CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 11 mai 2021

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BULGARIA (Applications nos. 18592/15 and 43863/15)     JUDGMENT   Art 14 (+ Art 8) • Discrimination • Sex • Family status • Discriminatory denial of surviving parent allowance to single mother of minor children of unknown father • Domestic legal provision based on an outdated and stereotypical understanding of families as necessarily having two legal parents • Applicant mother in a relevantly similar situation to surviving parents whose children were legally recognised by the deceased parent • Intimate information disclosure and/or undertaking of legal steps for paternal recognition an unjustified precondition for equal treatment • Children of unknown fathers objectively deprived of care and protection of one of their parents in the same way as children with one deceased parent • No evidence of fraudulent claim   STRASBOURG 11 May 2021   FINAL   11/08/2021   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Yocheva and Ganeva v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Tim Eicke, President,   Yonko Grozev,   Faris Vehabović,   Iulia Antoanella Motoc,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,   and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   18592/15 and 43863/15) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Bulgarian nationals, Ms Katerina Borislavova Yocheva (“the first applicant” or “the applicant”) and Katerina Nikolova Ganeva (“the second applicant”), on 15 April 2015 and 29 August 2015 respectively; the decision to give notice to the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) of the applications; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 16 March and 20 April 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the applicants’ complaints of discrimination against them as single mothers caring for their minor children whose fathers are unknown, based on the refusal of the authorities to grant the applicants payment of a family allowance provided to families in which children had only one living parent. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants were born in 1974 and 1966 respectively and live in Sofia. The first applicant was represented by Ms D. Marcheva, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The second applicant was represented by Mr P. Borisov, a lawyer practising in Pernik. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Stancheva ‑ Chinova, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. application no. 18592/15 5.     The first applicant is a single mother who lives with and cares for her two children, born in 2003 and 2006 respectively. Administrative proceedings for the payment of a family allowance 6 .     On 30 September 2013 the first applicant applied, under section 7(9) of the Family Allowances for Children Act 2002 (“the FACA”), for a family allowance for families of children who had only one living parent (see paragraph 37 below). 7 .     The Directorate for Social Family Allowances in Krasno Selo (“the Directorate”) refused to pay the allowance to the first applicant in an order issued on 14 October 2013. The reason given was that her situation did not fulfil the legal requirements set out in section 7(9) of the FACA; in particular, she had not submitted the documents required under section   17(3), points 13 and 14, of the Regulations for the implementation of the FACA (see paragraph 41 below). 8 .     The first applicant challenged the order before the higher administrative body, the Regional Agency for Social Assistance (“the Agency”), which upheld it on 4   December 2013. In particular, having established that the first applicant’s family consisted of her and her two children, the Agency found that she had not submitted any evidence to show that her children had been recognised by their father and that he had died. Likewise, she had not produced a certificate attesting that the children were their father’s statutory heirs (an “heirs certificate”) or a family-status certificate showing that she was not married. Judicial review proceedings regarding the payment of the family allowance 9.     The first applicant brought judicial review proceedings. 10.     She pointed out that she had submitted a certificate showing that the children’s father was unknown. As to an heirs certificate, it was objectively impossible for her to produce such a document, given that the children’s paternity had not been established. She further argued that the administration’s refusal to grant her the allowance in question was unlawful, as it was contrary to Article 6 § 2 of the Constitution, which prohibited discrimination on the basis, among other things, of origin (see paragraph 32 below). The legal definition of “children with only one living parent”, set out in paragraph   1, point 9, of the Additional Provisions of the FACA (see paragraph 40 below), could not exclude children who had not been recognised by their father. If the legislature had meant for section 7(9) of the FACA to apply only to children one of whose parents had died, they would have expressly said so by using the formulation “children with one deceased parent” instead of the current formulation “children with only one living parent”. 11.     The applicant referred to Article 16 of the revised European Social Charter (see paragraph 56 below), Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR” – see paragraph 61 below) and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the ICESCR” – see paragraph 62 below). First instance proceedings 12.     In a judgment of 14 March 2014, the Sofia City Administrative Court set aside the Directorate’s order and remitted the case to it to decide on the merits of the first applicant’s request in line with the reasoning in the court’s judgment. 13.     The City Court established that the first applicant’s family status corresponded to that of “unmarried individuals” and that she cared for her two minor children alone. The children’s birth certificates indicated their father as “unknown”. The court went on to observe that the law did not differentiate between children living in families as defined in paragraph 1 of the Additional Provisions of the FACA (see paragraph 39 below) and children in families where the parents were not married. It was unacceptable to place children whose parents were not married or did not live together, or whose fathers had not recognised them, in a less favourable position than that of children growing up in families that matched the legal definition above. Accordingly, a mother and her two children who have not been recognised by their father, the latter being unknown, represented a family within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision. Therefore, such children had only one living parent, given that the other one was unknown. 14 .     The City Court went on to find that the refusal by the administrative body to grant the allowance in question to the first applicant was contrary to Article 3 § 1 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in force in respect of Bulgaria since 1991 (see paragraph 60 below). The refusal was not in the best interest of the children, and that interest had to be the central consideration in the decision-making process of any institution, be it a private or a public one. Accordingly, if the legislation stated that the State provided assistance to the children of a parent whose husband or wife had died, it was reasonable to conclude that this also applied to children with only one parent, irrespective of whether the other parent had died or the children had not been recognised by their father. 15.     The court further held that depriving families in which one of the parents was unknown, or had not recognised the children, of the allowance in question would result in discrimination on the basis of social status vis ‑ à ‑ vis the parent who was alive. The law had envisaged that the allowance was due to families with children who had only one living parent, irrespective of the income of the family. Consequently, the granting of that family allowance had to be extended to all children who were being raised by only one parent. As a result of the absence of their second parent by virtue of being unknown, those children were in an identical situation to children one of whose parents had died. 16.     Indeed, a father was not obliged to recognise a child if he did not want to do so; a mother did not dispose of any legal mechanism to compel the father to recognise the child of his own motion, or to marry her. In both cases, children living in families with only one parent had the same needs and, in both cases, the State had a corresponding responsibility to ensure acceptable conditions for their care. The family allowance due to families under section 7(9) of the FACA (see paragraph 37 below) was determined precisely in view of the needs of children living in such families. The fact that the first applicant was a single mother could not be interpreted to the detriment of her children and be used in order to refuse to grant the family the above-mentioned allowance. Accordingly, the authorities were obliged to grant her the allowance towards providing care for her children as their only living parent. Last instance proceedings 17.     Upon an appeal by the Directorate, on 22 October 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court (“the SAC”), in a final judgment, quashed the lower court’s judgment and rejected the first applicant’s challenge to the Directorate’s order of 14 October 2013 (see paragraph 7 above). 18.     The SAC held that while the lower court had correctly established the facts, it had wrongly applied the law. In particular, in order to be eligible for the family allowance provided for by section 7(9) of the FACA, it was necessary to produce an heirs certificate and a family-status certificate, in accordance with the requirement under s ection 17(3), points 13 and 14, of the Regulations for the implementation of the FACA (see paragraph 41 below). The central consideration was, therefore, whether the case concerned a parent who had survived the death of his or her spouse and parent of his or her children. The common children of the deceased and surviving parents had to be the legal heirs of the former. That was the reason for the requirement to submit a certificate attesting to this with the request for the family allowance. Likewise, there was a requirement that the parent making the request had to be single at the time of the request. 19.     Consequently, the lower court had wrongly concluded that the key element was whether the first applicant as a single mother and her children represented a family. Instead, the crux of the matter was whether there was a surviving parent who had not remarried. The outstanding question therefore was whether the legal provision at stake applied only to situations of semi-orphaned children, or also to situations of children whose fathers had not recognised them. In order to establish the meaning of that provision, namely whether children who had not been recognised have equal rights with semi-orphaned children, it was necessary to look at the intentions of the legislature. 20.     In particular, paragraph 2 of the bill of 13 March 2012 for amending the FACA stated that the reason for introducing section 7(9) of the FACA was to improve the protection available to the most vulnerable group of children, namely those who were being brought up by only one living parent. The logic was that the optimal environment for every child was a family, as well as that there were more difficulties associated with caring for a child one of whose parents had died. Therefore, it could be concluded that, by making this family allowance available irrespective of the income of the family, the legislature had envisaged that it applied only in respect of families in which one of the parents had died. 21.     That had also been the conclusion of the Constitutional Court (“the CC”) in its decision no. 3 of 27 June 2013 in which it had rejected the request by the Ombudsperson to declare unconstitutional section 7(9) of the FACA in so far as it used the word “living” (see paragraphs 43-43 below). Specifically, the CC had found that the loss of a parent was the single most important factor affecting any given family environment. Thus, children most acutely affected by the loss of a parent were, in the first place, those whose parents had both died and, in the second place, those one of whose parents had died. The idea behind the law was that there was a significant difference between a child who is cared for by a surviving parent and a child who is cared for by a parent who has not married. In the latter case, the child had the right to bring an action to establish paternity. As a result of such an action, the child would become part of another family , with all the personal and economic consequences that would bring. This in turn was in the best interest of the child as it was of crucial importance for the establishment of his or her legal status. 22.     The CC had rightly determined that the situation of a child one of whose parents has died was not identical to that of a child who was cared for by a single parent for a different reason. The introduction of a different regime of protection in respect of these two categories was justified in order to ensure equal protection to children cared for by only one living parent. 23.     This led to the conclusion that a broad interpretation of section 7(9) of the FACA was contrary to the purpose of the law. Were the provision to be interpreted broadly, this would result in a much larger group of rather dissimilar cases which would have to be treated equally, in breach of the principle of equality before the law. That in itself would be unjust. 24.     The City Court had wrongly held that refusing to pay the family allowance to the first applicant was in breach of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 14 above). The provision in question provided that States were obliged to ensure that children benefited from the care and protection necessary for their well-being, taking into account the rights and obligations of their own parents or other caregivers, including by means of all necessary administrative and legal measures. It was precisely to provide for the best interests of the child that the legislature had introduced section 7(9) of the FACA, given that it provided the requisite care for children one of whose parents had died. Statistical data provided by the Government 25 .     According to information provided by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, a State agency, the number of children with unknown fathers born in the country between 2007 and 2015 was on average 12,400   per year. 26 .     As of February 2017, according to information provided by the State Agency for Social Assistance, the State was paying allowances under the FACA to the families of a total of 640,952 children, while the specific allowance under section   7(9) of the FACA was being paid to the families of 10,570 children with one deceased parent. application no. 43863/15 27.     The second applicant is a single mother who lives with and cares for her minor son born in 2007. 28.     She complained to the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination (“the Commission”) about her family being discriminated against as a result of her inability to obtain the allowance provided for by section 7(9) of the FACA because the father of her children was unknown as opposed to deceased. On 13 June 2014 the Commission found that section 7(9) of the FACA provided for less favourable treatment of families of children with only one parent in comparison with families in which one of the parents had died. That, the Commission ruled, was direct discrimination on the basis of “personal status”, “origin” and “family status”. 29.     The Council of Ministers brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. The second applicant participated in the proceedings as an interested party and submitted a reply to the position of the Council of Ministers. 30 .     In a judgment of 17 December 2014, the Sofia City Administrative Court overturned the Commission’s decision. The judgment indicated that it could be appealed against within fourteen days from the parties being notified of it (see paragraph 55 below). The second applicant was notified of it on 22 December 2014. She did not appeal against the judgment and neither did the Commission. The judgment thus became final on 20 January 2015. 31 .     On 21 April 2015 the second applicant enquired with the Commission about developments in the case and was told orally by a staff member that the Commission had not appealed against the judgment. On 1   July 2015 she wrote to the Commission repeating her request, but received no reply. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant domestic law and practice The Constitution 32 .     Article 6 § 2 provides that all citizens are equal before the law, where the term “citizens” refers to all individuals to whom the Constitution applies. There are to be no privileges or restriction of rights on the grounds of race, national or social origin, ethnic self-identity, sex, religion, education, opinion, political affiliation, personal or social status or property status. 33.     Article 14 provides that the family, motherhood, and childhood enjoy the protection of the State and society. 34.     Article 32 § 1 provides that the privacy of citizens is inviolable. Everyone is entitled to protection against any unlawful interference in his or her private or family affairs and against encroachments on his or her honour, dignity and reputation. 35 .     Article 47 provides that the rearing and upbringing of children until the attainment of majority constitutes a right and an obligation for the parents and that the State is to provide assistance to them. Mothers enjoy special protection from the State, which guarantees them paid leave before and after birth, free obstetrical care, easier conditions of work, and other types of social assistance. Under the same provision, children born out of wedlock enjoy equal rights with those born in wedlock. Children left without the care of the immediate family enjoy the special protection of the State and society. The FACA 36 .     Section 7(1) of the FACA, which was added to the FACA and came into force on 1   January 2013, stipulates that a monthly family allowance for a child who has not finished secondary education, but is no older than 20, is provided to low-income families whose children meet all of the following conditions: (a) they are not cared for full-time in a State institution; (b) they regularly attend school, unless this is impossible due to health reasons; and (c) they live on the territory of Bulgaria on a permanent basis. 37 .     Under section   7(9) of the FACA, in cases where the family comprises children with only one living parent, the family’s income is not taken into account as a condition for receiving this monthly allowance. 38 .     Section 7(2) of the FACA provides that the monthly family allowance described in section 7(1) is payable, irrespective of the family’s income, also to relatives or foster families who care for children. Under section 8d of the FACA, the monthly allowance is payable also to families with children with permanent disabilities, irrespective of the family’s income. 39 .     Under paragraph 1, point 1, of the Additional Provisions of the FACA, as worded at the relevant time, a family comprised spouses or unmarried parents who lived in the same household or single parents and minor children, as well as children over 18 years of age, but no older than 20, who were still in secondary education. “Children” included those who had been born into the family, those who had been recognised by their parents, those who had been adopted, and stepchildren, but did not include children who had married. 40 .     Under paragraph 1, point 9, of the Additional Provisions of the FACA, which was first introduced in 2012, “a child with only one living parent” is a minor, or under 20 years of age and in secondary education, one of whose parents (including adoptive parents) has died and who is being cared for by the other parent (including an adoptive parent), on condition that the latter has not remarried. 41 .     Section 17(3), points 13 and 14, of the Regulations for the implementation of the FACA provided at the material time that monthly allowances for families with children in secondary school who were no older than 20 and who had only one living parent, were payable upon submission of a request ( молба-декларация ) to that effect, to which had to be attached an heirs certificate and a family-status certificate. 42 .     Under section 17(3), point 1, monthly allowances for children living in low-income families were paid upon submission of a certificate showing the family’s income during the previous twelve months. The 2013 Constitutional Court’s decision 43 .     In its decision no. 3 of 27 June 2013, the CC rejected the Ombudsperson’s request to declare section 7(9) of the FACA (see paragraph   37 above) unconstitutional in so far as it used the word “living”. The Ombudsperson had submitted that when the legislature had introduced a privilege for a certain group of people, namely children with only one living parent, by eliminating family income as a criterion for eligibility for a family allowance, that privilege had to cover all children who had only one parent, as they were in an identical position to those in the first group. The CC acknowledged that in a State governed by the rule of law the legislature was required to treat similar cases alike and different cases differently. That was the only way to guarantee equality before the law and justice in society. That said, the existence of significant differences required the legislature to intervene and differentiate the applicable rules in order to achieve equal protection. 44 .     The CC went on to note that Article 14 of the Constitution provided that the family enjoyed the protection of the State and Article 47 §   1 of the Constitution required the State to assist parents in the upbringing of their children (see paragraph 35 above). It was beyond doubt that children who only had one living parent were a vulnerable category in need of protection by the State. The question was whether the legislature had breached the principle of equality before the law by introducing a privilege for only one sub-group of parents who were the sole caregivers to their children. 45.     The CC found that there were significant differences within the larger group of single-parent families referred to by the Ombudsperson. Families in which one parent cared for the children following the death of the other parent could hardly be considered identical to families in which the children were being brought up by one parent following the divorce of the parents and the granting of custody rights to one of them. In particular, while divorce put an end to the marriage of the parents, the child continued to have two parents. As a result, the environment in which that child was being reared differed significantly from the environment of a semi-orphaned child. In the former case the child was bound to receive care by both parents, as custody could be modified and, in any event, both parents were responsible for participating in the child’s upbringing. 46 .     Similarly, there was a significant difference between the situation of a child being reared by his or her surviving parent and a child being reared by a parent who was not married and caring for the child alone. In the latter case, it was possible for the child’s legal representative to bring an action in the name of the child for establishing the child’s legal ties to the other parent. As a result of such an action, the child would become part of another family, with all the personal and economic consequences that would bring. This in turn was in the best interest of the child as it was of crucial importance for the establishment of his or her legal status. 47 .     This was also the purpose behind Article 47 of the Constitution, namely the objective for every child to have his or her origin determined in relation to both parents as an important premise for defining the environment for the child’s care and upbringing. Similarly, Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulated that every child had the right to know his or her parents. A parent’s death automatically terminated the relationship between that parent and the child and undeniably affected his or her emotional and psychological state. Both the family and the child underwent a drastic change as a result of circumstances beyond their control and, in such situations, the State stepped in in order to provide assistance towards the care of the semi-orphan child. The introduction of a different regime of social protection in respect of these two categories was justified in order to ensure equal protection to children cared for by only one living parent. 48.     At their very origin, allowances for families with children were intended for families affected by factors over which they had no control, yet which had permanent negative effects on the psychological state of the family members. It was impossible to treat similarly different members of a very broad group without accounting for the reasons for which children were being reared by a single parent. If the word “living” were to be eliminated from the legal provision in question, this would lead to an unjust result, given that the same legal regime would apply to a diverse group of cases. That in turn would mean treating similarly different cases which would lead to a breach of the principle of equality before the law. 49.     The purpose of the privilege introduced by section 7(9) of the FACA was to differentiate a specific subset of cases from the broader group within which it fell. Extending the privilege to the broader constituents of the group would lead to the two constituent groups swapping places. If the privilege were to be applied to the whole broad group of cases of single ‑ parent families, this would lead to the opposite of the intended outcome, namely to a limitation of the rights of the people in the specific subset of cases. 50.     The reasons at the origin of the privilege introduced by the FACA fell outside of the characteristics, exhaustively enumerated in the Constitution, on the basis of which it was unacceptable to limit rights or grant privileges. There was no obstacle for the legislature to introduce additional characteristics, on the basis of which certain groups of people would benefit from a privilege, as long as it did not lead to a breach of the requirement in Article 6 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 above). In other words, privileges could not be discriminatory. This in turn meant that the difference in treatment provided in this particular case was justified by the differences observed within the broader group of single-parent families. 51 .     Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provided that States were obliged to ensure that children in a family benefited from the care and protection necessary for their well-being, taking into account the rights and obligations of their own parents or other caregivers, including by means of all necessary administrative and legal measures.   It was precisely to provide for the best interests of the child that the legislature had introduced section   7(9) of the FACA, given that it provided the requisite care for children one of whose parents had died. The Regulations for the implementation of the Social Assistance Act 52.     Paragraph 1, point 3, of the Additional Provisions of the Regulations for the implementation of the Social Assistance Act provides that a “single parent” is a person who, as a result of widowhood, divorce or lack of civil marriage, has the sole care of children younger than 18, or up to 20 years of age if they are still enrolled in secondary education. The Family Code Acknowledging paternity of a child 53 .     Under Article 65 § 1 of the Family Code, a father can acknowledge paternity of a child by means of a declaration made in writing and in person before a civil-status officer, or a declaration certified by a notary and deposited with the civil-status officer. Action for establishing paternity 54 .     Under Article 69 of the Family Code, an action for establishing paternity can be brought in court against the father by the child’s mother within three years of the birth and by the child himself or herself no later than three years after reaching majority. Under Article 129 of the Family Code, any parent can represent his or her minor child. In an interpretative ruling (no. 5/78 of 21 February 1979), the Plenary of the then Supreme Court clarified that, under the law (the provision in force at the time was identical to Article 69 of the Family Code currently in force), a child could bring a claim for the establishment of paternity even before he or she reached majority. This could be done by the child’s mother, acting as the legal representative of the child and exercising the child’s right to bring such a claim. The Protection Against Discrimination Act 55 .     Under section 68 of the Act, the decisions of the Commissions for the Protection against Discrimination are subject to judicial review within fourteen days of the interested parties being notified of them. Relevant international material European Social Charter (Revised) 56 .     Article 16 of the revised European Social Charter (“the Charter”), in force in respect of Bulgaria since 1 August 2000, reads as follows: The right of the family to social, legal and economic protection “With a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for the full development of the family, which is a fundamental unit of society, the Parties undertake to promote the economic, legal and social protection of family life by such means as social and family allowances, fiscal arrangements, provision of family housing, family allowances for the newly married and other appropriate means.” 57.     According to the interpretation given by the European Committee of Social Rights to the provisions of the Charter, compiled in its Digest   of   2018, the protection afforded in Article 16 of the Charter covers single-parent families. The scope of Article 16 is, in any case, not restricted to families based on marriage. States Parties enjoy discretion to choose the means in their endeavour to ensure the social, legal and economic protection of the various types of families that can be found in the population. States   Parties are required to ensure the protection of vulnerable families, single-parent families and Roma families, in accordance with the principle of equality of treatment. 58.     Article E of the Charter provides as follows: Non-discrimination “The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.” 59.     In its decision on a collective complaint (see International Association Autism-Europe v. France , Complaint No. 13/2002, decision on the merits of 4 November 2003, § 52), the European Committee of Social Rights observed that the wording of Article E was almost identical to the wording of Article 14 of the Convention. The Committee held that Article E not only prohibited direct discrimination but also all forms of indirect discrimination, and that such indirect discrimination might arise by failing to take due and positive account of all relevant differences or by failing to take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages that are open to all are genuinely accessible by and to all. In the same decision the Committee further considered that the insertion of Article E into a separate Article in the Revised Charter indicated the heightened importance the drafters paid to the principle of non-discrimination with respect to the achievement of the various substantive rights contained therein. It held that its function was to help secure the equal effective enjoyment of all the rights concerned regardless of difference (ibid., § 51). The Convention on the Rights of the Child 60 .     Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed in New York on 20 November 1989 and in force in respect of Bulgaria since 3 July 1991, reads as follows: “1.     In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 2.     States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 3.     States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) 61 .     Article 23 of the ICCPR reads as follows: “1.     The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2.     The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3.     No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4.     States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the ICESCR”) 62 .     Article 9 of the ICESCR reads as follows: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.” THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 63.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to order their joinder (Rule 42 § 1 of the Rule of Court). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 and 14 OF THE CONVENTION 64.     The applicants complained that by requiring that they, as single mothers, establish paternity of their children and provide a death certificate in respect of the children’s fathers as a condition for receiving a family allowance payable monthly to families with “children with only one living parent”, the authorities had breached their right to respect for their private and family life, protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, by interpreting the phrase “children with only one living parent” as meaning solely “children with one deceased parent”, the authorities had breached the applicants’ right not to be discriminated against, as they had failed to recognise that the category of families with “children with only one living parent” included that of families with “children one of whose parents was unknown”. They relied in this respect on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. 65.     The relevant Convention provisions provide as follows: Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Scope of the case 66.     Since the alleged discriminatory treatment of the applicants lies at the heart of their complaint, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, and bearing in mind that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint (see Radomilja and Others v.   Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018 ), the Court considers it appropriate to examine the applicants’ grievances only from the standpoint of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. Admissibility As regards application no. 43863/15 67.     The Government submitted that the second applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by omitting to seek to be granted the allowance in question, as well as by failing to appeal against the judgment of the Sofia City Administrative Court. Alternatively, she had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit, as she had lodged her application with the Court more than seven months after the last domestic decision in her case had become final. 68.     The second applicant stated that, if there were several possible remedies open to her, she was only expected to have tried one of them. Moreover, she had relied on the Commission to appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court in the discrimination proceedings which she had initially brought. The Commission had not explained its unusual lack of initiative and the second applicant considered that she should not be penalised for this. 69.     The Court considers it unnecessary to determine whether the second applicant exhausted domestic remedies as, in any event, it finds that her application is inadmissible for failure to observe the six-month time-limit. The Court notes in that connection that the second applicant was notified of the first-instance court’s judgment, which quashed the Commission’s decision and after which there were no further procedural developments at the national level, on 22 December 2014, and it became final on 20 January 2015 as no appeal had been lodged against it (see paragraph 30 above). It thus became the final domestic decision in her case. The second applicant was apparently told in April 2015 that the Commission had not appealed against the judgment (see paragraph 31 above). However, she only applied to the Court on 28 August 2015 which was more than six months after the judgment becoming final on 20 January 2015. 70.     It follows that application no. 43863/15 was lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. As regards application no. 18592/15 (a)    Compatibility ratione materiae 71.     The Court has consistently held that Article 14 has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. For Article 14 to be applicable, it is enough for the facts of the case to fall within the ambit of one or more of those provisions; moreover, the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article   14 extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention and the Protocols thereto require each State to guarantee. It applies also to those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Convention Article, for which the State has voluntarily decided to provide (see Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no.   34369/97, § 40, ECHR   2000 ‑ IV, and E.B. v. France [GC], no.   43546/02, §§ 47-48, 22   January 2008). 72.     Admittedly, Article 8 does not