CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 1 juin 2021

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF920FE69 { font-family:Arial; color:#f8f8f8 } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s403582AA { width:8.67pt; display:inline-block } .sD462BB4 { width:125.51pt; display:inline-block } .s64406319 { width:11.68pt; display:inline-block } .s2753FA3F { width:163.53pt; display:inline-block }     THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 51185/11 Tatyana Aleksandrovna NEVOSTRUYEVA against Russia   The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 1   June   2021 as a Committee composed of:   Georgios A. Serghides, President,   María Elósegui,   Andreas Zünd, judges, and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 August 2011, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Ms Tatyana Aleksandrovna Nevostruyeva, is a Russian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Igra, Udmurtiya Republic. She was represented before the Court by Mr R.K. Akhmetgaliyev , a lawyer practising in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan. 2.     The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin. Military service and death of the applicant’s son 3.     On 22   November 2003 the applicant’s son, D.N., was conscripted into compulsory military service. 4.     From 21   January 2004 D.N. served in a military unit based in Bikin, Khabarovsk Region. 5.     On 19   August 2004 the applicant’s son signed an enlistment contract to serve for an additional three years. On 21   August 2004 a psychologist with the unit declared D.N. fully fit for military service, deeming him a stable person and at low risk of committing suicide. On 26   December 2005 D.N. underwent several psychological tests, including a stress-resistance test, achieving good results. 6.     On 12   January 2006 D.N. took up sentry duties at a tower in which he was stationed alone. At approximately 5.15   p.m. on 13   January   2006 two servicemen arrived and told D.N. to come down to be replaced. A door of the tower opened and a gunshot was heard. One of the soldiers climbed up and found D.N. dead with a bullet wound in his head. Criminal investigation 7.     Later that day a criminal case into incitement to suicide was opened. 8.     On 6   February 2006 a forensic medical report concluded that D.N. had died from bullet wounds to the neck and head. 9.     A report of 13   March 2006 on D.N.’s psychological state prior to his death indicated that he had suffered from underlying situational neurotic depression. 10.     On 13   March 2006 the investigator closed the criminal case for lack of corpus delicti . 11.     The above-mentioned decision relied on the record of an on-site inspection, the forensic medical examination report, the psychological report and the witness statements of approximately twenty fellow military servicemen. According to the witnesses, D.N. was a steady, open-hearted and respected person. Some witnesses remembered that D.N. had complained of the difficulty of military service and that he had talked about plans to go on leave. One witness suspected that D.N. had been worrying about the loss of some of his personal documents. 12 .     Another witness, Pte T., recounted that the applicant’s son had told him that, while at the training unit, he had attempted to hang himself because he had been bullied by older conscripts. At D.N.’s request, Pte T. did not communicate that information to anyone else. 13.     A doctor testified that D.N. had not had any injuries or health complaints during a medical check-up he had undergone before taking up sentry duties on 12 January 2006. 14.     Ms T., a psychologist with the unit, stated that she had held a relaxation session on 12 January 2006 with the soldiers assigned to sentry duties on that date. She had led exercises intended to ease stress and to raise the morale of the soldiers. No one had made any complaints. All the soldiers had looked well and calm and she had not had any reason to prohibit any of them from taking up their duties. She admitted that she had not known D.N. well and could not describe his personality. 15.     Another psychologist, Ms N., who had met with and evaluated D.N., considered him to be an even-tempered and diligent person who posed no risk of suicide. He had been allowed to take up duties with access to weapons and he had carried out those duties regularly during his service. On 26   December 2005 D.N. had successfully passed a test on his ability to handle stress. During an individual session on 12   January 2006, D.N. had said that he had not had any bad news from home or conflicts with other soldiers. He had been cheerful and vivacious. 16.     With reference to the psychological report of 13 March 2006, the investigator concluded that D.N. had not suffered from any permanent or temporary mental disorders. He further suggested that the applicant’s son might have suffered a bout of depression caused by the loss of some personal documents. Inquiry 17.     On 10   May 2008 the applicant requested that a criminal case be opened against the military psychologists for failing to detect D.N.’s suicidal tendencies and to provide him with proper psychological assistance. 18.     The applicant’s request was refused by the investigating authorities on four occasions (26 June 2008, 27 March 2009, 20 November 2009 and 1   July 2011). Following the applicant’s complaints, the national courts set aside the first three refusals due to incompleteness of the inquiry. On two occasions the national courts also found unlawful the investigating authorities’ failure to inform the applicant about the progress of the inquiry. The final refusal to open a criminal case against the military psychologists due to lack of corpus delicti was not contested before the courts. COMPLAINTS 19.     The applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the State had failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard the life of her son and to carry out an effective investigation into his death. The relevant part of Article 2 of the Convention provides as follows: “1.     Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law ...” THE LAW 20.     The Government submitted that, according to the results of the psychological examinations and tests, the applicant’s son had never suffered from any psychological disorders or shown any suicidal tendencies; he had therefore been permitted to have access to weapons. D.N. had never asked for psychological assistance, which had been available at the military unit. On 12 January 2006 the psychologist, Ms   T., had seen all the servicemen including D.N. before they had taken up sentry duties and he had not had any complaints. He had not been subjected to any form of bullying or unlawful violence. On that basis, there had been no evidence to indicate a risk that D.N. would take his own life. Thus, the authorities had complied with their positive obligation to protect D.N.’s life. 21.     The Government further submitted that the criminal investigation into D.N.’s death had been thorough and effective and had examined all the possible explanations for his death. An additional inquiry into potential negligence on the part of the psychologists had been carried out. The conclusions of both the criminal investigation and the additional inquiry had relied on a significant amount of evidence, including witness statements and psychological report. 22.     The applicant submitted that the State authorities had been aware of the real and immediate risk to her son’s life, but that they had failed to take appropriate measures. Despite the fact that the applicant’s son had previously attempted to take his own life, no information about his suicide attempt had been provided to the commanders and psychologists of his new military unit. The applicant submitted that the psychological assistance provided to her son had been ineffective. The applicant also asserted that the military psychologists had had no relevant psychological training; one of them (Ms   T.) had had only six months’ work experience in psychology and had not known the applicant’s son well. 23.     The applicant further submitted that the investigation had not been thorough, as only the hypothesis of suicide had been examined. The inquiry in respect of the military psychologists had begun only after the applicant had requested it. The applicant had not been timely informed about the refusals to open a criminal case. The decisions not to open a criminal case had been quashed as unfounded on three occasions after the applicant’s complaints. 24.     The Court has to examine whether the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk that D.N. would commit suicide, and, if so, whether they did all that could reasonably have been expected of them to avoid that risk materialising (see Malik Babayev v.   Azerbaijan , no. 30500/11, § 67, 1   June   2017). 25.     The Court has previously had regard to a variety of factors in order to establish whether the authorities knew or ought to have known that the life of a particular individual was subject to a real and immediate risk, triggering the duty to take appropriate preventive measures. Those factors commonly include: a history of mental health problems; the seriousness of the mental condition; previous attempts to commit suicide or self-harm; suicidal thoughts or threats; and signs of physical or mental distress (see Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no.   78103/14 , § 115, 31   January   2019, with further references). 26.     It was not disputed by the parties that D.N. had not suffered from any mental disorders. 27.     As for D.N.’s first suicide attempt in the military training unit, the Court notes that Pte T.’s witness statement is the only indirect evidence of that attempt (see paragraph 12 above). No medical or personal documents or other evidence confirm the above-mentioned attempt or the authorities’ awareness of it. Furthermore, in August 2004 D.N. decided to continue to serve in the army under an enlistment contract. During the two years of his military service, and in particular, before his conscription, before his enlistment and again in December 2005, D.N. underwent psychological examinations and tests, and no risk of suicide was revealed as a result (compare Tikhonova v. Russia , no.   13596/05, § 74, 30 April 2014). Discussions with the psychologists, including at an individual session on 12   January 2006 before D.N. took up sentry duties, likewise did not indicate that there was any suicide risk. Furthermore, there is no evidence that D.N. had lodged any complaints with the officers of the military unit. 28.     The Court reiterates that, in this type of case, the unpredictability of human conduct must not be ignored, and the State’s positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, as a recent authority, Malik Babayev , cited above, §   74). In the circumstances of the present case, there is no evidence for the Court to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to D.N.’s life (see Tikhonova , cited above, § 75). The Court therefore finds that the particular circumstances leading to D.N.’s death were not foreseeable to the domestic authorities. Thus, no obligation to take operational measures to prevent a risk to life arose in the present case. 29.     As for the procedural limb of the applicant’s complaint under Article   2 of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicant was mainly dissatisfied with the additional inquiry and its conclusion not to open a criminal case against the military psychologists. However, as regards the criminal investigation, she did not indicate any particular omissions or deficiencies which could have rendered it inadequate (see Baklanov v.   Ukraine , no. 44425/08, § 88, 24 October 2013). 30.     The Court reiterates that where a positive obligation to safeguard the life of persons in custody or in the army is at stake, the system required by Article 2 of the Convention must provide for an independent and impartial official investigation that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness. In such cases, the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness, and must, of their own motion, initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the State officials or authorities involved. The requirement of public scrutiny is also relevant in this context (see, for instance, Marina Alekseyeva v. Russia , no. 22490/05, § 126, with further references, 19   December 2013). However, Article 2 of the Convention does not entail the right for an applicant to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence, or an absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or a particular sentence (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, §   96, ECHR 2004 ‑ XII). 31.     In the present case, the authorities immediately opened a criminal investigation into D.N.’s death, questioned a significant number of witnesses and obtained relevant forensic examinations. The investigation established no elements of a criminal offence in the circumstances of D.N.’s death, and the case was closed three months after being initiated. Thus, the investigation was sufficiently prompt. It established the relevant facts, and there is no reason to doubt the conclusions which it reached. Likewise, there is no reason to question the independence of the investigation. It appears that the applicant had no issues in accessing the material of the criminal investigation. 32.     In addition, at the applicant’s request the authorities carried out an additional inquiry into the quality of the psychological assistance provided to her son. Even though that additional inquiry had some deficiencies as established by the national authorities, there is nothing to cast doubt on the eventual conclusion that the psychologists’ actions had not amounted to criminal negligence. 33.     On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the investigation into D.N.’s death was effective. 34.     In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaints under Article 2 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 24 June 2021.   {signature_p_2}   Olga Chernishova   Georgios A. Serghides   Deputy Registrar   President