CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 juin 2021

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SLOVAKIA (Application no. 39654/15)     JUDGMENT Art 6 § 1 (criminal) and Art 6 § 3 • Fair trial of applicant, with slight intellectual disability, resulting in conviction for murder and prison sentence • Lack of sufficient indications requiring authorities to consider applicant a particularly vulnerable person and make appropriate adjustments • Applicant’s defence rights not irretrievably prejudiced or right to a fair trial not adversely affected • Authorities took all necessary steps   STRASBOURG 24 June 2021   FINAL   22/11/2021     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Hasáliková v. Slovakia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ksenija Turković, President,   Alena Poláčková,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato,   Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges, and Renata Degener, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   39654/15) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Ms Jana Hasáliková (“the applicant”), on 3 August 2015; the decision to give notice to the Slovak Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 5 § 2 and 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 18 May 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings, in which she had been convicted of murder and sentenced to a fifteen-year prison term, had been unfair. She alleged that no reasonable steps or adjustments had been made with regard to her intellectual disability and that, consequently, her rights had not been duly and effectively protected. She further complained that she had not had enough time to choose a lawyer and that her confession made before the police had served as the basis for her conviction even though she had later retracted it. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1972. She is currently serving a sentence in Levoča Prison. She was represented before the Court by Mr M. Cibuľa, a lawyer practising in Liptovský Mikuláš. 3.     The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Co-Agent, Ms M. Bálintová, from the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.     On 24 October 2009 a criminal prosecution was opened against an unknown perpetrator by the Žilina police following a murder committed the day before. The crime was classified as “particularly serious” ( obzvlášť závažný zločin ). 6.     On the basis of a statement by P.O., who was heard as a witness, the police suspected his brother, J.O., who was arrested on 24 October 2009 and taken to the police station at 8.18 p.m. 7.     On the evening of 24 October 2009 and the following day J.O. and his mother gave the police some items stolen from the victim’s flat. At 4.50   a.m. on 25 October 2009 the applicant’s sister gave the police clothes worn by the applicant the day before. The applicant insisted on the fact that no traces of the victim’s blood had later been found on the clothes. 8 .     On 25 October 2009, J.O. and the applicant were charged with “particularly serious” murder. The decision stated that, because of the likely sentence, they had to be legally represented from the pre-trial stage of the proceedings (see paragraph 40 below) and that if they (or others authorised to do so on their behalf) did not choose their defence counsel within thirty minutes of being notified of the charges, a lawyer would be appointed for them by the court. 9 .     On the same day, according to the Government, after finding out that J.O. lacked the financial means to find a lawyer, the investigator asked the Žilina District Court to appoint defence counsels for both J.O. and the applicant as they had not chosen a lawyer within the relevant time-limit. According to the applicant, the investigator made that request without knowing her position. The court granted the investigator’s request. 10 .     From 10.20 a.m. to 2.15 p.m. on 25 October 2009 J.O. was interviewed by the investigator and stated, in presence of the two court ‑ appointed counsels, that both he and the applicant had stabbed the victim. 11 .     On 25 October 2009, at around 3 p.m. according to the Government, the applicant arrived at the Žilina police station. According to the relevant record, she voluntarily responded to a summons to appear. She was notified of the charges and, from 3.20 to 5.25 p.m., was interviewed by the investigator in presence of the lawyers appointed for her and J.O. The first two pages of the record contained pre-printed information stating that the applicant had the right to choose a lawyer, that she had not done so and asked to be appointed one by the court, and that she had the right to remain silent and could not be forced into confession. The applicant specifically signed a statement saying that the information had been adequately explained to her and that she understood it. She further confirmed that she fully understood the charges and did not require any further explanation. All the pages of the interview record were signed by the applicant, and the last page was signed by both court-appointed lawyers. 12 .     During the interview the applicant indicated that she was seeing a psychiatrist once a year, that she was in receipt of an invalidity pension on account of a spinal disorder, that she fully understood the charges against her and waived her right to challenge them, and that she had not chosen a lawyer due to her financial situation and consented to be defended by the court-appointed lawyer. A note was made that the applicant had been given sufficient time to consult with her counsel prior to the interview. She then stated that she regretted what had happened, that she had been at the scene when J.O. had killed the victim, but that she had not participated in the killing. She later changed her description of the events and explained that J.O. had stabbed the victim first and then passed her the knife, and that the victim had died after she had stabbed her. At the end the applicant responded to the questions asked by her counsel and that of J.O. 13.     It appears from the police record that the applicant was arrested at 5.30 p.m. on 25 October 2009 as she was considered a flight risk. 14.     Several witnesses were also interviewed that day. The applicant pointed to the fact that two witnesses had stated that she had been with them in a pub at the time of the events. 15 .     At 12.12 p.m. on 26 October 2009 the investigator received an authority form confirming that a lawyer appointed by the applicant’s sister was representing the applicant in the criminal proceedings. The lawyer was given the opportunity to consult the case file; he then authorised another lawyer to be his substitute in communication with the applicant. 16.     At 3.03 p.m. the same day the Žilina regional prosecutor (“the prosecutor”) filed a request to place J.O. and the applicant in detention. 17.     On 27 October 2009 the court ordered an examination of the mental state of the two accused. 18 .     At 9 a.m. on 28 October 2009 the pre-trial judge interviewed J.O., who confirmed his confession made to the investigator and described the applicant’s involvement in the murder. The applicant’s substitute counsel was present. Following the interview, the court granted the prosecutor’s request to place J.O. in detention. No complaint was filed against that decision. 19 .     From 9.50 to 10.40 a.m. on 28 October 2009 the pre-trial judge interviewed the applicant, in presence of the substitute counsel. According to the official record, the applicant was again informed of her procedural rights. She then stated that she had been arrested at 5.30 p.m. on 25 October 2009 after voluntarily arriving at the police station, that she did not object to the police’s conduct and that no violence had been used against her. She then disputed her confession, asserting that her statement to the investigator was untrue and had only been made out of fear. When replying to the prosecutor’s questions, she admitted that she had stabbed the victim with J.O.’s knife under threat but declared that the victim had died only after J.O. had cut her throat. At the end, even though the applicant’s lawyer disagreed with the prosecutor’s request to place the applicant in detention, referring to the fact that the latter had voluntarily given herself up to the police, the court decided to order the applicant’s detention with effect from 5.30 p.m. on 25   October 2009. A complaint by her against this decision was dismissed by the Žilina Regional Court on 5 November 2009. 20.     During the pre-trial stage of the proceedings the authorities secured further witness statements, several expert opinions, including those concerning the mental state of the accused, and recordings of telephone conversations. 21 .     An expert psychiatric and psychological opinion drawn up in January 2010, using a wide range of tests, concluded that the applicant had a slight intellectual disability (with an IQ of between 64 according to the Raven test and 69 according to the verbal part of the WAIS-R test), with infantile features and simplistic thinking. According to the experts, she was also very naïve, emotionally immature and easily influenced. At the time of the events she had been able to identify that her actions were dangerous to society and to foresee their consequences, but had been limited in her ability to control herself due to emotional distress, a lower mental capacity and alcohol. The experts stated that during her examination the applicant had first denied the events but later confessed to them, had been insincere, had kept changing her statements and had naively feigned memory disorders. 22 .     On 28 May 2010 the applicant had a pre-trial confrontation with J.O., in presence of both defence counsels, during which she maintained that she had not been at the scene. When asked by the investigator why she had previously confessed to the murder and had been able to describe it in detail, the applicant responded that she had confessed out of fear and reproduced the events as described in the charges. J.O., on the other hand, first asserted that the applicant had been present and involved in the murder, then stated that she had not been at the scene and that he had committed the murder and felt guilty. 23 .     On 4 June 2010 the applicant and her counsel had the opportunity to consult the entire case file and familiarise themselves with the results of the investigation. They did not formulate any objections or propose any evidence; the applicant’s counsel expressly stated that he was not asking for the activities carried out before he had taken over the applicant’s representation to be repeated, but for the prosecutor to discontinue the prosecution because the evidence available did not, in his view, prove her guilt. 24.     On 17 June 2010 the applicant was formally indicted for a “particularly serious” murder committed together with J.O. 25.     It is mentioned in the above indictment that, on the same day, J.O. and the prosecutor concluded a plea bargain in which J.O. pleaded guilty of the murder committed together with the applicant in exchange for a prison sentence of twenty-two and a half years. 26 .     After the prosecutor asked the court to approve the above plea bargain, the applicant’s counsel complained to the court that he had not been informed beforehand of the plea-bargain negotiations despite the applicant and J.O. being tried jointly. The court did not accept his argument that such conduct had breached the applicant’s defence rights and on 2   July 2010 approved the agreement. 27.     At another hearing held later that day the court proceeded to a preliminary examination of the applicant’s indictment. The applicant refused to enter into a plea bargain and her counsel unsuccessfully proposed to the court that the prosecution be discontinued on the grounds that the crime had not been committed by the applicant. 28.     Public hearings were then held on 27 September 2010, 2   November 2010, 7, 27 and 28 December 2010, 7 and 11 January 2011. Numerous witnesses and experts were heard, and several expert opinions and other pieces of written evidence were produced. 29 .     At the hearing on 27 September 2010 the applicant denied her guilt, claiming that she had only confessed to the murder in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings out of fear. According to the record of the hearing, the expert in psychology present intervened in the applicant’s examination in order to rephrase a question asked by the prosecutor; on one other occasion the applicant declared that she did not understand the prosecutor’s question and it was then rephrased. 30.     On 8 October 2010 the court granted a request by the applicant for release from pre-trial detention, stating that the existence of a reasonable suspicion against her was weakened by the evidence produced to date and the fact that the decisive direct evidence, that is to say J.O.’s statement, had been lost due to the latter’s death. That decision was later quashed by the appellate court. 31 .     At the hearing of 27 December 2010 the court took note of J.O.’s death and granted a proposal by the prosecutor to read out J.O.’s statements made on 25 and 28 October 2009 as well as the record of the pre-trial confrontation between him and the applicant. The latter did not make any comments or propose new evidence. 32 .     In his closing arguments made on 7 January 2011, the applicant’s counsel pointed to the fact that both J.O. and the applicant had submitted numerous versions of events and that the evidence available, including several witness statements, demonstrated that the applicant had not been at the scene. He also insisted on the fact that she had been apprehended by the police in Liptovský Mikuláš on 24 October 2009, that is to say one day before her first interview, since she would have been unable to travel on her own to the police station in Žilina; that also explained why her clothes had been handed over at 4.50 a.m. on 25 October 2009 by her sister. According to her counsel, during those twenty-four hours the applicant had been described the events and told what to say; due to her intellectual disability, she had complied. Moreover, her subsequent interview had been unlawful because of the misleading nature of the questions asked by the investigator. 33 .     By a judgment of 11 January 2011 the applicant was convicted of “particularly serious” murder committed jointly with J.O. and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court noted that since both accused had repeatedly changed their version of events throughout the proceedings, their statements had been rigorously analysed and linked to the circumstantial evidence, without any reason being found for J.O. to have falsely implicated the applicant. In the court’s view, the applicant’s guilt had been proven mainly by J.O.’s testimony but also by her repeated confessions made to the investigator, the pre-trial judge and the expert, which provided a very detailed description of the events (that she would have been unable to repeat had she not been at the scene) and which were for the most part consistent with J.O.’s statements; given that the applicant had been unable to explain the subsequent changes in her testimony, but for the argument of fear, the court would not use her later statements. Other pieces of evidence, notably recordings of telephone conversations and some witness statements, also pointed to her guilt, and the expert opinions could not exclude the possibility that the victim had been stabbed by two people. Relying on the expert psychiatric opinion, which had not found any mental illness, the court considered that the applicant’s slight intellectual disability could not, as such, lead to a conclusion of diminished responsibility. 34.     In an appeal filed on 28 January 2011 the applicant challenged the guilty verdict, arguing that it had been clearly proven that she could not have been at the scene. She further complained that the court had refused to hear a witness for the defence and that her defence rights had been breached on account of the fact that her counsel had been unable to participate in the plea-bargain negotiations with J.O. 35 .     On 3 May 2011, following a hearing, the Žilina Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded on the grounds that she had only presented her own assessment of the evidence; the judgment was changed solely as regards the type of the prison in which she was to serve her sentence. The appellate court considered that the first-instance court had gathered the necessary evidence, drawn correct findings of fact and responded to all objections raised by the defence, and that its conclusions were neither unfounded nor arbitrary. The guilty verdict was based on sufficient and convincing evidence, including J.O.’s pre-trial statements made in compliance with the adversarial principle, the applicant’s testimonies collected in a lawful manner and her full and free confession; in this connection, the appellate court observed that the applicant had in no way explained her pretended fear or alleged any violence or threat of violence and that all her interviews had taken place in her counsel’s presence. The court further pointed out that the applicant’s assessment of the forensic evidence was subjective and isolated from other evidence, including her own statements; that no evidence put her guilt in doubt, since the timeline of events as established and the physical distance between the relevant places did not rule out the possibility that she had been at the scene at the time of the murder; that the absence of her fingerprints and DNA at the scene did not prove that she could not have been there; and that the applicant’s sister’s statement was not credible and did not, in any event, exclude the applicant’s presence at the scene at the time of the murder. As to the first-instance court’s refusal to hear a witness for the defence, the appellate court admitted that no reasons had been given in the judgment but considered that it was clear from the case file that the witness concerned had only been expected to confirm another witness statement found to be unreliable. It also admitted that the applicant’s counsel should have been summoned to the plea-bargain negotiations with J.O. since an accomplice’s statement of guilt necessarily affected the other accomplices. However, given the form and content of the plea-bargain negotiations, the absence of the applicant’s counsel did not amount to a substantial breach of the applicant’s defence and adversarial rights and did not render the agreement unlawful; in any event, the applicant and her counsel had been able to take note of the agreement and corresponding judgment concerning J.O., which were part of the case file. 36.     On 2 May 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, challenging shortcomings in the establishment of the facts as well as procedural errors and a breach of the principles of the presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo . She argued that J.O.’s statements were inconsistent and that the reliability of her confession should have been assessed in the light of her intellectual disability, the signs of which were clearly visible. In her view, the experts should have also examined her ability to understand the meaning of the criminal proceedings and testify about the events, and should have assisted her in her pre-trial interviews. The applicant further complained of a violation of her right to defence in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, claiming that she had been arrested and interviewed one day earlier than that recorded by the police. 37 .     On 12 August 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, holding, inter alia , that it was not called on to examine whether there was an extreme discrepancy between the evidence and the facts established by the lower courts. It further observed that the appeal on points of law could only be considered admissible if it had been proven that the applicant had been arrested on 24 October 2009 and that the authorities’ conduct had had a negative impact on her later statements, which was not the case here. 38.     The applicant filed a constitutional complaint in which she complained mainly of violations of her right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and of the principle of the presumption of innocence. She argued that the facts of the case and her participation in the murder had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and that all the evidence in her favour, including the expert opinions, had been ignored. The applicant further claimed that her pre-trial confession should not have been accepted as credible since it had not been supported by other reliable pieces of evidence and had been tainted by her intellectual disability, as well as the fact that her statements had been collected in the absence of an expert, in breach of her defence rights. Lastly, the applicant insisted on the fact that she had been arrested on 24 October 2009 and asserted that the Supreme Court’s failure to duly examine this complaint amounted to a denial of justice and to a violation of her right to an effective remedy. 39 .     On 4 February 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded, finding that the applicant was only challenging the outcome of the case and that the courts’ decisions were based on comprehensive and convincing arguments and displayed no signs of arbitrariness. It stressed that while the applicant had confessed repeatedly during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the guilty verdict had not only been based on that confession since she had also been incriminated by the repeated statements of her co-accused; the courts’ explanation as to why they had not believed the witnesses in the applicant’s favour could be accepted. Moreover, the applicant’s defence counsel, who had attended at all her pre-trial interviews, had never requested the assistance of an expert on account of her mental state. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 301/2005 Coll.), as in force at the relevant time 40 .     Article 37 § 1 (c) provided that the legal assistance of counsel was mandatory from the pre-trial stage of the proceedings if the person concerned had been charged with a “particularly serious” criminal offence. 41 .     Article 232 § 2 provided that the prosecutor was to summon to attend the plea-bargain hearing the accused and victim who filed a claim for damages in a due and timely manner; the public prosecutor was to inform the defence counsel of the accused of the time and place of the hearing. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION 42.     Relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a), (b) and (c) and on Article 17 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against her had been unfair and had not been adapted to take into account her mental state. She alleged, in particular, that she had been unable to fully understand the charges and accompanying instruction about her procedural rights, and that she had not had enough time to choose a lawyer and prepare her defence. No reasonable steps had been taken to address her mental health until the court hearing of 27 September 2010; that is to say, she had been deprived of adequate legal aid and any psychological assistance during the pre-trial activities carried out by the police on 24 and 25 October 2009. Moreover, her confession made on that occasion had been used as evidence against her even though she had later retracted it and there had been numerous items of evidence in her favour. 43.     The Court considers that the complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, which read as follows: “1.     In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing .. by [a] ... tribunal ... ... 3.     Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a)     to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b)     to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c)     to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d)     to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...” Admissibility 44.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant 45.     The applicant stated that the authorities should have considered her a vulnerable person requiring special treatment and assistance since they had known from the very beginning that she had attended a special school, was in receipt of a disability pension and was seeing a psychiatrist; moreover, her physical defect was clearly visible and her intellectual disability was clearly evident from any conversations with her. 46.     The applicant argued that she had not had the opportunity to choose a lawyer before her first interview, given that one had been appointed for her by the court on 25 October 2009 at the request of the investigator, who could not yet have been aware of her position and before she had been notified of the charges and information about her procedural rights (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). This was also proven by the fact that the court-appointed lawyer had participated in J.O.’s interview (see paragraph 10 above) which, according to the record, had taken place long before she had arrived at the police station. The applicant also complained that, once at the police station, there had been a lot of procedural steps for her to undergo and information to understand, which she had been incapable of doing since she had lacked adequate time and the assistance of a professional or family member. Her statements made in such a traumatising situation could not thus be considered reliable, particularly since she had been made to plead guilty and the investigator had asked her misleading and inadmissible questions. It should have been obvious to the investigator that she had been unable to understand and participate in the proceedings or make any informed choices, so her mental state should have been examined prior to her first interview. Furthermore, her subsequent statements had been confusing, divergent and inconsistent with the other evidence, namely witness statements confirming that she had been with them at the time of the events and the outcome of the expert examination finding no traces of blood on her clothes or any of her DNA at the scene. Given her mental state, any of her allegations and, nota bene , confessions should not have been accepted without due verification. However, the authorities had not taken any reasonable steps until 27 September 2010, when she had been interviewed in the presence of a psychologist. 47.     The applicant further asserted that the first interview of her co-accused J.O. had taken place before she had been aware of the charges, before she had been able to choose her counsel and before she had been advised of her right to be present. She also pointed to the fact that at the end of their pre-trial confrontation J.O. had stated that she had not been at the scene (see paragraph 22 above). Moreover, since neither she nor her counsel had been informed of the plea-bargain negotiations with J.O., they had been unable to participate and cross-examine him even though he had practically convicted her on this occasion. This deficiency could not be rectified later because J.O. had committed suicide, and the appellate court had also failed to draw conclusions therefrom. 48.     According to the applicant, her defence and fair-trial rights guaranteed by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention had been violated both by the court-appointed lawyer and the conduct of the authorities, and the adversarial principle had not been observed. (b)    The Government 49.     The Government stressed, firstly, that the applicant had neither been deprived of her legal capacity nor was she of limited legal capacity, that she had completed her secondary education and that she did not suffer from any visible defect preventing her from hearing, expressing herself or perceiving reality (contrast Z.H. v. Hungary , no. 28973/11, 8 November 2012). Her mental state had been subject to an expert examination, which had concluded that she had a slight intellectual disability, was emotionally immature, very naïve and sensitive to external influences, but that she was not suffering from any mental disorder or illness. In the experts’ view, the applicant’s intellectual disability did not make her incapable of foreseeing the possible consequences of her actions or of recognising their dangerousness, even though her ability to control her behaviour at the relevant time had been significantly reduced (see paragraph 21 above). 50.     In the Government’s view, the applicant had thus neither been vulnerable to the point of requiring particular adjustments, nor had the experts arrived at the conclusion that she would not understand the proceedings. They also noted that at no point had the applicant or her lawyer stated that she would have difficulties expressing herself or that there would be circumstances making her increasingly vulnerable. When, on one occasion, the expert had alerted the court to the fact that the applicant might not have understood a question, the prosecutor had rephrased it (see paragraph 29 above). That demonstrated, in the Government’s view, that the authorities had been ready to accommodate any difficulties the applicant might have. 51.     The Government argued that there was therefore no reason to assume that the applicant had not understood the charges against her on 25   October 2009, particularly since she had been immediately appointed a defence lawyer, whom she had had time to consult before her first interview. By signing the record of that interview the applicant had confirmed, in her counsel’s presence, that she fully understood what she had been charged with, that she did not need any further explanation, that she had been informed of her procedural rights and that she consented to be defended by the court-appointed lawyer (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). The next day she had been represented by a lawyer chosen by her sister, who had actively participated in all the interviews of her and her co-accused and witness examinations, having had the opportunity to consult the investigation file, suggest further evidence and raise any objections concerning the applicant’s rights. Her counsel had also been present at the court hearings, where he had been given the possibility to ask the applicant and witnesses questions. 52.     It could therefore be said that the applicant had never been examined in the absence of a lawyer or without prior consultation with him. However, in her two pre-trial statements made on 25 and 28 October 2009 (see paragraphs 12 and 19 above), she had confessed and described the circumstances of the murder, including her stabbing the victim. The Government observed that, in any event, those statements had not amounted to decisive evidence against the applicant. Indeed, she had also confessed to the murder during her expert examination (see paragraph 21 above), providing details consistent with the repeated incriminating statements of her co-accused and which could have been known only by someone at the scene. 53.     The Government further stated that the only reason the applicant’s co-accused J.O. had been absent from the trial had been the fact that he had died; his statement from the pre-trial stage of the proceedings had therefore been read out. Nevertheless, the applicant’s counsel had been present at J.O.’s pre-trial interviews (see paragraphs 10 and 18 above) when he had asked him questions, and a pre-trial confrontation had also taken place on 28 May 2010 in the presence of the applicant’s and J.O.’s counsels (see paragraph 22 above). The Government were therefore convinced that the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity throughout the criminal proceedings to contest J.O.’s statements. 54.     Lastly, the Government noted that the applicant mainly challenged the domestic courts’ assessment of the evidence and guilty verdict, which was contrary to the Court’s subsidiary role. In their view, all the evidence against the applicant had been lawful and taken in an adversarial manner, and her defence and fair-trial rights had been observed. The Court’s assessment (a)    Relevant general principles 55.     As the Court has explained on numerous occasions, its primary concern under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. It is not its role to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence, including evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law, may be admissible (see, inter alia , Ibrahim and   Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, §   250, 13   September 2016, with further references). In making this assessment, the Court will look at the proceedings as a whole, having regard to the rights of the defence but also to the interests of the public and the victims that crime is properly prosecuted (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, §   118, ECHR 2011). 56.     The right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 3 (c), is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial. The national authorities must have regard to the defendant’s wishes as to his or her choice of legal representation, but may override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice (see Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703/11, §§   79 and 81, with further references, ECHR 2015). Prompt access to a lawyer constitutes an important counterweight to the vulnerability of suspects in police custody, provides a fundamental safeguard against coercion and the ill-treatment of suspects by the police, and contributes to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused (see Ibrahim and   Others , cited above, § 255, and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no.   21980/04, §   112, 12 May 2017). One of the lawyer’s main tasks during the police custody and at the investigation stage is to ensure respect for the right of an accused not to incriminate himself and for his right to remain silent (see Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, § 128, 9 November 2018). 57.     In order to ensure that the protections afforded by the right to a lawyer and the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination are practical and effective, it is crucial that suspects be aware of them. The Court has therefore considered that it is inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to remain silent and the right to legal assistance that a person “charged with a criminal offence”, within the meaning of Article 6, should have the right to be informed of these rights. Consequently, Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention must be interpreted as safeguarding the right of persons charged with an offence to be informed immediately of the content of the right to legal assistance, irrespective of their age or specific situation and regardless of whether they are represented by an officially assigned lawyer or a lawyer of their own choosing (see Beuze , § 129, and Simeonovi , § 119, both cited above). 58.     The Court has also held that the privilege against self ‑ incrimination does not protect against the making of an incriminating statement per se but against the obtaining of evidence by coercion or oppression. It is the existence of compulsion that gives rise to concerns as to whether the privilege against self-incrimination has been respected (see Ibrahim and   Others , cited above, § 267). 59 .     The Court further reiterates the general principles to be applied in cases where a prosecution witness did not attend the trial but statements previously made by him or her were admitted as evidence ( see Al ‑ Khawaja and Tahery , cited above, §§   119-47, and Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, §§   110-31, ECHR 2015). The application of those principles involves, generally speaking, answering three questions: (i)   whether there was a good reason for the non-attendance of the witness and for the admission of the absent witness’s statement as evidence (see Schatschaschwili , cited above, §§ 119-25); (ii)   whether the evidence of the absent witness was the sole or decisive basis for the conviction or whether it carried significant weight (ibid.,   §§   116, 119 and 126-47) ; and (iii)   whether there were sufficient counterbalancing factors, including strong procedural safeguards, to compensate for the handicaps faced by the defence as a result of the admission of the untested evidence and to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair (ibid., § 147). In the latter context, the Court has held that the ability to confront a witness for the prosecution who is absent from the trial at the investigation stage is an important procedural safeguard which can compensate for the handicaps faced by the defence on account of absence of such a witness from the trial (see Chmura v. Poland , no.   18475/05, §§ 56 and 57, 3 April 2012; Gani v. Spain , no.   61800/08, §§   48-50, 19 February 2013; and Schatschaschwili , cited above, §   130). 60.     Lastly, the Court notes that the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 3 are not ends in themselves: their intrinsic aim is always to contribute to ensuring the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. Compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be examined in each case having regard to the development of the proceedings as a whole and not on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect or one particular incident (see Beuze , cited above, §§   121-22). (b)    Application of those principles to the present case 61.     Firstly, the Court notes that in the present case the applicant was prosecuted for a “particularly serious” murder which, under domestic law, required mandatory legal assistance. According to the official record submitted to the Court, she was first questioned by the investigator on 25   October 2009, approximately twenty minutes after arriving at the police station and after being notified of the charges (see paragraph 11 above). It is not disputed that the applicant was assisted by a lawyer from that first questioning by the police. However, given her assertions that she was not given the opportunity to hire a lawyer of her own choosing since the authorities had secured her a court-appointed lawyer without even knowing her position (see paragraph 9 above), the question arises whether or not her freedom to be assisted by a lawyer of her choosing as such was respected (see Dvorski , cited above, §§ 103 et seq.). 62.     Admittedly, it appears from the case file that the investigator’s request to have defence counsels appointed for both J.O. and the applicant was formulated before the applicant had been notified of the charges and information about her procedural rights and was based on J.O.’s statement that he lacked the financial means to choose a lawyer (see paragraph 9   above). The court then gave as a reason for appointing a lawyer for the applicant the fact that she had not chosen one of her own. The court-appointed lawyer was then present to assist the applicant from her very first contact with the police since he had participated in the questioning of J.O., which had taken place some time before (see paragraph 10 above). 63.     The Court further notes that according to the official record, the applicant was, on her arrival at the police station, notified of the charges, including information about legal assistance being mandatory in her case and about her right to choose a lawyer within thirty minutes of being notified of the charges (see paragraph 8 above). Neither the applicant nor the lawyer appointed for her by the court raised, at that particular time or later, any objection as to the applicant’s freedom to choose her own lawyer or as to the time allowed for preparation of the defence. On the contrary, by signing, in the presence of the court-appointed lawyer, her official statement made on 25 October 2009, the applicant confirmed that she had been informed of her right to choose a lawyer and given time to consult counsel prior to the police questioning (see paragraph 11 above). Moreover, the applicant indicated during her interview that she had not chosen a lawyer due to her financial situation and that she consented to be defended by the court-appointed lawyer (see paragraph 12 above). In this connection, the Court takes particular account of the fact that both the applicant and the lawyer signed the relevant record. 64.     The Court also observes that, as soon as the authorities were informed the next day that the applicant’s sister had hired another lawyer to represent the applicant, that lawyer was given the possibility to consult the case file (see paragraph 15 above) and participate in all the activities that followed in person or through his substitute. Later, the applicant’s counsel expressly stated that he was not asking for the activities carried out before he had taken over the applicant’s representation to be repeated (see paragraph 23 above). 65.     In view of the above considerations, the Court cannot give weight to the applicant’s allegation that she was limited in her right to choose a lawyer. 66.     Secondly, the applicant maintained that the authorities should have considered her a vulnerable person requiring special treatment, namely the assistance of a professional or family member in order to help her understand the charges and meaningfully participate in the proceedings. Without any adjustments addressing her mental state, her statements and, nota bene , confessions made in such a traumatising situation for her should not have been relied on, particularly since they had been inconsistent with the other evidence. 67.     The Court observes in this context that, when assessing the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, it has to examine, among other things, whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of age or mental capacity (see Ibrahim and Others , cited above, § 274). 68.     The Court has already accepted that a police interview is inevitably a stressful event from a suspect’s perspective (see Doyle v. Ireland , no.   51979/17, § 85, 23 May 2019). This must have been all the more true in the present case, where the applicant had a slight intellectual disability, as shown by the expert examination ca