CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 21 septembre 2021

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height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF CARTER v.   RUSSIA (Application no.   20914/07)   JUDGMENT   Art 2 (substantive) • Life • Poisoning and assassination of Russian defector and dissident in the United Kingdom by two persons acting as agents of Russia • Administration of poison amounting to exercise of physical power and control over man’s life in situation of proximate targeting Art 2 (procedural) • Domestic authorities’ failure to conduct effective investigation into death Art 38 • State’s failure to comply with its procedural obligation on account of unjustified refusal to submit material requested by the Court   STRASBOURG 21 September 2021   FINAL   28/02/2022     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Carter v.   Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Paul Lemmens, President ,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Dmitry Dedov,   Georges Ravarani,   Darian Pavli,   Anja Seibert-Fohr,   Peeter Roosma, judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar , Having regard to: the application against the Russian Federation (no. 20914/07) lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British and Russian national, Ms   Maria Anna Carter aka Marina Anatolyevna Litvinenko (“the applicant”), on 21   May 2007; the decision to give notice of the application to the Russian Government (“the Government”); the decision by the United Kingdom Government not to exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings; the parties’ observations and the United Kingdom Government’s reply to the Court’s questions; the decision to consider the admissibility and merits of the case together; the decision to refuse the applicant’s request for an oral hearing; the decision to refuse the applicant’s request for relinquishing jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber; Having deliberated in private on 18 May and 22   June 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the poisoning of the applicant’s husband, a Russian defector and dissident, in the United Kingdom. The applicant alleges that the killing was perpetrated on the direction or with the acquiescence or connivance of the Russian authorities and that the Russian authorities failed to conduct an effective domestic investigation into the murder. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in the United Kingdom. She was represented before the Court by Sir Keir Starmer QC, Mr Ben Emmerson QC and Professor William Bowring, barristers practising in London, and Ms   Louise Christian, a solicitor. 3.     The Government were represented initially by Mr   G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr   M. Galperin. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as appeared from the documents in the case file, may be summarised as follows. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE Mr   Litvinenko’s background and life in the United Kingdom 5.     The applicant is the widow of Mr   Aleksandr Valterovich Litvinenko, a Russian and British national who was born in 1962. 6.     From 1988 onwards Mr   Litvinenko worked in the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB) and its successor agencies, including Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), initially in the organised crime unit and later at the anti-terrorism department. In 1994, whilst investigating an assassination attempt on Mr   Boris Berezovskiy, a wealthy businessman and media tycoon, he developed a close friendship with him. 7.     In 1997 Mr   Litvinenko was tasked with the conduct of special operations which he regarded as unlawful, including an order to examine the possibility of assassinating Mr   Berezovskiy. Mr   Litvinenko reported the unlawful orders to the military prosecutor’s office and also to the newly appointed head of the FSB. In November 1998 he made public his allegations against the FSB at a press conference before international media. 8.     In December 1998 Mr   Litvinenko was dismissed from the FSB. In March 1999 he was arrested and detained for eight months in the FSB Lefortovo remand prison on the charge of having abused official authority. In November 1999 he was acquitted by the trial court but immediately rearrested on similar charges. The second case was discontinued because he was able to establish his alibi. A third set of proceedings was then brought against him on the charge that he had planted evidence on a suspect. Those proceedings were still pending in Moscow when Mr   Litvinenko left Russia in September 2000. He was ultimately convicted in absentia on those charges in 2002. 9.     In 2001 the United Kingdom granted asylum to Mr   Litvinenko and his family. They took up the option of changing their names: the applicant took the name of Maria Anna Carter and Mr   Litvinenko the name of Edwin Redwald Carter. On becoming eligible for naturalisation as British citizens, they made an application to that effect and were granted citizenship at a ceremony on 13   October 2006. 10.     In the United Kingdom Mr   Litvinenko involved himself in a wide range of activities, mainly focused on exposing corruption in Russian intelligence services and their links with organised crime. He published books that accused the FSB of masterminding the bombing of four apartment blocks in Moscow in 1999 in order to provide a justification for the decision to start the Second Chechen War. He maintained a friendship with Mr   Berezovskiy, who had left Russia at the end of 2000 and become a political exile in the United Kingdom, where he was granted asylum. Mr   Berezovskiy used his wealth to encourage and finance critics of the Russian authorities, such as Mr   Litvinenko. 11 .     There was also evidence of Mr   Litvinenko’s consulting for British intelligence services on Russian organised crime in Europe and travelling to other European countries, in particular Spain, to assist their law enforcement; the United Kingdom Government neither confirmed nor denied those allegations, referring to their long-standing policy to that effect. Mr   Litvinenko also cooperated with Mr   Scaramella, a consultant for the commission established by the Italian Parliament to examine KGB activities and Russian organised crime in Italy. 12.     Mr   Litvinenko also undertook private security work which involved preparing “due diligence” reports for companies seeking to find out information about Russian business contacts. He worked with three London-based private security companies, RISC Management Limited, Triton International Limited and Erinys UK Limited. The inquiries he had undertaken to carry out required him to enlist the assistance of his contacts in Moscow. From 2005 he involved in his business activities Mr   Andrey Lugovoy, formerly an officer of the KGB and the Federal Protection Service and head of security for Mr   Berezovskiy’s television station and later owner of a security company in Russia. One of the reports concerned a senior Russian official, the then assistant to the President of Russia, who had developed close links with the Tambovskaya criminal group, acquired business interests in Russian infrastructure projects and assisted a Colombian drugs cartel in a money-laundering scheme. The report – completed in September 2006 – apparently led to the collapse of the proposed business venture involving the official concerned, causing him significant financial losses. The events preceding Mr   Litvinenko’s death Mr   Lugovoy’s and Mr   Kovtun’s visit to London on 16-18   October 2006 13 .     On the morning of 16   October 2006 Mr   Lugovoy flew from Moscow to London aboard a Transaero flight. He was accompanied by his long ‑ standing acquaintance, Mr   Dmitriy Kovtun. 14 .     The registration number of the aircraft that made the flight was EI ‑ DDK. In contrast to the other aircraft on which Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun flew during that period, the British police were unable to test EI ‑ DDK for radioactive contamination. On 1   December 2006, when the British embassy in Moscow notified the Russian authorities and Transaero of possible contamination of the aircraft, they received the reply from the Russian Chief Public Health Officer that all planes had been tested and that no contamination had been found. EI-DDK was scheduled to fly to London on the following day but the flight was cancelled, and the aircraft did not return to the United Kingdom. 15.     On the afternoon of 16   October 2006 a meeting took place between Mr   Lugovoy, Mr   Kovtun, Mr   Litvinenko and a representative of Erinys UK Limited in the company’s boardroom. They sat around a table covered with baize cloth. Evidence of polonium contamination was later discovered on the area of the cloth located between the positions in which Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Litvinenko were sitting and on two of the chairs. 16.     After the meeting, the three Russian participants went together to a restaurant. Secondary radioactive contamination was found at one of the tables. 17 .     Later that day, after the dinner, Mr   Litvinenko suddenly began to feel ill and vomited. He continued to feel unwell for the next two days. He did not seek medical assistance, assuming it was food poisoning. 18 .     At 1.30   p.m. on 17   October 2006 Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun checked out of their hotel one day early without asking for a refund. Both of their rooms were subsequently tested and were found to contain significant contamination. Primary contamination, that is, contamination resulting from direct contact with radioactive material, was discovered in the u-bend of the sink in the bathroom of the room where Mr   Lugovoy had stayed. The level of contamination was consistent with radioactive material being poured down the sink plughole. 19.     Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun moved to a different hotel and had business meetings on that day. Secondary contamination was later discovered in the hotel rooms and the offices they visited and on a CD that Mr   Kovtun had given to a company representative. 20 .     On 18   October 2006 Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun returned to Moscow aboard a Transaero flight. The aircraft (EI-DNM) was tested and was found to contain secondary contamination in the area of the seats on which the two men had sat. In their reply of 1   December 2006, the Russian authorities claimed that the aircraft had been free of contamination. Mr   Lugovoy’s visit to London on 25-28   October 2006 21 .     From 25 to 28   October 2006 Mr   Lugovoy returned to London. He had several business meetings, including one in the offices of Mr   Berezovskiy. It also appears that he met Mr   Litvinenko at least once in a bar of the hotel where he was staying. 22 .     Secondary contamination was detected on the aircraft on which he had flown, in the offices he had visited and in his hotel room. The highest readings were found in the bathroom bin, in particular on one area at the base of the inner casing of the bin, and on two towels in the hotel laundry. The pattern of contamination appeared to be consistent with an accidental spillage, perhaps followed by an attempt to clean up or dispose of the material. Mr   Lugovoy’s and Mr   Kovtun’s visit to London on 31 October to 3   November 2006 23 .     Mr   Lugovoy returned to London on 31   October 2006. He was accompanied by family and friends, on a trip to watch a football match which had been planned some time before Mr   Lugovoy’s meeting with Mr   Litvinenko on 16 October. 24 .     On 1   November 2006 Mr   Kovtun flew into London from Hamburg on a flight that he had booked three days previously. The return ticket from London to Moscow had been purchased for him some time before, on 27   October, when Mr   Lugovoy was still in London. 25 .     On 1   November 2006 Mr   Litvinenko had a brief meeting with Mr   Scaramella (see paragraph 11 above) in a restaurant in central London. Mr   Scaramella’s hotel room, the Internet café he had used and the table at the restaurant where he had sat with Mr   Litvinenko were subsequently tested and found to be free from contamination. 26.     From there, Mr   Litvinenko went to meet Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun in the ground-floor bar of the hotel where they were staying. On his account, he drank some green tea from a teapot which was already on the table. The meeting lasted approximately twenty minutes. 27 .     Tests for contamination which were conducted at the hotel detected traces of radiation in many places. The highest readings were found in the bathroom of Mr   Kovtun’s room in a sediment trap, which was consistent with the theory that radioactive material had been poured down the plughole in one form or another. The other area of primary contamination was found on one of the bar’s teapots, in particular on the inside of the spout where the radioactive material appeared to have bonded with tannin deposits. Testing also showed high levels of secondary contamination on a cubicle door, a sink and a hand dryer in the men’s lavatories which, as it appeared from the CCTV footage, had been used by both Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun but not by Mr   Litvinenko. 28.     After leaving the hotel bar, Mr   Litvinenko visited Mr   Berezovskiy’s offices nearby. An acquaintance later gave him a lift home. Secondary contamination was found on the seat of the car and throughout Mr   Litvinenko’s house. However, no primary contamination was found anywhere in the house. 29.     Later that day, Mr   Lugovoy and his party went to see the match at the Emirates Stadium. On 3   November 2006 they left for Moscow, together with Mr   Kovtun. Secondary contamination was found on the seats they had occupied in the stadium and in the aircraft. Mr   Litvinenko’s illness and death 30.     In the early hours of 2   November 2006 Mr   Litvinenko was taken ill. He started vomiting, suffered from abdominal pain and developed bloody diarrhoea. On 3 November he was admitted to a hospital where he was initially treated for gastroenteritis. 31.     On observing that Mr   Litvinenko’s worsening condition did not fit with the diagnosis of gastroenteritis, medical staff started treating him for suspected thallium poisoning. His bone marrow had degenerated to the point where a transplant was considered to be the only means of restoring its function. On 17 November Mr   Litvinenko was transferred to University College Hospital (UCH) to assess the possibility of a transplant. 32.     On 21   November 2006 a pharmacist at UCH and staff at the poisons unit suggested the idea that chemotherapeutic agents or radioisotopes could have been used to poison Mr   Litvinenko. Samples of his blood and urine were sent to the Atomic Weapons Establishment for testing. The initial results revealing the presence of polonium were considered an anomaly and further testing was requested. 33.     Between about 3   p.m. and 5   p.m. on 23   November 2006 the results confirmed polonium contamination. At 9   p.m. Mr   Litvinenko suffered a cardiac arrest and died from multiple organ failure. 34.     The post-mortem conducted jointly by two pathologists established the cause of death to be acute radiation syndrome caused by the presence in Mr   Litvinenko’s body of very high levels of polonium ‑ 210. Scientific evidence indicated that the polonium ‑ 210 had entered the body by ingestion in the form of a soluble compound. The symptoms during the onset of Mr   Litvinenko’s illness had been consistent with the poisoning having taken place on 1 November. Initial investigations and attempted extradition The police investigation in the United Kingdom 35 .     Before Mr   Litvinenko’s death, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had already commenced an investigation into his apparent poisoning. Working with the Health Protection Agency, the police examined and assessed more than sixty scenes and directed over forty requests for mutual legal assistance to fifteen States. 36.     On 30   November 2006 the United Kingdom Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) requested the assistance of the Russian authorities under the provisions of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). The CPS requested that statements be taken from Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun, some members of Mr   Lugovoy’s family, Mr   Lugovoy’s lawyer and personal assistant, and the medical staff who were attending Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun. From 5 to 19 December MPS officers and detectives interviewed witnesses, including Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun, in Moscow. 37 .     On 22   May 2007 the MPS/CPS determined that there was sufficient evidence against Mr   Lugovoy to charge him with Mr   Litvinenko’s murder by poisoning; a Magistrates’ Court issued a warrant for his arrest, and the (then) Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom submitted a request for his extradition from Russia. 38 .     On 5   July 2007 Russia refused to extradite Mr   Lugovoy on the grounds that the Constitution prohibited Russian nationals from being extradited to foreign States. 39 .     Following further investigation, on 4   November 2011 the MPS/CPS considered that there was sufficient evidence also to charge Mr   Kovtun with the murder of Mr   Litvinenko and applied for the issue of a warrant for Mr   Kovtun’s arrest. 40.     Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun were placed on international lists of wanted persons. They both remain wanted for Mr   Litvinenko’s murder. The investigation in the Russian Federation 41 .     On 7   December 2006 the Russian Prosecutor General launched a criminal investigation “into the death of Mr   Litvinenko and the attempted murder of Mr   Kovtun”. In April 2007, a deputy Prosecutor General and assisting investigators came to London and conducted several interviews there, including one with Mr   Berezovskiy. 42.     Mr   Lugovoy gave press conferences denying any involvement in the Litvinenko poisoning and speculating that the British security services, members of the Russian “mafia” or Mr   Berezovskiy were responsible. He also alleged that Mr   Litvinenko and Mr   Berezovskiy were in the pay of the British intelligence services and that Mr   Litvinenko had sought to procure his assistance in finding compromising material on President Putin. 43 .     On 15   September 2007 Mr   Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, announced that Mr   Lugovoy – who had had no prior experience in politics and had not previously been involved in his party – would take second place on his party’s candidate list for the Duma election. Following the election on 2   December 2007, Mr   Lugovoy became a member of parliament and acquired parliamentary immunity. He was re-elected in 2011 and 2016 on the same party’s ticket. The inquest proceedings in the United Kingdom 44.     In the United Kingdom a Coroner’s inquest must be held to investigate the circumstances of a death where there is reasonable cause to suspect that a deceased person died a violent or unnatural death. The Coroner has the power to investigate the main cause of death together with any actions and omissions which led directly to the cause of death. 45 .     On 30   November 2006 the Coroner for Inner North London formally opened an inquest into Mr   Litvinenko’s death and immediately adjourned it pending completion of the ongoing police investigation. The inquest remained adjourned for nearly five years, during which time it was believed that criminal prosecutions might still be brought. However, by 2011 the Coroner was satisfied that there was no realistic prospect of any named individual either returning or being extradited to the United Kingdom. He therefore decided that the inquest should be resumed and Sir Robert Owen, a High Court judge since 2001, was appointed to conduct the inquest. Sir   Robert Owen designated the following individuals as “properly interested persons”: the applicant; Mr   Litvinenko’s children; Mr   Lugovoy; Mr   Kovtun; the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; and Mr   Berezovskiy. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (“the ICRF”) subsequently applied for, and was granted, properly interested person status. Being given the status of interested person gives participants the right to play an active part in the inquest hearing or any pre-inquest review hearing, including by examining witnesses. 46.     In preparation for the inquest, the United Kingdom Government collated material in their possession and made it available for inspection to counsel and the solicitor to the inquest. Counsel to the inquest subsequently expressed the view that this material established a prima facie case as to the culpability of the Russian State in Mr   Litvinenko’s death. However, some of this material was of a sensitive nature and, as the law did not allow evidence to be taken in “secret” or “closed” sessions at a Coroner’s inquest, the sensitive material, which included material relevant to the possible involvement of Russian State agencies in the death of Mr   Litvinenko, was excluded from the inquest proceedings under the public interest immunity principle. Sir Robert Owen therefore invited the United Kingdom Government to establish an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005. Unlike a Coroner’s inquest, an inquiry could hear evidence that could not be disclosed publicly. 47.     The Secretary of State for the Home Department initially decided not to establish an inquiry. However, following a successful application for judicial review by the applicant, that decision was quashed and on 22   July 2014 the Secretary of State for the Home Department announced the Government’s decision to establish an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 to investigate Mr   Litvinenko’s death. The “Litvinenko Inquiry” in the United Kingdom The conduct of the inquiry 48 .     The inquiry was chaired by Sir Robert Owen, who had also conducted the inquest. The inquiry’s terms of reference were to investigate the death of Alexander Litvinenko in order to (i) “ascertain ... how, when and where [the deceased] came by his death” and (ii) “identify ... where responsibility for the death lies”. The question of whether the United Kingdom authorities could or should have taken steps which would have prevented the death of Mr   Litvinenko was excluded from the scope of the inquiry as no material had been disclosed in the course of the preparation for the inquest to suggest that Mr   Litvinenko was or ought to have been assessed as being at a real and immediate threat to his life. 49 .     The open hearings commenced on 27   January 2015 and lasted thirty ‑ four days. Unless “enhanced measures” were in place, the public and press had unrestricted access to the hearings and a transcript of proceedings was posted on the inquiry website at the end of each day. A total of sixty ‑ two witnesses gave oral evidence to the inquiry, and witness statements from a further twenty witnesses were read to the inquiry. The witnesses included Mr   Litvinenko’s family, friends and business associates, medical professionals, nuclear scientists, police officers and experts in Russian history and testing by polygraph. 50.     Over several days in May 2015, the Chairman held closed hearings of the inquiry to assess a considerable quantity of closed documentary evidence, oral evidence from witnesses and closed witness statements. Attendance at those hearings was limited to the Chairman, counsel and solicitor to the inquiry and the legal team for the Home Secretary. The issues covered included the question of whether Mr   Litvinenko had any sort of relationship with British security and intelligence agencies, and if so the nature and extent of that relationship, and the question of whether the Russian State was responsible for his death. The assessment that the material was sufficiently sensitive to warrant being treated as closed evidence had been made by the Home Secretary, who had given effect to that decision by issuing a number of Restriction Notices. The Restriction Notices were published on the inquiry website and appended to the report. 51 .     The Chairman of the Litvinenko Inquiry granted applications for core participant status by the applicant, her son, the MPS, the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The ICRF confirmed in writing that it would not be making an application for core participant status in the inquiry. 52 .     Mr   Lugovoy declined to give evidence to the inquiry, although he had been represented for a time during the preparation for the inquest. 53 .     On 13   March 2015 Mr   Kovtun expressed a wish to become a core participant in the inquiry and give oral evidence via videolink. On 2   April 2015 the Chairman informed him that the granting of core participant status was conditional on his giving a confidentiality undertaking, providing a detailed witness statement, disclosing any material he claimed would be capable of exonerating Mr   Lugovoy, and confirming that he intended to cooperate with the inquiry. The first date for his oral evidence was set for Monday 27   July 2015. On Thursday 23   July 2015 Mr   Kovtun declined to give evidence on the grounds that, according to legal advice he had been given, prior to giving evidence he would need the ICRF to approve his application for a relaxation of the confidentiality obligations he owed to the ongoing Russian investigation. On 27 and 28   July 2015 counsel for the ICRF informed the inquiry that Mr   Kovtun had not made any such application. A written statement by Mr   Kovtun was read out at the hearing on 28   July 2015. 54 .     Towards the conclusion of the inquiry’s hearings, an issue arose under the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003. The evidence obtained from Russia pursuant to the request for assistance – including the records of the interviews conducted in Russia with Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun – had been obtained solely for the purposes of the criminal investigation and any criminal proceedings. The Russian authorities had subsequently given permission for that evidence to be used in the inquest proceedings but declined permission for the evidence to be used in the inquiry proceedings. The Chairman concluded that without the consent of the Russian authorities, the law precluded the use of the material for any purpose other than that specified in the request, namely the original criminal investigation and any subsequent prosecution. Accordingly, those records of interview could not be used by the inquiry. 55.     The Chairman’s report of the inquiry was completed and delivered to the Secretary of State for the Home Department in January 2016. 56 .     According to the report, no adverse inferences were drawn from the silence of any party concerned in the events which the inquiry was investigating (including Mr   Lugovoy, Mr   Kovtun and the Russian authorities), or from their refusal to participate. Instead, the Chairman took the view that a failure to participate or to give evidence would have the consequence that he would make findings of fact without the benefit of that party’s contribution. 57 .     With regard to the standard of proof, the Chairman said the following:     “[I]n making findings of fact I have adopted the ‘flexible and variable’ approach to the standard of proof ... [W]here in this Report I state that ‘I am sure’ I will have found a fact to the criminal standard. When I use such expressions as ‘I find’ or ‘I am satisfied’ the standard of proof will have been the ordinary civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. Where it is obvious that I have found a fact but I have not used one of these terms, the standard will have been the civil standard. All other expressions, such as a reference to a state of affairs being ‘possible’ will not be a finding of fact, but will indicate my state of mind in respect of the issue being considered.” 58 .     The Chairman endorsed the view that “there were reasons going beyond academic or judicial rigour why this Inquiry ought to be careful to restrict its conclusions to matters that were provable on the evidence before it”. He quoted the comments by Professor Service, an expert in Russian history, as reflecting his approach to the evidence: “But we have to be really cautious – and there’s another aspect of this that exercises me, and that’s that Russians want to see us fairly going through evidence in a scholarly environment or a judicial environment or an Inquiry like this in a fashion that they know doesn’t happen in their own country. So we must not sink at all below our conventional standards. We absolutely mustn’t, because some of what we do in relation to this Inquiry will get back to Moscow, and we must not give them the opportunity to say that we failed to respect our own standards because those are standards that are really worth keeping to.” 59.     On the use to be made of closed evidence, the Chairman clarified the approach he would take as follows: “I would perform a global analysis of the evidence adduced both in the open and the closed hearings ... [A]ny facts as found and recorded in the open section of the report will have been informed both by the evidence that I heard in the open hearings and by the relevant closed hearings ... I would provide a single report to the Home Secretary, but the consequence of the restriction notices and orders that had been made meant that parts would not be published if to do so would be to damage national security or international relations.” The inquiry’s findings as to the responsibility for the death of Mr   Litvinenko 60 .     The Chairman found, to the criminal standard of proof (“beyond reasonable doubt”), that Mr   Litvinenko had been fatally poisoned with polonium ‑ 210 on 1   November 2006. Primary contamination in the hotel bar where Mr   Litvinenko was drinking tea with Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun on that day, together with the absence of primary contamination in the other places that Mr   Litvinenko had visited that day, pointed to the conclusion that he had ingested the fatal dose of polonium ‑ 210 whilst drinking the tea. There was also evidence that he had received an earlier – smaller – dose of polonium ‑ 210 prior to the fatal dose on 1   November 2006. Primary contamination found on the boardroom table at Erinys, where Mr   Litvinenko had met with Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun, and similarly high levels of contamination in Mr   Lugovoy’s hotel room indicated that the earlier dose was likely to have been received on 16   October 2006. 61 .     The Chairman examined the theories put forward by Mr   Lugovoy at a press conference and by his representatives in the inquest proceedings that Mr   Litvinenko had poisoned himself either by accident, in the course of handling illicitly obtained polonium ‑ 210, or in order to commit suicide. He found those suggestions to be entirely without merit because primary radioactive contamination had not been found at Mr   Litvinenko’s house or on his clothing as it should have been, had he handled the substance on his own. There was no evidence at all that he had been involved in dealing with radioactive materials at any point in time or had had suicidal thoughts. It was also highly unlikely that, had he poisoned himself accidentally or deliberately, he would not have mentioned anything about the nature of the poison to the police or medical staff during the three-week period of painful and debilitating symptoms prior to his death. 62.     Having excluded the theory of self-poisoning, the Chairman found, to the criminal standard of proof, that on 1   November 2006 Mr   Litvinenko had been poisoned by Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun, who had placed the polonium ‑ 210 in a teapot at the hotel bar; that they had done so with the knowledge that they were administering a deadly poison; and that they had made an earlier attempt to poison him on 16   October 2006. The findings rested on scientific evidence showing primary contamination in the rooms occupied by Mr   Lugovoy (on 16 October) and Mr   Kovtun (on 1 November) and in the teapot, and secondary contamination in the men’s lavatories, which both had visited before meeting Mr   Litvinenko, and in other places in London where they had gone. Transcripts of interviews which the German police had conducted in Hamburg, where Mr   Kovtun had stayed before coming to London, showed that he had sought to enlist an acquaintance in the plan to poison Mr   Litvinenko and confided in a family member that unknown persons might have poisoned “them all”. The Chairman also considered and rejected the evidence as apparently inconsistent with Mr   Lugovoy’s and Mr   Kovtun’s involvement. He found in particular that a “lie-detector” test to which Mr   Lugovoy had submitted in Moscow in 2012 to show his innocence had been seriously flawed in the manner of its administration and that members of security services, such as Mr   Lugovoy, had in any event been trained to defeat similar tests. As to Mr   Lugovoy’s recurrent theme in press interviews that he had been the victim of a set-up by British intelligence services, an operation of that magnitude would have been a complex, expensive and extremely risky enterprise. However, there was not a shred of evidence to substantiate the claims of a set-up. 63 .     The Chairman found that all the evidence pointed to Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun having acted on behalf of someone else when they killed Mr   Litvinenko: “There is no evidence at all that either Mr   Lugovoy or Mr   Kovtun had any personal reason to kill Mr   Litvinenko. Mr   Lugovoy may have commented after Mr   Litvinenko’s death that he regarded Mr   Litvinenko as a traitor, but I do not think for a moment that that feeling on its own would have been sufficient to motivate Mr   Lugovoy to plan and conduct the protracted and costly operation against Mr   Litvinenko ... Moreover, had Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun been acting on their own behalf, it seems highly unlikely that they would have had access to the polonium ‑ 210 that they used to poison Mr   Litvinenko. All the evidence points in one direction, namely that, when they killed Mr   Litvinenko, Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun were acting on behalf of someone else.” 64 .     The Chairman examined – and excluded – the possibilities, all brought up by Mr   Lugovoy, that a number of parties, including Mr   Berezovskiy, the British intelligence services, groups linked to organised crime, or Mr   Scaramella had directed the killing. On the theory that Mr   Berezovskiy might have retaliated against Mr   Litvinenko for blackmailing him, the Chairman noted that there was no evidence of either blackmail occurring or Mr   Lugovoy’s acting on Mr   Berezovskiy’s behalf. In fact, Mr   Lugovoy suggested that it was someone else acting for Mr   Berezovskiy who had killed Mr   Litvinenko, but that hypothesis was inconsistent with the finding that it had been Mr   Lugovoy who had administered the deadly poison. The set-up by the intelligence services theory had been addressed before and found without merit. Even though it was not implausible that Mr   Lugovoy or Mr   Kovtun had acted on the orders of Russian crime gangs whose activities Mr   Litvinenko helped to elucidate, there was no evidence linking any known criminal leaders to the killing. Nor had there been evidence of Mr   Scaramella’s having any motive to kill Mr   Litvinenko or being involved in his death. 65.     The inquiry report turned to the possibility that one or more organisations of the Russian State may have been complicit in Mr   Litvinenko’s death. Six chapters of the report covered the evidence that Russia was the source of polonium ‑ 210, the motives that the Russian State may have had for wishing Mr   Litvinenko dead, and the evidence of links between Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun and the Russian State. 66 .     Regarding the source of polonium ‑ 210, the Chairman accepted that there was no secure basis to find that the polonium used to poison Mr   Litvinenko must have come from Russia but it certainly could have come from the Avangard production facility. The use of polonium ‑ 210 was a strong indicator of State involvement. That was both because ordinary criminals might have been expected to use a more straightforward, less sophisticated means of killing, and because polonium ‑ 210 must have come from a reactor, and such reactors were, in general, under State control. 67 .     The Chairman identified several reasons why organisations and individuals within the Russian State might have wished to target Mr   Litvinenko. First of all, he was regarded as having betrayed the FSB as a result of the public disclosures he made before he left Russia, a betrayal which would have been compounded by his writing and campaigning in the United Kingdom. Secondly, according to Mr   Lugovoy, the FSB had received information that Mr   Litvinenko was working for British intelligence. Thirdly, Mr   Litvinenko was a close associate of individuals such as Mr   Berezovskiy who were prominent critics of the Russian authorities. Fourthly, the causes espoused by Mr   Litvinenko – such as the FSB’s responsibility for the apartment bombings, the war in Chechnya and collusion between the Russian authorities and organised crime – were of particular sensitivity to the Russian authorities. Lastly, there was undoubtedly a personal dimension to the antagonism between Mr   Litvinenko and the President of Russia. In addition, the report noted that in the years prior to Mr   Litvinenko’s death the Russian authorities had been involved in the killing of a number of their opponents. 68 .     The report then addressed the links between Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun and the Russian State. Both Mr   Lugovoy and Mr   Kovtun were Russian citizens, resident in Russia, and both had served in the Russian military with Mr   Lugovoy being a former member of the KGB and Federal Protection Service. There was also evidence relating to a possible relationship between Mr   Lugovoy and the FSB in the years up to and including 2006. Following his return to Russia, Mr   Lugovoy had been supported and protected by the Russian authorities, which had awarded him an honour for services to the homeland. While that did not indicate that Mr   Lugovoy must have been acting on behalf of the Russian State when killing Mr   Litvinenko, this conduct towards Mr   Lugovoy suggested a level of approval for the killing of Mr   Litvinenko. While there was less evidence relating to Mr   Kovtun, he nevertheless appeared to have suffered no ill ‑ consequences as a result of the allegations made against him in respect of Mr   Litvinenko’s death. The Chairman concluded that when Mr   Lugovoy had poisoned Mr   Litvinenko, it was “probable” that he had done so under the direction of the FSB. The Chairman added that he regarded that “as a strong probability”. He also found that Mr   Kovtun was acting under FSB direction, possibly indirectly through Mr   Lugovo