against various Croatian companies arising from loans it had granted them in the former Yugoslavia, had been transferred to the New Ljubljana Bank by the entry into force on 27 July 1994 of the 1994 Amendments to the 1991 Constitutional Act of Slovenia, in particular by virtue of its section 22 (b) paragraph 1 (see paragraph 18 below). Thus, in those courts’ view, the Ljubljana Bank had no standing to sue in order to obtain repayment of such loans. The Slovenian Government declared that this interpretation was arbitrary, since the aforementioned transfer of claims was only partial, and the claims against Croatian debtors remained with the Ljubljana Bank. According to the Croatian Government, this interpretation by the Croatian courts was not universal and only applied to some precise cases, where it was legally justified. 16.     According to the applicant Government, the particular cases covered by the present application may be divided into four categories. Firstly, in several cases, the Croatian Constitutional Court confirmed the lower instance decisions finding that Ljubljana Bank lacked active standing to pursue its claims. Secondly, there are cases that are still pending, but the defendants have introduced the argument based on the aforementioned findings of the Constitutional Court; the Slovenian Government considered that these cases were in any event doomed to fail. Thirdly, there were similar proceedings that ended in a dismissal of the claims submitted by the Ljubljana Bank. Fourthly, in several cases, the Ljubljana Bank had been successful in securing favourable decisions of Croatian courts but had nevertheless been unable to enforce them for other reasons. 17.     The respondent Government explained that a significant part of the judicial case files in the individual cases referred to by the applicant Government has been destroyed due to the passage of time, according to the Croatian domestic rules on dealing with judicial archives.   LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant Slovenian domestic law 18.     Section 22 (b) of the 1991 Constitutional Act Implementing the Fundamental Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia ( Ustavni zakon za izvedbo Temeljne ustavne listine o samostojnosti in neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia no.   1/91), as amended by the 1994 Amendments ( Ustavni zakon o dopolnitvah Ustavnega zakona za izvedbo Temeljne ustavne listine o samostojnosti in neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia no.   45/94), which entered into force on 27 July 1994, reads as follows: “The Ljubljana Bank d.d., Ljubljana and the Maribor Credit Bank, d.d. Maribor shall transfer their respective businesses and assets to the new banks established under the provisions of this Constitutional Act. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Ljubljana Bank d.d., Ljubljana and the Maribor Credit Bank, d.d. Maribor shall retain: (i)     all potential obligations arising out of joint liability under the ‘New Financing Agreement’ and other potential obligations arising out of relations with the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the former SFRY in the part where the debtors are [located] in other republics of the former SFRY; (ii)     the relevant portion of potential claims under those headings; (iii)     all obligations relating to foreign currency [deposited] on foreign-currency ordinary and savings accounts in respect of which the Republic of Slovenia did not assume guarantees under section 19 of this Act; (iv)     obligations to the National Bank of Yugoslavia and those obligations to foreign creditors that were guaranteed by the SFRY where funds were used by the ultimate beneficiaries from other republics of the former SFRY; (v)     the claims related thereto. The Ljubljana Bank d.d., Ljubljana shall maintain its links with the existing branches and subsidiaries of Ljubljana Bank d.d. based in the other republics on the territory of the former SFRY, but shall retain the corresponding share of claims against the National Bank of Yugoslavia in respect of foreign-currency savings accounts.” 19.     Section 25 of the Banking Act 2015 ( Zakon o bančništvu , ZBan-2 , Uradni list RS , št. 25/15) reads as follows: “(1)     A bank shall be organised in the legal form of a joint-stock company or a European company. (2)     Unless otherwise provided by this Act, Companies Act provisions regarding joint-stock companies and European companies shall apply to banks.” 20.     The relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2006 ( Zakon o gospodarskih družbah , ZGD-1 , Uradni list RS , št. 65/09, with further amendments) read as follows: Section 3 “(1)     For the purposes of this Act, a company shall be a legal person that independently pursues a gainful activity as its sole activity. (2)     For the purposes of this Act, gainful activity shall be any profit-oriented market activity. (3)     The company referred to in paragraph (1) of this Section shall take one of the following legal forms: –     partnership: unlimited liability company or limited partnership; or –     company limited by shares: limited liability company, joint-stock company, partnership limited by shares or European company. (4)     The companies referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be considered as companies even if they carry out, in full or in part, a non-profit activity. (5)     A company or economic interest grouping may be established by any natural or legal person unless otherwise provided by the law. ...” Section 7 “(1)     ... [A] company shall assume responsibility for [its] liabilities with all [its] assets. (2)     The law shall determine when and how the company members shall share liability with the company.” Section 8 “(1)       Notwithstanding the preceding Section, Company Members shall also assume responsibility for the liabilities of the company in the following cases: –     if they have abused the company as a legal person in order to attain an objective that is forbidden to them as individuals; –     if they have abused the company as a legal person in order to cause damage to their or company’s creditors; –     if, in violation of the law, they have used the assets of the company as a legal person as their own personal assets; or –     if for their own benefit, or for the benefit of some other person, they have reduced the assets of the company, where they knew or should have known that the company would not be capable of meeting its liabilities to third persons. ...” Section 9 (1) “The provisions of this part of the Act shall apply to all companies unless explicitly provided otherwise.” Section 168 “(1)     A joint-stock company is a company which has its share capital divided into stocks. (2)     A joint-stock company is liable to creditors for its obligations with all its assets. (3)     Shareholders are not liable to creditors for the company’s obligations.” Section 169 “A joint-stock company may be formed by one or more natural or legal persons who shall adopt the company’s articles of association.” Section 265 (1) “The management directs the business operations of the company independently and at its own liability.” Section 266 (1) “The management acts on the company’s behalf and represents the company.” Section 292 (1) “Shareholders exercise their rights in respect of company matters at a general meeting, unless otherwise provided by this Act.” Section 293 (6) “The general meeting may not decide on issues concerning the conduct of business unless so requested by the management.” 21.     The relevant provisions of the Services of Public Economic Interest Act 1993 ( Zakon o gospodarskih javnih službah, ZGJS , Uradni list RS, št.   32/93) read as follows: Section 1 “This Act determines the method and forms of performance of services of public economic interest. Services of public economic interest provide material public goods as products and services whose permanent and uninterrupted production in the public interest shall be ensured by Republic of Slovenia or municipality or other local community in order to meet public needs when and insofar as they cannot be met on the market.” Section 2 “Services of public economic interest are determined by law ...” Section 6 “Slovenia (the State) or a local community provides services of public economic interest in one of the following legal forms: –     public utility unit, when it would be uneconomic or irrational to set up a public corporation or to grant a concession due to the small scale or characteristics of the service; –     public service agency, when the services include one or more services of public economic interest, which due to their nature cannot be performed as profitable or this is not their purpose; –     public company, when performing one or more services of public economic interest of a larger scale or when this is required by the monopoly nature of the activity, if that activity can be performed as profitable; –     by granting concessions. Public service agencies and public companies have to prepare a quality management program adopted by the founder. A concessionaire and a private law entity which operates with a public capital contribution in matters of the performance of services of public economic interest, operates in accordance with the manner prescribed for the performance of a public service.” Relevant international law material Interpretation of international treaties 22.     The Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties provides as follows: Article 31 General rule of interpretation “1.     A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2.     The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a)     any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b)     any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3.     There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a)     any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b)     any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c)     any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4.     A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a)     leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b)     leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” The specific nature of human rights treaties (a)    The International Court of Justice 23.     In its advisory opinion of 28 May 1951 on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ( ICJ Reports 1951, at p.   23), the International Court of Justice stated: “... In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interest of their own: They merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. ...” (b)    The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 24.     In its advisory opinion OC-2/82 of 24 September 1982 on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 74 and 75) (Series A, no. 2, paragraph   29), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared: “The Court must emphasise ... that modern human rights treaties ... are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction. ...” (c)    The United Nations Human Rights Committee 25.     The relevant part of the General Comment no. 24 on the Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, adopted at the 52nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on 4 November 1994 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), paragraph   17), reads as follows: “[I]t is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that provides the definition of reservations and also the application of the object and purpose test in the absence of other specific provisions. But the Committee believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties. Such treaties ... are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place ...” Relevant European Union law material 26.     In the case of Bank Mellat v. Council (Case T-496/10, judgment of 29 January 2013, EU:T:2013:39), an Iranian commercial bank owned by the Iranian State brought an action before the General Court of the European Union, seeking a complete or partial annulment of several Council regulations and decisions subjecting it to sanctions in the general framework of restrictive measures taken against Iran with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation. According to the applicant bank, these measures breached fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union. The European Commission and the Council of the European Union contended that legal persons which are emanations of non-member countries, such as the applicant bank, which they considered was an emanation of the Iranian State, could not rely on fundamental rights protection and guarantees under European Union law. The General Court rejected this argument in the following terms: “36 .     In that regard, it must first be observed that neither in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2010, C   83, p.   389) nor in European Union primary law are there any provisions which state that legal persons who are emanations of States are not entitled to the protection of fundamental rights. On the contrary, the provisions of the Charter which are relevant to the pleas raised by the applicant, and in particular Articles   17, 41 and 47, guarantee the rights of ‘everyone’, a wording which includes legal persons such as the applicant. 37 .     Nonetheless, the Council and the Commission rely, in this context, on Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4   November 1950 (‘ECHR’), the effect of which is that applications submitted by governmental organisations to the European Court of Human Rights are not admissible. 38 .     First, Article   34 of the ECHR is a procedural provision which is not applicable to procedures before the Courts of the European Union. Secondly, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the aim of that provision is to ensure that a State which is a party to the ECHR is not both applicant and defendant before that court (see, to that effect, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 13   December 2007, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey , No   40998/98, §   81, ECHR 2007 ‑ V). That argument is not applicable to the present case. 39 .     The Council and the Commission also argue that the justification of the rule on which they rely is that a State is the guarantor of respect for fundamental rights in its territory but cannot qualify for such rights. 40 .     However, even if that justification were applicable in relation to an internal situation, the fact that a State is the guarantor of respect for fundamental rights in its own territory is of no relevance as regards the extent of the rights to which legal persons which are emanations of that same State may be entitled in the territory of other States. 41 .     In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that European Union law contains no rule preventing legal persons which are emanations of non-Member countries from taking advantage of fundamental rights protection and guarantees. Those rights may therefore be relied upon by those persons before the Courts of the European Union in so far as those rights are compatible with their status as legal persons. 42 .     Further, and in any event, the Council and the Commission have not put forward any evidence capable of proving that the applicant was in fact an emanation of the Iranian State, that is, an entity which participated in the exercise of governmental powers or which ran a public service under governmental control (see, to that effect, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey , cited above in paragraph 38, § 79). 43 .     In that regard, first, the Council maintains that the applicant runs a public service under the control of the Iranian government since it provides financial services which are essential for the operation of the Iranian economy. The Council does not however contest the applicant’s claims that those services represent commercial activities carried out in a competitive sector and subject to the ordinary law. In those circumstances, the fact that those activities are essential for the operation of a State’s economy cannot, by itself, confer on them the status of a public service. 44 .     Next, the Commission maintains that the fact that the applicant is involved in nuclear proliferation demonstrates that it participates in the exercise of governmental powers. However, in adopting that approach the Commission assumes the truth of a premise which the applicant denies is true and which is a question of fact at the very core of the dispute before the Court. Further, the claimed involvement of the applicant in nuclear proliferation, as set out in the contested measures, cannot be assimilated to the exercise of State powers, but to commercial transactions entered into with entities engaged in nuclear proliferation. Consequently, that claim cannot justify the classification of the applicant as an emanation of the Iranian State. 45 .     Lastly, the Commission considers that the applicant is an emanation of the Iranian State because of the latter’s participation in its share capital. Leaving aside the fact that, according to the information provided by the applicant, which is not disputed by the Council and the Commission, the holding concerned is only a minority shareholding, that participation does not by itself imply that the applicant participates in the exercise of governmental powers or that it runs a public service. 46 .     In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant may take advantage of fundamental rights protection and guarantees.” 27.     The Council appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union. It complained, inter alia , that the General Court had made an error of law by holding that even if it were established that the bank was an emanation of the Iranian State, this bank would still be entitled to rely on fundamental rights protections and guarantees before the courts of the European Union. The Council relied in particular on Article   34 of the Convention, insisting that the ratio legis of this provision was that a State cannot enjoy fundamental rights. It also contested the General Court’s finding that there was no evidence to show that the Bank Mellat actually was a governmental organisation. The Court of Justice rejected these arguments ( Council v. Bank Mellat , Case C-176/13   P, judgment of 18 February 2016, EU:C:2016:96): “48 .     It must be pointed out that the action brought by Bank Mellat falls within the scope of the second paragraph of Article   275 [of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] ... 49 .     Bank Mellat puts forward pleas alleging an infringement of its rights of defence and its right to effective judicial protection. Such rights may be invoked by any natural person or any entity bringing an action before the Courts of the European Union. 50 .     The same applies to pleas alleging an infringement of essential procedural requirements, such as that alleging an infringement of the obligation to state the reasons for a measure. 51 .     As regards pleas alleging a manifest error of assessment or a breach of the general principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the question whether a State entity is entitled to invoke them is one that relates to the merits of the case ... 52 .     In the light of the above, the Council’s plea must be rejected, and there is no need to examine the argument that the General Court erred in holding that it was not established that Bank Mellat was a State entity, since that argument is ineffective.” 28.     In another, similar case, the Council and the Commission did not dispute the right of the applicant company itself to seek the annulment of the contested measures; they only denied that it had certain fundamental rights upon which it relied in order to obtain annulment. The General Court rejected this argument, which sought to reject the plea as inadmissible when, in its view, it concerned the merits. The Council appealed to the Court of Justice, arguing that if an entity which is a government organisation for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, does not have the fundamental right to the protection of property or other fundamental rights, it does not have locus standi to rely on an alleged infringement of those rights before the General Court. The Court of Justice held ( Council v. Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran , Case   C ‑ 348/12 P, judgment of 28 November 2013, EU:C:2013:772): “50.     ... Kala Naft ’s action fell within the scope of the second paragraph of Article   275 [of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]. The company had locus standi to challenge before the Courts of the European Union its inclusion on the list contained in the acts at issue, as that listing was of direct and individual concern to it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 [of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]. Its legal interest in bringing proceedings could not, therefore, be disputed. 51.     The General Court correctly considered, therefore, in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, that the argument as to whether Kala Naft was entitled to invoke fundamental rights protections and guarantees did not concern the admissibility of the action or even of a plea, but related to the merits of the case.” 29.     Finally, in the case of Petro Suisse Intertrade Co. SA v. Council (Joined Cases T ‑ 156/13 and T ‑ 373/14, judgment of 18 September 2015, EU:T:2015:646), the General Court confirmed the interpretation to be given to the aforementioned judgment: “39.     Moreover, in its judgment of 28   November 2013 in Council v. Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft ..., the Court of Justice rejected the inadmissibility arguments raised by the Council and the Commission according to which, as an emanation of the Iranian State , the applicant in the case in question, Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co. , did not enjoy protection of fundamental rights. The Court thus confirmed, in essence, that an entity which was an emanation of a non-Member State was entitled, by invoking, where applicable, fundamental rights guarantees, to bring an action for annulment of the restrictive measures adopted against it.” 30.     This approach has been repeated, both by the General Court and by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in several similar cases involving companies which may have been emanations of the Iranian State which were challenging the imposition of restrictive measures (see, among others, Sina Bank v. Council , Case T-67/12, judgment of the General Court of 4 June 2014, paragraphs 56-62; Bank of Industry and Mine v. Council , Case   T ‑ 10/13, judgment of the General Court of 29 April 2015, paragraphs 57-58; Council v. Bank Saderat Iran , Case C ‑ 200/13 P, judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 April 2016, paragraph 50). In Bank of Industry and Mine v. Council , the General Court held: “57.     However, even if that justification were applicable in relation to an internal situation, the fact that a State is the guarantor of respect for fundamental rights in its own territory is of no relevance as regards the extent of the rights to which legal persons which are emanations of that same State may be entitled in the territory of third countries (judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council , cited in paragraph 53 above, EU:T:2013:397, paragraph 69). 58.     In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that EU law contains no rule preventing legal persons which are emanations of non-Member States from taking advantage of fundamental rights protection and guarantees. Consequently, even if the applicant, as a public entity, is an emanation of the Iranian State, it may rely on those rights before the Courts of the European Union in so far as they are compatible with its status as a legal person (see, to that effect, Bank Melli Iran v Council , cited in paragraph 53 above, EU:T:2013:397, paragraph 70).” COMPLAINTS 31.     The applicant Government complained that, through systematic arbitrary and unlawful conduct amounting to an administrative practice, the Croatian authorities have prevented and continue to prevent the Ljubljana Bank from enforcing and collecting the debts of its Croatian debtors in Croatia. This alleged practice consists, firstly, in a systematically arbitrary interpretation of the relevant Slovenian law by Croatian courts, which refuse to recognise the locus standi of the Ljubljana Bank before them regarding these claims; secondly, in the interference of members of the executive branch of the respondent Government in judicial proceedings; thirdly, in systematically protracting the proceedings and various other procedural shortcomings, and fourthly, in the refusal of enforcement of final judicial decisions given in favour of the Ljubljana Bank by the Croatian courts. The applicant Government alleged multiple violations of Article 6 § 1, Article   13 and   Article   14 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. Under Article 41 of the Convention, they also requested just satisfaction corresponding to the losses incurred by the Ljubljana Bank as a result of the alleged violations. THE LAW 32.     With respect to the aforementioned complaints, the respondent Government raised three preliminary objections to the admissibility of the present application. First of all, they contended that it was, as such, incompatible with Article 33 of the Convention in that the applicant Government were not entitled to lodge it with the Court in the form of an inter-State case. Secondly, the respondent Government stated that the application should be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies “according to the generally recognised rules of international law”, contrary to the requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Thirdly, they objected that the application had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit set in that same provision. OBJECTION AS TO THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION WITH ARTICLE 33 of the convention 33.     Relying on the Court’s decision in Ljubljanska banka d.d. v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 29003/07, 12 May 2015), the respondent Government contended that, since the Ljubljana Bank had been found not to be a “non-governmental organisation” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention and therefore could not lodge an individual application with the Court, the Convention likewise precluded the applicant Government from vindicating the rights of this entity by means of inter-State proceedings under Article   33. The applicant Government disagreed with this objection; furthermore, in their initial observations, they claimed that the Court was not authorised to examine it at the admissibility stage of the proceedings. 34.     The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows: Article 1 “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.” Article 19 “To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’. ...” Article 32 “1.     The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles   33, 34, 46 and   47. 2.     In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.” Article 33 “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” Article 34 “The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.” Article 35 “1.     The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. 2.     The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article   34 that ... (b)     is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information. 3.     The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: (a)     the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application; ...” 35.     Before deciding on whether the present application is compatible with Article 33 of the Convention, the Court will ascertain whether the relevant provisions of the Convention allow it to examine this objection at the admissibility stage of the proceedings. Whether the Court may examine the present objection at the admissibility stage The parties’ arguments (a)    The Croatian Government 36.     The respondent Government considered that the range of preliminary issues that the Court could examine at the admissibility stage of an inter-State case was not limited to those mentioned in Article 35   §   1 of the Convention. From the formal point of view, it was true that, in an inter-State case, the Court could only check the fulfilment of two formal procedural admissibility conditions set by Article 35   §   1, that is, the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the observance of the six-month time-limit. Nevertheless, already at this preliminary stage, the Court did have competence to determine whether the application was wholly unsubstantiated, or otherwise lacking the requirements of a genuine “allegation” within the meaning of Article 33 of the Convention. The respondent Government referred to several decisions of the Court and of the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission”) in inter-State applications, in which both Convention institutions had recognised that they might, at this stage, carry out some admissibility assessment going beyond the two criteria laid down in Article 35   §   1. Thus, they might, and should, ascertain whether or not there was prima facie evidence of compliance with the exhaustion rule, or whether or not there was enough evidence to allow a judicial examination of the case in the first place. In any event, the question of interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 33 did not need to be reserved for the merits stage. 37.     The respondent Government further considered that the key question at stake in the present case was a “jurisdiction” issue within the meaning of Article   32 of the Convention. According to Article 32 § 1, the jurisdiction of the Court extended to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention which were referred to it as provided in Article   33, but that necessarily included the scope of the authorisation given to the Court by the latter provision. Moreover, a disagreement between the parties as to whether the applicant Government were entitled to submit an application under Article   33 of the Convention was a “dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 32 § 2, and the Convention did not preclude the Court from resolving it at the admissibility stage. (b)    The Slovenian Government 38.     In their written observations, the applicant Government pointed out that in an inter-State case, all issues other than those specified in Article 35 § 1 were reserved for the post-admissibility stage and had to be examined together with the merits of the case. In other words, the only reasons for which an inter-State application could be declared inadmissible at the preliminary stage were the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and failure to comply with the six-month time-limit. Conversely, the Court could not carry out a “preliminary examination on the merits” of the case and declare the application inadmissible for any of the other reasons mentioned in Article   35 – for instance, as incompatible with the Convention or its Protocols, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of application. Therefore, the applicant Government contended that the Court was not competent to deal with the question of the compatibility of the application with Article 33 of the Convention at the admissibility stage of proceedings, and that this question had to be reserved for a later stage. 39.     However, at the hearing of 12 June 2019, the applicant Government conceded that the question of interpretation of any provision of the Conven