CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 juillet 2021

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display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF ALI RIZA v. SWITZERLAND (Application no. 74989/11)   JUDGMENT   Art 6 (civil) • Access to a court • Inadmissibility decision of Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), sitting in Lausanne, upheld by Federal Supreme Court, on grounds of lack of jurisdiction to rule on merits of dispute between a professional football player and his former Turkish club • Art 6 §   1 applicable to economic rights resulting from a contractual relationship between private individuals. • Decisions neither arbitrary nor unreasonable • Extremely tenuous link between the dispute and Switzerland • Specificity of proceedings before the CAS and Federal Supreme Court • Proportionality Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 July 2021   FINAL   22/11/2021   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ali Riza v. Switzerland, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Paul Lemmens , President ,   Dmitry Dedov,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Georges Ravarani,   María Elósegui,   Darian Pavli,   Anja Seibert-Fohr , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   74989/11) against the Swiss Confederation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British and Turkish national, Mr Ömer Kerim Ali Rıza (“the applicant”), on 11   November 2011; the decision to give notice to the Swiss Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the right of access to a court, the right to a public hearing and the principle of equality of arms, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; the decision of the British and Turkish Governments not to avail themselves of their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention), the decision of the President of the Chamber on 22   January 2021 to appoint Carlo Ranzoni to sit as an ad hoc judge, in the absenceof a judge elected in respect of Switzerland (Article   26   §   4 of the Convention and Rule   29 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Having deliberated in private on 8 June 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns a dispute between the applicant, a professional football player, and Trabzonspor, the Turkish club for which he formerly played. He alleges, inter alia , that he did not have access to a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, following a decision by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), sitting in Lausanne, finding his case inadmissible on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the dispute, a decision that was upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Broxbourne. He was represented by Mr L. Valloni, a lawyer practising in Zurich. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr A. Chablais, of the Federal Office of Justice. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 4.     The applicant is a British national. In view of family’s Turkish origins, he was also granted Turkish nationality on 17 August 2004. 5.     At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a professional football player. 6.     In January 2006 the applicant signed an undated fixed-term employment contract, effective from 17 January 2006 to 30 June 2008, with Trabzonspor Kulübü Derneği (“the Club”), a professional football club in the Turkish league and a member of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF, Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu ); in turn, the TFF is affiliated with Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). The contract was drawn up in English and specified, among other points, the amount of the applicant’s salary and an arbitration clause in favour of FIFA. 7.     On 4 January 2008 the applicant left the Club and returned to the United Kingdom. He informed the Club that he would no longer play for it, claiming that the Club had failed to honour its contractual obligations. 8.     By decisions of 8 and 14 January 2008, the Club’s board of directors ordered the applicant to pay a fine for leaving the Club without notice, missing training sessions without permission and failing to return to the Club. The applicant was notified of those decisions on 14 and 15   January 2008 respectively, through a notary. 9.     On 18 January 2008 [1] the applicant brought the dispute before the FIFA Dispute Revolution Chamber. He alleged that the Club had repeatedly defaulted on its payment obligations under the contract, and that certain salary payments had been made with delays of more than four months. 10.     In a letter dated 19 February 2008, FIFA informed the applicant that it could not intervene in disputes between two parties of the same nationality. It therefore advised him to submit the dispute to the decision-making bodies of the relevant FIFA association member, in this case the TFF. 11.     On 8 April 2008 the applicant sent the Club and the TFF a written notice of termination of the contract entered into with the Club; he argued that this was within his rights, since his salary for the month of March had not been paid. The notice also stipulated that the applicant would no longer play for the Club in future. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE Turkish Football Federation (TFF) 12.     On 16 May 2008 the Club lodged an application brought its dispute with the applicant before the TFF’s Dispute Resolution Committee ( Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu Uyuşmazlık Çözüm Kurulu ), seeking a transfer ban, damages for wrongful termination of the contract and payment of the fine imposed on the applicant by its board of directors. 13.     On 2 December 2008 the Dispute Resolution Committee ruled in favour of the Club and ordered the applicant to pay compensation for the wrongful termination of the contract, and a fine. It also suspended his ability to sign with another club for four months. 14.     On 22 January 2009 the applicant lodged an objection with the TFF Arbitration Committee against the Dispute Resolution Committee’s decision of 2 December 2008. 15.     By a decision of 16 April 2009, the TFF Arbitration Committee upheld the Dispute Resolution Committee’s decision, finding that the contract had been wrongly terminated. However, it reduced the amount that the applicant had to pay and set aside the sporting sanction imposed on him. 16.     The applicant was notified of the Arbitration Committee’s decision on 21 October 2009. The law in force at the material time provided that the Arbitration Committee’s decisions were final and enforceable and were not subject to review by the ordinary courts (see paragraph   52 below). Proceedings against TURKEY before the european Court of Human Rights 17.     On 20 April 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the Court against Turkey, alleging a violation of Article   6 § 1 of the Convention on account, inter alia , of the TFF Arbitration Committee’s lack of independence and impartiality. His application was joined by the Court to those of four other Turkish nationals. 18.     In its judgment of 28 January 2020 ( Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey , nos. 30226/10 and 4 others, 28 January 2020), the Court noted, first, that at the material time the Arbitration Committee had exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction over the applicant’s dispute. Moreover, that body’s decisions were final and binding, and therefore not amenable to judicial review. Thus, the arbitration was compulsory (§   176) and, in consequence, the safeguards of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ought to have been afforded by the Arbitration Committee (§§   180-181). 19.     On the merits, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in relation to the applicant. It considered that the constitution of the TFF Arbitration Committee did not in fact meet the conditions for independence and impartiality. This was in large part due to the fact that the TFF Regulations did not provide adequate safeguards protecting the members of the Arbitration Committee from outside pressures. In addition, the Board of Directors, the TFF’s executive body, was made up of members or managers of football clubs and had excessive influence over the organisation and running of the Arbitration Committee (§   222). 20.     On that basis, the Court indicated that, under Article   46 of the Convention, measures were to be taken to ensure the structural independence of the Arbitration Committee (§ 242). Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for sport and the FEDERAL supreme COURT 21.     In the meantime, the applicant had applied on 11 November 2009 to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“the CAS”) against the TFF Arbitration Committee’s decision of 16 April 2009. 22.     On 12 March 2010 the CAS informed the parties, namely the applicant on the one side, and the Club and the TFF on the other, that it intended to rule on the preliminary question of its own jurisdiction. It asked the parties if they would like a hearing to be held on this question, in the absence of which it would base its decision solely on their written observations. 23.     On 17 March 2010 the applicant replied in the affirmative, whilst the two opposing parties stated that they both considered a hearing on the preliminary question of jurisdiction to be unnecessary. 24.     On 18 March 2010 the CAS gave the parties an opportunity to submit written observations regarding its jurisdiction, followed by a second round of written pleadings on 23 March 2010. 25.     On 10 June 2010 the CAS declared the case inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction, without holding a hearing. 26.     In its 22-page decision, the CAS considered, under section 176 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law ( la Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé , “PILA”, see paragraph 47 below), that the dispute in question fell under Chapter 12 of that Act, entitled “International Arbitration”, given that neither party was domiciled or habitually resident in Switzerland when the contract was concluded, and that the CAS headquarters are in Switzerland. 27.     The CAS then applied section 186 PILA (see paragraph 47 below), allowing it to rule on its own jurisdiction. It pointed out that Article R47 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration (“the Code”; see paragraph 48 below) established that its jurisdiction could derive either from a contract containing an arbitration clause, a subsequent arbitration convention, or even from a sporting organisation’s statutes or regulations providing for the appeal to the CAS. However, the CAS found that nothing in the contract between the applicant and the Club established its jurisdiction and noted that the parties had not signed a subsequent arbitration convention. 28.     The CAS then found that neither the FIFA statutes nor the 2008 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players provided a basis for its jurisdiction. With regard to the Regulation on the TFF Arbitration Committee, Article 14 provided that any opposition to the Arbitration Committee’s decisions on disputes arising in particular from sporting contracts could be submitted to the CAS, in so far as those disputes contained an international element (see paragraph 53 below). The CAS found that the international element in question referred to the dispute itself and not to the contract. In this regard, the CAS found that the dispute had nothing to do with the applicant’s wish to be transferred from Trabzonspor to a non-Turkish club and that no foreign club was involved in the dispute itself. The dispute related to salary arrears and arose from a contract between a Turkish club and the applicant, who was, among other things, a Turkish national. As to whether the applicant could be considered a foreigner in Turkey, the CAS referred to several documents and took account of various aspects of the player’s history. It noted, in particular, that he had arrived in Turkey in 2003 at the age of 23, and was registered there as a Turkish player. The CAS considered that, with regard to the dispute, his closest ties were with Turkey, and his dual nationality was insufficient grounds to justify ascribing an international element to the dispute within the meaning of Article 14 of the Regulations on the TFF Arbitration Committee. Lastly, the CAS pointed out that FIFA had already found that there was no international element to the dispute and had accordingly refused to become involved (see paragraph 10 above), and that the applicant had not challenged that decision. 29.     In conclusion, the CAS found that there was no international element to the dispute and, accordingly, that Article 14 of the TFF Arbitration Committee Regulations did not apply to the case (see paragraph 53 below). It followed that the conditions of Article R47 of the Code had not been fulfilled, and, according to the CAS, there was no basis for its jurisdiction (see paragraph 48 below). 30.     On 9 July 2010 the applicant lodged a civil-law appeal with the Swiss Federal Supreme Court against the CAS’s inadmissibility decision of 10   June 2010. 31.     Procedurally, the applicant asked first, as a preliminary measure, that the Federal Supreme Court grant suspensive effect to his appeal. Secondly, the applicant asked it to grant the Club and the TFF a single non-extendable time-limit for submitting comments. Thirdly, he expressed his wish for a public hearing before the Federal Supreme Court. 32.     On the merits, the applicant requested that the inadmissibility decision of 10 June 2010 be quashed on the basis of section 190 (2)(b) and (d) PILA (see paragraph 47 below), asked for the CAS’s jurisdiction to be recognised and, were this granted, that his case be sent back to the CAS. 33.     In this connection, the applicant alleged, for the first time, that there had been a violation of Article 29a (guarantee of access to the courts) and Article 30 (guarantee of judicial proceedings) of the Swiss Constitution (see paragraph   44 below), and of Article 13 of the Convention. In his view, the CAS had erred in holding that it did not have jurisdiction, since the international element in the dispute was clear from the contract, the legal bases for the dispute, the dispute itself and his personal situation. As a result of the CAS decision, it had proved impossible for the dispute to be examined by an impartial and independent court, since the Turkish authorities did not fulfil these criteria and the Arbitration Committee’s decisions were final and binding. On this basis, he requested that the CAS award be overturned, in accordance with section 190   (2)(b) PILA (see paragraph 47 below). Secondly, the applicant claimed in his appeal that the CAS had not fulfilled its obligation to give reasons for its decision. Thirdly, the applicant alleged that there had been a breach of his right to be heard, in that no hearing had been held before the CAS, although he had responded in the affirmative when asked for his view on that matter (see paragraph 23 above). In his view, a hearing would have given the CAS a more precise understanding of the factual situation, and especially of the fact that the applicant considered himself to be a foreigner in Turkey. He alleged a violation of Article 29 § 1 of the Constitution and Article   6 of the Convention, thus basing his request for the decision to be quashed on section 190 (2)(d) PILA. 34.     The Club and the TFF were notified of the appeal on 14   July   2010. 35.     The Federal Supreme Court ruled first on the question of suspensive effect, which it granted in a decision on 30 September 2010. 36.     The defending parties then applied for a security for costs order. The Federal Supreme Court granted this application on 11   November 2010 and fixed the amount of security at 10,000 Swiss francs (CHF), after having given the parties an opportunity to submit comments on this point. 37.     In a decision dated 2 December 2010, the Federal Supreme Court then gave the Club and the TFF until 18 January 2011 to submit their observations on the appeal (noting that the period of 18 December to 2 January inclusive was not included, this being the court recess). 38.     On 20 January 2011 the applicant received the observations submitted by the Club and the TFF on his appeal and was informed that he had until 7   February 2011 to comment on them. 39.     In a judgment of 19 April 2011, notified to the applicant on 13 May 2011, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 40.     It began by dismissing the applicant’s request for a public hearing. The Federal Supreme Court found that it was not appropriate to hold a public hearing on the basis of section 57 of the Federal Supreme Court Act ( “the FSCA”) (see paragraph   45 below). It added that a public hearing could exceptionally be required by a law that is higher than domestic law. However, this obligation did not apply in appeal proceedings against an arbitral award, governed by section 77 FSCA (see paragraph   45 below). 41.     The Federal Supreme Court pointed out that only the grounds listed exhaustively in section 190(2) PILA could be relied upon in support of an appeal against an international arbitration award. It noted that the provisions of the Constitution and the Convention were not, in principle, grounds for appeal, but that they could be mentioned in support of the grounds listed in section 190(2) PILA. However, section 77(3) FSCA set out a specific requirement that reasons were to be given for these complaints. In consequence, the Federal Supreme Court examined only complaints that had been raised and sufficiently substantiated in the notice of appeal. In the present case, however, the applicant had not satisfied that requirement when he relied in his appeal on Article 29a of the Constitution and Articles   6 and   13 of the Convention in relation to the CAS’s jurisdiction and the violation of his right to be heard. Thus, the Federal Supreme Court did not explore these complaints. 42.     Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court upheld the CAS’s decision to the effect that there was no international element to the dispute and that it did not therefore fulfil the conditions of Article 14 of the Regulations on the TFF Arbitration Committee. Thus, there were no grounds for the CAS’s jurisdiction (see point 4 et seq. of the judgment). 43.     Lastly, the Federal Supreme Court pointed out that, according to its case-law, section 190(2)(d) PILA did not confer a right either to particular reasoning in an arbitral award, or a hearing before an arbitration court (see point 5). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE RELEVANT SWISS LAW 44.     The relevant provisions of the Federal Constitution (Recueil systématique (“RS”) - Compendium of Federal Law, 101) read as follows: Article 29 General procedural guarantees “Every person has the right to equal and fair treatment in judicial and administrative proceedings and to have their case decided within a reasonable time. ...” Article 29a Guarantee of access to the courts “In a legal dispute, every person has the right to have their case determined by a judicial authority. The Confederation and the Cantons may by law precluded the determination by the courts of certain exception categories of case.” Article 30 Judicial proceedings “Any person whose case falls to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a legally constituted, competent, independent and impartial court. Ad hoc courts are prohibited. ...” 45.     The relevant provisions of the Federal Supreme Court Act of 17 June 2005 (the “FSCA”, RS 173.110) read as follows: Section 47 Extensions “Time periods set by the law may be extended. The periods set by the judge may be extended on sufficient grounds if the request is made before their expiration.” Section 57 Hearings “The President of the Court may order hearings.” Section 58 Deliberation “The Federal Supreme Court deliberates at a hearing: a.     if the President of the Court so orders or if a judge so requests; b.     if there is no unanimity. In other cases, the Federal Supreme Court issues its decisions by means of circulation.” Section 59 Publicity “Any oral proceedings, deliberations and votes at a hearing shall take place at a public sitting.” The Federal Supreme Court may order the hearing to be held totally or partially in camera in the event of a threat to safety, public order or morals, or if the interest of an implicated person so requires. The Federal Supreme Court shall make available to the public, for a period of 30 days from the date of notification, the operative part of any judgment which has not been delivered at a public sitting.” Section 61 Authority of res judicata “The Federal Supreme Court’s judgments shall acquire the authority of res judicata on the day of their delivery.” Section 77 International arbitration “A civil-law appeal shall be admissible against decisions of arbitral tribunals: a. for international arbitration, under the conditions provided for in sections 190 to 192 of the Federal Law of 18 December 1987 on Private International Law; b. for domestic arbitration, under the conditions provided for in sections 389 to 395 of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure of 19 December 2008 In the said cases, the following provisions are inapplicable: section 48 (3), sections   90 to 98, 103 (2), 105 (2) and 106 (1), together with section 107 (2) in so far as the latter provision enables the Federal Supreme Court to rule on the merits of the case. The Federal Supreme Court shall examine only those complaints which have been relied upon and substantiated by the appellant.” Section 100 Appeal against a decision “An appeal against a decision must be lodged with the Federal Supreme Court within 30 days of notification of the full [judgment]. ...” Section 102 Exchange of submissions "If necessary, the Federal Supreme Court shall communicate the appeal to the previous court as well as to any other interested parties or participants in the proceedings, or to the authorities who have standing to appeal; in doing so, they will grant them a time period to submit observations. ...” 46.     Article 312 of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (“the CPC”, RS 272) reads as follows: Article 312 “The appellate court serves the appeal on the opposing party for its written comments, unless the appeal is obviously inadmissible or obviously unfounded. A response to the appeal must be filed within 30 days.” 47.     The relevant dispositions of the Swiss Federal Act of 18   December 1987 on Private International Law (the “PILA”, RS 291) read as follows: Section 23 “If a person has one or more foreign citizenships in addition to Swiss citizenship, jurisdiction based on citizenship is determined by reference to Swiss citizenship only. If a person has more than one citizenship, the citizenship of the state with which such person is most closely connected is exclusively relevant in determining the applicable law, unless this Act provides otherwise. If recognition of foreign decision in Switzerland depends on a person’s citizenship, it is sufficient to take into consideration one of such person’s citizenships.” Section 176 “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to arbitrations if the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Switzerland and if at least one of the parties at the time when the arbitration agreement was concluded was neither domiciled nor habitually resident in Switzerland. ...” Section 186 “The arbitral tribunal shall decide on its own jurisdiction. ... The arbitral tribunal shall, in general, decide on its jurisdiction by a preliminary decision.” Section 190 "(1) The award shall be final when communicated. (2) It can be challenged only: a. if a sole arbitrator was designated unlawfully or the arbitral tribunal was constituted unlawfully; b. if the arbitral tribunal erroneously held that it had or did not have jurisdiction; c. if the arbitral tribunal ruled on matters beyond the claims submitted to it or if it failed to rule on one of the claims; d. if the equality of the parties or their right to be heard in adversarial proceedings was not respected; e.     if the award is incompatible with Swiss public policy (ordre public). (3) An interlocutory award may only be challenged on the grounds stated in subsection 2, points (a) and (b); the time limit for lodging an appeal shall run from the communication of that award." Section 191 “Appeal lies only to the Federal Supreme Court. The procedure shall be governed by section 77 of the Federal Supreme Court Act of 17 June 2005.” 48.     The relevant provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration (2004 version, in force at the material time) read as follows: R47 Appeal “An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body. ...” R57 Hearing “... After consulting the parties, the Panel may, if it deems itself to be sufficiently well-informed, decide not to hold a hearing. At the hearing, the proceedings take place in camera, unless the parties agree otherwise. ...” THE RELEVANT CASE-LAW OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT 49.     In its case-law, the Federal Supreme Court has established that the complaints listed under section 190(2) PILA are exhaustive (ATF [judgments of the Federal Supreme Court] 4A_370/2007 of 21   February 2008): “5.3.2 The European Convention on Human Rights does not apply directly to arbitration .... .The breach of the provisions of that convention is not included in the limited number of complaints listed in section   190(2) PILA. However, these underlying principles should not be immediately disregarded when examining these complaints (ATF 4P.105/2006 of 4 August 2006, at 7.3). To this effect, it is possible to accept, with the appellant, that a decision which undermined a principle as fundamental as the prohibition of forced labour, even indirectly, would be contrary to the concept of substantive public policy, within the meaning of Swiss law.” 50.     The Federal Supreme Court subsequently clarified its remarks, explaining that the principles arising from the Convention may be used, in the context of examining an appeal against a decision by the CAS, to secure the guarantees invoked on the basis of section 190(2) PILA (ATF   4A_238/2011 of 4   January 2012): “3.1.2 The respondent continues to rely on the case-law to the effect that it is not permitted to argue directly that there has been a violation of the ECHR in an appeal against an international arbitral award, given that such a violation is not one of the grounds exhaustively listed in section 190(2) PILA (ATF 4A_404/2010 of 19 April 2011 at 3.5.3; ATF 4A_43/2010 of 29 July 2010 at 3.6.1; ATF 4A_320/2009 of 2 June 2010 at 1.5.3; ATF 4A_612/2009 at 10   February   2010 at 2.4.1; ATF 4P.105/2005 of 4   August 2006 at 7.3). She further submits that, in this context, the appellant had in any event failed to satisfy the requirement that reasons be given, as set out in section 77(3) FSCA. It is true that, according to the cited case-law, an appellant cannot directly accuse the arbitrators of having breached the ECHR, even if the principles which arise from it can be used, where applicable, to secure the guarantees invoked [by the appellant] on the basis of section 190(2) PILA (see cited judgments, ibid.). However, the problem to be resolved in the present case is different: it is not a matter of examining whether the arbitrators failed to comply with one of these guarantees, interpreted where necessary in the light of Article 6 § 1 ECHR, but rather of investigating whether section 192 PILA, which enables parties to exclude in advance any appeal against an arbitration award (or to exclude one of the grounds of appeal), is compatible with Article 6 § 1 ECHR (indirect review of the standards).” RELEVANT TURKISH LAW 51.     Section 12/A of Law no. 5719, as in force at the material time, established the TFF Dispute Resolution Committee’s exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes arising under all kinds of contracts between (i)   clubs, (ii)   clubs and footballers, coaches, trainers, players’ agents, masseurs and match organisers; and (iii) players’ agents and footballers. 52.     Section 6 § 4 of Law no. 5894 of 5 May 2009 on the Establishment and Duties of the Turkish Football Federation (“the TFF Law”), as in force at the material time, reads as follows (translation): “All awards made by the Arbitration Committee are final and binding for the parties and proceedings cannot be brought against these awards before the judicial authorities.” 53.     Article 14 of the TFF Statutes on the Arbitration Committee reads as follows (translation): “Any opposition to the Arbitration Committee’s decisions for disputes arising from contracts of players, managers and trainers which have an international element may be submitted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the light of the regulations and directives of FIFA and UEFA.” RELEVANT FIFA RULES 54.     Article 63 § 1 of the FIFA Statues, as in force at the material time, reads as follows: “Appeals against final decisions by FIFA’s legal bodies and against decisions passed by confederations, members or leagues shall be lodged with the CAS within 21 days of notification of the decision in question. ...” 55.     Article 22(b) of the 2008 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, as in force at the material time, reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress before a civil court for employment-related disputes, FIFA is competent to hear: ... (b) employment-related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension, unless, at the national level, an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of the players and clubs has been established in the framework of the association and/or in the agreement of a collective agreement; ....” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A COURT 56.     Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that he had been unable to bring his dispute before an impartial and independent court in either Turkey or Switzerland, and that, as a result, his right of access to a court had been violated. 57.     Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by a tribunal ...” Admissibility Application of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (a)    The parties’ submissions (i)       The Government 58.     The Government considered that the present case should be declared incompatible ratione materiae with Article 6 of the Convention. 59.     They considered that the proceedings before the CAS had not been directly decisive for the applicant’s civil rights and obligations. In their view, since the CAS had declared that it did not have jurisdiction, the question of whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to the proceedings before that body had never arisen. 60.     As to the Federal Supreme Court, the Government accepted that, as a State court, it was required to ensure that the procedural guarantees of Article   6 § 1 of the Convention were complied with. However, they submitted that the dispute brought before the Federal Supreme Court, which was limited to the question of the CAS’s jurisdiction, was beyond the scope of this provision. They argued that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention admittedly guaranteed the right of access to a domestic court, but not a right of access to a private arbitration tribunal. The Government noted that the right of access to a State court was not in issue before the CAS or the Federal Supreme Court. Thus, the Government considered that the proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court had not been directly decisive for the applicant’s “civil” rights and obligations. (ii)     The applicant 61.     For his part, the applicant alleged that Article   6 § 1 of the Convention was just as applicable to the proceedings before the CAS as it was to those before the Federal Supreme Court. He argued that the arbitrators were comparable to judges and that they had a judicial function, although their jurisdiction depended on an agreement between the parties. 62.     He also submitted that the proceedings before the CAS and the Federal Supreme Court had been decisive for his civil rights and obligations. In his view, the TFF Arbitration Committee could not be considered impartial and independent. The CAS and the Federal Supreme Court had been the only bodies who met these two criteria and could thus determine the dispute between him and the Club and the TFF. (b)    The Court’s assessment 63.     The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applies only to the determination of “civil rights and obligations and any criminal charge” (see Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10, §   56, 2   October 2018). 64.     In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant complained before the CAS about the Arbitration Committee’s decision of 16 April 2009, ordering him to pay compensation to the Club. Consequently, the rights that the applicant asserted in his appeal before the CAS are of a pecuniary nature and stem from a contractual relationship between private persons. They are therefore “civil” rights within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see, to this effect, Mutu and Pechstein , cited above, § 57; see also Ali Riza and Others v. Turkey, nos.   30226/10 and 4 others, § 159, 28   January   2020). 65.     Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is therefore applicable ratione materiae to the dispute forming the subject matter of the present case, to which the applicant was a party before the CAS and the Federal Supreme Court. Conclusion 66.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant 67.     The applicant submitted that his right of access to a court under Article   6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached, in that he had been unable to bring his dispute before an impartial and independent tribunal in either Turkey or Switzerland. He considered that the Turkish national bodies did not meet these two criteria and emphasised that neither the CAS nor the Federal Supreme Court had ruled on the merits of the dispute. 68.     The applicant also alleged that the CAS had not correctly interpreted the contract and had thus disregarded the parties’ intentions. In his view, the CAS should have acknowledged that the arbitration clause in the contract extended to the CAS, thus applying the principle of in dubio contra stipulatorem. Such an approach was even more important with regard to disputes in the field of sports. 69.     The applicant further argued that the CAS had not assessed the international dimension of the dispute correctly. In his view, he ought to be considered as a British player who had spent some time in Turkey for his career. (b)    The Government 70.     The Government considered that the applicant had not been deprived of his right of access to a court. In their view, the dispute between the applicant, the Club and the TFF was an entirely Turkish matter. Accordingly, the Government argued that it had been the Turkish authorities’ responsibility to rule on a potential legal remedy against the Arbitration Committee’s decision. Thus, the applicant had never been denied his right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: in the Government’s view, he was merely required to assert that right before the Turkish courts. 71.     The Government added that, in any event, the applicant had been able to submit an appeal against the CAS’s arbitral award to the Federal Supreme Court and had thus been able to raise his related complaints. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court had then thoroughly examined, with detailed reasoning, all of the arguments presented by the applicant. According to the Government, there had thus been no infringement of the applicant’s right of access to a court. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 72.     The right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, must be construed in the light of the rule of law, which requires that all litigants should have an effective judicial remedy enabling them to assert their civil rights (see, inter alia, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management   Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 126, ECHR 2016; Eşim v.   Turkey , no.   59601/09, § 18, 17 September 2013; and Běleš and Others v.   the Czech Republic , no. 47273/99, § 49, ECHR 2002 IX). Everybody has the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention embodies the right to a court, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, is one particular aspect (see, inter alia, Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, nos. 52067/10 and   41072/11, § 70, 11 March 2014, and Golder v. the United Kingdom , 21   February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18). 73.     However, the right of access to a court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication, since the right of access, by its very nature, calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no.   20261/12, § 120, 23 June 2016; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management   Inc. , cited above, § 129; Yabansu and Others v.   Turkey , no.   43903/09, § 58, 12 November 2013; and Howald Moor and Others , cited above, § 71). Furthermore, these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired ( see Baka , cited above, §   120; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc., cited above, § 129; Stanev v.   Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 230, ECHR 2012; and Howald Moor and Others , cited above, § 71). 74.     That being said, such limitations will not be compatible with Article   6 § 1 if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Baka , cited above, § 120; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc ., cited above, § 129; Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom , 22   October 1996, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; Stagno v. Belgium , no. 1062/07, §   25, 7 July 2009; and Howald Moor and   Others , cited above, § 71). 75.     This access to a court is not necessarily to be understood as access to a court of law of the classic kind, integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country; thus, the “tribunal” may be a body set up to determine a limited number of specific issues, provided always that it offers the appropriate guarantees (see Ali Rıza , cited above, § 173; Mutu and   Pechstein , cited above, § 94; and Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom , 8   July 1986, § 201, Series A no. 102). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the establishment of arbitral tribunals in order to settle certain pecuniary disputes between individuals (see Suda v. the Czech Republic , no.   1643/06 , §   48, 28   October 2010). 76.     In addition, a distinction must be drawn between voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration. If arbitration is compulsory, in the sense of being required by law, the parties have no option but to refer their dispute to an arbitral tribunal, which must afford the safeguards secured by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Mutu and Pechstein , cited above, §   95; Ali Rıza , cited above, § 174; and Suda , cited above, § 49). 77.     Lastly, the Court reiterates the fundamental principle that it is for the national authorities, particularly the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, inter alia, Kruslin v. France , 24 April 1990, § 29, Series A no.   176   A; Kopp v. Switzerland , 25   March 1998, § 59, Reports 1998-II; and Nusret Kaya and Others v. Turkey , nos. 43750/06, 43752/06, 32054/08, 37753/08 and 60915/08, § 38, ECHR   2014 (extracts)). The Court cannot therefore call into question the assessment by the domestic authorities regarding alleged errors of law, save where these are arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, to that effect, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no.   73049/01, §§   85-86, ECHR   2007-I). (b)    Application of these principles to the present case 78.     The Court considers it appropriate to address the complaint regarding the right of access to a court by responding successively to the following questions: (i) What is the subject matter of the dispute to be determined by the Court? (ii) Was the applicant able to avail himself of a right of access to a court vis-à-vis Switzerland? (iii) Was there a limitation on the applicant’s right of access to a court? (iv) Was the limitation of the right justified? (i)       The subject matter of the dispute before the Court 79.     The Court notes that in the present case, the applicant submitted a number of arguments to show that the arbitration before the Turkish national authorities was compulsory. The Cou