CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 2 février 2021

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DENMARK (Applications nos. 25802/18 and 27338/18)     JUDGMENT   Art 3 P1 • Vote • Disenfranchisement of persons divested of legal capacity affecting only a small group and subject to thorough parliamentary and judicial review • Measure not amounting to automatic blanket restriction affecting all mentally disabled or those under guardianship • Absence of European or international consensus on the matter • Wide margin of appreciation not overstepped • No requirement under Art   3 P1 for a specific and individualised assessment of voting capacity when depriving a person of his or her right to vote • Eventual reduction of restrictions after careful and gradual assessment not to be held against the Government Art 14 (+ Art 3 P1) • Discrimination • Differential treatment in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate   STRASBOURG 2 February 2021   FINAL   06/09/2021   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Strøbye v. Denmark, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Marko Bošnjak, President,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Aleš Pejchal,   Valeriu Griţco,   Branko Lubarda,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Saadet Yüksel, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos. 25802/18 and 27338/18) against the Kingdom of Denmark lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Danish nationals, Mr Tomas Strøbye (the first applicant) and Mr   Martin Rosenlind (the second applicant), on 25 May 2018; the decision to give notice to the Danish Government (“the Government”) of the applications; the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants; the comments submitted by the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court); Having deliberated in private on 15 December 2020, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     In 1984 and 2009, respectively, the applicants were deprived of their legal capacity. Consequently, they were not entitled to vote, inter alia , in the 2015 parliamentary elections. They brought their case before the domestic courts, maintaining that their disenfranchisement was in contravention of Article 29 of the Danish Constitution, the Convention, and/or the UN Disability Convention. The courts found against them. 2.     The applicants complained of a breach of their right to vote under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, taken alone or read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. THE FACTS 3.     The first applicant was born in 1966. He lives in Frederiksberg. The second applicant was born in 1987. He lives in Greve. The applicants were represented by Mr Christian Dahlager, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen. 4.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Michael Braad, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their Co-Agent, Mrs Nina Holst-Christensen, from the Ministry of Justice. 5.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.     The first applicant was declared legally incompetent to manage his financial and personal affairs by the Copenhagen City Court ( Københavns Byret ) on 20 March 1984, as the conditions for declaring him legally incompetent under sections 2(1)(i) and 46 of the then applicable Act on Legal Competence ( myndighedsloven ) and part 43 of the Administration of Justice Act ( retsplejeloven ) were found to have been met. 7.     In 1996, the Act on Legal Competence was replaced by the Guardianship Act ( værgemålsloven ), which distinguished between (i) persons who under the Act’s section 5 were subject to guardianship but remained legally competent, and (ii) persons who were both subject to guardianship under section 5 and had been deprived of their legal capacity under section 6. Only those who had been deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 were to be considered legally incompetent. 8.     The second applicant was placed under financial guardianship and deprived of his legal capacity by order of the District Court of Roskilde ( Retten i Roskilde ) on 23 March 2009. The District Court gave the following reasoning: “On the basis of the [submitted] medical certificate, it is considered a fact that [the second applicant] is unable to manage his financial affairs because of mental disability, for which reason he requires financial guardianship and requires to be deprived of his legal capacity in order to prevent him from incurring more debt. Accordingly, the conditions for financial guardianship set out in section 5(1) of the Guardianship Act and the conditions for deprivation of legal capacity set out in section 6(1) of the Guardianship Act have been met. For that reason, an order for financial guardianship and deprivation of legal capacity is granted.” 9.     Under section 29 of the Constitution, and section 1 of the Danish Act on Parliamentary Elections, persons who were legally incompetent did not have the right to vote in general elections. 10.     Consequently, the applicants were not entitled to vote, inter alia , in the parliamentary elections that took place on 18 June 2015. 11.   By a statutory amendment (Act no. 391 of 27 April 2016), persons who were legally incompetent were given the right to vote in European Parliament elections and in local and regional elections, but not in national parliamentary elections. 12.     The applicants, joined by two other persons, instituted proceedings before the Danish courts, claiming that they had wrongfully been denied the right to vote in the parliamentary elections on 18 June 2015. They relied , inter alia , on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, both taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. 13.     The Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior ( Social- og Indenrigsministeriet ), against whom the above-mentioned proceedings were brought, contested the claims. 14.     Before the High Court of Eastern Denmark ( Østre Landsret ), a written statement submitted by the first applicant was read out. According to that statement, as read out by the first applicant’s mother: “He suffered brain damage after being immunised during his first year [of life]. He currently lives at the Egmont folk high school [ Højskolen ] in Hou. He is able to write with [the help of a third party supporting his] hand and wrote the statement because, unfortunately, he was not able to travel from Jutland to attend the trial hearing. For many years, he has had to share a single vote in general elections with his mother, who is his guardian. They have not always had the same perception of the political landscape. It is humiliating for him not to have the right to cast his own vote, and he would therefore be very pleased if judgment were to be delivered in his favour. According to his papers, he was deemed to be unteachable. However, neuropsychologists and occupational therapists have now been persuaded [that he has some] intellect. He asks for justice.” 15.     Before the High Court, the second applicant stated: “He lives in Greve in his own flat, which is part of a group home. A mentor comes every Wednesday to help him clean, do grocery shopping and read his mail. He is thirty-five years old [sic]. He works on the Glad Foundation reception desk every day from 8   a.m. until usually 2 p.m. or 3 p.m. There are always two employees at work on the reception desk, and on Fridays there are three. He felt sad and disappointed about not being allowed to vote in the general elections in June 2015, when everybody else was allowed to. He feels like an outcast from society. He reads the Metroexpress newspaper and is interested in politics. He watches the TV2 news before going to work, and he watches the “TV-Avisen” news on the DR1 channel in the evening. He was deprived of his legal capacity because it is difficult for him to manage his financial affairs. He requested a guardian himself. He asked his mentor to organise the [relevant] paperwork that had to be submitted to the State Administration ( Statsforvaltningen ). Later the case was heard in court.” 16.     In its judgment of 29 June 2017, the High Court dismissed the claim. The High Court gave the following reasoning: “...The provisions of the Constitution [regarding the right to vote] (previously section 35 and section 30, and now section 29) have continuously been construed by the legislature to mean that persons deprived of their legal capacity under section 2 and section 34 of the former Act on Legal Competence and, since the effective date of the Guardianship Act, under section 6 of the Guardianship Act, do not have the right to vote in general elections. This understanding also seems to be supported to a predominant extent in printed legal literature on the subject. The High Court concurs with this understanding of section 29 of the Constitution and finds, without taking into account the significance of Denmark’s international obligations, that there is no basis for a different interpretation of the provision. ... Accordingly, and since the High Court finds that the provisions of the international conventions acceded to by Denmark and relied upon by the plaintiffs and the intervener do not imply that the very limited number of persons deprived in full of their legal capacity by a court order under section 6 of the Guardianship Act, but who otherwise meet the conditions for suffrage in general elections, also have an absolute and unconditional right to vote in general elections, and since such legal status is not recognised in the judgments of the Court relied upon by the parties and the intervener, the High Court finds for the Ministry of [Social] Affairs and the Interior.” 17.     The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court, which by a judgment of 18 January 2018, upheld the decision of the High Court. The Supreme Court gave the following reasoning: “The right to vote (claims 1 and 2) Under section 29 of the Constitution, persons declared ‘legally incompetent’ do not have the right to vote in general elections. For the reasons given by the High Court, the Supreme Court concurs with the view that persons deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 of the Guardianship Act must be considered legally incompetent within the meaning of the Constitution, for which reason they do not have the right to vote in general elections. Section 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Act is worded accordingly. Notwithstanding Denmark’s international obligations, the Supreme Court cannot allow the appellants’ arguments that section 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Act is inapplicable and that they had the right to vote in the 2015 general election. The Supreme Court therefore concurs with the judgment delivered by the High Court in favour of the Ministry of [Social] Affairs and the Interior as regards claims 1 and 2. Entitlement to compensation (claim 3) The question is now whether the appellants’ rights under, in particular, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms were violated and, if so, whether the appellants are entitled to compensation. Under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Contracting States undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, this provision guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election, but this right is not absolute, and the Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation in that sphere – see in this respect, inter alia , paragraph 115 of the judgment delivered on 16   March 2006 in Ždanoka v. Latvia (application no. 58278/00) and paragraphs 57 and 62 of the judgment delivered on 6 October 2005 in Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no.   2) . It furthermore appears from those judgments that restrictions on the right to vote should not automatically adhere to the same criteria as those applied with regard to interference with other Convention rights; that interference must be necessary in a democratic society. However, restrictions on the right to vote must not be arbitrary or disproportionate, or thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature. When determining whether a restriction on the right to vote is compatible with the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights takes into account whether the restriction pursues a legitimate aim and whether it is proportionate to that aim. In the judgment of 20 May 2010 in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary , which concerned a provision of the Hungarian Constitution providing that persons placed under total or partial guardianship did not have the right to vote, the European Court of Human Rights was satisfied that the restriction pursued a legitimate aim. That aim was to ensure that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions and of making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs. The European Court of Human Rights found, however, that the Hungarian measure was disproportionate, for which reason it constituted a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In making that assessment, the European Court of Human Rights took into account the fact that the Hungarian Constitution did not distinguish between persons under total and persons under partial guardianship, and that there was no evidence that the competing interests had been weighed in order to assess the proportionality of the restriction. It furthermore appears from the judgment that 0.75% of the Hungarian population of voting age had been disenfranchised on account of being under guardianship, that the European Court of Human Rights considered that that was a significant figure, and that it could not be claimed that the restriction on the right to vote was negligible in its effects. The European Court of Human Rights found that the absolute disenfranchisement of all persons under partial guardianship without due consideration being given to [the degree of] their mental disability did not fall within an acceptable margin of appreciation, referring, inter alia , to the fact that the margin of appreciation allowed the Contracting States is substantially narrower if disenfranchisement applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society and that weighty reasons are required for such disenfranchisement. When the applicant lost his right to vote as a consequence of the automatic disfranchisement imposed, without access to any remedy, on persons under partial guardianship, he suffered a violation, for which reason the European Court of Human Rights did not speculate as to whether the applicant would still have been deprived of the right to vote even if a more limited restriction on the rights of the mentally disabled had been imposed, in line with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The European Court of Human Rights also said that the treatment of those with intellectual or mental disabilities as a single class constituted a questionable classification and that the curtailment of their rights must be subject to strict scrutiny. The indiscriminate removal of voting rights without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely on the basis of a mental disability necessitating partial guardianship could therefore not be considered to constitute legitimate grounds for restricting the right to vote. The Alajos Kiss judgment is the only judgment on disenfranchisement imposed as a consequence of guardianship, except for the judgments delivered by panels of three judges on 23 September 2014 in Gajcsi v. Hungary and on 21 October 2014 in Harmati v. Hungary , in which cases the Hungarian government did not dispute the alleged violation of the Convention. The Supreme Court finds that the purpose of disenfranchising legally incompetent persons under section 29 of the Constitution falls within the framework of a measure deemed to pursue a legitimate aim, as set out by the European Court of Human Rights in Alajos Kiss . The question is now whether the requirement of proportionality has been met. The first condition that must be met in order to deprive a person of his or her legal capacity under section 6 of the Guardianship Act is that the person must be unable to manage his or her own affairs owing to mental unsoundness or mental disability, etc. (see section 5), and the second condition is that a legal incapacitation order be necessary to prevent the person in question from exposing his or her assets, income or other financial interests to the risk of major loss, or to prevent financial exploitation. Persons subject to guardianship solely under section 5 are legally competent, whereas persons also deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 are legally incompetent. It follows from section 8(1) that a person cannot be deprived of his or her legal capacity if his or her interests can be sufficiently guarded through guardianship under section 5. As opposed to persons who are only subject to guardianship under section   5, persons deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 need more than a guardian to guard their interests; they are often persons who act contrary to their own best interests or risk being exploited by others. Under section 10, a legal incapacitation order must be quashed if the prescribed conditions are no longer met. The legal incapacitation order in respect of [one of the two additional persons who joined the proceedings] has been quashed, in accordance with that provision, and he is now solely subject to guardianship under section 5 and consequently now has the right to vote in general elections. Accordingly, strict requirements must be met in order to deprive a person of his or her legal capacity and to maintain in effect such a legal incapacitation order, and such requirements are closely related to the issue of whether the person in question is able to foresee the consequences of his or her decisions and to make conscious and judicious decisions. The Guardianship Act, which was enacted in 1996, reduced the group of persons declared legally incompetent and consequently disenfranchised in general elections as compared with the group similarly disenfranchised under the former Danish Act on Legal Competence ( myndighedsloven ). In 1990, just under 3,300 persons had been declared legally incompetent, and in December 2017 about 1,850 persons had been deprived of their legal capacity. Danish Act no. 391 of 27 April 2016 gave persons deprived of their legal capacity the right to vote in European Parliament elections and in local and regional elections. It appears from the preparatory notes to the Act that it was intended to bestow upon this group of individuals the right to vote to the extent possible under the Constitution. The restriction on the right to vote set out in section 29 of the Constitution therefore reflects an arrangement [ ordning ] that is considerably narrower than the Hungarian measure deemed by the European Court of Human Rights in respect of Alajos Kiss to be disproportionate. The Supreme Court finds that it follows from that judgment that an arrangement imposing a more limited restriction on the right to vote of persons suffering from a mental disability as compared with the then applicable Hungarian measure might be compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It cannot be inferred from the judgment that in order for a restriction on the right to vote of persons deprived of their legal capacity to be considered compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, a specific and individual assessment must always have been made of the relevant person’s mental capacity to exercise the right to vote. The Supreme Court observes in this respect, as did the High Court, that a specific and individual assessment of whether a person’s mental capacity is sufficient [for that person] to exercise the right to vote may give rise to concern. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning restrictions on the right to vote and on eligibility to stand for election for reasons other than mental disability also supports the view that a specific and individual assessment is not always required to deprive a person of his or her right to vote – see in this respect paragraphs 112 and 114 of the judgment delivered in Ždanoka v. Latvia and paragraphs 98, 99 and 102 of the judgment delivered on 22 May 2012 in Scoppola v.   Italy (no. 3) . The Supreme Court also observes that it follows from the legislation on elections and the constitutions of a number of other European countries that persons deprived of their legal capacity do not have the right to vote [it appears from the transcript that the Supreme Court referred to a report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 21 May 2014 “The right to political participation for persons with disabilities: human rights indicators”, see paragraph 71 below]. Against this background, the Supreme Court finds no basis for ruling that the arrangement set out in section 29 of the Constitution is contrary to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 or to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Supreme Court also finds, as was also found by the High Court, that there is no basis for ruling that section 29 of the Constitution is contrary to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. For this reason alone, the appellants are not entitled to compensation.” 18.     The Supreme Court judgment attracted renewed focus among politicians on the situation of persons who were both subject to guardianship and had been deprived of their legal capacity, and who did not have the right to vote in general elections. Consequently, several parties that were not government parties at that time introduced private members’ bill no. B   71, which sought that fewer persons subject to guardianship should be excluded owing to their disability from the right to vote in general elections. At the first reading of the bill in Parliament, the then Minister of Justice expressed the view that the bill served a commendable purpose, and he promised to examine the possibility of excluding fewer persons subject to guardianship from the right to vote in general elections. After the reading of the bill, a report was published saying that the Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs, the Interior and Children ( Social-, Indenrigs- og Børneudvalget ) looked forward to discussing with the Government the outcome of the analytical work launched by the Government. 19.     In the light of this report, the Ministry of Justice carried out an analysis of the rules within this field. On 3 October 2018, the Ministry of Justice concluded, on the basis of that analysis, that section 29 of the Constitution did not constitute a bar to an amendment to or repeal of the guardianship rules aimed at allowing some of those persons who had been deprived of their legal capacity to again be allowed to manage their own assets in full or in part. The opinion of the Ministry of Justice was that a person subject to guardianship who was barred only in part from managing his or her assets was not “legally incompetent” within the meaning of the Constitution and could therefore retain the right to vote in general elections. 20.     Against that background, the then Minister of Justice introduced a bill to amend the Guardianship Act and the Parliamentary Elections Act; that amendment was passed by Parliament on 20 December 2018 and entered into force on 1 January 2019. The following appears from the explanatory notes to the bill: “The first purpose of the bill is to introduce the possibility of depriving a person [only] partially of his or her legal capacity, one of the consequences being that such a person will retain the right to vote in general elections. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Government that, according to the principles of democracy, the group of persons with suffrage in elections to a body elected by the people ought to be as wide as possible. The Government wishes to bestow the right to vote in nationwide elections in Denmark upon as many citizens as possible – [including] persons subject to guardianship – within the framework of the Constitution. ... It appears from paragraph 2.4 of the report that as long as a group of persons are deprived of the right to manage their assets, it is a consequence of section 29 of the Constitution that those persons are barred from voting in general elections. It therefore requires an amendment to the Constitution if the deprivation of a person’s legal capacity is not to lead to disenfranchisement. However, section 29 of the Constitution is not a bar to an amendment to or repeal of the guardianship rules to the effect that some of the persons deprived of their legal capacity today would again be allowed to manage their own assets in full or in part. However, in the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, such an arrangement must not have as a consequence [the scenario] that persons in need of the protection afforded by the deprivation of their legal capacity would be left in a situation in which they risked being exposed to financial exploitation or ... a potential risk of losing their assets. It is observed that the group of around 1,900 persons who have been deprived of their legal capacity is a particularly vulnerable population group. It is the opinion of the Ministry of Justice that it would constitute a major impairment of the protection of those persons if the possibility of depriving them of their legal capacity were to be abolished entirely. In such a case, those persons would no longer be prevented from entering into legal transactions and incurring financial commitments, even though they are not able to understand the consequences, thereby exposing their assets to risk. The relevant persons might also risk financial exploitation. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice cannot recommend the full abolition of the possibility of depriving them of their legal capacity. ...” 21.     Accordingly, it was the assessment of the Ministry of Justice that the proposed possibility of the partial deprivation of legal capacity was most compatible with the aim of allowing as many citizens as possible the right to vote while protecting a small group of citizens in need of such protection by depriving them of their legal capacity. 22.     In the light of the above, the statutory amendment introduced the possibility of the partial deprivation of legal capacity. Thereby it became possible to limit an order restricting a person’s legal incapacity to comprise only particular assets or affairs, such as credit purchase transactions or taking out loans, or to specifying a maximum amount of agreements into which such a person could enter. Persons deprived only partially of their legal capacity remain legally competent and thus retain the right to vote in general elections. Only persons fully deprived of their legal capacity do not have the right to vote in general elections. 23.     The first applicant lodged an application with a district court for a change to his guardianship status following the statutory amendment. On 20   May 2019, the order regarding his legal incapacitation was quashed in its entirety, and he was consequently granted the right to vote in general elections. 24.     The second applicant also lodged an application for a change to his guardianship status. He is still subject to guardianship, but by a district court order of 9   November 2019, he was only partially deprived of his legal capacity pursuant to section 6(2)(2) of the Guardianship Act. Consequently, he was granted the right to vote in general elections. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE The Constitution 25.     The fundamental rules on the right to vote in general elections are set out in section 29 of the Constitution, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: Section 29 “(1) Any person who is a Danish national, has a permanent home in the realm and has reached the age to qualify for suffrage, as provided in subsection (2) hereof, shall have the right to vote in general elections unless he or she has been declared legally incompetent. It must be laid down by statute to what extent conviction [of a crime] and public assistance amounting to poor relief within the meaning of the law will lead to disfranchisement.” 26.     The provision was first introduced in the Constitutional Act, which was enacted on 5 June 1849. The wording of the part of the provision stipulating that persons declared legally incompetent do not have the right to vote was revised in 1915 and 1953. 27.     The following overview can be made of the development of the provision. 28.     In 1849, section 35 set out: “Any man of good repute and Danish nationality has the right to vote in general elections when he attains the age of 30, unless he:- [...] (c) is barred from managing his [own] property”.   29.     In 1915, section 30 set out: “Any man or woman of Danish nationality has the right to vote in general elections when he or she has attained the age of 25 and has a permanent home in Denmark, unless he or she: ... (c) is barred from managing his or her [own] property owing to bankruptcy or a declaration of legal incompetence.” 30.     In 1953, as stated above, the first sentence of section 29(1) set out: “Any person who is a Danish national, has a permanent home in the realm and has reached the age qualifying [him or her] for suffrage, as provided in subsection (2) hereof, shall have the right to vote in general elections, unless he or she has been declared legally incompetent ...” 31.     Section 35 of the first Danish Constitution of June 1849 set out the qualifications for suffrage. The conditions had been extensively discussed by the Constitutional Committee. One of the subjects discussed was whether suffrage was to be conditional on levels of income or assets (the so-called “census requirements”). By contrast with the census requirements, a less controversial issue was that of whether legally incompetent persons were to be barred from voting. A.F. Krieger, the spokesman of the Constitutional Committee, said in this respect (see the Report on the Parliamentary Debate, vol. 2, column 2184f): “There is indeed general agreement that legally incompetent persons, children, women and criminals should be barred from voting.” 32.     The 1915 amendment to the Constitution (see Act no. 161 of 5 June 1915) added the stipulation that whenever a person was barred from managing his or her property it should be “owing to bankruptcy or a declaration of legal incompetence”. The preparatory notes to the provision (see the Official Report on Parliamentary Proceedings (Rigsdagstidende ) 1914-15, column 3937) explained that the wording “owing to bankruptcy or a declaration of legal incompetence” had been added in order to ensure the suffrage of married women. The only reason for the amendment was therefore that women would qualify for suffrage even if they were barred from managing their own property because they had married. 33.     The provision was given its current wording by the 1953 amendment to the Constitution (see Act no. 169 of 5 June 1953). As regards the reason for this amendment, according to which it is a condition for suffrage that a person has not been “declared legally incompetent”, the preparatory notes read as follows (see in this respect the explanatory notes to section 29 in Report No. 66/1953 issued by the 1946 Commission on the Constitution): “There is consensus that bankruptcy should no longer be considered grounds for exclusion. However, it is maintained that a declaration of legal incompetence will continue to lead to disenfranchisement. The bill does not combine this with the requirement that a person declared legally incompetent must have been barred from managing his or her [own] property, as does the current Constitution. Under the Act on Legal Competence, such a restriction on the right to manage one’s property is always linked to a declaration of legal incompetence.” 34.     It thus appeared from the preparatory notes that no amendment was contemplated to the condition that a person declared legally incompetent would also become disenfranchised, since a restriction on the right to manage one’s own property was an automatic consequence of a declaration of legal incompetence under the former Act on Legal Competence. 35.     The procedure for enacting amendments to the Constitution is set out in section 88 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: “If Parliament passes a bill on a new constitutional provision and the Government wishes to proceed with the matter, a general election must be called. If the bill is passed without amendment by the Parliament that assembles after the general election, a referendum must be held on whether to approve or reject the bill within six months of its final passage. Detailed rules on the referendum process must be laid down by statute. If a majority of the persons casting a vote in the referendum and at least 40% of the electorate have voted in favour of the bill, as passed by Parliament, and if the bill receives royal assent, it shall form an integral part of the Constitution.” The process of preparing and enacting an amendment to the Constitution is a time-consuming one. Moreover, history has shown that it is difficult to reach the required voter turnout in a referendum on an amendment to the Constitution. The Parliamentary Elections Act 36.     Since the enactment of the 1849 Constitution, the conditions for suffrage laid down by the Constitution have been implemented by the enactment of an elections statute. Section 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Act reads as follows: Section 1 “Any person who is a Danish national, has attained the age of eighteen and has a permanent home in the realm shall have the right to vote in general elections, unless he or she is legally incompetent.” 37.     The following overview can be made of the development of the provision. 38.     In 1849, section 5 set out: “Therefore, no person subjected to guardianship or whose property is subject to insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings shall have the right to vote.” 39.     In 1915, section 2 set out: ‘No person shall have the right to vote if he or she: ... (c) is barred from managing his or her property owing to bankruptcy or a declaration of legal incompetence.’ 40.     In 1953, section 1(1) set out: “Any person who is a Danish national, is of the age to qualify for suffrage, as provided for in subsection (2) hereof, and has a permanent home in the realm shall have the right to vote in general elections unless he or she:- [...] (b) is barred from managing his or her property owing to a declaration of legal incompetence.” 41.     In 1965, section 1(1) set out: “Any person who is a Danish national, has attained the age of 21 and has a permanent home in the realm shall have the right to vote in general elections unless he or she has been declared legally incompetent.” 42.     In 1997, section 1 set out: “Any person who is a Danish national, has attained the age of 18 and has a permanent home in the realm shall have the right to vote in general elections unless he or she is subject to guardianship combined with deprivation of legal capacity under section   6 of the Guardianship Act.” 43.     In 2019, section 1, set out: “Any person who is a Danish national, has attained the age of 18 and has a permanent home in the realm shall have the right to vote in general elections unless he or she is legally incompetent.” 44.     The 1849 Elections Act of 16 June 1849 implemented section 35 of the Constitution, under which the right to vote was subject to “the right to manage one’s own property”. It followed from section 5 of the Elections Act that persons “subject to guardianship” did not have the right to vote. According to A.F. Krieger, the reason for the different wordings used was that the words used in the Constitution could have “a more specific meaning” (see the Report on the Parliamentary Debate, vol. 2, column 3407). 45.     In connection with the 1915 amendment to the Constitution, the provision of the Elections Act on suffrage was worded to render it identical with the wording of the constitutional provision on suffrage, as enacted (see Act no. 142 of 10 May 1915). 46.     The rules on elections to the Rigsdagen , the former parliamentary assembly, were replaced by the Parliamentary Elections Act (Act no. 171 of 31 March 1953) – in connection with the 1953 amendment to the Constitution, by which the Rigsdagen was replaced by the Folketinget as the Danish parliamentary assembly. By the enactment of the Parliamentary Elections Act, “bankruptcy” was omitted from the provisions regarding disenfranchisement, as bankruptcy should no longer lead to disenfranchisement, according to the findings of the 1946 Commission on the Constitution (see the explanatory notes to section 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Act provided in Report No. 74 of 2 February 1953 of the Commission on the Elections Act). However, the wording still said that the relevant person must not be “barred from managing his or her [own] property owing to a declaration of legal incompetence”. 47.     The expression “the right to manage one’s [own] property” was removed by a statutory amendment in 1965. Accordingly, this provision was given the same wording as section 29 of the Constitution, the only condition now being that a person must not have been “declared legally incompetent”. 48.     Section 1(1) of the Parliamentary Elections Act retained this wording, except for amendments to the age qualifying citizens for suffrage, until 1997. In 1997, the provision was reworded to say that persons who were both subject to guardianship and who had been deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 of the Guardianship Act did not have the right to vote. The amendment was made in the light of the enactment of the Guardianship Act. The amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act took into account the fact that the Committee on the Act on Legal Competence had assessed, in particular, the meaning of the wording of the Constitution in the light of the new Guardianship Act. 49.     Section 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, as currently worded, came into force on 1 January 2019 (see section 2 of Act no. 1722 of 27   December 2018) to reflect the new possibility to only partially deprive a person of his or her legal capacity. The provision is drafted to the effect that persons declared legally incompetent are disenfranchised, whereas persons deprived only partially of their legal capacity are deemed to be still legally competent and thus have the right to vote in general elections. The Guardianship Act 50.     In 1996, the Act on Legal Competence was replaced by the Guardianship Act, which distinguished between (i) persons who under section 5 were subject to guardianship but remained legally competent, and (ii) persons who were subject to guardianship under section 5 and were also deprived of their legal capacity under section 6. 51. The Guardianship Act defined three kinds of guardianship for adults. Guardianship under section 5 was the standard arrangement. It read as follows: Section 5 “(1) A guardianship order can be made in respect of any person unable to manage his or her own affairs owing to mental unsoundness, including severe dementia, or mental disability or other severe impairment, if necessary. (2) A guardianship order can be made in respect of any person who is unsuited to manage his or her own financial affairs owing to illness or other severe decline and who makes a request [for such an order] himself or herself – if necessary instead of appointing a surrogate decision-maker for such a vulnerable adult under section 7. (3) A guardianship order can be restricted to financial matters, including specific assets or affairs. Such an order can also be restricted to personal matters, including specific personal affairs. (4) Unless otherwise specifically provided, the guardian shall act on behalf of the relevant person in respect of affairs covered by the guardianship order. (5) Persons subject to guardianship under this provision are legally competent, unless deprived of their legal capacity under section 6.” Accordingly, section 5 of the Guardianship Act allowed for individual guardianship arrangements adapted to individual needs. Persons subject to guardianship under section 5 of the Act could enter into legal transactions on their own, and they had the right to vote in general elections 52.     At the relevant time, section 6 of the Guardianship Act was worded as follows: Section 6 “(1) Persons subject to guardianship over their financial affairs under section 5 can be deprived of their legal capacity, if necessary, to prevent them from exposing their assets, income or other financial interests to the risk of a major loss, or to prevent financial exploitation. The deprivation of a person’s legal capacity cannot be restricted to particular assets or affairs. (2) A person deprived of his or her legal capacity is legally incompetent and does not have the right to enter into legal transactions or to manage his or her assets, unless otherwise provided. (3) Legal incapacitation orders must be registered (see section 48 of the Registration of Property Act).” 53.     Under section 8 of the Guardianship Act, a guardianship order must be granted on the basis of the principle of implementing the least intrusive measure. One implication is that a person cannot be deprived of his or her legal capacity under section 6