CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 30 mars 2021

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display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } FOURTH SECTION CASE OF RIBCHEVA AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA (Applications nos. 37801/16 and 2 others)   JUDGMENT   Art 2 (procedural) • Ineffective investigation into allegedly negligent planning and conduct of operation against dangerous individual, who killed officer while being arrested • Obligation to investigate negligence or omissions on officials’ part arising also in relation to police officers killed by private persons while performing their duties Art 2 (substantive) • Scope and content of State’s positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect its own law-enforcement personnel against risks to their life • Authorities’ precautions reasonable, despite some mistakes in the planning and conduct of law-enforcement operation • Authorities afforded margin of appreciation and not to be subjected to impossible or disproportionate burden in this context • Requirement to ensure proper training and preparation of officers taking part in dangerous operations   STRASBOURG 30 March 2021 FINAL   30/06/2021   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ribcheva and Others v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Tim Eicke, President ,   Yonko Grozev,   Faris Vehabović,   Iulia Antoanella Motoc,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar , Having regard to: the three applications (nos. 37801/16, 39549/16 and 40658/16) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Bulgarian nationals, Ms Vanya Petkova Ribcheva, Ms Milena Georgieva Ivanova-Sharkova and Ms Teodora Emilova Sharkova (“the applicants”), on 1 July 2016; the decision to give the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) notice of the complaints concerning (a) the alleged failure of the authorities to prevent the death of Mr Emil Sharkov (who was, respectively, son, husband and father of the applicants); (b) the effectiveness of the investigation of any negligence by the authorities in relation to that death; and (c) the alleged lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of those matters, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the parties’ submissions and additional submissions; Having deliberated in private on 11 March 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the questions whether the authorities were required by Article 2 of the Convention, and if so, in what form, to investigate whether they were responsible for not doing enough to protect the life of a police officer killed in the course of an operation by the person that he was trying to arrest. The case also concerns the question whether the authorities had an operational duty under the same provision to protect that officer’s life and, if so, the scope and content of that duty. THE FACTS 2.     The three applicants were born in 1949, 1975 and 1999 respectively and live in Sofia. They were represented by Ms T. Petkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agents, Ms M. Kotseva, Ms A. Panova and Ms B. Simeonova, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as emerging on the basis of the materials submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. OPERATION ON 14 MARCH 2014 5.     The three applicants are the mother, widow and daughter of Mr Emil Sharkov, who was born in 1974 and had been an officer of the anti-terrorist squad of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1999. During an operation by the squad on 14 March 2014 in the town of Lyaskovets, Mr Sharkov was shot and killed by a Mr P.P. The purpose of that operation had been to arrest Mr P.P. and seize firearms that he had continued to keep even though his permits to do so had expired. Events leading to the operation 6.     Mr P.P., born in 1961, lived with his mother in a flat on the ground floor of a three-storey house in Lyaskovets. He stopped working in 2005. 7 .     In 2002 he passed an examination and was granted a licence to hunt, becoming a member of a local hunting club. His club membership and hunting licence expired in 2011 because he stopped paying the requisite fees. He did no hunting throughout the whole of the period of his membership. 8 .     In 2003 Mr P.P. applied for permission to acquire two hunting firearms. The head of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police rejected the application, apparently because he found that Mr P.P. was conflict-prone and had made threats against his neighbours. In February 2006 Mr P.P. renewed his application, and this time it was allowed. He then bought a smooth-bore semi-automatic shotgun and a hunting rifle. The authorities checked the place where he intended to keep the firearms and in June 2006 gave him a permit, valid for three years, to keep and carry them. In April 2009 Mr P.P. applied for and was granted permission to acquire another smooth-bore firearm for hunting, and bought a double-barrelled shotgun. In June 2009 his permit to keep and carry firearms for hunting was renewed for another three years. In 2010 he applied for and was granted permission to acquire one more hunting firearm, and bought another hunting rifle. 9 .     In early 2012 officers from the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force tried several times to check the conditions in which Mr P.P. kept his firearms, but he refused them entry to his flat. A neighbour told the officers that Mr P.P. and his mother never left the flat and just sat inside, watching passers-by through the windows. The police informed the Gorna Oryahovitsa district prosecutor’s office of Mr P.P.’s refusal to admit them, and of his reclusive behaviour. Shortly after that the prosecutor’s office applied to the Gorna Oryahovitsa District Court for an order to commit Mr P.P. to a psychiatric hospital. The case was adjourned twice because Mr P.P. could not be summoned, and the judge eventually ordered the police to bring him to the court by force. After several rounds of planning, the latest of which involved the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ anti-terrorist squad and the Ministry’s psychology institute, in March 2012 the police came to the view that any attempt to arrest Mr P.P. would be too risky, and decided not to go ahead with the operation, but to check whether he could be made to go out of his flat through a tactic not involving the use of force. In view of the inability to ensure Mr P.P.’s presence in court, the committal proceedings were discontinued about a year later, in March 2013. 10 .     Meanwhile, in June 2012 Mr P.P. did not seek a renewal of the permits to keep and carry firearms, and they expired. In July 2012 an officer from the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force tried to contact him about that, but Mr   P.P. remained inside his flat, refusing all communication with the officer. In July 2013 Mr P.P.’s neighbours complained to the police that he had threatened to kill them. This led to further attempts by the police to contact him and to seize his four firearms, to no avail. In October 2013 the Gorna Oryahovitsa district prosecutor’s office opened criminal proceedings against Mr P.P. on suspicion that he had unlawfully possessed firearms since June 2012. The prosecutor’s office ordered the police to seize his firearms, but the order could not be carried out as Mr P.P. refused to leave his flat and was armed and dangerous. Enquiries showed that he had not gone out of the flat since 2010 or 2011. 11 .     In January 2014 Mr P.P. wrote to the Gorna Oryahovitsa district prosecutor’s office, complaining about his neighbours and of harassment by the police, and threatening that if that conduct did not stop, events would unfold worse than those in 2003, when a man had barricaded himself inside his house, shot at police officers who had tried to arrest him, and been killed following a siege by the police and the anti-terrorist squad (for more details about that police operation, see Dimov and Others v. Bulgaria , no.   30086/05, §§ 8-29, 6 November 2012). Between November 2013 and February 2014 Mr P.P. also wrote six letters to the headmaster of a school adjacent to his house, complaining about the pupils’ conduct and making threats against them. Towards the end of February 2014, he telephoned the local police station and complained in an agitated manner about pupils who were making noise and throwing bottles and stones near his house. He threatened that he would go out in the street with a firearm and then “no one would pass by”. 12 .     On 12 March 2014, after receiving a fresh threatening letter from Mr   P.P., the school’s headmaster restricted pupils’ access to the parts of the school and schoolyard which lay close to Mr P.P.’s house and informed the police. On 13 March 2014 a police patrol was posted to prevent pupils from going close to Mr P.P.’s house. The operation itself Planning and preparation 13 .     In the meantime, in February 2014 the Gorna Oryahovitsa and Veliko Tarnovo police forces had started planning an operation to seize Mr   P.P.’s firearms. Since that was thought likely to prompt a violent reaction from him, entailing a risk to the lives of any officers involved, Mr   P.P.’s mother and Mr P.P. himself, the police sought the help of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ anti-terrorist squad and the Ministry’s psychology institute. The Ministry’s Secretary General approved the request in late February, and on 28 February members of the anti-terrorist squad and the psychology institute met in Sofia to plan the operation. They discussed various ways of conducting the planned operation without coming to a definite conclusion. According to a memorandum not drawn up until 14   March 2014, the day of the operation, on the instructions of the psychology institute’s head, the psychologists said that in view of Mr P.P.’s personality, any attempts to contact him in advance or negotiate with him would be counterproductive, and that it would be best to act swiftly and by surprise. They confirmed this in a working document they drew up a few days after the meeting, on 4 March. A second meeting took place on 7   March, this time without the participation of the psychologists, but with the participation of police officers from Veliko Tarnovo and Lyaskovets. Those officers showed their Sofia colleagues photographs and plans of the house. The idea was mooted to make a video-recording of the building, so as to detect any reinforcement of the windows which could impede entry, but no final decision on that was taken. The tactical options envisaged during the meeting were either a quick attack to overawe Mr P.P. before he could barricade himself or flee or, failing that, a siege. No specific date was set for the operation. 14 .     In the meantime, between 28 February and 7 March 2014 the anti-terrorist squad carried out exercises to prepare for the operation. 15 .     The threats which Mr P.P. had made on 12 March 2014 against the pupils from the nearby school (see paragraph 12 above) spurred the authorities into action. The next day, 13 March, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs enquired whether the anti-terrorist squad’s preparations were sufficiently advanced to carry out the operation the following day, and received a positive answer. In the afternoon the national police and the anti-terrorist squad drew up a plan for the operation. It was approved by the Ministry’s Secretary General, who also issued an order for the operation to proceed, putting the commander of the anti-terrorist squad and the head of the Ministry’s criminal police directorate jointly in charge of it. Meanwhile, the Gorna Oryahovitsa district prosecutor’s office obtained a judicial warrant to search Mr P.P.’s flat. 16 .     Later that day, the anti-terrorist squad drew up a more detailed plan for the operation, which was fixed for 6 a.m. the following morning. The two envisaged tactical options were, again, either a quick attack with an attempt to storm Mr P.P.’s flat using special devices and stun grenades, or, failing that, a siege. The squad officers due to take part in the operation – including about thirty officers, excluding the sniper team – participated in a briefing held at 6 p.m. in Sofia, at which each of them was assigned a specific task. Decisions were also made about the firearms and equipment which would be needed. It was also decided that two psychologists from the Ministry’s psychology institute would be dispatched to Lyaskovets to assist in the operation if necessary. The sniper team were briefed at 6.30 p.m. 17 .     In the meantime, in the afternoon of 13 March two plain-clothes officers from the Veliko Tarnovo police force were sent by their superior to make a video-recording of Mr P.P.’s flat. They filmed the house from a distance and then gave the camera to a uniformed officer whom they met nearby, and he filmed the flat’s entrance from up-close. It appears that the officers were spotted by Mr P.P. Once back at the police station, they sent the recording to the anti-terrorist squad, but it found that its quality was too poor to be of any help. 18 .     A second briefing of the squad was held in Sofia at 1   a.m. on 14   March. Final decisions were made about each officer’s task and how to coordinate the different teams. The two psychologists were not given any specific tasks. The officers were shown photographs and plans of Mr P.P.’s flat. 19 .     A final briefing was held at 4.30 a.m. on 14 March in Veliko Tarnovo. The anti-terrorist squad discussed the operation with the Veliko Tarnovo and Gorna Oryahovitsa police forces, as well as with prosecutors from the Veliko Tarnovo and the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor’s offices and the investigator in charge of the criminal case against Mr P.P. The local police were entrusted with securing the outside perimeter and with ensuring the presence of emergency medical and firefighting teams. After the briefing, the members of the anti-terrorist squad assigned to carry out the operation and the two psychologists drove from Sofia to Veliko Tarnovo, where they held another briefing with the local police and prosecuting authorities, and then to Lyaskovets. Execution 20 .     The members of the anti-terrorist squad and the two psychologists arrived in Lyaskovets at about 5.30 a.m. or 5.45 a.m. on 14 March, parking their vehicles a few hundred metres from Mr P.P.’s house. The two   psychologists remained near the vehicles. The assault party, which comprised only squad members, checked their equipment and approached the house, accompanied by officers from the Veliko Tarnovo and Lyaskovets police forces. The squad’s commander, another officer in charge of tactics and a liaison officer remained about twenty metres from the house as the five assault teams approached it. The first team, consisting of eight officers, equipped with a heavy ballistic shield and a hydraulic door breacher, entered the staircase corridor and stood in front of the flat’s entrance door. The second and third teams, consisting of, respectively, six   and five officers, positioned themselves around two balconies, and some of the officers climbed onto the balconies. Mr Sharkov was the second team’s leader. Two smaller teams, consisting of two officers each, stood in front of the flat’s windows. It is unclear what kind of firearms they had with them. The four-member sniper team were positioned a bit further afield, on all sides of the house. 21.     The assault began at about 6 a.m. The two smaller teams fired blanks to distract Mr P.P., while the team at the flat’s front door tried to force it open with a door breacher. They were unsuccessful, as it had been reinforced from the inside. The commander then ordered the assault party to regroup, and only three officers remained in front of the flat’s front door, while the remaining officers went to the first balcony to assist the second team. 22 .     While the first team was continuing to try to break the front door, an officer from the second team (the one standing around the first balcony) climbed up, shouted “Police!”, and tried to open the balcony door, which had been blocked from the inside with a ladder. He forced it open and two   other officers entered the flat’s dining room. It was dark and empty. The officers saw Mr P.P. and his mother move from the adjoining room, which was lit by an electric bulb, into a corridor. Mr P.P. was carrying a long ‑ barrelled firearm. The officers shouted “Stop, police! Drop the weapon!” but Mr P.P. did not stop and opened fire. One of the officers was hit in the left arm. He took cover and returned fire. Mr P.P. kept on shooting, and the two officers retreated to the balcony. The other officer was hit in his bullet-proof vest. They were able to move out and the wounded officer was sent for medical treatment. The three remaining members of the team, including Mr Sharkov, remained on the balcony. 23 .     Meanwhile, one of the five officers from the third team (located near the second balcony) climbed up and broke open the balcony door, which had been blocked with a big box containing a television set. Three other officers from the same team then entered through the balcony in one of the flat’s bedrooms. The three officers made a visual sweep of the bedroom, and then one of them stepped into a corridor, holding his firearm extended in front of him. Mr P.P. shot him in the right arm, just above the wrist. The officer dropped his firearm and tried to throw a stun grenade towards Mr   P.P. One of the other two officers, who were still inside the bedroom, helped him withdraw. After returning to the bedroom, the officer who had been shot started to put a dressing on his arm, while the two others, as well as the team leader, who had meanwhile also entered the bedroom through the balcony, fired at Mr P.P. and shouted at him to surrender. Mr   P.P. fired back at them from the corridor. The wounded officer was able to move back to the second balcony and was also sent for medical treatment. 24 .     After finding out that two officers had been wounded, the squad’s commander ordered a partial disengagement, and the other officers took position on the two balconies, hiding behind the corners of walls and their ballistic shields. They continued exchanging shots with Mr P.P. 25 .     Mr Sharkov was among the officers positioned around the first balcony (the second team). When he learned that two officers had been wounded, he asked another officer to pass him a heavy ballistic shield, and one was fetched for him. He and two other officers knelt behind the shield, while Mr P.P. shot at them from inside the flat. Two of his shots hit the shield. One of the other officers returned fire. During a short lull Mr   Sharkov and the other officer switched places. Throughout that time they shouted at Mr P.P. to come out and surrender. Mr P.P. said that he would, and the officers assured him that they would not shoot at him if he did. At that point Mr Sharkov raised his head above the shield. Mr P.P. opened fire and shot him above the left eyebrow, just under his helmet. Mr   Sharkov fell back on the balcony and his helmet twisted to one side, covering the entry wound. Two officers fired at Mr P.P. to enable the others to move Mr Sharkov’s body. An officer tried to find a pulse or a pupillary reflex, but there was none. Mr Sharkov’s body was then stripped of its protective gear, put in an ambulance, and driven to a hospital in Veliko Tarnovo. The subsequent autopsy showed that the entry wound was just above the left eyebrow, 3   cm from the end, and that the exit wound, which measured 6   cm by 4   cm, was 4   cm behind the left ear. The medical experts said that the shot had caused immediate brain death and that the ensuing terminal state had lasted another ten to fifteen minutes. It would not have been possible to resuscitate Mr   Sharkov even if he had had immediate specialist medical care. 26 .     After the shooting, a police officer carrying a ballistic shield moved into the room from the second balcony to help two other officers withdraw onto the balcony. The three hid behind a shield, exchanging fire with Mr   P.P. One of them was hit in the right arm, which he had extended in front of the shield to be able to fire from a better position. 27 .     Mr P.P. then took position in a corridor, exchanging fire with the officers who had remained standing on the balconies and who had made no further attempt to enter the flat. The Ministry’s Secretary General, informed of the way in which the operation was unfolding, arrived from Sofia at about 8.30 a.m. and took charge of it. The squad also asked for backup with better equipment and firearms. 28 .     At about 10 a.m., after several telephone conversations with the police, Mr P.P.’s mother came out of the flat. She told the officers that Mr   P.P. was wounded, and that he had known that the authorities would come for him and had been waiting for them. Shortly after that, at about 10.25 a.m., Mr P.P. shouted from inside the flat that he was wounded and could not move, and asked for medical assistance. After some hesitation, at about 11 a.m. he crawled out of the flat onto the first balcony, at which point he was arrested and taken to a hospital. Specially equipped officers then searched the flat for explosive devices. 29 .     In the afternoon, the police again searched the flat, seizing, among other things, the four hunting firearms kept by Mr P.P., a revolver and a considerable amount of ammunition for each of those firearms, all spread at various locations around the flat. Further searches of the flat were made on 15   and 21 March and 9 April 2014. The ensuing criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 32 to 37 below) found that during the operation against him, Mr   P.P. had used two of his four firearms (the second hunting rifle and the smooth-bore semi-automatic shotgun – see paragraph 8 above) and had fired at least twenty-four shots against the officers; six of those had been direct hits. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS Parliamentary hearing 30 .     Five days after the operation, on 19 March 2014, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Domestic Security and Public Order questioned the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and the Ministry’s Secretary General about the operation. The Committee asked them about the planning for the operation and the tactic used by the anti-terrorist squad. The Secretary General accepted that the operation had been a failure, and blamed the two   Veliko Tarnovo police officers who had made the video ‑ recording of Mr   P.P.’s house the day before the operation (see paragraph 17 above). In the Secretary’s view, that had tipped Mr P.P. off about the impending operation and had enabled him to prepare for it, in effect laying an ambush for the anti-terrorist squad. Criminal proceedings against Mr P.P. 31 .     Mr P.P. was promptly charged with murdering Mr Sharkov and attempting to murder the five other officers of the anti-terrorist squad whom he had wounded, and with unlawfully possessing firearms. In December 2014 he was indicted. 32 .     His trial took place over several days in 2015. The Veliko Tarnovo Regional Court heard a number of witnesses and admitted a considerable number of expert reports. The applicants took part as private prosecutors alongside the public prosecutor, and also as civil claimants. 33 .     On 19 November 2015 the Veliko Tarnovo Regional Court found Mr   P.P. guilty of aggravated murder and attempted murder, both characterised by premeditation, and the unlawful possession of firearms. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay each of the three applicants 100,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (51,129 euros (EUR)), plus interest, in non-pecuniary damages. The court also made awards of damages in favour of Mr Sharkov’s father and of one of the wounded officers. 34 .     In the reasons for its judgment, which ran to 107 pages, the court set out all developments relating to Mr P.P.: his firearms permits and purchases, his bizarre and aggressive conduct after 2010, and his interactions with the authorities after 2012, including the unsuccessful attempts to seize his firearms and commit him to a psychiatric hospital. The court also described in detail the preparation and execution of the operation against Mr P.P. It further analysed, apparently in response to arguments raised by counsel for Mr P.P., the reasons why the operation had been rendered necessary. Having analysed the steps taken by the authorities with respect to Mr P.P. and his conduct, the court concluded that the decision to deploy the anti-terrorist squad had been lawful and fully justified. However, it went on to note that the authorities’ choice of the most appropriate method of dealing with Mr P.P. could not be reviewed by it, since that matter was not part of the criminal case against Mr P.P. The court nevertheless observed that in the circumstances the use of firearms against Mr P.P. had been justified, in particular because he had fired first. 35 .     The court further noted that Mr P.P. had fired on Mr Sharkov during a lull and following a brief dialogue with the officers. On that basis, it found that Mr P.P. had intended to kill Mr Sharkov rather than just fire at random during a heated exchange of shots with the police. Based on the meticulous manner in which Mr P.P. had fortified all entrances and windows of his flat and had readied his firearms, the court found that he had acted with premeditation. The court went on to discard the suggestion that Mr P.P. had acted in self-defence, on the basis of a misunderstanding about the nature of the operation against him, or out of confusion. Having analysed in detail the sequence of events and the exact positions of all officers present at the scene, the court further ruled out the possibility that the shot which had killed Mr Sharkov had been fired by another officer rather than Mr P.P. The court also found that the main reason why no other officer had suffered life-threatening injuries was that Mr P.P.’s shots against them had been stopped or blunted by their protective equipment (see прис. № 111 от   19.11.2015 г. по н. о. х. д. № 462/2014 г., ОС-Велико Търново). 36 .     Both Mr P.P. and the prosecution appealed. On 8 February 2017 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment, fully agreeing with its findings. It likewise held that the decision to deploy the anti-terrorist squad had been wholly justified, in particular since Mr P.P. had been in possession of four firearms with expired permits and had been making credible threats towards others. However, the court said that the way in which the operation against Mr P.P. had been prepared and carried out – including the equipment used for it, the communication between the various teams and the commanders, and its timing – was a matter falling within the discretion of the police and was not amenable to review by the courts in the criminal case against Mr P.P., even though his counsel had made arguments in that regard and the lower court had touched on the point. The court concluded that the decision about which unit and how many officers had had to be deployed had been one for the Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The force used against Mr P.P. had been proportionate, and he could therefore not validly assert that he had acted in self-defence. That was especially true for his shot against Mr Sharkov, which he had fired when the officers had stopped their attack against Mr   P.P. in the expectation that he would surrender, as announced by him. Mr P.P. had used that brief lull to pinpoint Mr Sharkov’s position and shoot him in the only unprotected part of his body – his forehead (see реш. № 224 от 08.02.2017 г. по в. н. о. х. д. № 202/2016 г., АС-Велико Търново). 37 .     Mr P.P. appealed on points of law, but on 21 August 2017 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate judgment. It likewise found that the decision to deploy the anti-terrorist squad had been wholly justified. It went on to say that the squad’s attempt to storm into Mr P.P.’s flat in the manner chosen by them had been the only feasible option, since the element of surprise had already been lost. The force used against Mr   P.P. had been proportionate in view of the “critical situation” deliberately created by him (see реш. № 112 от 21.08.2017 г. по н.   д.   №   402/2017 г., ВКС, III н. о.). First internal investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs The investigation 38 .     On the day of the operation, 14 March 2014, the Minister of Internal Affairs ordered an internal investigation by the Ministry’s inspectorate. It was conducted by two inspectors, who were assisted by an officer from the arms-control and licensing division of the National Police. They interviewed and obtained written statements from a number of officials and civilians involved in the operation and the events leading up to it, including twenty-three officers of the anti-terrorist squad who had taken part in the operation (all of whom were guaranteed anonymity), and various other materials. The investigation report 39 .     The investigation report, which became ready three weeks later, on 4   April 2104, and ran to thirty-two pages, covered four points: (a)   Mr   P.P.’s firearms permits; (b) the aborted operation against him in March 2012 (see paragraph 10 above); (c) the actions of the police with respect to Mr P.P. between March 2012 and the planning of the operation on 14 March 2014; and (d) the planning and execution of the operation on 14 March 2014. 40 .     In relation to point (a), the report noted that in 2006 and 2009 there had been no grounds to reject Mr P.P.’s applications for firearms permits. It found that in mid-2012 the police officer from the firearms-control unit of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force who had tried in vain to contact Mr P.P. with a view to persuading him to surrender his firearms after the expiry of the permits to keep them (see paragraph 10 above) had then failed to inform his superiors with a view to the information being passed to the prosecuting authorities. The officer had thus neglected his duties, and was to be reprimanded. That was, however, impossible, since in 2013 his employment with the police had ended. The report went on to say that the officer’s superior had failed to investigate the matter and relay the information that Mr P.P. was continuing to keep firearms in spite of the expiry of his permits to the prosecuting authorities, in breach of his duties. He likewise deserved to be warned in writing, but the statutory time-limit for doing so had already expired. But his failure had also amounted to the criminal offence of misconduct in public office (see paragraph 84 below). The report further found that the prosecuting authorities had first learned that Mr P.P. was continuing to keep firearms despite the expiry of his permits – which was a serious criminal offence – in October 2013, when investigating complaints by his neighbours about his making threats against them. The failure to inform those authorities of Mr P.P.’s continuing to keep firearms in spite of the expiry of his permits for about a year and a quarter was also the fault of the head of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force (who was also director ad interim of the Veliko Tarnovo regional police directorate). He thus deserved to be reprimanded for neglecting his general duty to oversee firearms in his area. 41 .     In relation to point (b), the report found that all steps relating to the aborted operation in March 2012 had been lawful. 42 .     In relation to point (c), the report found that for more than a year, between March 2012 and the planning of the operation on 14 March 2014, the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force had not made any serious efforts to get Mr P.P. to leave his flat or hand over his firearms. The only officer who had taken any initiatives in that regard had been the local constable. The heads of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force and of the Veliko Tarnovo criminal police branch had thus neglected their duties, and had to be reprimanded and temporarily barred from promotion. 43 .     Lastly, in relation to point (d), the report found that the decisions to hold the operation on 14 March 2014 and involve the anti-terrorist squad had been in line with the applicable regulations. So had been its planning and preparation. The report then set out in some detail the operation’s preparation and execution, and noted that there had been two elements which had not gone according to plan. The first had been the failure to break the front door of Mr P.P.’s flat. This failure had been caused by the absence of reconnaissance by the squad itself and to the lack of a properly equipped door breacher – since the one purchased for the squad had not come equipped with all the required accessories. The available door breacher had, however, been deemed fit for purpose. There had moreover been a fall-back option: to attempt entry through the flat’s balconies. For its part, the squad’s omission to do its own reconnaissance could reasonably be explained by the unavailability of properly trained officers, the risk of their being easily spotted in a small town like Lyaskovets, and the need to act urgently, within a day. The second aspect which had not gone to plan – and which had been the main reason for the operation’s failure – had been the lack of surprise: the fact that Mr P.P. had become aware that the operation would take place, which had enabled him to prepare to repel it. The report laid the blame for that on the two officers from Veliko Tarnovo police force who had video-recorded Mr P.P.’s flat the previous day (see paragraph 17 above). The report found that they and their immediate superior had acted on their own initiative and had then not brought to the attention of their superiors that Mr   P.P. had spotted them. The report therefore suggested that they be dismissed, noting that disciplinary proceedings had already been opened against all three. 44 .     The report went on to say that, according to the statements of the squad members, neither they nor their commanders had underestimated the situation. Planning and control had been adequate, without panic and a clear chain of command, even though that had been the first time in the squad’s history that it had had to face such heavy fire. The level of training for such operations had also been satisfactory. The officers had, however, told the inspectors that they did not have modern training simulators and suitable firing ranges, that their video-acquisition equipment was scant and with limited technical capabilities, that they lacked thermal-imaging and night-vision devices, that all of their breaking-in equipment (battering rams, pickaxes and ladders) had been hand-built by themselves, and that they did not have tactical dogs, which could be particularly useful for situations as the one at hand. The gas grenades available to the squad were chiefly suited for crowd control, and their stun grenades were ill-suited for special operations, especially operations involving children below six years of age and elderly people. Nearly all squad officers had also complained of their handgun holsters, which did not permit them to carry their handguns with the torchlights fitted. The report also pointed out that two of the assault teams had been given ballistic shields only during the course of the operation rather than from the outset. Lastly, the report noted that there were no regulations specifically governing special operations of the squad; the existing ones, dating from November 2012, only covered anti-terrorist operations, the defence of strategic installations, and the prevention and stopping of serious offences. The report accordingly recommended that the regulations governing the squad’s operations be updated to encompass special operations such as these, and that the need for additional equipment and firearms be considered. Classification and declassification of the investigation report and action taken on its basis 45 .     The inspectors’ report was immediately classified. After the proposals in it were approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs, full copies of the report were sent to the Ministry’s Secretary General and to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Domestic Security and Public Order; various excerpts were also sent to the Ministry’s human resources department and the heads of the units in which the officers proposed for disciplinary punishments worked, the head of the anti-terrorist squad, and the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor’s office (in connection with the proposal to open criminal proceedings for misconduct in public office – see paragraph 40 above). 46 .     In May 2014 the heads of the Gorna Oryahovitsa and Veliko Tarnovo police forces were temporarily barred from promotion, as recommended by the report (see paragraph 42 above). Both sought judicial review, and in March 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed their disciplinary punishments, finding that the disciplinary proceedings in the case of the Veliko Tarnovo police force had been tainted by irregularities and that the disciplinary offences charged against both officers had not been made out (see реш.   №   3287 от 25.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 7621/2014 г., ВАС, V о., and реш. № 3284 от 25.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 8879/2014 г., ВАС, V о.). 47 .     On 27 October 2014 the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor’s office refused to open criminal proceedings for misconduct in public office in connection with the failure to take action in relation to Mr P.P.’s firearms after July 2012 (see paragraph 40 above). It noted that, according to its inquiries, the officer alleged to have neglected his duties in that respect had not been duly tasked with doing anything in connection with that matter. 48 .     The inspectors’ report was declassified on 11 September 2019, a little over five months after the expiry of the applicable five-year statutory period during which it had to remain classified. Following an enquiry from this Court, dated 13 December 2019, whether the report was still classified, it was provided to the Court on 29 June 2020 following a further check by the State Agency for National Security that it had been proper to declassify it. Up until that date, the Government were categorically opposed to any disclosure of the report, or even excerpts from it, to the applicants. Before disclosure of the report to the Court, the Minister of Internal Affairs nevertheless decided that the identities of all officers of the anti-terrorist squad mentioned in the report should remain secret, in order to protect their safety, and ordered that all passages capable of identifying them be redacted from the copy sent to the Court. The redacted report was forwarded to the applicants on 2 July 2020. More than six years and three months after the report had been drawn up, this was the first time the applicants became aware of its content. Second internal investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs The investigation 49 .     On 23 September 2014, in response to separate complaints made by Mr Sharkov’s mother, Ms Ribcheva (the applicant in the first application), both to the prosecuting authorities (on 8 September – see paragraph 69 below) and to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Minister ordered a second internal investigation into the operation on 14 March 2014. The investigation was be carried out by two inspectors from the Ministry’s inspectorate, the head of the Ministry’s vice offences unit and a senior officer from its anti-abduction unit. They were assisted by an expert from the Ministry’s information technology division. The investigators interviewed and obtained written statements from a number of officials and civilians, including eighteen of the officers of the anti-terrorist squad who had taken part in the operation. It also gathered a significant amount of written evidence, and inspected Mr P.P.’s flat. The investigation report 50 .     The report of this investigation was completed a month and a half later, on 7 November 2014, and ran to thirty-eight pages. It exhaustively set out Ms Ribcheva’s allegations in relation to the operation (see paragraph 69 below), and then proceeded to examine whether each of those allegations had been confirmed by the evidence obtained during the investigation. It also described in detail both the planning and execution of the operation on 14   March 2014 and the events leading up to it. 51 .   &#xa0