CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 9 juillet 2021

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font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   GRAND CHAMBER CASE OF M.A. v. DENMARK ( Application no. 6697/18 )   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Positive obligations • Family life • Unjustified statutory three-year waiting period for family reunification of persons benefiting from subsidiary or temporary protection status, not allowing individualised assessment • Wide margin of appreciation to be afforded to States in deciding whether to impose a waiting period • Insurmountable obstacles to family life progressively assuming more importance in the fair-balance assessment for waiting periods beyond two years • Decision-making process required to include fair-balance assessment and to safeguard flexibility, speed and efficiency • Three-year rule not revised after sharp fall in number of asylum-seekers • Long period of separation from family member left in country characterised by violent attacks and ill-treatment, with insurmountable obstacles to reunification in country of origin • Fair balance not struck between relevant interests at stake   STRASBOURG 9 July 2021     This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of M.A. v. Denmark, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Robert Spano, President ,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Ksenija Turković,   Paul Lemmens,   Síofra O’Leary,   Yonko Grozev,   Faris Vehabović,   Iulia Antoanella Motoc,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Georges Ravarani,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking,   Péter Paczolay,   María Elósegui,   Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges , and Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 10 June 2020, 10 March and 12   May 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date:   INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the Danish authorities’ temporary refusal to grant the applicant’s wife a residence permit in Denmark based on family reunification. In particular the applicant complained that persons like him, who had been granted “temporary protection” in Denmark, were subject to a statutory three-year waiting period before being granted family reunification (unless exceptional reasons existed), whereas other persons being granted international protection in Denmark were not subject to such a restriction. The applicant relied on Article 8 read alone and in conjunction with Article   14 of the Convention. PROCEDURE 2.     The case originated in an application (no. 6697/18) against the Kingdom of Denmark lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Syrian national, Mr M.A. (“the applicant”), on 30   January 2018. The President of the Grand Chamber acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule   47 §   4 of the Rules of Court). 3.     The applicant was represented by Mr Christian Dahlager, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen. The Danish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Michael Braad, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their Co-Agent, Mrs Nina Holst-Christensen, from the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The applicant alleged that the final refusal by the Danish authorities on 16 September 2016 to grant him family reunification with his wife in Denmark had been in breach of Article 8, read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. 5.     The case was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court, pursuant to Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court. It was communicated to the Government on 7 September 2018. 6.     The applicant and the Government filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 7.     On 19 November 2019 the Chamber of the Fourth Section, composed of Faris Vehabović, President, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Carlo Ranzoni, Georges Ravarani, Péter Paczolay, Jolien Schukking, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to such relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 8.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 9.     The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe exercised her right under Article 36 § 3 of the Convention to intervene in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber and submitted written observations. 10.     Leave to intervene, under Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule   44 § 3 of the Rules of Court, was granted to the Governments of Norway and Switzerland, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Danish Institute for Human Rights. 11.     A hearing took place in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 June 2020 (Rule 59 § 3); on account of the public-health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, it was held via video-conference. The webcast of the hearing was made public on the Court’s website the following day. There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   M. Braad , Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Mrs   N. Holst-Christensen , Ministry of Justice,   Co-Agent , Mrs   L. Zeuner , Ministry of Immigration and   Integration, Mrs   M-L . Lindsay-Poulsen , Ministry of Immigration   and Integration, Mrs   A-S . Saugmann-Jensen , Ministry of Justice, Mrs   Ø . Akar , Ministry of Immigration and Integration, Mr   C . Wegener , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr   N.R. Brandt , Ministry of Immigration and Integration, Mrs   S. Larsen Vaabengaard , Ministry of Justice, Mrs   S. Bach Andersen , Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   C . Dahlager, Lawyer, Mrs   D. Kynde Nielsen , Lawyer,   Counsel ; (c)     for the Office of the Commission for Human Rights Mrs   D. Mijatović , Commissioner for Human Rights,   Agent , Mrs   A. Weber , Adviser to the Commissioner,   Adviser ; (d)     for the Swiss Government Mr   A. Chablais , Head of the International Unit   for the Protection of Human Rights,   Agent , Mrs   D. Steiger Leuba , Mrs   K.M. Hamann ,   Advisers .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Braad, Mr Dahlager, Mrs Mijatović and Mr Chablais. The Court also heard replies from the representatives of the parties to questions from judges. THE FACTS 12.     The applicant is a Syrian national, born in 1959, who fled Syria in January 2015. He entered Denmark in April 2015 and requested asylum. 13.     In his interview with the Immigration Service ( Udlændingestyrelsen ) on 11 May 2015, the applicant explained that he had left Syria legally by plane from Damascus, via Beirut, to Istanbul. He had stayed in Istanbul for two months in a rented apartment. His brother, born in 1965, joined him there, and via an agent, they travelled by boat to Greece, and from there, hidden in a truck, to Denmark. The trip had cost him around 7,000 euros (EUR). In support of his request for asylum, he submitted that being a doctor, he was at risk of being subjected to ill ‑ treatment by both the authorities and the rebel movement. He had twice been stopped at a checkpoint. He also stated that his wife, G.M., born in 1966, whom he had married in 1990, worked as a media consultant. She and their two adult children had remained in Syria. 14.     On 8 June 2015 the Immigration Service granted him “temporary protection status” for one year, under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act, concerning individuals who face capital punishment, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment owing to severe instability and indiscriminate violence against civilians in their home country.   His residence permit was subsequently extended for one year at a time. 15.     The Immigration Service did not find that the applicant fulfilled the requirements for being granted protection under section 7(1) of the Aliens Act (individuals falling under the protection of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, “Convention status”) or under section 7(2) (individuals, who do not qualify as refugees under the UN Refugee Convention, but who are facing capital punishment, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if returned to their home country, “protection status”). At the relevant time, residence permits under subsections 1 and 2 were normally granted for five   years. 16.     The applicant appealed against the decision to the Refugee Appeals Board ( Flygtningenævnet ), arguing that he should be granted protection under section 7(1) or (2) of the Aliens Act. By a decision of 9   December 2015, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the Immigration Service’s decision to grant the applicant temporary protection under section 7(3). The reasoning was as follows: “The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board accept as a fact, based on the information provided by the Immigration Service, that the appellant satisfies the conditions for being granted residence under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act. The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that the appellant has failed to render it probable that he has placed himself in such an adversarial position to the Syrian authorities or to the opposition of the regime due to his specific and personal circumstances that he risks persecution or ill-treatment falling within section   7(1) or section 7(2) of the Aliens Act if returned to Syria. The majority of the Board have emphasised in this context that the appellant was not subjected to specific and personal persecution during his stay in Damascus despite the fact that he was stopped at a checkpoint on two occasions because he is a doctor. In making this assessment, it was taken into account that the appellant was stopped solely for the reason that he was a doctor and that on both occasions he was permitted to continue, and that he had not been called on at his house by authorities or other groups, nor had they otherwise approached him about specific matters. The majority of the Board accordingly find, regardless of the generally difficult conditions of doctors in Syria, that the appellant cannot be deemed to have caught the attention of the authorities or others in such manner that he falls within section 7(1) or section 7(2) of the Aliens Act. Reference is also made to the circumstance that it is solely based on the appellant’s own assumption that [he] will experience problems due to his medical profession. Accordingly, [the applicant] does not satisfy the conditions for being granted residence under section 7(1) or section 7(2) of the Aliens Act, for which reasons the Refugee Appeals Board upholds the decision made by the Immigration Service.” Under Danish law, decisions of the Refugee Appeals Board are final and not subject to appeal (section 56(8) of the Aliens Act). 17.     In the meantime, on 4 November 2015 the applicant requested family reunification with his wife and two adult children, who were born in 1992 and 1993 respectively. The children are not part of the proceedings before the Court. In the application the applicant’s wife, who at the relevant time was 48 years old, declared that she did not suffer from any serious illness or disability. 18.     On 5 July 2016, the applicant’s request was rejected by the Immigration Service because he had not been in possession of a residence permit under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act for the last three years as required under section 9(1)(i)(d) of the Act, and because there were no exceptional reasons, including concern for the unity of the family, to justify family reunification under section 9c(1) of the Act. The Immigration Service emphasised that it had not taken a stand on whether other conditions had been fulfilled, including whether the marriage could be legally acknowledged in Denmark. 19.     The applicant appealed against the refusal to grant him family reunification with his wife. On 16 September 2016 the Immigration Appeals Board ( Udlændingenævnet ) upheld the decision. It noted in particular that the applicant was in good health, that the applicant’s wife had confirmed that she did not suffer from any serious illness or disability and that she was not in need of care provided by others. 20.     The applicant instituted proceedings before the courts complaining that the refusal to grant him family reunification with his wife was in breach of Article 8 read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. He submitted that he had been discriminated against as compared to persons who had been granted protection under section   7(1) and (2) of the Aliens Act. By Law no.   102 of 3   February 2016 (hereinafter “the 2016 Act”), the Danish Parliament had amended section 9(1)(i)(d) of the Aliens Act, so that the right to family reunification for a person who, like him, had been granted “temporary protection status” under section 7(3) could be exercised only after three years (in the absence of exceptional reasons), while individuals enjoying “Convention status” or “protection status” could be granted family reunification without being subjected to a waiting period. 21.     The High Court of Eastern Denmark ( Østre Landsret ) found against the applicant in a judgment of 19 May 2017. 22.     On appeal, by a judgment of 6 November 2017, the Supreme Court ( Højesteret ) also found against him. Sitting as a panel of seven judges, it stated as follows: “The case involves judicial review of the decision made by the Immigration Appeals Board on 16 September 2016, in which the application for residence in Denmark for [G.M.], the spouse of [M.A.], was rejected. [G.M.] had applied for a residence permit based on her marriage to [M.A.], who had been granted residence in Denmark under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act (temporary protection status due to the general situation in Syria, his country of origin). The reason for the decision is that [M.A.] had not yet had his residence permit issued under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act for at least the last three years, see section   9(1)(i)(d), and that there were no exceptional reasons, including regard for family unity, for issuing a residence permit under section 9c(1) of the Aliens Act. [M.A.] has submitted that the refusal of his application for family reunification was contrary to Article 8 read alone and to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 8, when the decision of the Immigration Appeals Board was made, or at least the refusal is contrary to the Convention at the present time. The Supreme Court notes in this respect that a judicial review of the Immigration Appeals Board’s decision under section 63 of the Danish Constitution ( grundloven ) must be based on the circumstances existing at the time when the decision was made, see, inter alia , the Supreme Court decision reproduced on p. 639 of the Weekly Law Reports for 2006 (UfR 2006.639 H). The issue of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 ... According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, any State is entitled to control immigration into its territory provided that the State complies with its international obligations. Article 8 does not imply a general obligation on the part of a State to respect immigrants’ choice of their country of residence or to grant them the right to family reunification on its territory. In a case which concerns family life as well as immigration, the extent of a State’s obligations will vary according to the particular circumstances of the person involved and the general interest, see, for example, paras 43 and 44 of the judgment delivered by the Court of Human Rights on 10 July 2014 in Mugenzi v. France . The decision in the case at hand was made in accordance with the provision that persons who are not recognised as refugees according to the UN Refugee Convention, but who cannot return because they risk ill-treatment falling within Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights because of the general conditions in their country of origin, must normally have held a residence permit for three years before they become eligible for family reunification. A number of other signatory countries to the Convention on Human Rights also have rules stipulating that persons who are granted protection status without being UN Convention refugees can only be granted family reunification after the expiry of a certain period. The European Court of Human Rights has not yet considered to what extent such statutory waiting periods applicable to persons who are granted protection status without being UN Convention refugees are compatible with Article 8. The Court said in its judgments of 10 July 2014 in Tanda-Muzinga v. France and Mugenzi v. France that refugees need to benefit from a family reunification procedure that is more favourable than that foreseen for other aliens and that such applications must be examined promptly, attentively and with particular diligence. The applicants in the above two cases were not persons granted temporary protection status, but refugees recognised under the UN Refugee Convention. As a matter of fact, the cases did not concern a statutory waiting period as in the case at hand, but situations in which the visa application examination procedure had been unreasonably lengthy. The Court of Human Rights found in its judgment of the same date (10   July   2014) in Senigo Longue and Others v. France that Article 8 had been violated in a situation in which the French authorities had, in connection with the examination of an application for family reunification, doubted the applicant’s maternal relationship with two children who had been left alone in Cameroon and had taken four years to reach a decision. In that case, the Court said that, despite the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State, the decision-making process did not sufficiently safeguard the flexibility, speed and efficiency required to observe the right to respect for family life. The applicant in that case was not a refugee, but had come to France as a result of family reunification with her spouse. The case did not concern the period of 18 months that she had to wait under French law before being able to apply for family reunification, but only the long processing time after the application had been lodged. It follows from the ... Court’s case-law that the factors to be taken into account when determining whether a State is obliged to grant family reunification are the extent to which family life is effectively ruptured, the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of one or more of them and whether there are factors of immigration control or considerations of public order weighing in favour of exclusion, see, inter alia , § 70 of the judgment delivered on 28   September 2011 in Nunez v.   Norway . It appears from the preparatory notes of section 7(3) and section 9(1)(i)(d) of the Aliens Act that the separate treatment of this group of people whose need for protection is based on the general situation in their country of origin (temporary protection status under section 7(3) and the limited right to family reunification afforded to this group were introduced in the light of the conflict in Syria, which has caused millions of people to flee and has led to a significant increase in the number of new asylum-seekers in Denmark. It also appears from the preparatory notes that the Government is ready to assume joint responsibility and safeguard the protection of this group of asylum-seekers for as long as they need protection, but that Denmark is not to accept so many refugees that it will threaten national cohesion. Moreover, it appears that the number of newcomers determines whether the subsequent integration becomes successful and that it is necessary to strike the right balance to maintain a good and safe society. Against this background, the Supreme Court finds that the restriction on the eligibility for family reunification is justified by interests to be safeguarded under Article 8 of the Convention. The question is now whether the restriction is necessary in a democratic society in order to safeguard the said interests. The Supreme Court finds that the situation of [M.A.] is not comparable with the situations considered by the European Court in Tanda-Muzinga v. France , Mugenzi v.   France and Senigo Longue and Others v. France . The first two cases concerned UN Convention refugees, and all three cases concerned long processing times. The assessment of whether the decision of the Immigration Appeals Board to refuse family reunification is compatible with Article 8 must therefore be based on the general criteria listed by the European Court of Human Rights, see Nunez v. Norway (cited above). [M.A.] had held a residence permit for Denmark for about one year and three months when the application was refused by the Immigration Appeals Board. Accordingly, he had limited ties in Denmark, and [G.M.], his spouse, has no ties in Denmark. The Supreme Court accepts as a fact that the couple face insurmountable obstacles to cohabiting in Syria because [M.A.] risks ill-treatment falling within Article 3 if returned to Syria due to the particularly serious situation characterised by arbitrary violence and ill-treatment of civilians. In reality, the refusal of the application for family reunification therefore implies that he is prevented from cohabiting with his spouse, although the barrier to his right to exercise his family life is only temporary. It follows from the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board of 9 December 2015 that [M.A.] has not placed himself in an adversarial position to the Syrian authorities or to the opposition of the regime due to his specific and personal circumstances so that he risks persecution or ill-treatment falling within section 7(1) or section 7(2) of the Aliens Act and that he has not caught the attention of the Syrian authorities or others in such manner as to fall within those provisions. Therefore, he can return to Syria when the general situation in the country improves. If there is no such improvement within three years from the date on which [M.A.] was granted residence in Denmark, he will normally be eligible for family reunification with his spouse. An application to this effect can be lodged two months prior to expiry of the three-year period, and the Supreme Court accepts as a fact that, in that case, the application will be examined as set out in the preparatory notes of the Act as quickly as possible when he has resided in Denmark for three years and a decision has been made to renew his temporary residence permit under section 7(3). Should exceptional circumstances emerge before the expiry of the three-year period, such as serious illness, which will make the separation from his spouse particularly severe, it will be possible to be granted family reunification under section 9c(1) of the Aliens Act. Against this background, the Supreme Court finds that the condition that [M.A.] must normally have been resident in Denmark for three years before he can be granted family reunification with his spouse falls within the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State when balancing the regard for the respect for his family life and the regard for the interests of society, which can be safeguarded according to Article 8. The Supreme Court finds that the decrease in the number of asylum-seekers in 2016 and 2017 cannot result in a different outcome of the assessment of whether the decision made by the Immigration Appeals Board in the case of [M.A.] was justified. The Supreme Court observes in this respect that it was decided by Law no. 153 of 18   February 2015 [the 2015 Act], which introduced the one-year residence permit requirement as a condition for the right to family reunification, that a review of the Aliens Act should be introduced in the Parliamentary year 2017/18 at the latest. By Law no. 102 of 3   February 2016 [the 2016 Act], which amended the three-year residence permit requirement, this review clause was maintained. The reason for this amendment given in the preparatory notes is that the Government found that the extraordinary situation with a very large number of asylum-seekers and applications for family reunification in Denmark had made it necessary to tighten rules as proposed. The Supreme Court therefore concurs in the view that the decision made by the Immigration Appeals Board is not contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issue of differential treatment under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 8 The requirement of three years’ residence as a condition for family reunification applies to persons like [M.A.] issued with a residence permit under section 7(3) of the Aliens Act who risk ill-treatment falling within Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights if returned to their country of origin because the situation in the country of origin is generally characterised by arbitrary violence against civilians. As opposed to those situations, the three-year residence requirement does not apply to aliens issued with a residence permit under section 7(1), because they fall within the Refugee Convention, or under section 7(2), because they risk ill-treatment falling within Article 3 if returned to their country of origin due to their personal circumstances. Article 14 of the Convention ... prohibits differential treatment based on the rights protected by the Convention, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, etc. or ‘other status’. [M.A.] had not experienced differential treatment based on sex, race or any other status as expressly listed in Article 14 by the date of the decision made by the Immigration Appeals Board. However, it appears from the ... Court’s case-law that a person’s immigration status can be any ‘other status’ falling within Article 14, see §   45 of the judgment of 27 September 2011 in Bah v. the United Kingdom and §§   44 to 47 of the judgment of 6 November 2012 in Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom . It further appears that differential treatment contrary to Article 14 occurs if persons in similar or comparable situations are afforded a more favourable treatment in terms of the rights protected by the Convention and such differential treatment is not based on objective and fair reasons, that is, if the differential treatment is disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. Finally, it appears that the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment and that the scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background. According to the preparatory notes to section 9(1)(i)(d) of the Aliens Act, the different rules on family reunification applicable to aliens granted residence under section 7(1) and (2) and aliens like [M.A.] who are granted residence under section   7(3) are justified by the circumstance that aliens granted residence under section 7(1) and (2) are subjected to personal persecution, usually because of a conflict with the authorities or others in their country of origin, whereas aliens granted residence under section 7(3) are not subject to personal persecution but have fled due to the general situation, such as war, in their country of origin. Those individuals therefore do not have a specific conflict with anybody in their country of origin, and the preparatory notes considered it a fact that, in general, this group of individuals have a more temporary need for protection than persons subjected to personal persecution as the situation in their country of origin may quickly change in nature and become more peaceful. The Supreme Court considers it doubtful whether the situation of [M.A.] is comparable with the situation of aliens granted residence under section 7(1) and (2) of the Aliens Act because they risk persecution due to their personal circumstances if returned to their country of origin. Despite this assumption, the Supreme Court finds that the difference in the right to family reunification, which is, as already mentioned, based on an assessment of the need for protection among different groups of individuals, must be deemed to have been based on objective and fair reasons falling within the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in a case concerning differential treatment based on immigration status. Accordingly, the Supreme Court finds no basis for dismissing the assessment made by the Danish Parliament, according to which, from a general perspective, the need for protection of persons falling within section 7(3) of the Aliens Act is more temporary than that of persons falling within section 7(1) and (2). The general situation in a person’s country of origin, which has justified a temporary need for protection, may quickly change. This is illustrated by the judgments delivered by the Court of Human Rights on 28 June 2011 in Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom and on 5 September 2013 in K.A.B. v.   Sweden . In assessing whether the restriction on the right of [M.A.] to be granted family reunification in Denmark with his spouse is compatible with Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Supreme Court has also emphasised that his separation from his spouse, as mentioned in the above paragraph on Article 8, is only temporary and that he can be granted family reunification at a later point if exceptional reasons apply. Against this background, the Supreme Court concurs with the view that the decision made by the Immigration Appeals Board is not contrary to Article 14 of the Convention ... taken together with Article 8, either.” 23.     On 26 April 2018, having resided in Denmark for two years, ten months and two weeks, the applicant submitted a new request for family reunification. His request was refused on 22 October 2018 because the applicant had failed to submit documentation regarding the authenticity of the marriage. Having submitted the necessary documentation, on 24   June 2019 the applicant’s wife was granted a residence permit, initially valid for one year. She entered Denmark on 29 September 2019. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant Domestic Law 24.     The relevant provisions of the Aliens Act read as follows: Section 7 “(1)     Upon application, a residence permit will be issued to an alien if the alien falls within the provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28   July 1951). (2)     Upon application, a residence permit will be issued to an alien if the alien risks the death penalty or being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in case of return to his or her country of origin. An application as mentioned in the first sentence hereof is also considered an application for residence under subsection (1). (3)     In cases falling within section 7(2) in which the alien’s risk of the death penalty or of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is based on a particularly serious situation in his or her country of origin characterised by arbitrary violent attacks and ill-treatment of civilians, temporary residence will be granted upon application. An application as mentioned in the first sentence hereof is also considered an application for residence under subsections (1) and (2).” 25.     In 2015 protection under section 7(1) and (2) was granted for five years at a time. Protection under section 7(3) was initially granted for one year and subsequently, after one year, for two years at a time. 26.     In 2016 the Aliens Act was amended, so that protection under section 7(1) was granted for two years at a time; protection under section   7(2) was initially granted for one year at a time and subsequently two years at a time, and protection under section 7(3) was granted for one year at a time the first three years and subsequently for two years at a time. 27.     In 2019, by Law no. 174 of 27 February 2019, which entered into force on 1 March 2019, section 7(1) and (2) of the Aliens Act were amended, inserting the words “for the purposes of temporary residence” after the words “residence permit”. 28.     Section 9(1)(i) of the Aliens Act regulated the basic criteria for family reunification: “(1)     Upon application, a residence permit can be issued to: (i)     an alien over the age of 24 who cohabits at a shared residence, either in marriage or in regular cohabitation of prolonged duration, with a person permanently resident in Denmark over the age of 24 who – (a)     is a Danish national; (b)     is a national of one of the other Nordic countries; (c)     has been issued with a residence permit under section 7(1) or (2) or section 8; (d)     has held a residence permit under section 7(3) for at least the last three years; or (e)     has held a permanent residence permit for Denmark for at least the last three   years; ...” 29.     Section 9c(1) of the Aliens Act, which provided for a general exception to section 9 where exceptional reasons made it appropriate, had the following wording: “(1)     Upon application, a residence permit can be issued to an alien if exceptional reasons make it appropriate, including regard for family unity and, if the alien is under the age of 18, regard for the best interests of the child. Unless particular reasons make it inappropriate, including regard for family unity and, if the alien is under the age of   18, regard for the best interests of the child, the issue of a residence permit under the first sentence hereof as a result of family ties with a person living in Denmark is subject to the conditions set out in section 9(2) to (24), (34) and (35). The provisions of section 9(26) to (33) and (36) to (42) apply with the necessary modifications.” 30.     Section 7(3) and section 9(1)(i)(d) of the Aliens Act were introduced by Law no. 153 of 18   February 2015, which entered into force on 20   February 2015 (hereinafter “the 2015 Act”). This Act made a distinction between, on the one hand, individuals who were not eligible for Convention status under section 7(1) but who risked the death penalty or being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to their country of origin (protection status under section 7(2)) and, on the other, individuals who risked the death penalty or being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment owing to a particularly serious situation in their country of origin characterised by arbitrary violent attacks and ill-treatment of civilians (temporary protection status under section 7(3)). Section 9(1)(i)(d) postponed the right to family reunification in general for individuals with temporary protection status under section 7(3) by one year, with the exception provided for under section 9c(1). Lastly, the Act introduced a review clause into section 3 in order to evaluate the amendments during the 2017/18 parliamentary year at the latest. 31.     The preparatory notes to the bill (Bill no. L72 of 14   November 2014) leading to the 2015 Act, stated, among other things: “1.     Introduction and background The developments in Syria have caused millions of people to flee their homes. Denmark and various other countries have offered massive aid to help the many people affected by the conflict cope with the unfortunate situation they find themselves in. To date, Denmark has thus provided relief measures worth approximately DKK 800 million to the region. Also, Denmark has already received a significant share of spontaneous asylum-seekers from Syria, and has decided to earmark 140 of the resettlement places for 2014 to quota refugees from Syria. The Government takes a humane approach to asylum policy and is fundamentally of the view that Denmark should take a share of the responsibility for the world’s refugees. At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that Denmark cannot offer residency to all those who need help. In the course of 2014, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of asylum-seekers arriving in Denmark and our neighbouring countries. Some of the asylum-seekers arriving in Denmark from countries like Syria come from areas with extreme and random ill-treatment of civilians because of the current conflict in the country and are consequently entitled to protection under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Government wants to meet its international obligations and offer this group of asylum-seekers protection for as long as they need it. At the same time, the Government wants to make sure that these aliens, whose need for protection is temporary, can be returned as soon as the situation in their country of origin makes it possible. In line with the cases previously decided by the Refugee Appeals Board, this group of asylum-seekers are granted a residence permit with protection status under section   7(2) of the Aliens Act, despite the fact that this is not wholly consonant with the original intention behind the provision. With the bill, it is proposed to introduce temporary protection status for aliens whose need for protection is based on a particularly serious situation in their country of origin in connection with an armed conflict or a similar situation. The bill does not extend the right to asylum in Denmark, but makes it easier to return this group of people to their country of origin once the fighting in Syria has calmed down. It is proposed that aliens falling within the rules on temporary protection should be granted residence permits allowing them to stay temporarily in Denmark. The residence permits can be renewed after one year and subsequently two years after the date of any renewal, in which connection an assessment will be made of whether they still need protection. Owing to the temporary nature of the protection status, it is further proposed that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, an alien granted temporary protection should not be eligible for family reunification unless the temporary residence permit is renewed after one year. The introduction of a temporary protection status for certain aliens will not affect refugees covered by the UN